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Abstract 
This thesis explores the effects of additional parties on the decision-making processes of UK voters 
in lab-based studies. Specifically, it is concerned with the idea that intrinsic aspects of the democratic 
system, such as the inclusion of additional parties in an election, can reduce the likelihood of ‘correct 
voting’ (a voter choosing the candidate whose policies best match their own policy preferences). 
Firstly, how correct voting is affected by increasing choice set size (i.e. the number of candidates 
available to choose between). We also examine how a suspected partisan heuristic, ‘party label’, 
affects rates of correct voting. We conduct four experiments using dynamic information 
environments, and materials from the five main UK political parties. Results show increasing choice 
set size negatively predicts voters’ ability to choose the best available option in the choice set. Results 
for party label are mixed, but strongly suggest party label acts as a beneficial aid to correct voting and 
may act to offset the effects of increasing choice set size. 
Secondly, we analyse the patterns of information processing from the previous experiments, 
creating novel metrics of heuristic processing. We find party label and choice set size affect voters’ 
information processing, namely the amount and equality of search between alternatives. 
Finally, we examine the effect of additional alternatives on political decision-making via the 
established ‘context effects’ paradigm. We test the ‘attraction’, ‘similarity’, ‘compromise’, and 
‘phantom’ effects in a series of fictional and more realistic political scenarios, culminating in a field 
study during the 2015 UK General Election. We find evidence for the attraction and similarity’ 
effects, but inconsistent evidence for other context effects; and that asymmetric dominance patterns 
exist in a minority of UK voters’ political preferences (in contrast to a previous finding in the U.S).  
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Foreword 
A foreword to a PhD thesis might be considered the height of self-importance, yet given the political climate 
in which it was conducted and written, and its topic, it seems remiss of me to not give some sort of personal 
comment. 
When I first came to UCL in 2011, I was engaged by the UK Labour Party to assist the London Mayoral and 
Assembly election campaigns for 2012. It was a handy earner and gave me hands-on experience of UK politics 
in and around London. I listened to Conservatives, UKIPers, Liberal Democrats, Greens, and of course Labour 
voters; seeking as a budding psychologist to understand their voting choices, but also to strategically influence 
them. I grew fascinated with the idea that there was a genuine disconnect between who people voted for and a 
voter’s actual policy preferences. I wondered whether such a disconnect resulted in governments and polices 
that do not reflect the preferences of society. 
This PhD was conducted against the backdrop of a Liberal Democrat collapse and a UKIP rise leading up to 
the 2015 UK General Election, fuelled by a working-class switch to UKIP. A recurring question in the political 
commentary was: why would working-class voters vote for UKIP or Conservatives, parties that traditionally 
do not align with working-class preferences and priorities? 
On June 23rd 2016, during this thesis’s completion, the UK voted 52 percent to 48 percent to leave the 
European Union, despite all the political parties (except UKIP), and various experts, advocating for a Remain 
vote. By June 25th 2016, news outlets were carrying stories of ‘Leavers’ experiencing ‘buyer’s remorse’, while 
the British pound weakened significantly.  
This thesis is concerned with whether voters’ make correct decisions, as based on their own political 
preferences, and is agnostic as to whether those preferences themselves are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Oh, if I could have 
my time again to answer such questions. 
- Keith O’ Brien, August 2016 
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: Introduction 
“The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average 
voter.” 
- Anonymous1 
What is it to ‘vote’? A beguilingly simple question about an act that is considered so intrinsic, and 
commonplace, to the western world and its method of democratic self-governance. Democracy asks of us a 
simple task: choose the people, representing the policies, which you believe are best for you and (ideally) 
society. The physical act of voting is, in the main, effortless: requiring a few scratches of a pencil, or a press 
of some buttons, to indicate your choice. Such small moments are what determine the future; our political 
choices, and those of billions of others in democracies world-wide, fundamentally dictate the lives we live, the 
societies we create and maintain, and the people that lead those governments charged with these same 
responsibilities. To vote is to craft a shared vision and future. All this, in a scratch of a pencil, every few years. 
As is the way with things that seem simple, delve a little deeper and one often finds profound complexity. 
The ‘simple act’ of voting is truthfully, anything but. A person casting a vote is the culmination of countless 
processes: the accumulation and formation of beliefs and values; the state of current affairs; input from social 
groups, the media, and political leaders; the argumentation and persuasion of political party campaigns and 
rhetoric; considerations of strategic voting tactics given the electoral context and system (e.g. first-past-the-
post, or proportional representation); and many more. Democracy, at the most fundamental level, begins in the 
minds and choices of every citizen and manifests itself through the aggregate behaviour of all individuals in 
society.  
As such, one would presume that the field of psychology would have much to say about the judgments and 
decisions voters (i.e. people) make in politics. Surely there is no richer field for research and exploration for 
understanding human behaviour ‘in the field’, than politics? Surprisingly, until the last two decades, the 
opposite seems mostly true, with the general sentiment being that genuine interdisciplinary research between 
                                                     
1 Often misattributed to Winston Churchill, debunked in Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations (Langworth, 
2011). First appeared attributed to Churchill online in 1992. 
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the fields of political science and psychology has been lacking (Druckman, Kuklinski, & Sigelman, 2009). In 
the last decade, interest and interdisciplinary research between the two fields has led to a new field emerging, 
aptly termed ‘political psychology’, which we introduce below to familiarise the reader with the field, and also 
to establish the central theme for this thesis: the exploration of voters’ psychological processes in the 
democratic system.  
There is no shortage of potential questions to be asked and explored in politics as psychologists (e.g. 
examining the popularity of Donald Trump in America2), but this thesis is concerned with a simple one: do 
voters chose well? Or more specifically, do voters choose ‘correctly’: based on their needs, preferences, and 
desires? Common opinion, held not least by the historical goliath whose wry quotation opens this chapter, 
suggests not. In such cases, why do voters not choose ‘correctly’; and what factors may help or hinder them? 
This is a question surprisingly overlooked in research in political science in favour of who people vote for, 
and why people do (not) turn out to vote. Yet in psychology, such questions of how choices are made, the 
accuracy of our judgments, or our ability to maximise benefit given individual/group goals, are at the heart of 
fields such as judgment and decision-making, and consumer psychology. For the better half of a century.  
These questions lie at the core of this thesis and are present throughout all its chapters. We investigate these 
using two differing paradigms: one rooted firmly in ‘information processing’ approaches to voter decision-
making (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). The other, via consumer psychology, examines how violations of rational 
preference arise from contextual changes with the addition of more options (Huber & Payne, 1982; Tsetos, 
Usher, & Chater, 2010).   
To pre-empt the conclusions of this thesis, we find evidence that increasing the number of additional parties 
being considered by voters as part of their ‘choice set’, dramatically affects their ability to choose an option 
that best matches their own political preferences. While, as with all science, our results are caveated and more 
research is recommended, our findings challenge a core assumption of democracy: providing voters with more 
choices negatively impacts their ability to vote in line with their own preferences. This is an open challenge to 
policy-makers, democrats, and psychologists; to seek ways of either a) changing the democratic system, or b) 
                                                     
2 See Jonathan Haidt’s (2012) work on the moral psychology of conservativism in the USA. 
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providing novel ways of aiding voters in their decision-making as to make the best choices possible, based on 
their own preferences, values, and beliefs. 
The last ‘great change’ to modern democracy was the introduction of the secret ballot, a change now so 
commonplace as to rarely be questioned. However, studies have demonstrated increased voter participation by 
re-introducing social norms and making local voting history information available (Green & Gerber, 2010), 
leading many to argue that the secret ballot has been the major factor contributing to the fall in voter turnout 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Issenberg, 2012)3.  
While we cannot claim our findings necessitate a change in how our democratic system(s) should function, 
we argue they raise fundamental questions that should be addressed. We examine the only requirement of 
democracy itself: a choice, a vote.  
 Introduction to ‘Political Psychology’ 
‘Political scientists’ and the field of political science as a social science, can be traced back to the times of 
Plato (427–347 BC), Xenophon (c. 430–354 BC), and Aristotle (‘The Father of Political Science’; 384–322 
BC), albeit in its earliest form of ‘political philosophy’. The foundations of modern political science, and its 
aim to model itself after the ‘physical sciences’ (Lipsett, 1969), emerged during the Progressive Era in the 
United States (1890s-1920s). Over the last century political science has “borrow[ed] prolifically from other 
disciplines, including psychology, cognitive science, economics, statistics, sociology, geography, 
anthropology, philosophy” etc. (Druckman et al., 2009, p. 486,), evolving from socio-economic models of 
explaining (and predicting) human political behaviour, to more cognate models (Cutler, 2002). Yet, only in 
the last two decades has ‘political psychology’ grown from a small subset of where the fringes of political 
science, psychology, and sociology, meet into a field of its own right. The first Oxford handbook of Political 
Psychology was published in 2003 (2nd Ed, 2013), and the field now boasts its own landmark journal, the 
‘Journal of Political Psychology’4.  
                                                     
3 “Abolish the Secret Ballot”, Sasha Issenberg. The Atlantic, July/August 2012 
4 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9221  
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In general, political psychology can be divided into three areas: how individual political actors make political 
decisions (citizens or politicians) through studying individual preferences; how voters search for information, 
how they make evaluations, judgments, and (eventually) decisions; and a second domain regarding how 
institutions of politics make decisions. We are interested in the first two areas.   
The initial use of psychological constructs from social psychology such as ‘attitudes’ and ‘motivation’, has 
provided a deeper understanding of voter behaviour than gross ‘ideology’ or socio-demographic perspectives 
(Cutler, 2002). Research has explored the foundations of political attitudes via ‘moral psychology’ (Graham, 
Haidt & Nozek, 2009; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; 2007; 2013), and the formation of ‘voter preference’ 
(Druckman & Lupia 2000; Druckman 2004). There is even evidence that it is possible to predict people’s 
dating preference from their political orientation (Klofstad, McDermott & Hatemi, 2012). 
More recently, political psychologists have started to examine political behaviour through the lens of 
cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience (Lakoff, 2008; Western, 2008), examining how political 
campaigns use emotion to influence attitude formation and decision-making (Ridout & Searles 2011), and how 
personality traits predict vote choice (Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, Fraley, 2007; Schoen & Schumann, 
2007).  
Of particular interest are judgment & decision-theoretic (JDT) approaches used to understand political 
behaviour, in particular looking at ‘voter choice’ in elections. Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau (1995) were some 
of the earliest to examine how voters evaluate candidates (see also: Funk, 1999); with others investigating and 
how ‘priming’ and ‘framing’ of attributes and issues (e.g. by the media; Ha, 2011) affects voter processing of 
candidate evaluations (Druckman, Jacobs, & Ostermeier, 2004).  
There has also been an upsurge of interest in the role of emotion in the cognitive processes of judgment 
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007), with researchers investigating the effect of emotion on vote choice (i.e. anxiety: 
Ladd & Lenz, 2008; 20115), and voter participation (Valentino, 2008; 2011). Miller (2011) reviewed the view 
of emotion in political science as being an ‘irrational’ influence on the uneducated masses (i.e. via the use of 
persuasive, affectively laden, rhetoric), arguing that those highest in political knowledge and information 
                                                     
5 For a critique see Brader (2011). 
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(political ‘sophisticates’) are more likely to experience emotion in reaction to politics and allow it to influence 
their political behaviour. 
Despite all these streams of research, this new field is still fraught with fundamental issues arising from its 
(initially) one-way appropriation of concepts and discussion, from psychology to political science, by political 
scientists whom have “mischaracterized concepts and used them in casual and ad hoc or post hoc ways, 
limiting both theoretical and empirical progress and undermining any realistic prospect of contributing back 
to psychology” (Druckman & Kuklinski, 2009, p. 498). This according to Druckman and Kuklinski (2009) is 
because “political scientists have [in]sufficiently immersed themselves in the relevant psychological literatures 
on which they have drawn” (p. 498).  
While not untrue, this seems a harsh judgment of political scientists, and it seems unfair to place such blame 
entirely on political science as a field. There must be a pro-active involvement from psychologists in these 
disciplines- not least to ensure the theories and constructs that have arisen in psychology are correctly 
understood outside of our discipline, but also to ensure our models and understanding of human behaviour are 
borne out in real-life contexts. This thesis embraces this sentiment insofar as practicable, aiming to contribute 
to the greater shared understanding of human behaviour, particularly in the political domain. 
 Why does political judgment & decision-making matter? 
 “Nobody would say, 'I'm voting for this guy because he's got the stronger chin,' but 
that, in fact, is partly what happens.” 
- Daniel Kahneman6 
Historically, there has been little differentiation between ‘judgment’ and ‘decision-making’, with the two 
often conflated (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Gilovich & Griffin, 2010). This is understandable- a decision-
maker should choose an alternative (i.e. candidate, or party) if it is the most preferred on a set of criteria. Yet, 
“choosing one alternative from a set can invoke different psychological processes than judging alternatives” 
(Johnson & Russo, 1984, p. 549; emphasis in original). A judgement constitutes the evaluation of a single (or 
multiple) entities along one or more dimensions (e.g. cost, efficiency, weight, size), while a decision involves 
                                                     
6 Interview: The Truth About How We Think. Gallop, Inc. 20th March, 2012. 
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an active choice between two or more alternatives that have, presumably, been evaluated on differing 
dimensions (e.g. what gym to go to, whom to marry, which candidate will deliver on healthcare pledges). As 
such, decisions also involve beliefs about the outcomes associated with each alternative. For example, one may 
prefer a candidate on all policies, but believe they may have a low probability of electoral success, and opt for 
a lesser preferred candidate with a higher perceived likelihood of electoral victory. 
Judgment, and decisions, lie at the heart of all politics. Easton (1953) defines politics as the ‘authoritative 
allocation of values’, arguing any study of politics must include how those authoritative allocations are made. 
In modern societies, in the main, this is through systems of representative democracy.  
Representative democracy relies on the assumption that voters vote in line with their preferences and/or best 
interests; in order to empower a relatively small number of people to reflect and design society in line with 
those presumed preferences. If people are not accurate in their vote-decisions, the quality of democratic 
representation provided by the electoral system, and the legitimacy of elected governments and any decisions 
they make, are in question (see also, Lau, Patel, Fahmy, & Kaufman, 2013). In majoritarian democracies where 
marginal vote differences determine one party’s overall control of the government (e.g., UK, USA), inaccurate 
voting can lead to governments that are not just unrepresentative but opposed to the preferences of broad 
swathes (or even the majority) of the public. Voting is the primary way that citizens influence their government, 
yet even freely chosen decisions can be misguided. The democratic system is founded on the notion that on an 
aggregate level, votes for a candidate or party endorse policies and values that determine the future of the 
nation, and distribution of resources amongst its populace. It assumes that voters are rational, unbiased, and 
approximate the best decision possible themselves based on their preferences and goals (and/or societal goals).  
Yet psychology has shown over the last few decades that humans are not perfectly rational beings 
(Gigerenzer, 2015), and are prone to biased and sub-optimal decision-making (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982). Counter-intuitively, increasing available information can lead to inaccurate decisions, but greater 
confidence in the decisions (Hall, Ariss, & Todorov, 2007). We are prone to violations of rationality just by 
adding an extra option to a binary choice (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Busemeyer, Barkan, Mehta, & 
Chaturvedi, 2007). People engage in ‘confirmatory screening’ (Nickerson, 1998), leading to poor decisions by 
neglecting otherwise useful information. We even engage in motivated reasoning to support our political 
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viewpoints leading to “biased decision-making” (Lodge & Taber, 2000, p. 186; Taber & Lodge, 2006), often 
strengthening our beliefs in the face of disconfirming information (Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010).  
Yet these are not the only ways research has shown voters can be biased when making political decisions: 
voters can even be influenced at the point of voting. Badawood & Wood (2012) have shown that there existed 
a clear bias in the 2010 London local elections for names that were closer the top of the paper, a classic 
‘primacy effect’. As do Meredith & Salant (2013) in California’s local council and school board elections. 
Johnson & Miles (2011) argue that primacy effects for alphabetical listings disappear when using real UK 
parties in a general election setting, they predict primacy effects should appear in ‘lower-order’ elections, such 
as UK Local Elections, where multiple candidates appear under the same partisan banner. Johnson & Miles 
(2011) suggest primacy effects might arise because more positive arguments are generated in their favour by 
virtue of being first. Augenblick & Nichelson (2016) offer another explanation, ‘choice fatigue’, finding 
conducting multiple decisions before a given contest significantly increases the tendency to abstain or rely on 
decision shortcuts (‘heuristics’), such as: voting for the status quo (due to the ‘incumbency bias’, or a 
‘recognition heuristic’), or the first listed candidate.  
Even voter turnout levels display inherent voter irrationality (Downs, 1957). While it may seem rational to 
vote, one’s chances of exerting a meaningful influence on the outcome are usually statistically unlikely 
(dependent on actual voter turnout). Therefore, the rational option is to minimize one’s costs associated with 
the act of voting, as they are more likely to outweigh the expected benefits7. This is what is known as ‘Downs 
paradox’ (Downs, 1957); a standard problem for ‘public choice’ theory (for a conflicting view, see: Aldrich, 
1993). Yet people vote, and they do so in the majority in 158 of 269 countries (Pintor, Gratschew, & Sullivan, 
2002).  
Given these findings about the fundamental nature of human decision-making, what implications exist for 
democracy? As the fundamental nature of representative democracy encourages the proliferation of differing 
political options, does the number of options a voter faces at the ballot box (i.e. candidates, parties, referenda 
                                                     
7 “Is it irrational to vote?”, The Economist, 23/10/2012. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/10/presidential-election-0  
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policies) help them choose (e.g. by increasing the variety of options available), or is there such a thing as ‘too 
much choice’ (Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Kamenica, 2010)? 
Do voters ‘get it right’? And what, or when, is a vote ‘correct’? 
 ‘Correct’ Voting 
Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 2006) are the main contributors to the political decision-making literature, positing 
an information-processing approach to voter decision-making. Following in the tradition of Simon (1972; 
1982) and his work on ‘bounded rationality’, Lau and Redlawsk (2013) view voters as “limited information 
processors” (p. 136) who are unable to meet the computational requirements as expected by rational choice 
theory (Anderson, 1983; Gilovich & Griffin, 2010). The limitations of memory, both in working memory 
capacity and long-term memory, means that information is unlikely to be perfectly processed, consolidated, 
and retrieved, and as such, political knowledge and preferences are also unlikely to be fixed and available at 
any given point (Weber & Johnson, 2009; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). For all of these reasons, voters could be 
liable to err when making a vote-decision.  
Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 2001; 2006) have explored this concept, proposing that the accuracy of voter 
decision-making can be considered in terms of the degree to which voters choose the candidate whose policies 
best represent their preferences – a ‘correct vote’ (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 2001) 
operationalized CV using dynamic information boards8 in two differing ways. The first, by measuring the rate 
of choice switching voters engaged in, from a chosen candidate to an alternative in a mock US Presidential 
election (or primary). The second, by constructing a ‘normative naïve’ measure of voter preferences. In the 
former, after making their initial vote decision for a candidate, voters were given additional time and all 
possible information about the candidates in the race, as to mimic having ‘perfect information’ (Lau & 
Redlawsk, 1997), with a ‘correct vote’ ascribed if voters stayed with their original choice.  
In the latter normative naïve measure, the assumption is that all voters attempt to vote correctly given the 
information available (naïve decision-making). Lau and Redlawsk (1997) constructed an objective 
determination of whom voters should have voted for given their own political preferences, and the information 
                                                     
8 We cover dynamic information processing board methods in more detail in Chapter 2, as it forms a key part of our experimental 
methodology. See Lau & Redlawsk (2001, 2006) for an in-depth discussion. 
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to which they were exposed (through intentional access), using the distance between the artificial candidates’ 
positions (compiled via expert judgments: Lau & Redlawsk, 1997; 2001) and participants’ self-reported 
positions, on various policy/values scales. This model assumes that voters average the overall favourableness 
(or ‘utility’) of the information for each candidate, and choose the candidate with the highest evaluation. In 
essence, following the weighted additive rule of decision-making (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), and is 
the method assumed by many popular models of the vote decision (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Kelley & Mirer, 1974; 
Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau, 1995). 
Lau and Redlawsk (1997) argue that as their measure significantly predicted sixty-six percent of correct vote 
choices (rate of non-switching after learning all information about the candidates under unlimited time), this 
measure did “almost as well in determining correct voting decisions as did voters themselves” (p. 590). Later, 
Lau and Redlawsk (2008) define correct voting (CV) as “the likelihood that citizens, under conditions of 
incomplete information, … vote for the candidate or party they would have voted for had they had full 
information about those same candidates and/or parties” (p. 396). We raise two issues here with such an 
approach to CV.  
Firstly, it is difficult to ascertain under Lau and Redlawsk’s (1997) method of assessing ‘perfect information 
CV’, if voters stay with a chosen alternative because it is the correct choice, or because positive evaluation of 
the chosen option increases as a result of being chosen (choice-supportive bias; Benney & Henkel, 2006). 
Alternatively, voters may switch in order to reduce uncertainty arising from being asked to reconsider their 
choice and any foregone hedonic utility (Brehm, 1956; Liebermann, Ochsner, Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001). 
There is no evidence on how voters’ re-engage with the information in Lau and Redlawsk’s (1997) paradigm; 
participants may seek to reduce dissonance by searching for (dis)confirmatory information, though research 
suggests voters generally reduce dissonance arising from challenges to vote choices/intentions by engaging in 
confirmatory information search, bolstering support for their candidate (Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 
2010). Further issues around preference retrieval are elucidated by research on ‘choice blindness’ (Hall, 
Johansson, & Strandberg, 2012). The authors show that for moral and political preferences (which are 
considered strongly held attitudes and beliefs; Maio & Haddock, 2010), the majority of people do not recognize 
when their moral and political choices have been reversed, and in fact offer plenty of introspective justifications 
for their apparent choices. It is difficult to say which choice (the initial or subsequent) is the ‘correct’ choice. 
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Therefore, directly asking participants to consider their vote choices in retrospect is possibly not the best 
measure of how accurately they voted given their preferences.  
Secondly, using a measure of CV that considers only the information that participants accessed ignores 
whether they could have accessed more (or all) of the information and didn’t (intentionally or otherwise), 
limiting access to potentially diagnostic information. Indeed, this is the naïve assumption of Lau and 
Redlawsk’s (1997) measure, that participants try to vote correctly given available information.  
We conceptualise a normative naïve measure of CV that differs operationally from the Lau and Redlawsk 
(1997) but stays more closely to the original conception. We base our normative naïve measure on all the 
information present for each candidate’s position on various policy stances, and those of the voter’s self-
reported stances, regardless of whether that item was accessed for a candidate or not. Our measure is 
normatively stricter than Lau and Redlawsk’s (1997; 2006; 2008), but we argue better approximates decisions 
made under conditions of perfect information, and is a better benchmark of accuracy. There are other practical 
methodological issues in the CV framework (e.g. directional versus proximal distance models), and we discuss 
these in more detail, and where we diverge from Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 2006), in Chapter 2. We also discuss 
more general limitations and considerations of the correct voting framework in the General Discussion. 
There are certain known factors which influence CV rates. Research conducted in the USA suggests greater 
ability (political knowledge, or ‘political sophistication’; Luskin, 1990), experience (age; Marsiske & Margrett, 
2006), and effort (the motivation to vote correctly) are positively associated with higher rates of CV (Lau & 
Redlawsk, 2006). Lau, Patel, Fahmy, & Kaufman (2013) find in a comparison of CV across thirty-three 
democracies, that information availability (as measured by media density), the distinctiveness of party 
ideology (choice clarity), and majoritarian or presidential style democracies, were all positively predictive of 
increased CV.  
Correct voting is not an idle consideration: it an important qualification to views of democratic health, as 
typically measured by raw voter turnout. Lau et al. (2013) argue that the rate of electors voting correctly is a 
higher normative standard than turnout or voter accessibility by which to judge the health of democracies, as 
even freely chosen decisions can be misguided. As voting is the primary way that citizens influence their 
government, election returns provide the most immediate feedback to government officials about the electorate 
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opinion of their performance, and correct voting ascertains the accuracy of the signals that are sent to elites, 
and thus the quality of democratic representation provided by an electoral system (Lau et al., 2013). 
This thesis, therefore, constitutes the first body of experimental research on correct voting using outside of 
the USA, in a majoritarian democracy (the UK), that the author is aware of. Therefore, we explore some of the 
cultural differences between the UK and the USA, and how it relates to correct voting, below. 
 Cultural Differences in Correct Voting 
An obstacle to reviewing the extant literature on political behaviour and JDM is that the majority of studies 
are largely conducted in the USA. When attempting to garner and use insights from the political psychology 
literature, we must question are they applicable to a multi-party context such as in Europe (e.g. Britain & 
Ireland). Serious differences exist between the UK and the USA, and some are discussed below. 
Firstly, the bipolar ideological spectrum of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ that is so frequently used in American 
political science literature for self-identification or classification of participants, does not easily apply outside 
of the USA. ‘Liberal’, in simple terms, exists on a two-dimensional scale: social liberalism (pro-welfare 
collectivist policies), and economic liberalism (neoliberalism, free-market). Similarly, for ‘conservative’ as it 
consists of economic conservatism (fiscally frugal, low government spending), or social conservatism (e.g. 
‘traditional family values’, preserving the status quo, anti-immigration).  
Research has pointed to the USA being increasingly polarized along one-dimensional party/ideological lines 
(Bartels, 2000; DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996; Levendusky, 2009), which makes for more consistent 
understanding and identification of the parties and one’s position relative to them and their policies9. In a 
European context, people tend to identify on a multi-dimensional ideological space, holding (in)consistent 
left/right-wing stances on both economic and social issues (Steinmo, 2007). Europe is also less polarized to its 
extremes both in its elites and popular attitudes, allowing for moderates to emerge and be represented by a 
formalized party structure (Sartori, 1966; 1976), and makes clear ideological divisions between parties more 
difficult. 
                                                     
9 Pew Research Centre (2014) have a fascinating summary of data on America’s increasing polarisation, accessible at 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america/  
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To add further complication, the terms ‘left’ and ‘right-wing’ are more common in usage outside of the USA 
and are incorrectly assumed by many as to be interchangeable with ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ respectively. 
On a one-dimensional scale ‘left-wing’ is generally identified with market regulation/state ownership and 
social liberalism, while ‘right-wing’ is generally conflated with economic liberalism (light-touch or no 
regulation) and social conservatism (i.e. racism, fascism, ultra-religiosity etc.).; e.g. one can be a social liberal 
and an economic conservative and identify as ‘right-wing’, but collapse them on a single linear dimension for 
ease of discussion and identification. 
These ideological differences result in and are compounded by, electoral differences between the USA and 
Europe. The USA has, for all intents and purposes, a two-party system where voters chose between 2 main 
parties that share over 95 percent of the vote (Bartels, 2000), share all the media coverage, and are represented 
(barring a few ‘independents’, e.g. Bernie Saunders, until the 2015/16 Democratic primaries10) exclusively by 
members of those two parties in both legislative houses. In the UK and Europe more generally, multi-party 
elections are commonplace, with parties representing a variety of points along the ‘left-right’ spectrum (used 
here for simplicity). Often parties will share values/issues/traits, usually those in ideological proximity, but it 
is not uncommon for a party (i.e. on the left) to hold a position that might be seen as belonging to the right (i.e. 
pro-privatization of state services or resources, strong punitive stances on crime). For example, New Labour 
under Tony Blair greatly expanded the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), started by the Conservative Party, 
following his election in 199711, and campaigned on “massively” increasing privatization in New Labour’s 
2001 re-election12. This resulted in the privatization of public services such as London Underground's 
infrastructure, elements of the NHS, and the introduction of privately sponsored schools (‘academies’). 
For voter decision-making, this means voters outside of the USA do not have a simple ideological divide 
represented by two main (ideologically consistent, and opposing) parties. At all levels13 of elections (e.g. local, 
general), voters are faced with an enlarged choice set of candidates and parties to choose from, with various 
attributes/traits associated with each, that may or may not be shared by one or more parties/candidates. Also, 
unlike the system of primaries as in the USA, there is no ‘knock-out’ round to narrow down the field of possible 
                                                     
10 http://www.sanders.senate.gov/ 
11 Report by World Bank. ‘The U.K. Treasury Infrastructure Finance Unit: Supporting PPP Financing During the 
Global Liquidity Crisis’. March, 2010 
12 http://news.bbc.co.uk/news/vote2001/hi/english/newsid_1333000/1333532.stm  
13 Termed ‘orders’ in political science (i.e. first-order, second-, etc.) 
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candidates to choose from; so all decisions are expected to made by evaluating and comparing the full range 
of candidates/parties on a ballot paper, the number of which can run into double and triple digits. A recent 
example is the Senate race in the 2013 Australian elections, where a record ninety-six candidates from thirty-
nine groups (plus independents) were nominated for the Senate, requiring a ballot paper 1metre long and 
magnifying glasses to read the small print14.  
The voting system is yet another key difference. In the USA, voting systems are decided at the state level 
and are usually one-seat one-choice ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP; or ‘majority vote’) elections. In the UK for 
parliamentary elections, this is at least somewhat consistent. However recently in the USA, particularly at 
lower-order elections (local/congressional), ‘ranked choice’ (a.k.a. ‘multi-alternative vote’ or ‘single 
transferable vote’ [STV]) has been used. To add further complexity, many countries in Europe have 
‘proportional representation’ (PR), with constituencies being ‘multi-seat’; this means voters have the option 
of choosing as many candidates as there are seats available with the most popular candidates (as determined 
by FPTP or STV/AV) being elected to fill those seats, as is common in UK local elections. There also exist 
hybrids of all of these systems, and list systems in Europe, but we will not delve into them in any detail here. 
The ballot paper is also a key difference. Ignoring discussions on paper vs. electronic ballots, an obvious 
difference is when one goes to vote there are a variety of cues present or absent on the ballot paper that a voter 
could utilize. Normally a candidate’s name and party affiliation (if any) are present on the paper, however, 
some states in the USA place a candidate’s image on the ballot paper by their name (as is common in Ireland 
and other countries). Therefore, trait inferences from candidate images can arise and factor largely in voter’s 
decision-making especially in the absence of other cues (Olivola & Todorov, 2010a). While unexplored, if 
candidate images are replaced with party logos (as is standard in the UK), partisanship may become the 
dominant cue during candidate evaluation, or cause heuristic use resulting in biased judgments (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2011).  
These voting systems allow for large amounts of decision-theoretic concepts to be at play and examinable. 
We could expect voters to engage in some amount of strategic voting behaviour and counter-factual thinking 
(if-then), predominantly among political sophisticates. Due to the increased complexity of the decision 
                                                     
14 http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/metrelong-ballot-paper-means-voters-will-need-to-
read-the-fine-print-20130817-2s3yw.html  
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environment, we should expect voters to experience greater uncertainty, leading to the use of simplifying 
heuristic strategies (e.g. ‘satisficing’, ‘take the best’, partisanship). As such, non-USA elections are a rich and 
fertile ground for decision science research.  
Lau et al. (2013) measured CV in 33 democracies by using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 
data to calculate ‘utility scores’ for party candidates, considering a correct vote as one for the candidate with 
the highest utility, and comparing with survey respondents’ reported vote choice. Rates of CV were higher in 
the USA (88% in 2004; 82% in 1996) than in the UK (79% in 1997; 78% in 2005). Across the entire analysis 
of thirty-three democracies, ten factors were found to be associated with CV, some of which we described 
previously. Lau et al. (2013) reported that across all 69 elections considered, that the probability of casting a 
correct vote dropped from 79 percent to 57 percent when the number of parties increases from two to nine. 
Additionally, in a lab-based study, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) found increasing candidate numbers was 
negatively associated with correct voting. Exactly why rates of CV decrease so dramatically as the number of 
candidates/parties increases is explored in the next section (Section 1.5). 
Several questions arise out of examining the cultural differences between the UK and the USA: what, if any, 
is the effect of additional parties on voter decision-making? What role does partisanship play outside of the 
USA, when there are more than two political ‘tribes’ that may have shared and diverging policy positions? 
Finally, how do these differences impact on voters’ ability to vote correctly in the UK, compared to the USA?  
 The cognitive psychology of additional options 
Cognitive psychology has much to offer on the question of how additional options affects decision-making. 
In modern society people are beset by an ever-increasing abundance of options to choose from: potential mates 
(as exampled by online dating applications such as ‘Tinder’); career options; and consumer products, to name 
a few. The proliferation of choice arising from market democracies has been recently discussed as a source of 
decline in personal well-being (Lane, 2000). In the case of dating applications like Tinder, increasing search 
options have been shown to trigger excessive searching, poorer choices, and less selectivity (Wu & Chiou, 
2009; Finkel et al., 2012)15; and greater errors in memory for those options presented (Lenton, Fasolo, & Todd, 
                                                     
15 And Tinder’s use has recently been linked to lower evaluations of self-esteem, especially among men (Strubel & Petrie, 2016; 
under review). 
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2008). These findings would seem to violate the regularity principle, a cornerstone of classical choice theory 
(Arrow, 1963; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006), which holds that expanding a choice set cannot make 
decision makers worse off, as the probability of an option that best matches their preferences increases. 
The idea that increasing the number of options (‘alternatives’) in a choice set leads to increasing choice 
difficulty and adverse consequences (e.g. inability to choose; decrease in choice satisfaction) is well 
documented (Chernev, 2003b; Iyengar, Huberman, & Jiang, 2004; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). This phenomenon 
has been alternatively referred to as the “the problem of too much choice” (Fasolo, McClelland, & Todd, 2007), 
“too-much-choice effect” (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2009), and “choice overload” (Poynor & 
Diehl, 2007; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Mogilner, Rudnick, & Iyengar, 2008). For consistency, we use the term 
‘choice overload’ henceforth. 
There have been a number of arguments proposed in favour of ‘choice overload’. For example, as options 
within a category increases, information about those options increases, and differences between attractive 
options decreases (Fasolo et al., 2008; Timmermans, 1993), with justification of any choice becoming more 
difficult (Sela, Berger, & Liu, 2009). Alternatively, an exhaustive comparison of options increasing choice set 
sizes is cognitively effortful and time-consuming; and decision-makers with non-defined preferences may face 
more (un)attractive options, requiring additional time and cognitive resources in their evaluation (Kahn & 
Lehmann, 1991).  Indeed, choice overload increases if decision-makers are unfamiliar with, or have unclear 
prior preferences for, items in a choice set (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Mogilner et al., 2008). Those with clear 
preferences prefer larger assortments, with choice probability and satisfaction increasing with choice set size 
(Chernev 2003a; 2003b). Notably, choice overload can only occur if there is no obviously dominant option 
(best on all attributes considered) in the choice set, otherwise, the decision will be relatively easy regardless of 
set size (Dhar, 1997). 
Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) find in a meta-analysis of sixty-three conditions across fifty 
experiments, that the overall mean effect size for choice overload to be near-zero (D= .02). Scheibehenne et 
al. (2010) identify three potential moderators of choice overload: assortment structure ([lack of] categorisation, 
difficult trade-offs, information overload, & time pressure); decision strategies (relative vs absolute 
evaluations, maximizing, choice justification, & heuristics); and perception of the distribution of attributes. 
33 
 
‘Assortment structure’ and ‘decision strategies’ are of particular interest. We save discussions around 
categorization in a political context (e.g. by party, or ideology), and difficult trade-offs, for Chapter 2. 
Below, we further consider the effect of additional options on decision-making. Firstly, how it adds to the 
complexity of the decision environment through information overload, and use of decision strategies (e.g. 
heuristics). And secondly, how the addition of alternatives leads to perceived changes in the decision 
environment, and violations of voter preference, via context effects.  
 Information Processing & Heuristics 
The information overload hypothesis predicts that if the total amount of information about a choice set grows 
too large, a negative impact on decision making will result (Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, 
& Kohn-Berning, 1974). Decision-makers confronted with more information make less informed choices (Lee 
& Lee, 2004; Lurie, 2004), and Greifeneder et al. (2010) find choice satisfaction decreases as choice set size 
increases when options described on increasing number of attributes. 
Information overload occurs as cognitive limits prevent the processing of relevant information to the 
appropriate degree. The human cognitive system suffers from issues of ‘computational constraint’: we are 
limited cognitive processors due to limitations of attention and memory, with neither motivation nor ability to 
make the largely intractable calculations dictated by rational choice theory (RCT; Anderson, 1983; Gilovich 
& Griffin, 2010; Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Simon, 1979). The standard RCT approach views humans as 
“omniscient calculators”, who can perform the expected complex computation tasks to reach a decision (e.g. 
calculating the subjective expected utility of all possible outcomes) given adequate motivation and information. 
This view of homo economicus has been critiqued from a variety of viewpoints, not least because people have 
a poor ability understanding problems involving probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1983; for a review, 
Kahneman, 2011). 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) point out that people do not need to calculate their optimal behaviour 
functions, they need only use ‘successful’ algorithms to approximate the most optimal behaviour; and term 
these ‘fast & frugal’ cognitive algorithms ‘heuristics’. (for a review, see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier (2011) define a heuristic as “a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the 
goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods” (p.454). 
34 
 
Heuristics make judgments faster and less effortful through frugality, by: (i) examining fewer cues, (ii) 
reducing the effort of retrieving cue values, (iii) simplifying the weighting of cues, (iv) integrating less 
information, and (v) examining fewer alternatives (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002) add to this, proposing that a heuristic assesses a target attribute by another property (attribute 
substitution) that is more easily accessible. 
Information-processing approaches to examining voter decision-making have become popular in recent 
years (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, 2006), examining the selection of an alternative (or ‘candidate’) from a finite 
number of alternatives contained in a choice set, based on its attributes (e.g. policies, candidate personal 
information, campaign details). Heuristics may help voters choose between varying numbers of alternatives, 
all of which may have differing number of attributes. For example, by: editing or eliminating unfamiliar 
candidates from the choice set (familiarity heuristic), or choosing that option that is most familiar (recognition 
heuristic; Gigerenzer & Gaissmeier, 2011); or choosing the alternative best on a key attribute (‘Take-The-
Best’); or not computing weights for each attribute (i.e. use a simple -1/0/+1 score ‘tallying’ method). The 
alternative being calculating overall values (utilities), for each alternative, weighted by their perceived 
importance, and again by the probability of an outcome occurring given the choice (i.e. a calculation of risk 
given uncertainty). 
Lau and Redlawsk (2001; 2006) provide some of the most prominent heuristics voters seem to utilize in 
vote-tasks (i.e. candidate party affiliation, candidate ideology, endorsements, polls, & candidate appearance). 
Of all of these, candidate appearance has been studied the most, with prominent work by Todorov and Uleman 
(2002; 2003) on trait judgments of likeability, competence, trustworthiness, and aggressiveness, from single 
glances or 100ms exposure to a face (Willis & Todorov, 2006; Todorov et al., 2008). Trait judgments of 
competency predict the winning candidate in a variety of real-life and lab-based elections in the US with only 
100ms exposure; 66-72% of time in the 2000, 2002, 2004 US Senate elections (Todorov et al., 2005), 68.5% 
of the time for state-governor elections from 1996-2006 (Ballew & Todorov, 2007); and in 2006, 72.4% of the 
Senate elections and 68.6% of the gubernatorial elections (Ballew & Todorov, 2007). 
The other ‘political heuristics’ have received less experimental attention, with other authors positing that 
candidate partisan identity (e.g. being a Labour or Conservative politician) acts as a heuristic in voter decision-
35 
 
tasks (e.g. Rahn, 1993). Partisan identities are stereotypic schemata with which voters can infer a large amount 
about those with a partisan label (e.g. ‘liberals are for high taxes’, ‘Republicans are anti-government’, ‘Tea-
Partiers are crazy’). Acceptance and application of these partisan stereotypes result in a schemata-based 
affective response, though this is mediated by how consistent with the stereotype the target seems to be 
(Collange, Fiske, & Sanitioso, 2009). Gaissmaier & Marewski (2011) investigated party label as a recognition 
heuristic, with results from four major German elections showing that mere recognition of party names forecast 
parties’ electoral success fairly well. 
Political heuristics may be used in isolation as appropriate, or operate in tandem to produce some form of 
compound decision. In keeping with general views on heuristics, Lau and Redlawsk (2006) find that heuristic 
use depends on a person’s overall cognitive style, and are increasingly utilized in low-information 
environments, or where the DM has limited time or cognitive capacity; and that heuristic use varies as a 
function of political sophistication. Lau and Redlawsk (2006) found that heuristic use among sophisticates 
improved correct voting, while it decreased correct voting among non-sophisticates, however, this effect 
reverses when sophisticates were presented with non-stereotypic candidates. This seems intuitive- heuristics 
only approximate optional decisions if they are correctly applied given the informational environment. 
In prior studies by Lau and Redlawsk, partisan cues needed to be learned in bi-party elections of 2-6 
candidates through intentional access of informational items; yet this is not reflective of reality, where partisan 
cues (e.g. party brands) are ubiquitous and salient. In electoral contexts outside of the US, which are 
predominantly multi-party electoral contexts, heuristics (such as partisanship) should narrow information 
search down to a few alternatives, and voters may engage in a more effortful comparative depth of search 
within them. Decreasing correct voting rates may reflect the fact that voters never get the opportunity to learn 
about potentially more congruent candidates, as they are biased from the outset. If heuristics bias our decision-
strategies in such a way as to decrease correct voting, then we should be able to observe bias where partisanship 
is a global cue rather than a learned one. Results in Lau and Redlawsk (2006) seem to support such a rationale, 
and as such we explore this in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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 Preference violations & ‘context effects’ 
‘Contextual preference reversals’ are the observation that people’s preference between options can be 
reversed by the presence of ‘decoy options’ added to a choice set, are extensively documented in the cognitive 
psychology and consumer psychology literature (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; 2014; Tsestos, Usher, & Chater, 
2010). To illustrate this with a classic example: Imagine Ms. X sitting in a restaurant oscillating between menu 
options A and B, and eventually opting for A, at which point the waiter informs her of a hitherto unknown 
option C (e.g. a daily special). This in mind, Ms. X gratefully orders option B instead. Why would the 
information about a non-preferred option (D, a ‘decoy’) cause Ms. X to switch to the originally lesser-preferred 
competing option B? This is a classic example of a ‘contextual preference reversal’, which has been found to 
occur in human decision-making between alternatives that vary on several dimensions or, attributes (e.g., price 
and quality).  
Context effects raise challenges for rational choice theories, which presume that people should always prefer 
options that are highest on preferred values dimensions. Underlying these option-based accounts of choice is 
the assumption that value is assigned independently to the considered option and choice is determined by 
comparison of values; thus whether A is chosen over B depends on the relative values of A and B. No additional 
option (e.g. C) should affect the relative values of A and B. Such value-based choice accounts include: expected 
utility theory (Debreu, 1960; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947); theories that allow noise either in the 
assignment of, or decision between, goodness values (e.g., stochastic expected utility; Blavatskyy, 2007); and 
psychological theories of choice like prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Four such reversal effects have been reported so far in the literature, the: attraction effect (Huber, Payne, & 
Puto, 1982); similarity effect (Tversky, 1972); compromise effect (Simonson, 1989); and the phantom effect 
(Choplin & Hummel, 2005; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; 2007).  
In the attraction effect, an ‘irrelevant’ option D (a decoy) is added to the choice set of A and B; similar to 
but of less value than A (inferior, or ‘dominated’, on one or more attribute dimensions), which creates a bias 
in favor of A (the ‘targeted’ option). This violates the principle of regularity, which holds that preference for 
option A should not increase when more irrelevant options are added to the choice set.  
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In the similarity effect, the introduction of a new option S, which is very similar to B (and of equal value), 
shifts the relative choice between A and B in favor of the dissimilar option (the ‘competitor), A. The similarity 
effect demonstrates a violation of the independence from irrelevant alternatives principle.  
In the compromise effect, option C is of approximately equal value to A and B, and is placed either in the 
middle within the two-dimensional attribute space, making it a compromise between AB. Or, it is positioned 
as to make either A or B the compromise option in the choice set (sitting the target along the ‘line of 
indifference’; Berkowitsch, Scheibehenne, & Rieskamp, 2014).  
Finally, the most recently discovered reversal effect, the phantom decoy effect, occurs following the 
introduction of an unavailable but dominant option P (i.e. better on one or more attributes), biasing choice 
share toward the dominated target (e.g. option A). Phantom decoy effects raise an additional challenge to the 
theory of choice (Pettibone & Wedell, 2007), as decision-makers should not be influenced by unavailable 
options, but only by those options available for choosing and can provide utility. The relative positions of 
options for each effect are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.1: Illustration of alternative placement for each context effect. In each instance, A will increase choice share over 
B. Letters represent the decoy location for each context effect. 
Various theoretical accounts to explain the mechanisms behind context effects have been mooted, such as: 
decision-field theory (DFT; Roe, Busmeyer, & Townsend, 2001); leaky competing accumulators (LCA; Usher 
& McClelland, 2004), decision-by-sampling (DBS; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006); and reason-based choice 
(Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). These accounts are based on either: attentional switching between 
different choice aspects; relational evaluation of properties and loss aversion; and value shifts or contrast 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 1
 
Attribute 2 
A: Target 
B: Competitor 
C: Compromise decoy 
D: Attraction decoy 
S: Similarity decoy 
P: Phantom decoy 
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effects; although “no single mechanism accounts for all three decoy effects” (Tsetsos et al., 2010, p. 1276). 
Other mechanisms, such as dimensional weight change, stretching or shrinking of the choice space, ranking, 
grouping, etc., have been proposed (Guo & Holyoak, 2002; Pettibone & Wedel, 2007; Stewart et al., 2006). 
Attention to choice aspects and temporal correlations are put forward as explanations for the similarity effect. 
Imagine at any given time Ms. X is influenced by the imagined taste of dish A, while other times it is the 
healthiness of dish B that sways her. For Mrs. X, the criterion of her choice is continually shifting. This is a 
stochastic criteria shifting mechanism (Roe et al., 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2004; Usher & Zakay, 1993), 
resembling the stochastic examination of choice attributes proposed by elimination by aspects (EBA; Tversky, 
1972). 
Suppose Mrs. X’s probability of choosing dish A was .50 (the tasty option), and the waiter introduces dish 
C- which is almost exactly the same as, and no better or worse than, dish A- Mrs X will resume her oscillation 
between taste and health; but she has a further choice: between A and C. If she makes this choice between A 
and C randomly, then the probability of choosing the tasty dish is now .25, less than the .50 probability of 
choosing dish B. Yet before C was added, the probability of choosing A was greater than the probability of 
choosing B. In this example. Mrs. X’s preferences fluctuate and the preferences for A and C are positively 
correlated. The general principle is that when temporal correlations between momentary preferences exist, the 
correlated options (A, C) split their winning choice share, and hence lose share relative to the uncorrelated 
options (B). 
The impact of relational (vs. independent), evaluation of options is exampled by the attraction effect. If 
option D is added to the menu, which is just like option A, but marginally inferior in on at least attribute (and 
no better on any other), no matter how one weighs the attributes (taste, health) it is clear that A is better than 
D. According to reason-based decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1993; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 
1993; Simonson, 1989), people choose by searching for a justification for their choice. Choosing A is justified 
by its clear superiority to D, but choosing D has no clear justification, being difficult to compare with either A 
or B. However, decoy effects have been found in other, non-human species (Hurly & Oseen, 1999; Shafir, 
Waite, & Smith, 2002), suggesting that justification is not crucial for such effects to occur (at least, to the point 
we are able to claim non-humans do not justify their actions to themselves/others).  
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The compromise effect and the attraction effect can be accounted for by assuming that values are computed 
via pairwise comparisons. If we assume each option is compared with every other option and considerations 
are transformed into utilities via some value function characterized by loss aversion (a steeper utility slope in 
the losses domain vs that in the gain domain, such that losses loom larger than gains; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1991; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). Under the attraction effect, as D confers an advantage to B on one attribute 
and a disadvantage on the other, this disadvantage looms larger than the advantage- and the overall value 
contributed by D relative to B is negative. As the compromise option has no great disadvantages relative to 
other options in the set, the overall relative evaluations to the alternative options are positive.  
Local contrast enhancement could also account for the attraction effect, as observed through work in visual 
perception. Massaro and Anderson (1971) showed that a circle appears larger when surrounded by smaller 
circles, with such effects possibly occurring through a process of lateral inhibition between similar items, in 
that only alternatives that are similar inhibit each other. Enhancement of the dominating option A occurs as 
inferior option D has negative values, while superior A, has positive values; thus, D causes a relative evaluation 
enhancement in the attribute value of A, since passing negative activation via an inhibitory link results in 
excitation (Roe et al., 2001).  
However, choices are not independent of temporal processes, and a number of dynamical theories of value-
based decision making have been proposed, accounting for the choice outcome and also for the dynamics of 
the decision process as it unfolds over time. DFT for multi-attribute choice (Roe et al., 2001), which considers 
attentional shifting and value shifts; and LCA (Usher & McClelland, 2004), which considers attentional 
switching and relational evaluation via elements of EBA (Tversky, 1972) and the context-dependent advantage 
model (Tversky & Simonson, 1993). Both of which account for the attraction, similarity, and compromise 
effects (for a comparative review, see Tsetsos et al., 2010). LCA can account for the phantom decoy effect by 
assuming that people use the superior unavailable decoy as a reference point; while the DFT could account for 
phantom decoys if the valence of the superior decoy is negative due to its unavailability (see a detailed 
discussion, including limitations of the LCA/DFT accounts, in: Pettibone & Wedell, 2007). 
DFT and LCA are not the only two theories that account for the similarity, attraction, and compromise effects 
simultaneously. Other multi-alternative, multi-attribute, theories have been proposed, in particular, decision 
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by sampling (Stewart et al., 2006). In decision by sampling, no underlying psycho-economic scales are 
assumed, instead, the subjective value of an attribute is its rank in the decision sample, which consists of 
attribute values both present in the decision context and drawn from memory16. Decision by sampling and its 
mechanisms (ranking and ordinal comparisons) appear to be promising for the case of preference reversal 
effects, accounting for a large set of decision phenomena such as loss aversion, temporal discounting, and 
overestimation of small probabilities (Tsetsos et al., 2010); and was recently integrated with LCA in a 
dynamical model for decisions under risk (Stewart & Simpson, 2008).  
We have given a taste for some of the theories that account for these context effects, we will not be evaluating 
them further. Context effects have potential to exert influence in political decision-making, which is inherently 
based on voter’s choosing options that differ on multiple attributes, just as they do in cognitive psychology or 
consumer decision-making. Of relevance to this thesis, context effects have implications for correct voting: if 
a voter prefers party A over B, or B over A, these preferences should not be affected by the presence of 
additional options in the choice set. In other words, if party B is a voter’s correct choice this choice should not 
be affected by the addition of an inferior option party D (attraction effect), such that the voter now chooses 
party A, an incorrect option. 
While there has been a recent upsurge of interest in the robustness of context effects, in particular, the 
attraction effect, in more realistic decision-domains (Frederick, Lee, & Baskin, 2014; Huber et al., 2014; Yang 
& Ling, 2014), there has been a surprising surfeit of research examining whether context effects occur in 
political decision-making (cf. Pan, O’ Curry, & Pitts, 1995). Considering the prevalence of context effects in 
other domains of multi-attribute multi-alternative choices, we examine context effects in political decision-
making in depth in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                     
16 This is not dissimilar to models of evaluation developed in political psychology, such as: the on-line model, which posits that 
individuals’ attitudes are formed in real time at the moment of information exposure, updating an ‘affective integrator’ (i.e. an on-line 
tally) as new information is encountered (Hastie & Park 1986; Lodge et al. 1989; McGraw et al. 1990); or, the memory-based model 
which states that individuals form their preferences at the time of judgment, retrieving relevant information from long- term memory 
(Kelley and Mirer 1974; Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992). On-line and memory-based processes may act jointly in shaping 
evaluative judgments (Redlawsk 2001; McGraw et al. 2003; Lau and Redlawsk 2006), with a ‘hybrid model’ proposed; in line with 
the view of people as “flexible processors” (Uleman et al., 1996) with ‘dual processing’ systems (Chaiken and Trope, 1999). McGraw 
(2003) muses, “There is good reason to suspect that a hybrid approach, incorporating both time-of- exposure and time-of-judgment 
information effects on evaluative judgments may provide a more psychologically realistic model”. (p. 408). For a review, see Kim and 
Garrett (2011). 
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 Summary and Overview of Empirical Chapters 
The structure of the remainder of the thesis is as follows.  
In Chapter Two, we examine the conceptual and practical aspects of ‘correct voting’, carrying out a number 
of lab-based experimental studies among the UK electorate. We investigate the effect increasing the number 
of alternatives (candidates) has on voters’ ability to correctly choose the alternative that best matches them on 
their self-reported preferences. We also examine in a first-pass, if the presence of political heuristics (e.g. 
partisanship) affect voters’ ability to vote correctly. 
In Chapter Three, we delve further into the results from Chapter Two, examining voters’ information 
processing at the cognitive level, and the effects of increasing choice set size. We also examine at the 
information processing level if there is any effect of the partisan heuristic on voters’ information processing; 
and overall, how voters’ information processing relates to correct voting. We develop novel measures of 
comparing preference for the chosen alternative relative to the choice set, based on the amount of informational 
search, and the average duration of search, that voters’ engage in. 
In Chapter Four, we explore if context effects can occur when making decisions in political domains. We 
conduct a number of experimental studies, using realistic and fictional political scenarios, and examining issues 
such as ‘desirability’ in eliciting political context effects. We also report results from a two-cohort study, one 
field and one online, carried out during the 2015 UK General Election. It explores if asymmetric preference 
structures approximating those seen in ‘context effects’ exist naturally among the UK electorate and their 
relationship to their intended vote choice in the General Election. 
Finally, we conclude with a general discussion in Chapter 5. We summarise our findings, and their 
implications for further research on voter decision-making, the field of political psychology, and democracy 
at large. 
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: Correct Voting in dynamic voting environments 
 Background 
Information-processing approaches to examining voter decision-making have become popular in recent 
years (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, 2006). Information processing accounts include Multi-Attribute Decision 
Making (MADM), that is: the selection of an alternative (or ‘candidate’) from a finite number of alternatives 
contained in a choice set, based on its attributes (e.g. policies, candidate personal information, campaign 
details). Such attributes may be exclusive to one alternative or shared by alternatives in the choice set. While 
much of political science and political psychology research is concerned with how and why voters make their 
decisions (e.g. voting on partisan lines, policy issues), some researchers (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 1997) have 
been concerned with how well voters make decisions, and consequent implications for democracy and 
governments.  
Democracy relies on the assumption that voters vote in line with their preferences and/or best interests; in 
order to empower a relatively small number of people to reflect and design society in line with those presumed 
preferences. If people are not accurate in their vote-decisions, the quality of democratic representation provided 
by the electoral system, and the legitimacy of elected governments and any decisions they make, are in question 
(see also, Lau, Patel, Fahmy, & Kaufman, 2013). In majoritarian democracies where marginal vote differences 
determine one party’s overall control of the government (e.g., UK, USA), inaccurate voting can lead to 
governments that aren’t just unrepresentative but opposed to the preferences of broad swathes (or even the 
majority) of the public. 
Voting is the primary way that citizens influence their government, yet even freely chosen decisions can be 
misguided. The accuracy of voter decision-making can be considered in terms of the degree to which voters 
choose the candidate whose policies best represent their preferences – a ‘correct vote’ (Lau & Redlawsk, 
1997). Therefore, the rate of electors voting correctly is a higher normative standard than turnout or voter 
accessibility by which to judge the health of democracies (Lau et al., 2013).  
As discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.4), Lau and Redlawsk (2001) found increasing candidate numbers was 
negatively associated with correct voting. In a comparative study, Lau et al. (2013) reported a negative 
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relationship between rates of CV and number of parties. One possible explanation for this dramatic decrease 
in CV rates as the number of alternatives increase might be in terms of ‘chance levels’. The chance of a voter 
choosing a party who matches her own interests simply is higher when there are two parties (as any voters 
choosing randomly will be correct 50% of the time) than when there are nine. Lau and Redlawsk (1997) find 
voters choose correctly better than chance when there are two candidates, and Lau et al. (2013) show above 
chance levels of CV across 69 elections where chance levels range between 27% and 37%. Another explanation 
is task complexity (Timmermans, 1993), or task difficulty, that increases the cognitive complexity of the 
decision and results in poor outcomes. 
Decision-makers often simplify choice-tasks through the use of various ‘heuristics’ (‘cognitive shortcuts’; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). A seminal definition of the aim of heuristics is to reduce complex tasks to 
simpler judgmental operations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Some researchers have suggested that heuristics 
can approximate, and even outperform, optimal decision-making strategies (e.g., Todd & Gigerenzer, 2011). 
While heuristics are usually effective, “sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” (p.1, Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Heuristic success is dependent on applying the appropriate heuristic given the 
environmental structure (or decision context), with misapplication leading to errors in accuracy (Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2011).  
Increasing the number of alternatives (herein, candidates) should increase the complexity of the task, and 
increase the reliance on heuristics (Bettman, Luce & Payne, 1998). Political decision-making is no exception, 
as Lau and Redlawsk (2001, 2006) find increasing numbers of candidates increased the use of ‘political’ 
heuristics, specifically differing types of political heuristics. In two candidate scenarios, for example, voters 
use the viability or likelihood of a candidate being elected; and candidate ideology in four candidate scenarios 
(Lau & Redlawsk, 2001).  
We examine the possible effects of an increase in choice set size (number of candidates), and use of political 
heuristics, on correct voting, using Lau and Redlawsk’s (2006) methodology of dynamic (information) process 
tracing environments (DPTE). 
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 Dynamic Processing Tracing  
Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 2001a,b; 2006; 2009) study voter decision-making using dynamic process-
tracing (DPT); adapting the traditional static information board used in psychology studies of decision-making 
(e.g. Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn-Berning, 1974; Payne, 1980), and studies on 
decision-making and information search in political environments (Riggle & Johnson, 1996; Huang, 2000; 
Huang & Price, 2001). Information boards typically display a static list of attributes belonging to options in a 
choice set in a matrix, with decision-makers able to select an attribute to learn more detailed information about 
that item. DPT is a dynamic version of the information board, “uniquely suited for studying decision-making 
in complex social situations” (Lau & Redlawsk, 2009, p.1), in particular it is useful to simulate the ebb & flow 
of information during actual election campaigns, and examine how voters obtain, process, and evaluate the 
information they encounter about candidates.  
Traditional information boards suffer from the problem of being static, allowing constant access to all 
attributes for all alternatives. Considered in the context of elections, this presumes a voter is able to access any 
information about a candidate at any point in time, and allows for ease of comparison between them all. While 
the internet17 and ‘comparison tools’18,19 certainly make such scenarios more plausible, in real elections 
information is often chaotic, sometimes unavailable, candidates can obscure stances on issues, and learning is 
time-limited; you only have until ‘Election Day’. Additionally, in standard information boards the decision-
making is an active learner, yet in elections (and reality more generally) information exposure occurs without 
any active effort (e.g. advertisements, social networks endorsements), and may result in ‘information overload’ 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Put simply, traditionally static information boards represent an ‘ideal’ world- 
while we are interested in approximating decision-making in the real world. For a review of information board 
studies, see Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993); and process tracing methods in decision-making more 
generally, see Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, and Ranyard (2010; 2011). 
Lau and Redlawsk (2006; 2009) operationalize DPT by presenting information in the form of ‘attribute 
labels’, which flow down a computer screen (over time, at a specified rate) rather than remaining fixed on 
                                                     
17 Manifesto watch: Where parties stand on key issues.  BBC. 25 Feb, 2015 
18 CompareTheParties: “Political Comparison Made Easy”. http://www.comparetheparties.co.uk/   
19 Pocket Politics. http://www.pocketpolitics.co.uk/  
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screen, allowing for a limited number of attributes to be available on screen for access at any given time. Labels 
include a candidate’s name, a brief description of the attribute and/or the information contained within, and 
can include images (e.g. candidate image, party label, other). Participants access the information by clicking 
on the attribute label, which ‘opens’ showing the information contained within. Importantly, attribute labels 
continue scrolling in the background, creating a ‘cost’ to accessing the information and dwelling on it, in terms 
of missed information. As the scrolling format allows only a subset of the total available information available 
at any one time, it makes the overall task of processing the election information less manageable for a subject 
(and more akin to real-world elections). The total number of attributes and the number of times each appears 
can all be pre-determined by the experimenter(s).  
 
Figure 2.1: Example of the DPTE flow stage screen.  
Other functionalities exist, such as: ‘campaign-ad pop-ups’, poll result announcements, and even social 
network information (e.g. a real or fictional confederate shares information on the election in real time). Where 
necessary, we provide additional details in the Methods section of each experimental section.  
 Partisanship 
Partisanship remains the central factor in explaining not just how people vote, but also how they see the 
political world (Bartels, 2000), and is historically defined as “the individual’s affective orientation to an 
important group-object in his environment” (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 121). Miller and Shanks (1996) reason 
that party identification is analogous to religious affiliation, as psychological attachments to groups; i.e. “I am 
Catholic” or “We are Jewish,” is much like “I am a Democrat” or “We are Republicans” (Green, Palmquist, 
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& Schickler, 2002; Miller & Shanks, 1996).  
Partisanship not only acts as an internal reference point for use in voters’ judgment model, but perceived 
candidate partisanship and the degree of alignment of the two also act as cues during evaluation and preference 
formation for a candidate. Longitudinal studies in America and Europe (for a review, see: Sears, 1975) has 
shown that by adolescence, most children have a partisan identification connected to political preferences like 
adults, and nearly all share it with their parents (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). Achen (2002) wryly queries this, 
stating: “parents are rarely able to influence their teenage children’s hairdos, clothing styles, tastes in popular 
music, or even more important decisions such as the choice of a life partner… Why should party identification 
be any different?” (p. 152). Achen (2002) constructs a compellingly simple dynamic model of Bayesian 
retrospective voting by partisan identification across multiple elections to explain this phenomenon, explaining 
(in plain terms) that the initial priors a young voter has when they go to vote is a regressed form of the partisan 
identity of their parents. 
Partisanship can bias our evaluation and interpretation of common events (Bartels, 2002; Gerber & Huber, 
2010; Zaller, 1992), and determine our preferences for biased political information (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; 
Redlawsk, 2002), and therefore might play a causal role in attitude formation rather than just filtering 
information. Gerber, Huber and Washington (2010) corroborate this, finding that people reminded that they 
needed to identify with a party (by way of registering for a party in a primary) exhibited heightened partisan 
identities, were increasingly partisan in their voting choices and evaluations of partisan figures and institutions. 
Thus, partisan information about candidates may lead voters to engage in confirmatory decision-making and 
could affect voters’ ability to vote correctly by directing them away from potentially useful information about 
other alternatives. 
Various authors have posited that partisan identity (‘party label’) acts as a heuristic in voter decision-tasks 
(e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Rahn, 1993). Party labels are stereotypic schema with which voters can infer a 
large amount about those with a partisan label (e.g. Liberals are for high taxes, Republicans are anti-
government). Party labels act as ‘top-level’ affective proxies; a pre-computed summary of affective reactions 
to all the schema’s attributes (Lau & Sears, 1986). Application of party labels to candidates can easily lead to 
errors if the default attributes do not apply (e.g., if a pro-EU candidate runs for an anti-EU party). In the UK, 
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political parties tend to run ‘national’ campaigns focusing on party brand and nationwide policies, rather than 
‘local’ campaigns; the latter being where candidate policies might differ from the party nationally to appeal to 
a local base, as is common in other democracies where ‘politics is more local’ (e.g. Ireland; Weeks & 
Quinlivan, 2009). As such, candidate policies may not reflect national party policies as indicated by partisan 
identifiers (and vice versa), and voters may not identify these differences when opting to vote by brand. 
Despite participants choosing to access information informing them of the party to which a candidate 
belonged (to a greater extent than any other information), Lau and Redlawsk (2001) could not assess the 
importance of party label as a heuristic due to the uni-party design of their study. Lau and Redlawsk (2006) 
found differing results in a primary campaign for their party heuristic, with it decreasing the probability of 
correct voting in 2-candidate scenarios but increasing correct vote probability in 4-candidate scenarios. 
Whether this reached significance is unclear (p. 251), but more importantly, there is no reason for party label 
to have any effect given all the candidates in a primary campaign belong to the same party (p. 94). 
Thus, the party label heuristic is best studied in multi-party scenarios. Further, as Lau and Redlawsk (2001) 
relied on voters to directly access partisan affiliation during information search, we are interested in how party 
label as a global cue (i.e. visible from the onset & throughout) impacts voter decision-making strategies. In 
particular, how it impacts the ability of voters to vote correctly. 
 Directional vs. Proximal Models (of Correct Voting): 
In order to assess the rate of correct voting (CV) among an electorate, we first must consider how to measure 
CV as pertains to voter preferences for attributes (e.g. policies). To do this, we ask voters for their preferences 
on a variety of policy issues, and match those with the positions of the political alternatives on offer- much as 
voters (should) do when voting. Arguments over the two dominant ‘spatial’ models of voting, ‘proximity’ 
(Davis & Hinich, 1966; Downs, 1957) and ‘directional’ (MacDonald, Listhuag, & Rabinowitz, 1991; 
Rabinowitz & MacDonald, 1989), abound in political science and public policy (Blais et al., 2001; Cho & 
Endersby, 2003; Lewis & King, 1999), with attempts at unifying the two under a common framework (Merril 
& Grofman, 1999; Weber, 2015).  
Proximal Model: The ‘proximity spatial’ model is the most prominent spatial theory of electoral choice 
(Downs, 1957), positing electoral choice is best understood by examining the proximity between 
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candidate/party attributes and voters’ preferences; simply, voters will choose candidates whose preferred 
policies are ‘closer’ to theirs. The proximity model has a lot of appeal, and similarities to decision-science: 
individuals (voters) make decisions (choosing candidates) according to their preferences (proximity between 
policy positions). It presents a “simple and intuitive link between formal representation of voters’ issue-based 
information processing and their observable candidate-based electoral choice” (Ye, Li, & Leiker, 2011, p. 
497).  
Within the proximity model, we define a multi-dimensional policy space (‘Davis-Hinich space’; Davis & 
Hinich, 1966) where a voter’s most preferred policy bundle, and their perception of candidates’ issue positions, 
are represented by points in the space; their respective ‘ideal points’. The spatial distance between these ideal 
points corresponds to preference proximity: smaller distance, the more proximate the preferences. Preference 
proximity helps explain individual voters’ comparison of candidates: a voter ranks candidates in accordance 
with the distance from their respective ideal points, such that the most proximate is the most preferred and so 
forth.  
Proximal CV Method: Our ‘proximal’ of correct voting arises from the standard Euclidian distance formula 
for calculating the distance between 2-points in an n-dimensional space, and is standard in the ‘proximal model’ 
of voter decision-making used by the political sciences (Hinich & Enelow, 1984). The resulting output is a 
utility score for each candidate, relative to the voter’s stated preferences, and is illustrated in Equation 1; where 
q is a candidate’s score on a given issue and p is a voter’s self-placement on the issue, over N policy issue 
dimensions. Decision-weights (dw) are derived from participants’ explicit ratings of a policy issue’s 
importance to them, obtained via a questionnaire post-experiment, and rescaled to range between ‘0’ and ‘1’. 
Equation 1: Proximal Correct voting, using a Euclidian distance equation (with decision weights). 
 
Where participants indicated a decision-weight of ‘0’, or answer ‘Don’t Know’ on a policy issue 
questionnaire, this dimension is removed from the equation, as if we multiply any dimension by a dw of 0, 
𝑑 𝑞, 𝑝 =   𝑞1− 𝑝1 2 𝑑𝑤1 +  𝑞2− 𝑝2 2 𝑑𝑤2 …  +  𝑞𝑛− 𝑝𝑛 2 𝑑𝑤𝑛 =    𝑞𝑖−𝑝𝑖 2 𝑑𝑤𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
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then this will be incorrectly scored as being perfectly aligned with a candidate on that policy issue, and will 
result in a biased score. 
We prefer the proximal model and methods of operationalizing correct voting, as lab and survey 
experiments by Claassen (2007), Tomz and Van Houweling (2008) and Lacy and Paolino (2010) find that 
proximity theory offers the best model of voting behavior. We outline additional reasons for our use of the 
proximity model below. First, we review the directional model, as favoured by Lau and Redlawsk (1999; 
2006). 
Directional Model: The Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) ‘directional spatial’ model states that the 
distance between a voter and a candidate on any given dimension (e.g. policy issue) matters less than whether 
or not they are on the same ‘side’ on an issue (i.e. on the same side, relative to the ‘neutral point’ of an issue). 
Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) argue this captures the ‘affective intensity’ of spatial issue voting, which 
is missed from the proximity model. The authors state that, if a candidate and voter are on the ‘same side’ the 
affect associated with the issue will be positive (regardless of distance); whereas if they are on ‘opposite sides’ 
of an issue, affect will always be negative (regardless of distance). Thus the utility of a candidate on a given 
dimension for a voter can be expressed formally in Equation 2, where U(Qj) is the utility of candidate Q over 
all ideal vector points in the dimension j, for a voter with a vector of ideal points Pi, where P0 is the neutral 
point. 
Equation 2: Directional spatial model of voting. 
 
Simply stated; the utility for any given candidate is the product of the distance of a candidate from the 
neutral point and the distance of a voter from the neutral point, on a given dimension.  
Directional CV Method: Determining a ‘standard’ operationalisation of Lau and Redlawsk’s ‘directional’ 
measure of correct voting is mildly difficult, as they use differing methodologies when examining CV in 
laboratory settings (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997; 2006), or determining CV from national election panel surveys 
like the American National Election Survey (ANES; Lau, Andersen, & Redlawsk, 2008). Despite this, at the 
core of their directional measure(s), is the Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) directional spatial model. 
U 𝑄𝑗  =  Q𝑗 − P0 ′(P𝑖 − P0)  
50 
 
Using the directional model of voting, Lau and Redlawsk (1999; 2006) aim to capture a voter’s ‘agreement’ 
with (or ‘favourability’ toward) a candidate on a given dimension. They further rescale the resulting utility 
score to range between +/- 1 for a given candidate on a given dimension, based on the maximum range possible 
from the neutral-point. For example, for a 7-point scale where ‘4’ is the midpoint (or ‘neutral-point’), the 
maximum range from the neutral point is -3 and +3, whose absolute product is ‘9’. A scenario where a voter 
and candidate occupy the extreme ends on an issue scale would result in a utility of -1 for that issue (i.e. [[7-
4] * [1-4]]/9 = -1]. Lau and Redlaswk (2006) average this utility over the number of items accessed for a given 
candidate. 
It is also important to look at what dimensions are included in constructing the measure(s) as per Lau and 
Redlawsk (2006; Lau et al., 2008). In calculating their directional measure of correct voting, Lau et al. (2008) 
include “the interests and concerns of each voter” (p. 408) by including some, but not always all, of the 
following: a measure of party identification (strength); trait judgments of candidate personality; thermometer 
ratings of candidate-group links; candidate performance evaluations (if examining existing datasets from the 
ANES); and issue stands (where voters line on certain policy issues). All these dimensions are rescaled to 
range between -/+ 1. 
Secondly, Lau et al. (1997; 2008) state they include the degree a voter ‘cares’ about each of these 
dimensions of judgment: by obtaining explicit weights (e.g. a participant reporting their partisan 
identification); or calculating implicit weights (e.g. the proportion of questions answered for a judgment 
dimension, a proxy for how much a participant ‘cares’ about that dimension). They calculated policy issue 
weights either by asking for participants’ perceived importance of that issue to them (Lau & Redlawsk 1997), 
or by calculating a scaled importance weight for each issue based on how many candidates in the choice set 
they attributed a perceived position to; ‘0’ if unanswered, ‘0.5’ if answered at all, and increasing the weight 
proportionately towards ‘1’ with each additional candidate the voter attributed a position to on that policy 
issue. 
Lau et.al (2008) calculated 4 different versions of their directional measure; by using (un)weighted versions 
of either an additive or averaged utility model for each candidate, noting that these measures are highly 
correlated and “there were absolutely no differences between the additive and averaging algorithms for 
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combining the information”, and “while it is certainly possible to create situations where these two procedures 
produce very different results, in practice those situations apparently do not occur very often” (Lau et al., 
2008, p.401).  
We construct our own version of Lau and Redlawsk’s (2006; 2008) directional (utility) measure, in order 
to check if using a ‘directional spatial model’ vs. a ‘proximal spatial model’ approach leads to different 
conclusions around ‘correct voting’ in our own experiments. As Lau et al. (Note 37, 2013) state that empirically 
the results arising from the two are usually indistinguishable, we do not expect to observe any. Additionally, 
Weber (2015) notes the high collinearity of both model predictions, stating that while the models are 
theoretically distinct, they make identical predictions in most real-world situations. Further details on the 
measure can be found in Appendix B.  
 Decision difficulty, confidence, and alternative similarity 
The literature on ‘choice overload’ resulting from increases in choice set size has been summarized in 
Chapter One (Section 1.5). Put simply, choice overload occurs when the complexity of the decision task 
exceeds an individual’s cognitive resources (Simon, 1955; Toffler, 1990), caused in the main by the number 
of alternatives available (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). As choice overload is a subjective state of the decision-
maker (DM), we can only observe it through a series of objective indicators: process-based indicators, that 
describe the subjective state of the DM (e.g. decision confidence, regret); and outcome-based indicators, that 
describe the DM’s observable behavior (likelihood of reversing choice, nature of chosen option). 
In general, those experiencing choice overload are less likely to be satisfied with their decisions (Botti & 
Iyengar, 2004), less confident that they have chosen the best option (Haynes, 2009), and prone to more post-
decision regret (Inbar, Botti, & Hanko, 2011). While we are not directly addressing the central choice overload 
phenomenon here, we are interested in how task complexity can be observed. It stands to reason that we should 
observe changes as mentioned previously in voters’ internal states, and behavioural outcomes, in our studies. 
We assess this by asking participants how confident they are in their vote choice, how confident they would 
not change their vote if given additional time, and how difficult was their choice.  
Various theories, including choice overload, predict task complexity will increase as alternatives become 
more similar, becoming more difficult to justify the choice of an option (Sela, Berger, & Liu 2009). 
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Scheibehenne et al. (2010) note the similarity between available options “have often not been precisely 
controlled in studies on choice overload … even though they potentially affect choice satisfaction, regret, and 
motivation” (p. 419). The use of the proximity model provides a solution to this problem, as we can compute 
the distance between the alternative most proximal to a voter (i.e. closest to their ideal point in n-dimension 
policy space), and the next-most-proximal (and so forth) as a proxy for similarity; investigating any 
correlations of alternative similarity with voter’s internal and behavioural outcomes. 
 Experiment 1 
Lau and Redlawsk (2001) find increasing candidate numbers increases heuristic use, and decreases the 
probability of a correct vote (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, 2006), but in a uni-party scenario. We test this further in 
a UK setting with multi-party candidates. We test the potential influence of the party label heuristic on ‘correct 
voting’ by manipulating the presence of the party label. Our hypotheses are: 
H1: That rates of ‘correct voting’ will decrease when the number of candidates (alternatives) increases 
from 2 to 3. 
H2: That ‘correct voting’ will decrease when Party Label (party identity) information is available. 
H3: That H1 and H2 will have multiplicative effects, such that the effect of excluding Party Label will be 
greater in the 3-candidate condition, due to the enhanced task complexity. 
Methods 
 Participants 
Participants were native English speakers and eligible to vote in the UK local or parliamentary elections 
before enrolment in the study. 136 participants (78 female), aged 18-73 (μ= 27.72 years), were recruited. 
Participants were mostly single (71%); students (76%); self-identifying as ‘White-British’ (55%); and with an 
income under £10,000 per annum (53%). Participants were paid £4 for participating. Ethical approval was 
granted from UCL (CPB/2010/10). 
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 Design 
A 2x2 ('Number of Candidates' x 'Party Label') between-participants design was employed. Participants 
were randomly assigned to a ‘Party Label Present’ (PLP) or a ‘Party Label Absent’ (PLA) condition by the 
experimenter, and randomly assigned further by the software to either a 2 or 3 candidate condition within that 
block. The latter randomisation led to some imbalance in cell sizes (2Can- PLA: 35; 3Can- PLA: 34; 2Can- PLP: 
41, 3Can- PLP: 28)  
The 2-candidate condition consisted of simulated candidates representing the UK’s main political parties, 
the Labour Party and the Conservative Party [Lab/Con]. The ‘3-Candidate’ (3-Can) condition also included 
the Liberal Democrats [Lib]. Each candidate had 21 policies that could be accessed during the campaign stage. 
The party association of the candidates was either explicitly presented (PLP) or not (PLA). ‘Party Label’ and 
‘Number of Candidates’ were the only variables manipulated in this study.20  
Participants indicated their vote choice at the end of the trial by choosing one of the candidates, or opting for 
‘None of the Above’ or ‘Abstain/Spoil’. 
 Materials 
Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE): The experiment was carried out using the Dynamic 
Process Tracing Environment software (Lau & Redlawsk, 2009). Stimulus items (i.e., candidate policies) are 
presented during ‘flow stages’. Participants are told that item boxes will appear with summary ‘headlines’ 
along with the candidate’s name, and they have to click on an item to read and learn more about that item if 
they wish. Participants are also informed that information continues to ‘flow’ in the background, even while 
reading an open item, as to mimic the flow (and opportunity cost) of information over time in a real campaign.  
                                                     
20 There were, however, a number of additional scales included (e.g., ‘Need for Cognition’, UK Civics Test questionnaire). These 
are not the focus of the current discussion and will not be discussed further. 
54 
 
The order of items was randomised, with each item appearing twice during the experiment. The time between 
an item appearing at the top of the 'flow screen' and exiting at the bottom was 15 seconds. Participants could 
click on any item currently visible in the 'flow screen'. The ‘flow stage’ automatically terminated after the 
disappearance of the last stimulus item.  
Candidate Party Label: Party-identifying information for candidates in PLP conditions was imparted by 
putting party logos and party-branded colour theme (i.e. Red= Lab, Blue=Con, Yellow= Lib) on stimulus items 
(e.g. a red rose and red border for Labour candidates), and explained before the voting task. A separate printed 
sheet with the candidate names, the party they belonged to, and the relevant party logo, were made available 
to the participant in the PLP conditions. In PLA conditions logos were absent, and all stimulus item borders 
were grey, and no additional printed materials were provided. 
Constructing the Candidates: Male-only names were used to control for effects of candidate gender on 
vote-choice.  Names were chosen from the 3 most common UK first and surnames on the 2007 UK Electoral 
Roll, and randomly allocated. This was then checked against the list of MPs in the House of Commons to 
Figure 2.2: Example of DPTE ‘flow’ screen in PLP condition. 
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check that such politicians did not already exist21. See Table 2.1 for the candidates. Other information, such as 
age, occupation etc. were created from the 2010 Smith Institute report on MP demographics22. 
Table 2.1: Candidate Names, Party Affiliation, and Party Label. 
Surname, Forename Party Affiliation Party Label 
Williams, James Conservative Party 
 
Smith, Robert Labour Party 
 
Jones, Michael Liberal Democrats 
 
Candidate Policies (Attribute Items): Candidate policies were taken from the relevant party manifesto 
from the 2010 UK General Election (Manifesto Project, 2013; BBC News, 2010), and prioritized based on 
public attitude polls asking voters to rank the importance of policy categories just prior to the time of the 
experiment (e.g., when asked “Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the 
country at this time?”, 77% of the public reported [the] ‘Economy’)23.  
21 stimulus items for each candidate were constructed based on these policy categories (e.g. for ‘Economy’, 
policies on ‘Jobs’ were used, e.g., “[Labour] will guarantee people aged 18-24 a job, work experience or 
training place if they are unemployed for more than six months”), and controlled to be similar in word length, 
complexity and informational content. Each policy was assigned a value between 1-7, based on its position in 
a political ‘left-right’ continuum, with up to 7 possible options for that policy (e.g. on Deficit: Lab, Lib, and 
Con received 2, 4 or 5 respectively; for higher education fees, 1= 100% Government Funded, and 7= 100% 
Tuition Fees). Candidate policies were scored blind by the experimenter, with no knowledge of participants’ 
experimental data. For the full text of materials used, see Appendix A.3. 
                                                     
21 6 ‘Jones’s, 6 ‘Williams’s, and 10 ‘Smith’s, were MPs in the 2010 House of Commons. List of MPs elected in the United Kingdom 
general election, 2010. 
22 Who Governs Britain? - Smith Institute, 2010.  
23 YouGov (2013a). Issue Tracker (2). https://goo.gl/1L7Iog  
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Table 2.2: Attribute Text, and scores for candidates on 7-point Left-Right scale [in parentheses]. 
Attribute 
Candidate 
Williams, James (Con) Smith, Robert (Lab) Jones, Michael (Lib) 
Age 47 51 52 
Occupation 
“…works for a financial services firm in the 
private sector.” 
“…is a full-time public representative for 
local government.” 
“…is self-employed, and owns a small-
medium business.” 
Marital Status “is married to his wife Jane.” “lives with his partner, Fiona.” “is unmarried, and single.” 
Education 
“said his days at public school were his best.” “said he was proud to have gone to a state 
school.” 
“visited his old private school while 
campaigning.” 
Political Experience “has not had any political experience yet.” “is currently a local councilor for the area.” “has previously been an MP in parliament” 
Academies 
“continue the roll out of academies, and 
expand the programme to allow every 
existing school - including primaries - to seek 
Academy status.” [6] 
“will continue roll-out of Academies, and 
leave them independent of local authority 
control.” [5] 
“hopes to replace Academies with "Sponsor 
Managed Schools", to be run by educational 
charities and private providers, but under 
local authority control” [3] 
Council Tax 
“would provide funding for a two-year 
council tax freeze, and allow local residents 
to block "high" council tax rises.” [3] 
“ruled out Council Tax revaluation in the next 
Parliament, and would continue selective 
capping of "excessive" rises in council tax.” 
[2] 
“would replace the Council Tax with a Local 
Income Tax set by Local Councils, and it 
would not be capped by the Government.” [5] 
Child Tax Credits 
“will end tax credits for families earning over 
£50,000.” [3] 
“Give parents of one- and two-year-olds an 
extra £4 a week in Child Tax Credit per 
child.” [5] 
“will make the payments of tax credits for six 
months at a time so that payments are stable 
and predictable; and restrict credits to those 
that need them most” [2] 
National Deficit 
“aims to eliminate "the bulk" of the UK's 
structural deficit within five years, with 6 
billion pounds in cuts… spending cuts would 
happen in all areas, apart from health and 
foreign aid.” [5] 
“would target an increase in public spending 
over the next year, before cutting the deficit 
by more than 50% by 2014 and reducing the 
structural deficit by at least two-thirds over 
the next parliament.” [2] 
“plans to cut £15 billion per year of lower 
priority spending to protect front-line 
services, while reducing structural deficit by 
at least two-thirds over the next parliament.” 
[4] 
Elderly Care 
“wants to enable retirees to prevent their 
homes from being sold to fund residential 
care costs by paying a one-off premium of 
8,000 pounds at retirement. [He] also says 
that they would reject any proposals to fund 
care by levying charge on elderly peoples’ 
estates after death.” [5] 
“would ensure government would cover 
people's care costs after they have spent two 
years in residential care from 2014. [He] also 
wants to establish a "National Care Service" 
free at the point of use for all adults with an 
"eligible care need", with funding 
arrangements decided by a Commission by 
2015.” [2] 
“wants to establish an independent 
commission, with cross-party support, to 
develop proposals for long-term care of the 
elderly.” [4] 
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EU Membership 
“would pass a law to require a referendum on 
any future treaty that transfers power from 
Britain to the EU.” [4] 
“strongly supports continued EU membership 
for the UK.” [2] 
“would strongly support continued EU 
membership, and would opt into pan-
European justice policies.” [1] 
Euro Currency 
“would rule out joining the Euro currency if 
in government.” [5] 
“would support joining the Euro in principle, 
if approved in a referendum, but has no 
current plans to enter.” [3] 
“would support Euro membership in 
principle, but has no current plans to enter.” 
[2] 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
“wants an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050.” [2] 
“would cut greenhouse gas emissions by over 
34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050.” [3] 
“a 40% reduction in greenhouse gasses 
emissions by 2020, rising to 100% by 2050.” 
[4] 
Health Spending/NHS 
“cut the cost of NHS administration by a 
third, while increasing health spending in real 
terms every year up to 2015.” [2] 
“to protect frontline NHS from spending cuts, 
saying the NHS was a vital part of British 
life.” [1] 
“more cost-effective purchasing of drugs, 
including greater use of generic drugs, would 
be carried out to make savings in the NHS.” 
[2] 
3rd Heathrow Runway 
“would block the third runway at Heathrow 
and would also oppose second runways at 
Stansted and Gatwick Airports.” [3] 
“would support a third runway at Heathrow, 
but would oppose any extra runways at any 
other UK airport in the next Parliament.” [6] 
“wants to block a third runway at Heathrow, 
and any expansion of other airports in the 
South East.” [3] 
High Speed Rail 2 (HS2) 
“develop a high speed rail network 
connecting cities across England, Scotland 
and Wales, with the construction of the first 
stage to begin in 2015.” [5] 
“to build a new high-speed rail line, initially 
linking London to Birmingham, Manchester, 
the East Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds, and 
eventually extending to the North and 
Scotland.” [5] 
“supports Crossrail and North-South high-
speed rail, but would prefer more private 
sector funding for the plans.” [4] 
Immigration (Levels of) 
“would bring down net immigration to 1990s 
levels, and ensure only economic migrants 
who will "bring the most value to the 
economy" are admitted, but also would 
establish an annual limit for non-EU 
economic migrants… wants to apply controls 
on migrants from new countries joining the 
EU.” [5] 
“wanted to break the automatic link between 
staying in the UK for a set period and being 
able to settle or gain citizenship, and continue 
to force employers to advertise skilled 
vacancies in job centres four weeks before 
appointing a skilled immigrant from outside 
the EU… would expand the Migration 
Impacts Fund to channel money to parts of 
the country which take in the most migrants.” 
[3] 
“wanted to increase the cost to business of 
work permits for immigrant employees to pay 
for training British workers… would create 
an "earned route" to citizenship for illegal 
migrants who have been in the UK for 10 
years, who have no criminal record and speak 
English.” [4] 
Jobs/Unemployment 
“will replace current employment schemes 
with a single Work Programme via private 
and voluntary sector providers.” [5] 
“will guarantee people aged 18-24 a job, 
work experience or training place if they are 
unemployed for more than six months.” [3] 
“will introducing a new ’90-day promise’, 
instead of the current 10 months, to make 
available a place in work, training, education 
or an internship.” [2] 
‘Mansion Tax’ 
“said calls for a "mansion tax" are ridiculous, 
and is opposed to the idea.” [5] 
“a "mansion tax" of 1% on properties worth 
more than 2 million pounds will be 
introduced.” [2] 
“supported a mansion tax in principle, they 
would enact a 7% stamp duty on those whose 
properties are worth above 2 million pounds.” 
[3] 
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Nursery Care 
“supports free nursery care for pre-school 
children, offered a range of private and public 
providers.” [4] 
“promises to provide nursery places for 
20,000 two-year-olds in the most deprived 
areas by 2015, and increase free nursery 
hours to 15 hours a week for three- and four-
year-olds.” [2] 
“would be protected as it is, but when 
possible, wants to introduce free, universal 
childcare provision for children aged 18 
months-five years for 20 hours a week.” [1] 
Nuclear Power 
“wants to speed up the planning process for 
new nuclear power plants, so new plants can 
be built faster.” [4] 
“said they supported changes to the planning 
system to encourage a new generation of 
nuclear power stations to cater for energy 
demand, and supports things remaining the 
same for now.” [3] 
“opposes any new nuclear power plants being 
built.” [2] 
Pension Age 
“would bring forward the rise in the state 
pension age to 66; although no sooner than 
2016 for men and 2020 for women.” [3] 
“would increase pension age for women to 65 
in 2020, and to 68 for both men and women 
between 2024 and 2046.” [2] 
“says it should remain at current levels.” [1] 
Police 
“wants Police Crime Commissioners to have 
responsibility for strategy and budgets at an 
area specific level.” [6] 
“wants to protect "frontline" police from 
budget cuts in the next parliament.” [3] 
“would increase overall police numbers by 
3,000 over five years.” [2] 
Prisons 
“would increase prison capacity 15,000 
places, in order to scrap the early release 
scheme.” [4] 
“would add 15,000 prison places by 2014.” 
[3] 
“need to reduce the use of short sentences and 
encourage use of community sentencing, as 
the way to reduce prison overcrowding.” [2] 
3rd Level Tuition Fees 
“retain the current level of tuition fees for 
university, and give bonuses for early 
repayment of student loans.” [3] 
“will lower Tuition Fees for universities etc. 
to 6,000 pounds.” [2] 
“would retain the current level of tuition fees, 
and provide more support for graduates 
around debt repayment.” [3] 
Trident (Nuclear Defence) 
“is committed to replacing Trident to 
maintain the UK's independent nuclear 
deterrent.” [4] 
“is committed to replacing Trident to 
maintain the UK's independent nuclear 
deterrent.” [4] 
“would rule out the like-for-like replacement 
of the Trident nuclear weapons system, and 
halve the UKs stockpile of nuclear warheads 
as a prelude to kick-starting multilateral 
disarmament.” [3] 
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Post-Ballot/Decision Questionnaire: Following their vote choice, participants were asked the questions 
contained in Table 2.3, and also how realistic they found the campaign and candidates, and if there were ways 
to improve it to make it more reflective of a typical UK election campaign.  
Table 2.3: Post-Ballot Box Questionnaire; text and scale points.  
Question Scale End-Point ‘Text Anchor’ 
“How 'believable' or realistic were the 
candidates you experienced?” 
0 ‘Not at all Believable’ – 100 ‘Completely 
Believable’ 
“If you had more time to learn about the 
candidates running in this election, how 
confident are you that you would still vote for the 
same person?” 
0 ‘Not at all Confident’ – 100 ‘Completely 
Confident’ 
How confident are you that the person you chose 
best reflects the type of person you want 
representing you? 
0 ‘Not at all Confident’ – 100 ‘Completely 
Confident’ 
How difficult was it for you to decide how to vote 
for your choice? 
0 ‘Not at all Difficult’ – 100 ‘Extremely 
Difficult’ 
Briefly, what was the most important reason you 
decided to vote for the candidate you supported 
in the election? 
Free Text Answer 
 
 Procedure 
The study was conducted in individual lab cubicles at UCL, with the experimenter in a separate adjoining 
room. Participants were given a brief overview of the experiment, whereupon they were invited to sign a 
consent form and begin. 
Participants first read an introductory message on screen consisting of an overview of the study’s main 
stages, and requirements for each one. Upon continuing, participants completed three questionnaires 
measuring their ‘political sophistication’, ‘rate of civic involvement’ and other political behaviours (i.e. ‘media 
viewing habits’) – these are not the focus of the current discussion.  
After completion of the questionnaires, participants were presented with instructions on the software’s 
operation, and the experimental voting task, before proceeding to engage in a practice trial featuring two 
candidates (Ken Livingstone & Boris Johnston, 2012 London Mayoral candidates), with four stimulus items 
(none relating to main experimental stimuli) per candidate. After completion of the practice experiment, 
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participants proceeded to the main experiment. Upon making their vote choice, participants completed a further 
2 questionnaires (‘Need for Cognition 5Q’, ‘Need to Evaluate 16Q’)24 as well as completing a policy attitude 
survey relating to the 21 policy attributes that appeared for each candidate (21 questions), before being 
debriefed as to the purpose of the experiment and paid. 
 
Correct-Voting Measure: Participants’ policy preferences are compared with each candidate’s policies 
using their responses to the policy attitude survey. The overall distance between their preferences and the 
policies offered by candidates are calculated using the Euclidian calculations for the distance (d) between two 
points in (n) dimensions:  
𝑑 𝑞𝑝 =   𝑞𝑥1− 𝑝𝑥1 2 +  𝑞𝑥2− 𝑝𝑥2 2 … +  𝑞𝑥𝑛− 𝑝𝑥𝑛 2 =    𝑥𝑞𝑖−𝑥𝑞𝑖 
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
d(qp) is the distance between the participant p and the candidate (alternative) q over the values for each 
policy issue Xi. These positions are given by participants’ responses to the 21 question policy attitude survey 
and the candidates’ values for each policy on the ‘left-right’ continuum25. An end-product value of ‘0’ between 
a candidate and a voter indicates a perfectly proximal (overlapping) preference-distance, with an increasingly 
positive (due to the squared difference) value reflecting relative distance away from each other. For example: 
if a person scores ‘1’ for Candidate A, and ‘2’ for Candidate B, and ‘6’ for Candidate C, we can say A is closer 
to B, and B is closer to A than C. 
Determining the Correct Choice: From the above calculations, we already have a ranked objective 
measure of whom a participant should have voted for (e.g. A, as A<B<C). If a participant voted for the most 
proximal candidate available to them in the ‘election’, it was deemed a ‘correct’ vote, otherwise, they voted 
‘incorrectly’. In the event of a participant being equally close to two or more of the candidates, a vote for either 
of them was treated as voting ‘correctly’.  
                                                     
24 We do not address the use of these measures any further in our results or discussion. 
25 We do not capture participant’s decision-weights for inclusion in the distance calculation here, as equal-weight models have been 
shown to approximate the performance of optimally weighted decision models (Dawes, 1979). However, we do so in subsequent 
experiments (Experiments 3 & 4), finding no meaningful differences in the pattern of results following on their inclusion. 
61 
 
Alternative Distance (Similarity): Using the Euclidian scores of candidate distance relative to the voter 
(who lies at the origin in N-dimension space), we computed the ‘distance’ (or difference) from the ‘best’ 
alternative in the choice set (based on proximity) to the ‘next best’ in the choice set. Where the resulting values 
trend towards ‘0’, distances between the two ‘best’ alternatives will be small; the converse also being true. For 
brevity, we refer to this as ‘distance BNB’. 
 Results 
 
The Labour candidate was the most popular in our experiment (60% of votes), followed by Conservative 
(21%), Liberal Democrat (8%), None of those on ballot (8%) and Abstain/Spoil (3%). 
We examined the relationship between Vote Choice and Number of Candidates. The moderate relationship 
between these variables was significant, 2(4, N= 136) = 15.72, p = .003, ϕc= .338. This is as expected: a 
lack of a 3rd (LibDem) candidate in 2-Candidate conditions will create a significant effect, as there will be 
no LibDem votes. There was no relationship between Vote Choice and Party Label, 2 (4, N= 136) = 2.75, 
p= .601, ϕc= .141.  
 
Figure 2.3: % Vote Choice per candidate condnition 
 
We removed all participants who responded ‘Abstain’ or ‘Don’t Know’ from our analyses (N=16), leaving 
120 participants in our sample. This led to unequal cell sizes in our data, therefore we also compare our results 
to a bootstrapped sample (r= 10,000).  There are no meaningful deviations from the reported results unless we 
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mention them in footnotes where appropriate. As outlined in Section 2.1.3, we also calculated correct voting 
(CV) using the directional method. There are no meaningful differences in our results using either the 
directional or proximity model of CV in our results, unless mentioned in footnotes. For supporting analyses, 
see Appendix A.2. 
Using binary logistic regression, we regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) on our main condition 
variables, with Party Label (PL: Absent, Present) and Number of Candidates (NOC: 2CAN, 3CAN) entered in 
Block 1, and their interaction term in Block 2. The regression model containing PL and No. of Candidates was 
significant, 2(2)= 14.93, p= .001, R2= 16.8%, and predicted 68.3% of the overall cases correctly. Adding the 
interaction term did significantly improve the model (p= .036). We report the full model in Table 2.4, 2(3)= 
19.34, p< .001, R2= 21.4%. 
Table 2.4: Logistic Regression results of Party Label and Number of Candidates on CV rates. (N=120). 
Predictor  SE  e 
Party Label (PLA) 1.77** .83 4.52 5.91 
NOC (2CAN) -.77 .56 1.88 .464 
PL*NOC -1.98** 1.00 3.92 .137 
Constant 1.05** .41 6.62 2.87 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. *** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
The main effect of PL did not significantly predict CV, = .50, p= .24, with participants 1.6 times more 
likely to vote correctly when party label is present. The main effect of NOC did significantly predict CV,  = 
-1.53, p= .001, with participants being 78% less likely to vote correctly when the number of candidates in the 
choice set increases from 2 to 3. 85.1% of participants voted correctly when the choice set contained 2 
candidates, whereas 54.7% of participants voted correctly when choice set contained 3 candidates (see Figure 
2.4). 
The interaction term was significant, = -1.98 p= .048, therefore we analysed the effect of PLP/A for 2 vs. 3 
candidates separately. In the 2CAN condition, participants voted correctly 74.2% of the time when PLA, and 
94.4% of the time when PLP; which is significant, (1, 67)= 5.38, p= .02. In the 3CAN condition, participants 
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vote correctly 57.1% of the time when PLA, and 52.0% of the time when PLP, the difference between conditions 
being non-significant, (1, 53)= .14, p= .70 (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4: % Correct Voting by condition 
Chance Level Analysis: The significant effect of number of candidates would of course be expected 
even if participants were choosing candidates at random, due to the fewer options available in the 2-
Candidate condition. We therefore compared rates of CV to chance levels in these conditions, collapsing 
across party label conditions. 85.1% of participants voted correctly in the 2-candidate condition (greater than 
the 50% expected by chance, p< .001), whilst the 54.7% of participants voting correctly in the 3-candidate 
condition did not differ significantly from chance levels (33%; p= .67). Thus, the influence of increasing the 
number of candidates on levels of CV cannot be explained solely on the basis of a difference in chance 
levels. Note that we are not claiming that participants are choosing randomly in the 3-Can condition; simply 
that based on their own reported policy preferences they choose the correct candidate no better than if by 
chance. 
 
Overall participants found the candidates in the experiment believable (= 67.23, SD= 18.90), had 
confidence in their vote choice (= 55.18, SD= 20.17), were confident they would not change their vote (= 
65.34, SD= 19.34), and felt making their vote choice was not especially difficult (= 42.48, SD= 24.44). 
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We carried out a multi-variate ANOVA on all four measures, finding only number of candidates had a 
significant effect averaged across all the dependent variables, Pillai’s Trace V= .09, F(4, 112)= 2.77, p= .03, 
ηp²= .09. Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that this effect was only significant for how confident 
participants were in their vote choice, F(1, 119)= 6.26, p= .014, ηp²= .054. Participants’ confidence in their 
choice is lower in the 2-candidate condition (= 50.91, SD= 20.69) than in the 3-candidate condition (= 
60.51, SD= 18.34), suggesting participants are more confident in their choice as the choice set size increases. 
See Figure 2.5 for all variables by PL and NOC. 
 
Figure 2.5: Post-Ballot Measures by Condition. Bars are +/- SD. 
 
Vote confidence appears to increase significantly when the numbers of candidates in the choice set 
increases, which itself negatively predictive of correct voting rates. We test if increasing confidence may be 
mediating the effect of NOC on CV26. While NOC is predictive of levels of vote confidence, , p= .013, 
vote confidence is not predictive of CV, , p= .35. 
 
                                                     
26 As a check, CV was also regressed on all the post-ballot variables, noting none significantly predicted CV; though ‘perceived 
difficulty’ was marginally significant (p= .052) and bootstrapping improves this to p= .038. NOC remains negatively predictive (p= 
.005).  
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We regressed ‘distance BNB’ (centered on its mean) as a predictor variable on CV, finding it was negatively 
associated with the likelihood of voting correctly but not significantly, = -.15, p= .93. Thus, the similarity of 
the proximal candidate and the second-most proximal candidate does not predict rates of correct voting, 
suggesting conflict arising from their similarity does not affect the ability to vote correctly. 
Correlations of ‘best-next-best’ distance: Distance from the ‘Best’ to the ‘Next Best’ option in the choice 
set was not significantly correlated with vote-choice difficulty (r= .002, p= .98); nor was it significantly 
correlated with how confident participants were they would not change their vote given more time (r= -.05, p= 
.55). This suggests that increasing similarity between the two most similar alternatives (presumably the most 
‘attractive’ options in the choice set) does not relate to how difficult participants found the vote choice. 
Likewise, alternative similarity is unrelated to how confident participants would not switch their vote choice; 
though the negative relationship is in line with the idea that decreasing distance (increasing similarity) would 
lead greater uncertainty in the decision.  
However, distance was significantly negatively correlated with how confident people were in their vote 
choice, r= -.24, p= .01, suggesting that as the two candidates most proximal to a voter’s ideal point become 
closer or ‘more similar’, participants become more confident in their vote. This may be as a result of 
participants feeling that ‘they can’t go wrong’ in their choice, given the relatively small size of the choice sets 
used (2 and 3 alternatives) compared to other studies (e.g. 24 alternatives). 
 
We find that PL is not significantly predictive of correct voting, whereas NOC does significantly predict 
CV, with participants more likely to vote incorrectly as the choice set size increases. Rates of CV do differ 
significantly from chance in the 2-candidate condition, whereas they do not in the 3-candidate condition. We 
find an interaction between PL and NOC, such that highest rates of correct voting occur when there are 2 
candidates and PL is present (94%), but lowest when there are 3 candidates and PL is present (52.0%).  
There is a difference in how confident participants are about their vote, with participants feeling 
significantly more confident in their vote choice when there are 3 candidates compared to 2 candidates, with 
no significant differences in perceived choice difficulty.  
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Similarity (as measured by the distance between the two most proximal alternatives) of alternatives in the 
choice set to the participant is not predictive of CV and is not correlated with how difficult participants found 
their choice, or how confident they were in sticking with their choice. Similarity was correlated with how 
confidence participants were in their vote, with increasing similarity between the two most proximal candidates 
correlating with greater levels of vote confidence. 
 Discussion 
In discussing our findings, we refer back to our original hypotheses: 
H1: That rates of ‘correct voting’ will decrease when the number of candidates (alternatives) increases 
from 2 to 3. 
Our analysis showed a strong relationship between CV and Number of Candidates. Indeed, we showed that 
in 3-Candidate conditions, voters chose the candidate who best represented their policy levels at a level no 
better than chance. Rational theories of choice would predict CV will remain unchanged with larger numbers 
of vote-choice alternatives, with increasing alternatives to choose from increasing the probability of an option 
appealing that best matches a voters’ preferences.  
However, we know from findings in decision-making research that increasing the numbers of alternatives 
in a choice set increases the difficulty of the choice task (Johnson & Payne, 1985), due to increased information 
search requirements. This subsequently leads to the use of different decision-making strategies, which can 
result in different choices being made. It nonetheless seems striking that such a small increase to three 
alternatives leads to such a large effect on voters’ ability to vote correctly (85.1% to 54.7%), given in real-
world elections increases from two to nine alternatives decrease correct voting from 79% to 57% respectively 
(Lau et al., 2013). Contrary to Lau et al.’s (2013) results from real-world elections, we find participants do not 
do better than chance in a controlled laboratory-based study when there are 3 alternatives in the choice set.  
H2: That ‘correct voting’ will decrease when Party Label (party identity) information is available. 
H3: That H1 and H2 will have multiplicative effects, such that the effect of excluding Party Label will be 
greater in the 3-candidate condition, due to the enhanced task complexity. 
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We observed no support for H2. This was a simplified laboratory version of a real-world voting task, 
potentially reducing the need to rely on cognitive shortcuts such as the party label heuristic. We predict that 
such effects might be stronger in more complex scenarios, where task demands are greater. The lack of an 
effect, however, given the weight to it in the literature, suggests the importance of investigating this issue 
further. 
It is also the case that in the present study, the candidate attributes were highly stereotypic, reinforced 
through the addition of candidates’ ‘personal information’ (e.g. their school education and occupation). This 
should have made the candidates’ party affiliation readily apparent even in the absence of a party label. This 
might account for the lack of a significant overall effect of Party Label but does not explain the interaction 
effect (H3) with Number of Candidates.  
Contrary to H3, we find that there is no significant difference between the 3-candidate conditions whether 
party label is absent or present (57% vs 52%, respectively), but rather that correct voting is significantly higher 
(94%) when there are 2 candidates and party label is present, compared to when it is absent (74%). This is 
contrary to H2 and H3. This suggests any effect of party label may be strongest when choice sets are smaller. 
Our results suggest that party label exerts a positive effect on correct voting rates, in that CV rates are higher 
when it is present than when it is absent. 
Given the nature of the candidates used in the 2-candidate condition, this may not be unsurprising. The 
Labour and Conservative candidates are generally divergent on many issues, and it may be that this becomes 
apparent to participants as they learn about them during the flow stage, decreasing the perceived complexity 
of the task. The addition of party labels may encourage participants to engage in a matching-strategy with their 
own preferences, and may reduce the need for participants to engage in effortful learning about the alternatives. 
Of those in the 2-Can/PLP condition 30.6% self-identified as closest to Labour and 8.3% Conservative, 
19.4% as Liberal Democrat, 27.8% as Green Party, 5.6% ‘None of the Above’, and 8.3% ‘Don’t Know’. Given 
the low amount of participants unsure of which party they may be closest to, the high rates of CV in this 
condition may be resulting from the task being too easy- in that is obvious whom they are (or are not) closest 
to in terms of policy. However, this does not explain why the combined 82% of participants in the 3-Can/PLP 
who felt closest to either Labour, Conservative, or Liberal Democrats does not align with the correct voting 
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rate (52%). There are two possibilities besides increased task complexity; the first being that participants’ 
policy preferences may not align with their preferred party’s stances, leading to incorrect voting. Party label 
can be a useful cue, but only if it aligns well with a candidate’s policies, and the voter’s. In our case, party 
label does match the candidates’ policies as they are derived from the real-world policies of each. The second 
is that the addition of the Liberal Democrats may result in preference violations (i.e. context effects) as 
discussed in Chapter 1. We explore this possibility in Chapter 4. 
We also find that participants’ confidence in their vote choice is higher as choice set size increases and that 
participants are more confident as the ‘best’ and ‘next-best’ candidates become closer in n-dimensional policy 
space. Under rational models of decision-making, such a finding makes sense; as choice set size increases, the 
likelihood of an alternative (candidate) that better approximates a voter’s preferences also increases. Further, 
as two options come closer together and are more similar, the more likely choosing either will satisfy a voter’s 
preferences; in a 2-candidate choice set the choice becomes arbitrary, and in the 3-candidate set a choice even 
at random will satisfy preferences 2/3rds of the time. While both of our measures of confidence are negatively 
correlated with perceived choice difficulty, difficulty did not seem significantly affected by either of our 
condition manipulations nor by how similar options are. One might expect perceived difficulty to increase 
following an increase in choice set size (as per Johnson & Payne, 1985), and they did differ, with perceived 
difficulty higher in the 3-candidate condition (, SD=21.97; vs. = 36.48, SD= 26.03), albeit non-
significantly. Among those pursuing a ‘satisficing’ strategy (Bearden & Connolly, 2008; Simon, 1978), 
difficulty should not increase from the increasing similarity of alternative, as any choice becomes increasingly 
as ‘good’ (or correct) as another, unless the motivation to discriminate among options is high. We do not ask 
participants directly to vote ‘correctly’, or motivate them in any overt way to discriminate between options 
beyond choosing a candidate to vote for. Therefore, it is possible that participants are following a satisficing 
strategy when choosing a candidate. 
In real-world voting with multiple parties and candidates, strategic voting concerns (e.g. electability; Blais 
& Gschwend, 2011) complicate things further. This is highly unlikely to have been a concern in the present 
study, as our election scenarios stressed candidates were equally ‘tied in the polls’, thus reflecting equal 
likelihood of election at the time. We discuss these further in the chapter, and in the general discussion (Chapter 
5). 
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Given the contradictory nature of our results in comparisons to what was expected given much of the 
literature on partisanship and choice overload, we decided to attempt to replicate these results in a further 
experiment. 
 Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we found support for our first hypothesis that the number of candidates in the choice set 
would affect correct voting, with participants voting less correctly when the number of candidates increased 
from 2 to 3. Therefore, we conduct an additional experiment to test if the results replicate.  
Methods 
 Participants 
Participants were native English speakers and eligible to vote in the UK local or parliamentary elections before 
enrolment in the study. 105 participants (70 female), aged 18-52 (μ= 20.54 years), were recruited. Participants 
were mostly single (74.3%); students (96.2%); self-identifying as ‘White-British’ (40%) or ‘White-Other’ 
(14.3%); and with an income under £10,000 per annum (78.1%). Participants were paid £4 for participating. 
Ethical approval was granted from UCL (CPB/2010/10). 
Randomisation led to some imbalance in cell sizes (2Can- PLA: 25; 3Can-PLA: 29; 2Can- PLP: 24, 3Can-
PLP: 32). 
 Design, Materials, and Procedure 
The design, procedure, and materials, used were the same as those in Experiment 1, with the exception that 
we removed the candidate-specific personal attribute items (e.g. candidate’s education history, marital status, 
age, etc.) from the presentation in the flow stage. These items are not included in how we calculate CV and 
were originally included to increase candidate ‘believability’ to participants. Also, personal information about 
candidates might lead to participants forming stereotypical views of candidates, which may undermine the 
effect of party label, and/or be used as cues in candidate evaluation. As the alternative is to include these items 
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and capture participants’ appraisals/preferences for each, we elect to be consistent with our conception of 
correct voting as being based on policy preferences only27. 
 Results 
 
The Labour candidate was the most popular in our experiment (48.6% of votes), followed by Conservative 
(25.7%), Liberal Democrat (14.3%), None of those on the ballot (3.8%) and Abstain/Spoil (7.6%). This is 
shown in Figure 2.6. 
We examined the relationship between Vote Choice and Number of Candidates. The strong relationship 
between these variables was significant, 2(4, N= 105) = 17.98, p = .001, ϕc= .414. This is as expected: a lack 
of a 3rd (LibDem) candidate in 2-Candidate conditions will create a significant effect, as there will be no 
LibDem votes. There was no relationship between Vote Choice and Party Label, 2 (4, N= 105) = 3.78, p= 
.436, ϕc= .19.  
 
Figure 2.6: % Vote Choice by candidate condition 
 
                                                     
27 It is worth stating that voters only fall back on "demographic cues" (Popkin, 1991, 63); such as their similarity to a candidate’s 
age, gender, race, cultural membership, and educational background; in order to estimate candidates’ ideological positions when such 
information is not available, or voters do not have opinions on the issues, or don’t have strongly held partisanship priors. None of which 
are an issue in our studies. While gender (McDermott, 1997; Fulton & Ondercin, 2012), and a combination of race and gender (Philpot 
and Walton, 2007), has a significant impact on voting decisions, we control for all of these, as all our candidates are male and White 
British. 
 
71 
 
 
We removed all participants who responded ‘Abstain’ or ‘Don’t Know’ from our analyses (N=16), leaving 
94 participants in our sample. This led to unequal cell sizes in our data, therefore for we also compare our 
results (where possible) to a bootstrapped sample (r= 10,000).  Where there are meaningful deviations from 
the reported results, we note them in footnotes.  
We regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) on the group variables Party Label (PL) and Number of 
Candidates (NOC), entering these in Block 1, and their interaction term in Block 2. The regression model 
containing PL & No. of Candidates was significant, p= .009, R2= 12.8%, and predicted 64.5% of the overall 
cases correctly. The addition of the PL & NOC interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= 
.28), which was significant overall, p= .015, R2= 14.2%, and predicted 64.5% of the overall cases correctly. 
We report the overall model in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Logistic Regression results of Party Label and Number of Candidates on CV rates. N= 93. 
Predictor  SE  e 
Party Label (PLA) .40 .65 .39 1.5 
NOC (2CAN) -1.60** .66 5.78 .20 
PL*NOC .96 .90 1.13 2.62 
Constant .442 .43 1.07 1.55 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. ** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
Looking at our main-effects, NOC significantly predicted CV, = -.1.10, p= .015, with participants being 
77% less likely to vote correctly when the number of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. When 
there are 2 candidates in the choice set, participants vote correctly 65.1% of the time, and 42% of the time 
when there are 3 candidates. Additionally, in this experiment, PL significantly predicted CV, = .92, p= .041, 
with participants 2.5 times more likely to vote correctly when PL is present (differing from Experiment 1). 
When PLA, participants vote correctly 43.2% of the time, and 61.2% of the time when PLP.  
Despite the non-significant interaction term, in light of H3, we analysed the effect of PLP/A for 2 vs. 3 
candidates separately. In contrast to Experiment 1, in the 2-Can condition there was no effect of Party Label 
on CV, 2(1, 43)= .39, p= .53, ϕc= .09, where CV is 60.9% when PLA and 70% when PLP. Again differing from 
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Experiment 1, there was a significant effect of PL on CV in the 3-Can condition, 2(1, 49)= 4.92, p= .027, ϕc= 
.131, where CV increases from 23.8% when PL is absent to 55.2% when PL is present. The pattern of results 
is shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7: % CV rates by condition 
Chance Level Analysis: The significant effect of number of candidates would, of course, be expected even 
if participants were choosing candidates at random, due to the fewer options available in the 2-Candidate 
condition. We compared rates of CV to chance levels in these conditions, collapsing across party label 
conditions. 65.1% of participants voted correctly in the 2-candidate condition at rates non-significantly 
different from chance (50%), p= .15. This is in contrast to Experiment 1, where CV rates were greater than 
chance levels in the 2-candidate condition.  
The 42% of participants voting correctly in the 3-candidate condition did not differ significantly from 
chance levels (33%; p= .47). Thus, the influence of the number of candidates on levels of CV could be 
explained on the basis of choosing at chance levels. Again, we are not claiming that participants are choosing 
randomly; simply that based on their own reported policy preferences they choose the correct candidate no 
better than if by chance.  
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Overall participants found the candidates in the experiment believable (= 66.27, SD= 16.85), had 
confidence in their vote choice (= 53.15, SD= 17.52), had confidence they would not change their vote (= 
58.36, SD= 20.11), and felt making their vote choice was of medium difficulty (= 48.02, SD= 25.02). 
We carried out a multi-variate ANOVA on all four measures, finding neither Party Label (PL), number of 
candidates (NOC), nor their interaction term, had a significant effect averaged across all the dependent 
variables. NOC was significant for how confident participants were that they would not change their vote 
choice given more time, F(1, 90)= 4.28, p= .041, ηp²= .045. Participants’ confidence they wouldn’t change is 
higher in the 2-candidate condition (= 63.07, SD= 18.19) than in the 3-candidate condition (= 54.23, SD= 
19.12).  The means and standard deviations are similar across all groups and are shown graphically in Figure 
2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8: Post-Ballot Measures by condition. Bars are +/- SD. 
 
While we found no significant differences between our conditions for any of our post-ballot box measures, 
in keeping with our discussion around confidence and difficult in Experiment 1, we regressed the post-ballot 
measures of vote confidence, believability, and difficulty, on CV. The model was not significant, 2(7) =9.41, 
p= .22, explaining 13% of the variance in CV, and correctly classifying 64.5% of the cases We found no 
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significant effect of any of the variables on CV, and note in passing that PL and NOC remain significant (= 
.94, p=.04; =-.53, p =.021) after controlling for all these post-ballot measures. 
 
We regressed ‘distance BNB’ (centered on its mean) as a predictor variable on CV, finding it was positively 
associated with the likelihood of voting correctly, = .36, p= .039, indicating participants were 1.43 times more 
likely to vote correctly as the distance between the two most proximal alternatives increases. We re-ran the 
previous regression model, including ‘distance BNB’ (centered on its mean) as a predictor variable with PL 
and NOC in Block 2, their 2-way interaction terms in Block 3, and their 3-way interaction term in Block 4.  
Our regression model for Block 2 was significant, 2(3) = 12.21, p= .007, R2= 16.4%, and correctly 
classifying 66.7% of the cases. Increasing distance between the ‘best’ and ‘next-best’ alternatives was non-
significantly associated with the likelihood of voting correctly, = .29, p= .09; indicating the effect was non-
significant when controlling for the main effects of NOC and PL. PL was marginally significant, = .86, p= 
.0628, with participants 2.35 times more likely to vote correctly when PL is present after controlling for 
distance; NOC was significant, = -1.02, p= .026, with participants 65% less likely to vote correctly when 
there are 3 candidates.  
Adding the interactions between our condition variables and the distance between alternatives in Block 3 
did not significantly improve our model (p= .16), nor did the addition of a three-way interaction in Block 4 
(p=. 38). The overall model was significant, 2(7) = 18.21, p= .012, R2= 23.5%, which we report in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6: Logistic Regression results of ‘distance’ between ‘best’ and ‘next best’ options on CV rates. (N= 93) 
Predictor  SE  e 
Distance .80* .45 3.19 2.24 
Party Label (PLA) .38 .80 .23 1.47 
NOC (2CAN) -1.91** .76 6.22 .26 
PL*NOC 1.08 1.04 1.08 2.96 
Dist*PL -1.11* .63 3.05 .330 
                                                     
28 Bootstrapped sample (r=10,000) estimates p= .051. 
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Dist*NOC -.21 .63 .11 .81 
Dist*PL*NOC .73 .84 .75 2.08 
Constant 1.01 .48 4.44 2.74 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. ** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
Distance & Post-Ballot Box: Increasing distance was not significantly correlated with ‘candidate 
believability’ (r=-.06, p= .56); nor with ‘vote confidence’ (r=.06, p= .57); nor with ‘confident wouldn’t change’ 
(r=.11, p= .27); nor with ‘perceived choice difficulty’ (r= -.06, p= .59). 
 
In contrast with results from Experiment 1, we find that PL is significantly predictive of correct voting with 
participants more likely to vote correctly when PL is present. NOC significantly predicts CV, with participants 
more likely to vote incorrectly as the choice set size increases, however, rates of CV do not differ significantly 
from chance in either the 2-candidate condition (differing from Experiment 1) or 3-candidate condition (similar 
to Experiment 1). We find no significant interaction between PL and NOC. The highest rates of correct voting 
occur when PL is present and there are 2 candidates (70%), but least when PL is absent and there are 3 
candidates (23.8%).  
Unlike Experiment 1, distance (or similarity) between the two ‘best’ candidates based on participants’ self-
reported preferences was positively predictive of correct voting, in that the more similar alternatives became 
the more likely participants were to correctly vote. In addition, the main effects of PL and NOC remain after 
controlling for distance/similarity between the 2 ‘best’ alternatives. 
We find no difference in vote confidence, candidate believability, or perceived difficulty, across our 
conditions and none were predictive of correct voting. 
 Discussion 
H1: That rates of ‘correct voting’ will decrease when the number of candidates (alternatives) increases 
from 2 to 3. 
As per Experiment 1, we find rates of correct voting decrease when the number of candidates increases 
from 2 to 3 in our replication study (65.1% to 42%). In contrast to Experiment 1, we find that CV rates were 
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no better than chance in the 2-candidate condition (65.1% vs. 50%) where originally they were greater than 
chance levels. The only major changes between Experiments 1 and 2 were the participants themselves and the 
removal of the candidates’ personal information. Overall, the demographics of our participants are highly 
similar, as were their prior party preferences and their vote choices at our ‘ballot box’, therefore we do not see 
this as a plausible explanation.  
We removed items containing ‘personal information’ of the candidates, 15 items in total (10 in the 2-
candidate condition with an additional 5 from the 3-candidate condition). On a purely information-processing 
level, we would not expect this to affect results, as we scale the time spent in the flow stage to the number of 
items presented, therefore allowing participants comparable amounts of time to process the information. 
However, they could have been providing additional information that was somehow diagnostic to a candidate’s 
policy stands (though efforts were taken for them to be as non-stereotypic as possible.  
One would suspect that the removal of attribute information from each candidate would decrease the task 
complexity, especially in the 2-candidate condition, and thus should not affect the previously high CV rates in 
the smaller choice set. However, it may be participants were utilizing candidates’ personal information in 
Experiment 1 to discern either candidate ideology/partisanship, or as cues in their own right, in aiding them in 
making a correct vote for a candidate. Without this information, participants may be engaging in more effortful 
decision-strategies, and experiencing greater task demands- leading to decreases in correct voting. While do 
not know the nature of participant’s information search or processing, we address this point in Chapter 3. 
H2: That ‘correct voting’ will decrease when Party Label (party identity) information is available. 
We obtained the opposite to predicted findings for H2 in this experiment, with party label exerting a positive 
effect such that when it is present correct voting increases (61%), compared to when it is absent (43%). We 
mused on the possibility of party label aiding participants in making a correct vote in the Discussion section 
of Experiment 1 due to the correct voting pattern, finding direct evidence of such in Experiment 2. 
Given that candidate information (age, gender, race, cultural membership, and educational background) can 
be used to estimate candidates’ ideological positions when such information is not available (Popkin, 1991), 
our removal of such for Experiment 2 may have resulted in party label having a much greater effect, serving 
its purpose as a stereotypic schema or ‘proxy’ for candidates’ beliefs, values, and policies. One would think as 
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our correct voting measure is only based on values for our experimental candidates and participants’ self-
reports, the addition of party labels could not provide any additionally useful information to participants in 
making their decision. However, party label may still act as a heuristic by guiding participants to explore those 
options that they are most likely to agree with in greater depth, perhaps by a form of confirmatory search. 
H3: That H1 and H2 will have multiplicative effects, such that the effect of excluding Party Label will be 
greater in the 3-candidate condition, due to the enhanced task complexity. 
We found no support for H3 in this study, with trends in the opposite direction. Participants vote correctly 
at the highest rates when party label is present and there are 2 candidates in the choice set (70%), and lowest 
when there are 3-candidates and party label is absent (23.8%). This is similar to Experiment 1, where the 
highest rates of correct voting were when party label was present and there were 2 candidates; while CV rates 
were lowest in Experiment 1 when there were 3-candidates and party label was present. Comparing across all 
conditions between Experiments 1 and 2, we do see an overall drop in correct voting rates; PLA-2CAN (74.2% 
-> 60%); PLA-3CAN (57.1% -> 23.8%); PLP-2CAN (94.4% -> 70%); with the exception of 3CAN-PLP (52% 
-> 55.2%). There are some possible explanations, the most obvious being the removal of candidates’ ‘personal 
information’ items (age, marital status, education, political experience, & occupation), which may have been 
decreasing reliance on party label. More complex tasks where there is less diagnostic information should 
increase reliance on party label as a heuristic. We can observe this in the pattern of our results, with candidate 
conditions with party label present having higher CV rates than those with party label absent. 
An alternative view may be that the addition of candidates’ personal information items in Experiment 1 
made the overall decision-process more difficult and effortful, by including extra information that required 
participants (if they wished) to compare between alternatives. If so we would expect perceived difficulty to be 
lower in Experiment 2 following their removal, whereas in fact perceived difficulty is slightly higher in 
Experiment 1 (=48.02 vs. =42.48). While the results are not significant, when party label is absent, 
perceived difficulty increases as number of candidates increases, as one would expect due to the expected 
complexity of increasing choice set size, with resulting decreases in correct voting (PLA-2CAN: 60% vs.PLA-
3CAN: 23.8%). However, when party label is present participants perceive their vote choice as more difficult 
when there are 2 candidates (= 54.10) compared to 3 candidates (= 46.07; p> .05), while correct voting rates 
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are higher in the PLP-2CAN (70%) versus PLP-3CAN (55.2%). That said, perceived choice difficulty is a 
subjective measure, not an objective measure, and simply reporting something was difficult does not 
necessarily translate to poor performance. We note that participants are also more confident in their vote choice 
when there are 3 candidates and party label is present (vs. 2 candidates); it may be that in enlarged choice sets 
party label is a reassurance for voters in the choice they made- decreasing perceived difficulty and raising 
confidence in their choice. No consistent pattern that may relate to correct voting emerges at the descriptive 
level for any of our post-ballot measures, and none of the variables were predictive of correct voting. 
Our measure of alternative similarity, the distance between the two most proximal alternatives, was 
positively predictive of CV, unlike in Experiment 1. In other words, as the two alternatives that were closest 
to participants converged, or became ‘more similar’, participants were less likely to vote correctly. Others have 
predicted task complexity will increase following an increase in the similarity between attractive alternatives 
(e.g. Scheibehenne et al. 2010; Sela, Berger, & Liu, 2009), leading to negative outcomes. Our results support 
this conclusion when correct voting is our outcome measure. However, as we do not ask participants for their 
appraisal of the alternatives, it is hard to tell if participants see this convergence as ‘all options are equally 
good’ (attractive), ‘all options are equally bad’ (unattractive), or otherwise. 
 Importantly, our main effect of number of candidates holds after controlling for alternative 
distance/similarity, with party label nearing significance at = .05 (bootstrapped sample); suggesting the 
negative effects of expanding choice sets, and the positive effects of party label, occur despite 
similarity/proximity between the two best alternatives. There are two views of how party label may operate in 
a scenario where both ‘most proximal’ alternatives are increasingly similar (e.g. in a 2-candidate race); firstly, 
if similar in every aspect, party label should not matter- as choosing either alternative is functionally equivalent. 
However, if alternatives are similar in nearly, but not all, aspects party label may be the only obvious 
individuating cue between them, reducing decision errors (e.g. by attending to some, but not all information 
that may prove diagnostic).  
Considering our aim to make our experiments as ‘real’ as possible, removing personal information for 
candidates may seem counter to this. In real world voting tasks, it is arguable either way that a voter takes into 
account a candidate’s age, marital status, education, and employment history (and so on). Undoubtedly for 
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differing kinds of voters these will be weighted more heavily than others, acting perhaps as simpler proxies 
for more complex policy stances (e.g. ‘if X worked in the NHS, I can presume he is supportive of retaining the 
NHS, which I agree with’). Indeed, it is also plausible that voters care, or ‘weight’ issues (attributes), 
differently. For example, one might care more about the NHS than about education. We address the issue of 
attribute weighting in the next section, where we discuss refining correct voting. 
Refining Correct Voting: A more fundamental question is around the accuracy of our correct voting (CV) 
measure in establishing a ‘correct vote’ based on a voter’s preferences. CV is a complex concept, and 
measurable in multiple ways (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). The conclusions presented here reflect the measure that 
we chose, and we have outlined our rationale for that previously (section 2.1.3, this chapter). The degree to 
which these conclusions are robust across different potential measures is yet to be seen, and worthy of 
investigation. For example, one issue not considered in the previous two experiments was the relative 
importance (weighting) of each policy item to voters, an issue that we are address in Experiment Three. While 
this is potentially a limitation of Experiments 1 and 2, within judgment analysis research equal-weight models 
have been shown to approximate the performance of optimally weighted decision models (Dawes, 1979). It 
may, nevertheless, be the case that a single issue dominates a participants’ preference, and we were unable to 
assess that in the current study. It is also debatable whether weights should be created from participants judging 
policy importance independently (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006), or in relation to each other, or generating 
importance weights implicitly. 
 Experiment 3 
The main change in this experiment compared to the previous two experiments is the capturing and 
inclusion of participants’ decision-weights in the calculation of participants’ ‘correct vote’. In all other respects 
we keep the same methods and materials as those for Experiments 1 & 2.  
Our initial hypothesis remains the same, namely:  
H1: That rates of ‘correct voting’ will decrease when candidates (alternatives) increase from 2 to 3. 
Given our findings that correct voting tends to increase in the presence of party label (Experiments 1 & 2), 
we revise our second and third hypotheses: 
80 
 
H2: That ‘correct voting’ will increase when Party Label (party identity) information is available. 
H3: That H1 and H2 will be multiplicative effects, such that the effect of including Party Label will be greater 
in the 3-candidate condition, due to the enhanced task complexity. 
Methods 
 Participants 
Participants were native English speakers and eligible to vote in the UK local or parliamentary elections 
before enrolment in the study. 149 participants (99 female), aged 18-56 (μ= 25.10 years), were recruited. 
Participants were mostly single (63.8%); students (71.1%); self-identifying as ‘White-British’ (42.3%) or 
‘White- Other’ (16.1%); and with an income under £10,000 per annum (51%) or between £10-20,000 per 
annum (28.6%). Participants were paid £4 for participating. Ethical approval was granted from UCL 
(CPB/2010/10).  
Randomisation led to some imbalance in cell sizes (2Can- PLA: 42; 3Can-PLA: 28; 2Can- PLP: 37, 3Can-
PLP: 42) 
 Design, Materials, & Procedure 
The design, procedure, and materials, used were the same as those in Experiment 2, with the following 
exceptions. 
Importance Ratings: In contrast to the previous two experiments, we obtained participants’ ratings of how 
important each policy issue was [to them]. We obtained the participants’ decision-weights at the end of the 
experiment. Upon completing the policy questionnaire, participants were automatically forwarded to a 
participant-ID-linked online Qualtrics questionnaire. Participants were presented with all the policy items on 
a single screen, in a randomized order, and were instructed to insert a numerical rating between ‘0’ (‘Not at all 
important’) and ‘10’ (‘Extremely Important’) for how important they personally felt each item was. Each 
policy item also had an accompanying version of the explanatory text presented in the political questionnaire, 
in case participants were unable to recall what the issue related to. We divided the results by ‘10’ to rescale 
them to lie between 0-1. 
Upon completion, participants were debriefed as to the nature of the experiment and paid. 
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Issue decision-weights in Correct Voting: We used the importance rating to weight the distance between 
the candidate and the voter on each policy issue in our proximal model of correct voting. We can redefine the 
model as,  
𝑑 𝑞𝑝 =   𝑞1− 𝑝1 2 𝑑𝑤1 +  𝑞2− 𝑝2 2 𝑑𝑤2 … +  𝑞𝑛− 𝑝𝑛 2 𝑑𝑤𝑛 =    𝑥𝑞𝑖−𝑥𝑝𝑖 
2
 𝑑𝑤𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where D(qp) is the distance between the participant p and the candidate (alternative) q over the values for 
each policy issue (variable) Xi. In addition, dwi is the decision weight on issue i for all N of i. We follow the 
same procedure as previous; obtaining the relative distance(s) from the voter to the candidate, and identifying 
their ‘best’ option from the choice set, and classifying it as a ‘correct’ or incorrect vote if they chose that option 
at the ‘Ballot Box’ stage. 
 Results 
We compare the results using the weighted and unweighted versions of our proximity measures29, and find 
no meaningful differences in the results; nor do they affect the pattern of results in our analyses (see Appendix 
A.1.3 for details). These results support points made by Dawes (1979) that unweighted models approximate 
the performance of optimally weighted decision models. This gives us additional confidence in the results we 
have obtained previously in Experiments 1 & 2, namely that including decision-weights would not have led to 
differing outcomes. Results here use the weighted proximity measure.  
If there are any meaningful points to the contrary, they are noted in footnotes where appropriate. 
 
The Labour candidate was the most popular in our experiment (48.3% of votes), followed by Conservative 
(26.2%), Liberal Democrat (9.4%), ‘None of those on ballot’ (7.4%) and Abstain/Spoil (8.7%). See Figure 2.9. 
We examined the relationship between Vote Choice and Number of Candidates. The strong relationship 
between these variables was significant, 2 (4, 149) = 18.42, p = .001, ϕc= .35. This is as expected: a lack of a 
                                                     
29 We also compare weighted & unweighted ‘directional’ measures, also finding no meaningful differences. See Appendix A.1.3. 
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3rd (LibDem) candidate in 2-Candidate conditions will create a significant effect, as there will be no LibDem 
votes. There was no relationship between Vote Choice and Party Label, 2 (4, 149) = 2.27, p= .68, ϕc= .12.  
  
Figure 2.9: % Vote choice by candidate condition 
 
 
We removed all participants who responded ‘Abstain’ or ‘Don’t Know’ from our analyses (N= 25), leaving 
124 participants in our sample. This lead to unequal cell sizes in our data, therefore for we also compare our 
results (where possible) to a bootstrapped sample (r= 10,000).  Where there are meaningful deviations from 
the reported results, we note them in footnotes. 
We regressed CV on the group variables Party Label (PL) and Number of Candidates (NOC), entering these 
in Block 1, and their interaction term in Block 2. The regression model containing PL & No. of Candidates 
was significant, 2(2) = 21.28, p< .001, R2= 21.2%, and predicted 70.4% of the overall cases correctly. PL did 
not significantly predict CV, = .15, p= .70 (in line with Exp.1, but not Exp. 2); while NOC did, = -.1.77, p< 
.001, with participants being 83% less likely to vote correctly when the number of candidates in the choice set 
increases from 2 to 3 (as per Exp. 1 & 2). 
The addition of the PL & NOC interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .86), though 
the overall model remained significant, p< .001, R2= 21.2%, and predicted 70.4% of the overall cases correctly. 
The overall model results are shown in Table 2.7. The PL & NOC interaction term trended in the predicated 
direction, but was non-significant, = .14, p= .86.  
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Table 2.7: Logistic Regression results of Party Label and Number of Candidates on CV rates.  
Predictor  SE  e 
Party Label (PLP) .08 .60 .02 1.08 
NOC (2CAN) -1.84*** .60 9.58 .16 
PL*NOC .14 .81 .03 1.15 
Constant 1.27ǂ .428 8.86 3.57 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. ** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
In the 2-Can condition CV is 78.1% when PLA and 79.4% when PLP. In the 3-Can condition, CV increases 
from 36.0% when PL is absent to 41.2% when PL is present. We note that the results trend in the predicted 
direction, and are similar to those in Experiments 1 and 2. Pattern of results are shown in Figure 2.10. 
 
Figure 2.10: % CV rates by condition 
Chance Level Analysis: The significant effect of number of candidates would of course be expected even 
if participants were choosing candidates at random, due to the fewer options available in the 2-Candidate 
condition. We therefore compared rates of CV to chance levels in these conditions, collapsing across party 
label conditions. 78.5% of participants voted correctly in the 2-candidate condition (greater than 50%, p< 
.001), whilst the 39% of participants voting correctly in the 3-candidate condition did not differ significantly 
from chance levels (33%; p= .21). Thus, the influence of increasing the number of candidates on levels of CV 
cannot be explained solely on the basis of a difference in chance levels. These results are in line with those 
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obtained in Experiment 1, but differ in that CV rates did not differ from chance in the 2-candidate condition 
in Experiment 2. 
 
Overall participants found the candidates in the experiment believable (= 61.28, SD= 18.56), had 
confidence in their vote choice (= 61.11, SD= 19.69), had confidence they would not change their vote (= 
59.15, SD= 18.51), and felt making their vote choice was of medium difficulty (= 49.34, SD= 26.89). 
We carried out a multi-variate ANOVA on all four measures, using Party Label (PL), number of candidates 
(NOC), and their interaction term (PL*NOC) as predictor variables. We found PL*NOC had a significant 
effect averaged across all the dependant variables, Pillai’s Trace V=.08, F(4, 117)= 2.68, p= .035, ηp²= .08. 
Levene’s Test was non-significant for all the variables (all p> .12). Follow-up univariate analyses showed 
significant effects.  
PL*NOC had a significant effect on participants’ confidence they would not change in their vote choice, 
F(1, 120)= 3.92, p= .049, ηp²= .03, with participants’ most confident in their vote when party label was absent 
and there were 2 candidates (= 63.48, SD= 17.92), and least when absent and 3 candidates (= 50.93, SD= 
22.44). PL*NOC had a significant effect on participants’ perceived vote choice difficulty, F(1, 120)= 9.32, p= 
.003, ηp²= .07, with participants’ feeling their vote was least difficult when party label was absent and 2 
candidates (= 41.24, SD= 25.98), present and three candidates (= 43.26, SD= 27.09), and hardest when PL 
was absent and there were 3 candidates (= 61.00, SD= 27.07). 
These results differ from Experiments 1 and 2. In Exp.1, only vote confidence was affected by NOC, such 
that participants were more confident as choice set size increases; while this experiment suggests the opposite 
is true when PL is absent. Looking at the trends in Figure 2.11, confidence seems to be greater in the 3-
candidate condition when PL is present (vs. absent), which can also be observed in Figure 2.8 (Exp. 2) and 
somewhat in Figure 2.5 (Exp. 1). Similarity, the trends for perceived difficulty in Figure 2.11 are in line with 
those in Figure 2.8 (and somewhat Figure 2.5), namely that difficulty increases as choice set increases, but the 
presence of party label in the 3-candidate condition leads to participants as perceiving the choice as easier than 
when it is absent. 
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Figure 2.11: Post-Ballot Measures by condition. Bars +/- SD. 
 
We regressed all of our post-ballot measures of vote confidence, believability, and difficulty, on CV in 
Block 1, adding our main predictors (PL, NOC) and their interaction term in Blocks 2 and 3. The regression 
model containing our post-ballot variables was marginally significant, 2(4) = 8.86, p= .065, R2= 9.2%, and 
predicted 62.1% of the overall cases correctly. Only believability, controlling for all other variables, 
significantly predicted CV, = .03, p= .005, with participants being 1.03 times more likely to vote correctly 
when candidates are perceived as being more believable. 
Adding the main predictors in Block 2 improved the model, with NOC remaining significant (p< .001), 
while adding the interaction term in Block 3 did not further improve the model (p= .17). Believability remained 
significantly predictive of CV in Blocks 2 & 3 (p< .003). 
 
Correct Voting, Distance & Difficulty: We regressed ‘distance BNB’ (centered on its mean) as a predictor 
variable on CV in Block 1, finding it was positively associated with the likelihood of voting correctly, = .62, 
p< .001, indicating participants were 1.86 times more likely to vote correctly as distance between the two most 
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proximal alternatives increases. We including ‘distance BNB’ (centred on its mean) as a predictor variable 
with PL and NOC in Block 2, their 2-way interaction terms in Block 3, and their 3-way interaction term in 
Block 4.  
 Our regression model for Block 1 was significant, 2(3) = 24.68, p< .001, R2= 24.2%, and correctly 
classifying 72.0% of the cases. Increasing distance between the ‘best’ and ‘next-best’ alternatives was non-
significantly associated with the likelihood of voting correctly, = .35, p= .0730. PL was non-significant, = 
.18, p= .66; NOC was significant, = -1.19, p= .016, with participants 70% less likely to vote correctly when 
there are 3 candidates after controlling for the effect of distance. 
Adding the interactions between our condition variables and the distance between alternatives in Block 2 
did not significantly improve our model (p= .90), nor did the addition of a three-way interaction in Block 3 
(p=. 29). The overall model was significant, 2(5) = 25.80, p< .001, R2= 25.2%, which we report in Table 2.9.  
Table 2.8: Logistic Regression results of ‘distance’ between ‘best’ and ‘next best’ options on CV rates.  
Predictor  SE  e 
Distance .33 .27 1.49 1.39 
Party Label (PLP) .17 .65 .07 1.18 
NOC (2CAN) -.98 .81 1.45 .37 
PL*NOC -.02 1.01 .00 .97 
Dist*PL .32 .51 .38 1.37 
Dist*NOC 1.01 .46 4.86 2.76 
Dist*PL*NOC .33 .27 1.49 1.39 
Constant .17 .65 .070 1.18 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. ** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
Distance & Difficulty: Increasing distance was not significantly correlated with any of the measures of 
choice confidence or believability of the candidates collected after participants choose a candidate at the ‘Ballot 
Box’ stage (all p> .25). Distance between the ‘best’ and ‘next best’ options was negatively correlated with vote 
                                                     
30 Bootstrapped sample (r=10,000) estimates p= .039, indicating distance may still be a significant factor, controlling for PL and 
NOC. 
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choice difficulty (difficulty increases as alternatives becomes ‘more similar’, but not significantly, r= -.10, p= 
.25.  
 
We found no effect of PL on correct voting rates, with voting rates comparable in both conditions (59.6% 
vs 60.3%). We found NOC had a significant effect on CV, such that participants vote correctly 78.8% of the 
time when there are 2 candidates, and 39% of the time when there are 3 candidates (which does not differ 
significantly from chance levels). There was no significant interaction between PL and NOC, though the trends 
observed are in line with previous results, such that CV rates are lowest when party label is absent and there 
are 3 candidates (36%), with an increase when PL is present and 3 candidates (41.21%), and highest when PL 
is present and there are 2 candidates (79.4%).  
The distance between the two most ‘proximal’ candidates on our correct voting measure was positively 
correlated with CV, such that increasing distance between the two increased the likelihood of correctly voting. 
All our post-ballot measures are significantly correlated in the directions one would expect, with 
believability and vote confidence (& confidence wouldn’t change) positively correlated, and vote confidence 
and perceived difficulty negatively correlated. Participants are most confident in vote choice when PL is absent 
and there are 2 candidates, and least confident when PL is absent and there are 3 candidates’. Perceived 
difficulty was lowest in the PL absent 2-Can condition, and highest in the PL absent 3-Can condition, with 
participants perceiving their choice as easier when there are 3 candidates and PL is present, compared to when 
there are 2 candidates and PL is present. 
 Discussion 
H1: That rates of ‘correct voting’ will decrease when candidates (alternatives) increase from 2 to 3. 
Again in this experiment we find that correct voting is affected by the size of the choice set, with participants 
far less likely to vote correctly when just increasing the choice set size from 2 to 3 candidates. Participants 
vote correctly 78.8% of the time when there are 2 candidates, and 39% of the time when there are 3 candidates, 
with rates not different from what would be expected by chance in the 3-candidate condition. That we have 
observed this in three separate studies indicates that the number of alternatives in a choice set, even in political 
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decision-making, seems to be exerting a strong effect on participant’s ability to correctly vote. Whether this 
effect is linear, or otherwise, in nature is not able to be determined from the current studies, and requires 
subsequent testing with larger choice sets. 
H2: That ‘correct voting’ will increase when Party Label (party identity) information is available. 
In contrast to the results of Experiment 2, we do not find any differences in correct voting rates between 
when party label is absent or present. Participants vote effectively at the same rates in either condition (59.6% 
vs 60.3%). It is difficult to pinpoint an exact explanation for this, given the materials are the same as those in 
Experiment 1 (interaction) and Experiment 2 (main effect), though the significant effect of candidate 
believability, where increasing believability is predicative of correctly voting, leads one to consider a possible 
explanation by way of the candidate materials.  
Experiment 1 was carried out in 2013, and based on the 2011 General Election Manifesto of the UK political 
parties; whereas Experiment 3 took place at the end of 2014 and ran through until the start of 2015, a new 
General Election year in the UK. It is entirely possible that the candidate materials no longer reflected what 
participants perceived to be relevant as relates to the party. Simply, party label may have been irrelevant as the 
policy items for each candidate did not reflect the policy they were supposedly stereotypic of in the real world; 
as such, party label would not be an appropriate (or useful) heuristic for participants’ to employ.  
If so, this is heartening in some regards. Our original hypothesis was that party label would be used 
inappropriately as a heuristic, such that it would lead to greater rates of incorrect voting. Our results do not 
support this (in any experiment). A question remains whether participants are actively ignoring party label, or 
if participants are not aware of it, or if there is some cognitive awareness but the effects are not such that they 
affect correct voting. While testing such ideas is difficult in the current experimental paradigm, we note Lau 
and Redlawsk (2000) operationalize party label as its own information item for access in the flow stage. 
However, had we done the same, even one access would not allow us to say participants are effectively ignoring 
it; it seems highly likely participants are paying party label some degree of attention at a cognitive level during 
the experimental flow stage, so a possibility exists to investigate party label’s effects on participants’ 
information processing to provide better insight (see Chapter 3). 
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H3: That H1 and H2 will have multiplicative effects, such that the effect of including Party Label will be 
greater in the 3-candidate condition, due to the enhanced task complexity. 
We find no support for H3 in this study, though we note the consistency of the worst voting rates being 
when there are 3 candidates and party label is absent (36%), and the slight bump in correct voting rates in the 
3-candidate condition when party label is present (41.2%). Participants are least confident they would not 
switch their vote in the party label absent 2-Can condition, and perceived their vote as the most difficult when 
party label was absent and 3 candidates.  
Participants perceived their vote was most difficult when there were 3 candidates and party label was absent 
(36% CV). Participants found their choices similarly difficult, when there were 2 candidates and party label 
was absent/present (78.1% & 79.1% CV, respectively). However, participants found the 3-candidate condition 
where party label was present even easier than when party label was present and there were just 2 candidates 
(despite lower CV rates; 41% vs 79% respectively). Participants find the choice harder when party label is 
absent and the choice set size increases (with lower CV rates), but party label’s presence seems to mitigate this 
somewhat, with participants finding the decision less difficult and are more confident in it; this finding seems 
consistent across the 3 experiments thus far. 
As per Experiment 2, in this experiment we find that the distance (similarity) between the two alternatives 
closest to the participant’s ‘ideal’ (sic: ‘correct’) choice, and by definition each other, is significantly predictive 
of correct voting. When the distance between the two alternatives increases in n-dimensional policy space, 
participants are more likely to vote correctly. This is understandable; when alternatives are close together as 
to be near indistinguishable (though still technically different by even a margin), voting for either might seem 
as a ‘either is as good’ model of decision-making. Participants, who not perfectly rational beings with unlimited 
cognitive capacity and time, should be happy to settle for either, as the costs of being ‘incorrect’ are somewhat 
negligible. However, our correct voting measure does not allow for this; while it is mathematically possible 
for two alternatives to exactly occupy the same point in n-dimension space, it does not occur in our 
experiments; only one option, no matter how close they are, is the correct option for the voter given the 
available alternatives in the choice set.  
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As an aside, while it is tempting to attribute the results around ‘alternative distance’ to the use of the 
importance (i.e. ‘decision’) weights in this experiment, we did analyse the results without the use of decision-
weights, finding they make no difference to the results, and distance is still predictive of correct voting even 
excluding weights in the correct voting calculation. Similarly, the lack of an effect for party label does not 
differ if we use differing correct voting metrics (weighted, unweighted; proximal, directional). In fact, we find 
few changes in classifications (correct, incorrect) between measures, and that statistically all are highly 
correlated with each other. In that, our results chime with those of Lau and Redlawsk (Table 1, 2008), who 
find that all their 4 possible measures are significantly correlated with each other (equal weights: additive 
utility/averaged utility; implicit importance weights: additive utility/averaged utility), with the implicit 
weighting “barely better than a simple equal weights” version (p .401; r= .45 vs. r= .46), and no difference 
between additive or averaging methods. In our analyses, we find the weighted and unweighted versions, using 
participants own self-reported importance of policy items, in operationalising correct voting to be functionally 
the same. This is in line with Dawes (1979), and is another demonstration that equal-weight models 
approximate the performance of optimally weighted decision models. For those with a penchant for such detail, 
see Appendix A.1.2. 
In conclusion, we find that there is no effect of party label on correct voting, with a possible explanation 
being the age/relevancy of the materials used. Given the inconsistency of the results for party label across 
Experiments 1-3, we can address this issue by updating the materials used to be more believable and reflective 
of the real-world parties and electoral realities. We find in this experiment, and in Experiments 1 and 2, that 
the size of the choice set of candidate does negatively affect voters’ ability to correctly vote. Given that we 
only look at a maximum of 3 alternatives, the effect of larger choice set sizes should be examined, as it is 
unclear if this effect is linearly related to increasing choice set size, or follows a non-linear function.  While 
there was no interaction of choice set size and party label, the trends remain consistent with those previously, 
namely that party label seems to mitigate some of the negative effects of increasing choice set size, such that 
correct voting rates improve.  
We address these issues in Experiment 4, increasing the choice set sizes examined, and updating the 
experimental materials in line with the UK General Election 2015. 
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 Experiment 4 
The results and discussion of Experiments 1-3 raise some important aspects that warrant further 
examination. While we have observed a consistent effect of increasing choice set size leading to decreased 
correct voting, we do not know if this will extent to even larger choice set sizes. This is pertinent given the 
historical trend towards increasing political plurality  (Peterson, 1979), and in countries such as India the 
number of parties have grown from 53 to 1687 since 195231. Appropriately, the UK political landscape is not 
limited to 3 political parties, but also include additional parties with 2 parties in particular that roughly map 
onto the ‘further ends’ of the left-right political spectrum: the Green Party (left), and the UK Independence 
Party (right). At the time of data collection for the experiment (March, 2015), the Conservative Party was 
averaging 35% daily in national polls; the Labour Party, 35%, the Liberal Democrats, 8%; UKIP, 12%, and 
the Green Party, 6%32. These polling figures make excluding UKIP, and to a degree the Green Party, from 
analysis fairly unrepresentative of the electoral realities that we are trying to reflect. 
Considering the inclusion of these additional parties raises some issues. Experimentally, the ideal scenario 
for a study design would be to have: a baseline 2-candidate condition, a 3-candidate condition, two 4-candidate 
conditions (‘Main 3’ + Green/UKIP), and an omnibus 5-candidate conditions (total: 5 conditions), but we err 
against this for practical and theoretical reasons.  
We aim to keep in line with the principle strength of the previous studies, namely that they reflected 
scenarios that are inherently realistic and thus ecologically valid. There exists no parliamentary seat (and 
arguably no council seat) in the UK, where there is a believable scenario that includes either UKIP or the Green 
Party, and excludes the other. Indeed, on multiple occasions, instances of the Green Party polling higher than 
the Liberal Democrats have made national news coverage33. In addition, it is likely that including one raises 
the saliency of the absence of the other, thus limiting the effect of our manipulations. Indeed, the most common 
scenarios are a Labour-Conservative ‘two horse race’34, a ‘three-way’ with Labour-Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat, or a ‘5-way battle royale’ between all 5 parties. Utilizing such a design would allow us to plot a 
trend of correct voting by choice set size, and while a worthwhile endevour, this seems more useful where 
                                                     
31 NDTV (2014) Number of Political Parties Increased Over 30 Times Since Independence. https://goo.gl/SGkQaP  
32 YouGov (May 7th, 2015): Voting Intention 2010 to 2015. Available here: https://goo.gl/wmOhvx  
33 “Greens ahead of Liberal Democrats in YouGov poll.” The Guardian (Oct, 2014).  https://goo.gl/ANv6mY  
34 There are instances of Labour-Lib, Conservative-Lib marginals, but they are few: 8 out of 650 in 2015 GE. 
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political choice sets naturally range into higher numbers; such as in countries with proportional (non-
majoritarian) democracies (e.g. Ireland, Spain, Finland, most of South America35).  
We are interested primarily if the principles we are interested in still hold; namely, does choice set size 
continue to lead to higher rates of correct voting compared to a smaller set, removing the need for ‘stepped’ 
comparisons. As we have studied differences in 2-/3-candidate choice sets at length in Experiments 1-3, here 
we opt to compare a 3-candidate condition, consisting of Labour/Conservatives/Liberal democrats, with an 
expanded choice set that includes the Green Party and UKIP (5-candidates).  
In keeping with Experiments 1-3, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: That rates of ‘correct voting’ will decrease when candidates (alternatives) increase from 3 to 5. 
While we found no support for an effect of party label in Experiment 3, a main concern was that the 
materials were outdated, thus limiting any usefulness of the party label to act as a beneficial heuristic in aiding 
correct voting (i.e., the materials used were inconsistent with those signaled by partisan labels). We have 
accounted for this in this experiment, updating the materials in line with those produced by the 5 main parties 
(wherever possible), and including the party labels for the new additional parties. Thus one would expect that 
where party label is present, it should be a far more useful heuristic, and that reliance on it should increase. 
Thus our second hypothesis is: 
H2: That ‘correct voting’ will increase when Party Label (party identity) information is available. 
Finally, we hypothesize that: 
H3: That H1 and H2 will be multiplicative effects, such that the effect of including Party Label will be greater 
in the 5-candidate condition, due to the enhanced task complexity. 
Due to the addition of the 2 additional parties, we include the same amount of policy items in the flow stage 
for participants to access for each candidate, increasing the amount of information by 66% in the 5-candidate 
condition. The 5-candidate condition should be the most informationally complex, with the lowest rates of 
                                                     
35 The Ace Project; http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?view=country&question=ES005  
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correct voting when party label is absent and there are 5 candidates, with rates of correct voting improving 
when party label is present. 
Methods 
 Participants 
Participants were native English speakers and eligible to vote in the UK local or parliamentary elections 
before enrolment in the study. 154 participants (89 female), aged 18-56 (μ= 26.88 years), were recruited. 
Participants were mostly single (69.5%); students (72.1%); self-identifying as ‘White-British’ (39.3%), 
‘White- Other’ (8.4%) or Chinese (17.5%); and with an income under £10,000 per annum (56.5%) or between 
£10-20,000 per annum (27.9%). Participants were paid £4 for participating. Ethical approval was granted from 
UCL (CPB/2010/10). 
Randomisation led to some imbalance in cell sizes (3Can- PLA: 43; 5Can-PLA: 45; 3Can- PLP: 33, 5Can-
PLP: 33) 
 Design, Materials, Procedure 
Unless otherwise mentioned, all methods, materials, and procedures are the same as per Experiments 1-3. 
We include importance ratings in our calculation of correct voting. 
Candidate Party Label: Party-identifying information for candidates in PLP conditions was imparted by 
putting party logos (e.g. a red rose and red border for Labour candidates) and party-branded colour theme (i.e. 
red= Labour, blue=Conservative, yellow= Liberal Democrat, green= Green Party, purple= UKIP) on stimulus 
items, and were also identified and explained (if PLP) before the voting task. A separate printed sheet with the 
candidate names, the party they belonged to, and the relevant party logo, were placed by the participant in the 
PLP conditions. In PLA conditions logos were absent, and all stimulus item borders were grey, parties were not 
referred to in the task instructions, and no additional printed materials were provided. 
Constructing the Candidates: Male-only names were used to control for effects of candidate gender on 
vote-choice.  Names were chosen from the 5 most common UK first and surnames on the 2015 UK Electoral 
Roll, and randomly allocated. This was then checked against the list of MPs in the House of Commons to 
check that such politicians did not already exist.  
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Table 2.8: Candidate Names, Party Affiliation, and Party Label. 
Surname, Forename Party Affiliation Party Label 
Williams, James Conservative Party 
 
Smith, Robert Labour Party 
 
Jones, Michael Liberal Democrats 
 
Taylor, Harry UK Independence Party 
 
Davies, John Green Party 
 
Candidate Policies (Attribute Items): Candidate policies were taken from the relevant party manifesto 
from the 2015 UK General Election (Manifesto Project, 2015; BBC News, 2015), and prioritized based on 
public attitude polls asking voters to rank the importance of policy-categories just prior to the time of the 
experiment36 (e.g., when asked “Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the 
country at this time?”, 50% of the public reported [level of] ‘Immigration; YouGov, 2015).  
17 stimulus items for each candidate were constructed based on these policy categories (e.g. for ‘Economy’, 
policies on ‘Jobs’ were used, e.g., “[Labour will] guarantee a job for under 25s unemployed for over a year, 
and adults unemployed for more than two years, and create 1 million new high technology, green jobs by 
2025”), and controlled to be similar in word length, complexity and informational content. Each policy was 
assigned a value between 1-7, based on its position in a political ‘left-right’ continuum, with up to 7 possible 
options for that policy (e.g. on Deficit: Lab, Lib, and Con received 2, 4 or 5 respectively; for higher education 
fees, 1= 100% Government Funded, and 7= 100% Tuition Fees). For full copies of materials used, see 
Appendix A.4. 
                                                     
36 YouGov Poltiical Tracker (March 2nd, 2015). Located here: https://goo.gl/WvMXUR  
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Table 2.9: Attribute Text, and scores for candidates [attribute score in parentheses]. 
Attribute 
Candidate 
Williams, James (Con) Smith, Robert (Lab) Jones, Michael (Lib) 
Taylor, Harry 
(UKIP) 
Davies, John 
(Green) 
Academies 
“continue the roll out of 
academies, and convert up to 
3,500 more schools that 
"require improvement" into 
academies…wants primary 
schools in England that 
repeatedly fail tests be forced 
to become academies, or have 
sponsorship replaced if already 
an academy.” [7] 
“wants to allow good and 
outstanding schools to convert 
to academy status if they 
wish, but would not give 
converting schools subsidies. 
[He] also believes that control 
of academies should be under 
the Local Authority and 
Parent Groups.” [5] 
“to support the idea of 
academies, but wants to limit 
academies in hiring 
unqualified teachers. [He] has 
given a 'parental guarantee', 
promising parents their child 
will be taught a core 
curriculum by a properly 
qualified teacher.” [6] 
“wants to keep existing 
Grammar Schools and 
encourage the creation of 
new Grammar Schools 
[He] wants to allow 
charitable associations, 
parental co-operatives, 
profit-making private 
companies or individuals 
to run schools.” [7] 
“is against Free Schools 
and academies due to 
lack of local democratic 
accountability and 
oversight, and is 
opposed to creating 
more Free Schools & 
Academies, and will 
integrate them into the 
Local Authority school 
system.” [2] 
National Deficit 
“aims to eliminate "the bulk" 
of the UK's structural deficit 
within five years, with 6 billion 
pounds in cuts. [He] has said 
these spending cuts would 
happen in all areas, apart from 
health and foreign aid.” [6] 
“will introduce a variety of 
'wealth' taxes on 'mansions' 
and bankers bouses, and 
pledged a 5% pay cut for 
every government minister. 
[He] wants to also blacklist 
tax-avoiding companies from 
operating in the UK.” [2] 
“promises strict new fiscal 
rules to ensure the deficit is 
gone by April 2018, with the 
wealthy contributing the 
most. [He] plans to increase 
capital gains from 28% to 
35%., and impose an 
additional 8% rate of 
corporation tax on UK banks 
to raise an extra 1billionn 
pounds a year.” [4] 
“will eradicate the deficit 
by 2018 and secure an 
overall budget surplus by 
2019-20. Achieve this by 
approx. 25billionpounds 
in spending cuts, not tax 
rises” [6] 
“aims to more than 
halve the deficit with 
taxation and spending 
by: raising the 
proportion of taxation 
from 36% of GDP, and 
'efficiency savings' of 
23billion pounds (or 
0.25% over the entire 
public service each 
year).” [1] 
Elderly Care 
“said elderly benefits including 
free bus passes, TV licences, 
prescriptions, eye tests and the 
Winter Fuel Allowance would 
not be means-tested if [he] 
won the general election.” [5] 
“ensure government would 
cover people's care costs after 
they have spent two years in 
residential care from 2014… 
also wants to establish a 
"National Care Service" free 
at the point of use for all 
adults with an "eligible care 
need", with funding 
arrangements decided by a 
Commission by 2015. [2] 
“… has pledged to increase 
National Healthcare 
spending, which includes 
elderly care, by 8 billion a 
year by 2020/21, in three 
stages.” [4] 
“would increase 
dementia funding by 130 
million pounds per year 
over the next parliament 
and would increase 
social care funding for 
older people by 1 billion 
pounds each 
year…stated that [he] 
will merge health and 
social care under the 
NHS.” [4] 
“said that personal and 
nursing care for all 
older people will be 
provided free, and 
house owners would 
not be required to sell 
their home to pay for 
such care if elected.” 
[4] 
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EU Membership 
“would pass a law to require a 
referendum on any future 
treaty that transfers power 
from Britain to the EU, and 
also create a UK Sovereignty 
Bill to ensure ultimate 
authority stays in Parliament.” 
[4] 
“strongly supports continued 
EU membership for the UK, 
and will not support an in/out 
referendum on Britains 
membership in the EU… will 
push for reform of European 
Union instead.” [3] 
“would support continued EU 
membership, and does not 
want an in-out referendum on 
Britain’s membership of the 
EU. [He] wants instead to 
achieve EU reform to make it 
more competitive, efficient 
and accountable.” [3] 
“strongly believes in 
leaving the EU, and 
would seek to do as soon 
as possible if elected.” 
[5] 
“wants a UK 
referendum on the EU; 
calling for radical 
reform of the EU to 
increase transparency 
and give Member 
States more control 
over their economies.” 
[3] 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
“wants to reduce all UK 
greenhouse gas emissions by 
80% by 2050.” [4] 
“would cut greenhouse gas 
emissions by over 34% by 
2020 and 80% by 2050.” [4] 
“aims for a 40% reduction in 
greenhouse gases emissions 
by 2020, rising to 100% by 
2050.” [5] 
is critical of EU targets 
on Greenhouse gas 
emission reductions. 
[He] is a climate change 
skeptic, of "apocalyptic 
claims" by climate 
research. [1] 
“wants to reduce all 
UK greenhouse gas 
emissions to 10% of 
their 1990 levels by 
2030.” [6] 
Health Spending/NHS 
“vowed to cut the cost of the 
National Health Service (NHS) 
administration by a third, but 
increase health spending in real 
terms every year to 2015.” [2] 
“promised to keep the 
National Health Service 
(NHS) ring-fenced and spend 
an extra 2.5billion pounds a 
year starting 2017/18. This is 
in addition to plans to spend 
2billion pounds a year starting 
in 2015/2016.” [2] 
“has pledged 8billion pounds 
of extra spending on the NHS 
if [he] is elected to 
government in the coming 
election.” [1] 
“committed to investing 
3 billion pounds per year 
extra in the National 
Health Service (NHS) 
front-line services... 
wants to integrate health 
and social care funding 
under an NHS-controlled 
'social care fund'.” [2] 
“says health spending 
should be "maintained 
at around the average in 
the European union", 
and suggests directly 
funding the National 
Health Service (NHS) 
with an 'NHS tax' as 
part of general income 
and other taxation.” [2] 
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Immigration (Levels of) 
“wants to bring net 
immigration down to below 
100,000 people a year (it 
currently stands at 243,000), 
and promised to make reform 
of EU free movement rules 
part of renegotiations of 
Britain's relationship with the 
EU.  
[He] would make migrants 
wait four years before they can 
claim certain benefits, such as 
tax credits, Universal Credit, or 
get access to social housing. 
[He] wants to stop migrants 
from claiming child benefit for 
dependents living outside the 
UK, and remove those that 
have failed to find work after 
six months from the Welfare 
system.” [5] 
“wants to make it easier to 
deport foreign criminals, and 
to tackle illegal immigration 
with "proper" entry and exit 
checks to count people 
moving in and out of the 
country, and introduce a 
'smarter system' of controls to 
get the top talent and 
investment the UK needs, 
whilst controlling low skilled 
migration. [He] also said we 
need to further support the 
Border Agency in guarding 
ports and airports. 
[He] wants people coming 
here not to be able to claim 
benefits for at least two years, 
and for people working in 
public services in public 
facing roles to be required to 
speak English.” [4] 
“wants to introduce exit 
checks, so the Government 
can keep track of who is 
leaving the country and 
identify people who are 
overstaying their visa… 
wants all new claimants for 
Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) 
to have their English 
language skills assessed, with 
JSA then being conditional on 
attending language courses 
for those whose English is 
poor. [He] will also ensure 
that EU migrants have to 
"earn" their entitlement to 
benefits.” [4] 
“wants to reduce net 
immigration to 50,000 
people a year… wants to 
use a 'points policy' to 
select migrants with the 
skills and attributes 
needed in the UK, for 
people inside and outside 
the EU, and time-limited 
work permits. [He] said 
proof of private health 
insurance will be a 
precondition for 
immigrants and tourists 
to enter the UK… will 
require immigrants to 
financially support 
themselves and any 
dependents for 5 years, 
and wants tougher 
English language tests 
for migrants seeking 
permanent residence. [4] 
“wants to progressively 
reduce UK immigration 
controls, and says 
illegal immigrants 
living in the UK for 
over five years will be 
allowed to remain, 
unless they pose a 
serious danger to public 
safety. 
 
[He] wants access to 
benefits, the right to 
vote, and tax 
obligations to apply to 
everyone living on 
British soil- regardless 
of passport type.” [4] 
Income Tax 
“promised an income tax cut 
for 30 million people by 2020. 
Income Tax would start to kick 
in at 12,500pounds a year, 
instead of 10,500pounds. The 
higher tax rate, 40%, would 
start at 50,000pounds a year 
instead of 41,900, again by 
2020.” [6] 
wants to reintroduce the 50% 
top rate of income tax for 
earnings over 150,000 pounds 
per year. [He] also wants to 
cut income tax for 24 million 
people by bringing back the 
10% rate on lower incomes.” 
[2] 
“wants to raise the 'personal 
allowance' - the amount you 
can earn before you have to 
start paying income tax - to 
11,000pounds in April 2016 
and then to 12,500pounds by 
2020.” [4] 
“wants to increase the 
personal allowance - the 
amount you can earn 
before you have to start 
paying income tax - to 
the level of full-time 
minimum wage earnings 
(about 13,500pounds) by 
2020.” [7] 
“said people earning 
more than 100,000 
pounds a year would 
pay 50% income tax if 
[he] was elected to 
government.” [2] 
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Jobs/Unemployment 
“wants to create three million 
apprenticeships in the UK, 
which will be paid for by 
welfare benefit cuts.” [4] 
“will guarantee a job for 
under 25s unemployed for 
over a year, and adults 
unemployed for more than 
two years, and create 1 
million new high-tech green 
jobs by 2025. [He] wants to 
get as many young people to 
go on an apprenticeship, as 
currently go to university, by 
2025, and also ban 
"exploitative" zero hour 
contracts. [4] 
“wants to give an extra 
1pound an hour for the lowest 
paid apprentices, and has 
vowed to campaign to create 
a million more jobs.” [4] 
“says firms should be 
allowed to offer jobs to 
British workers first 
"without the fear of 
being sued for 
discrimination". [4] 
“is proposing a national 
energy conservation 
scheme to create 
thousands of new jobs. 
[He] wants to create 
"sustainable jobs" and 
promote more local 
production of food and 
goods.” [4] 
‘Mansion Tax’ 
“vowed to oppose any possible 
mansion tax on high-value 
properties if [he] is elected to 
government.” [5] 
“will bring in a ‘progressive 
mansion tax on properties 
worth over 2million pounds, 
that will rise in line with 
property prices; which will 
raise 1.2billion pounds.” [1] 
“supported a mansion tax in 
principle, [he] would prefer to 
create additional banded 
levys on top of council tax for 
high value properties worth 
over 2 million pounds.” [2] 
"is critical of a 'mansion 
tax' on high-value 
properties, claiming it is 
a "policy of vengeance 
against the wealthy". [5] 
“against a mansion tax, 
but in favour of a 'Land 
Valuation Tax' (LVT) - 
a tax payable on the 
annual value of land, 
levied by the local 
community at rates to 
be agreed amongst 
Districts and Regions.” 
[2] 
Nursery Care 
“has no plans to change the 
number of free hours for 
childcare entitlement, and 
pointed out his scheme to 
allow working parents to get a 
20% rebate on the costs of 
childcare.” [3 
“promises to extend the 
current free childcare for 
working parents with 3 and 4 
year olds from 15 to 25 hours 
per week, saying it would be 
worth 1,500pounds per child. 
[He] would double the 
number of childcare places at 
Sure Start centres and 
guarantee childcare from 
08:00am to 18:00pm for 
parents of primary school 
children.” [2] 
“would extend the existing 
entitlement of 15 hours a 
week free childcare to all 
extend the existing 
entitlement of 15 hours a 
week for 3 & 4 year olds to, 
all children of working 
parents aged between nine 
months and three years.” [1] 
“has yet to announce 
detailed childcare 
policies ahead of the 
election.” [3] 
“would extend the 
hours of 
nursery/children’s 
centre entitlement for 
children aged 3 and 4… 
wants nursery staff to 
be given adequate 
training, including 
training in nutrition.” 
[2] 
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Nuclear Power 
“is committed to retaining 
nuclear power plants, and the 
long term expansion of nuclear 
power generation in the UK.” 
[5] 
“believes that nuclear power 
must remain part of the UKs 
energy mix, but would be 
reluctant to provide public 
subsidies for building nuclear 
power plants.” [4] 
“supported nuclear power in 
'limited' circumstances, and 
backs the continued 
operations at existing nuclear 
power stations until the end 
of their working lives.” [4] 
“thinks we should 
abandon renewables and 
instead base our energy 
strategy on gas, nuclear 
and coal. [He] believes 
that nuclear power is a 
vital part of energy 
generation.” [5] 
“opposes all nuclear 
power generation, and 
has said [he] will 
cancel construction of 
new nuclear stations, 
and nuclear power will 
not be eligible for 
government subsidy. 
Money earmarked for 
new nuclear plant 
research, development 
and construction will be 
reallocated to energy 
efficiency measures 
and renewable energy 
infrastructure.” [1] 
Pensions 
“would retain the Triple Lock 
on the Basic State Pension, 
guaranteeing it rises yearly by 
whichever is the highest: 
inflation, wages, a minimum of 
2.5%. This would see the state 
pension increase by 3 pounds 
year on year from 113pounds 
currently.” [3] 
“will honour the 'triple lock' 
on pensions, which 
guarantees the state pension 
will rise by whichever is 
highest amount: inflation, 
average earnings, or by 2.5% 
minimum. This would see the 
state pension increase by 3 
pounds year on year from 
113pounds currently.” [3] 
“plans to raise the state 
pension from 107pounds to 
around 144pounds per week, 
and will protect future 
pensioners with a fair, single 
tier pension.” [1] 
“has yet to announce any 
pension policy for this 
election.  
 
Previously promised [he] 
would roll all existing 
State pensions, Pensions 
Credit, the Winter Fuel 
Allowance into a flat-
rate non-means tested, 
non-contributory and 
non-taxable 'Citizens 
Pension' of 130pounds 
per week for all 
pensioners aged 65 and 
over.” [2] 
“wants to replace state 
pensions with an 
unconditional 'Citizens 
Pension'; set at the rate 
of the official poverty 
line (currently 
170pounds per week 
for someone living 
alone, or 300pounds 
per week for couples), 
and would be linked to 
average earnings. [He] 
said pensioners would 
be allowed work, and 
earners would be taxed 
at normal rates.” [1] 
Police 
“has not outlined any specific 
cuts to the police force, other 
than a general 25 billion cut in 
the public sector.” [6] 
“wants to protect frontline 
police from budget cuts in the 
next parliament, and -scrap 
Police and Crime 
Commissioners, which would 
save 50million pounds.” [2] 
“has no plans to cut police 
numbers, but would replace 
Police & Crime 
Commissioners with 'Police 
Boards' made up of local 
councilors.” [3] 
“promises to stop the 
scrapping of front-line 
police jobs.” [4] 
“vowed to defend local 
neighbourhood policing 
from cuts, arguing for a 
better use of the 
policing budget to 
boost frontline 
capacity.” [4] 
100 
 
Prisons 
“would build new prisons to 
increase capacity by 5,000 and 
break the cycle of repeat 
offenders though education & 
rehabilitation, and increased 
monitoring upon release by the 
probation service.” [4] 
“has pledged to reduce prison 
overcrowding, but as yet have 
not announced specific 
policies to do so. In the 
previous election [he] 
promised if elected [he] 
would add 15,000 prison 
places.” [2] 
“believes that we need to 
reduce the use of short 
sentences for personal drugs 
possession.” [3] 
“will double the number 
of prison places through 
better use of existing 
prisons.” [6] 
“committed to 
significantly reducing 
the prison population; 
by decriminalising 
cannabis, axing prison 
sentences for 
possession of other 
drugs, and 
decriminalising 
prostitution. [He] 
promised that courts 
will have a duty to 
reduce use of custodial 
sentencing in favour of 
community sentencing, 
and Young People 
under the age of 18 
would no longer be 
kept in custody.” [1] 
3rd Level Tuition Fees 
“wanted to retain the current 
level of tuition fees for 
university, and give bonuses 
for early repayment of student 
loans.” [3] 
“has pledged to scrap the 
current 9,000pounds-a-year 
tuition fees and may replace it 
with a maximum of 
6,000pounds, if elected to 
government.” [2] 
“will not change the current 
level of tuition fees of 
9,000pounds per student, and 
will block any cuts in tuition 
fees if in government.” [3] 
“would remove tuition 
fees for students taking 
approved degrees in 
science, medicine, 
technology, engineering, 
maths on the condition 
that they live, work and 
pay tax in the UK for 
five years after the 
completion of their 
degrees… wants students 
from the European 
Union (EU) to pay the 
same student fee rates as 
International students, 
whom pay a higher 
amount than EU 
students.” [5] 
“will scrap tuition fees 
if elected to 
government.” [1] 
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Trident (Nuclear Defense) 
“was committed to replacing 
Trident to maintain the UK's 
independent nuclear deterrent. 
[He] is committed to 
maintaining constant nuclear 
patrols, and has indicated that 
4 new submarines will be 
required.” [4] 
“has not committed to 
renewing or replacing 
Trident, Britain’s nuclear 
weapons program; but have 
indicated [he] might consider 
the prospect of Britain’s 
nuclear fleet being replaced 
with a cheaper system, or 
downgraded in some way.” 
[3] 
“has promised to replace a 
number of Trident nuclear 
submarines, but not all four 
currently in the Trident 
program.” [3] 
“will cancel Britain’s 
nuclear weapons 
program, Trident, or its 
replacement, and [he] 
accepts that Britain will 
not have an independent 
nuclear deterrent.” [1] 
“will scrap Britain's 
nuclear weapons 
program, aka. Trident if 
elected to government.” 
[1] 
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After completion of the practice experiment, participants proceeded to the main experiment. Upon making 
their vote choice, participants completed a policy attitude survey relating to the 17 policy attributes that 
appeared for each candidate (17 questions; see Appendix B). Upon completing the policy questionnaire, 
participants completed an online Qualtrics questionnaire where they were presented with all the policy items 
on a single screen, in a randomized order, and were instructed to insert a numerical rating between ‘0’ (‘Not 
at all important’) and ‘10’ (‘Extremely Important’) for how they personally felt about each item.  
Upon completion, participants were debriefed as to the nature of the experiment before being debriefed as 
to the purpose of the experiment and paid. 
 Results 
 
The Labour candidate was the most popular in our experiment (35.7% of votes), followed by Liberal 
Democrats (20.1%), Conservatives (18.2%), Green Party (10.4%), ‘None of those on ballot’ (11.0%) and 
Abstain/Spoil (4.5%). No participant chose the ‘UKIP’ candidate. 
We examined the relationship between Vote Choice and Number of Candidates. The strong relationship 
between these variables was significant, 2 (5, N= 154) = 28.08, p< .001, ϕc= .42. This is as expected: a lack 
of the two additional candidate in 3-Candidate conditions will create a significant effect, as there will be no 
Green or UKIP votes. There was no relationship between Vote Choice and Party Label, 2 (5, N= 154) = 8.43, 
p= .13, ϕc= .23.  
  
Figure 2.12: % Vote Choice by candidate condition 
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We removed all participants who responded ‘Abstain’ or ‘Don’t Know’ from our analyses (N= 24), leaving 
N=130 participants in our sample. This lead to unequal cell sizes in our data, therefore for we also compare 
our results (where possible) to a bootstrapped sample (r= 10,000).  Where there are meaningful deviations 
from the reported results, we note them in footnotes. 
We regressed CV on the group variables Party Label (PL) and Number of Candidates (NOC), entering these 
in Block 1, and their interaction term in Block 2. The regression model containing PL & No. of Candidates 
was not significant, p= .47, R2= 1.6%, and predicted 60.0% of the overall cases correctly. The addition of the 
PL & NOC interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .14), and was non-significant, p= .26, 
R2= 4.1%, and predicted 60.8% of the overall cases correctly. We report the full model in Table 13. 
Table 2.10: Logistic Regression results of Party Label and Number of Candidates on CV rates.  
Predictor  SE  e 
Party Label (PLA) -.47 .49 .93 .62 
NOC (2CAN) -1.08* .55 3.78 0.34 
PL*NOC 1.16 .74 2.47 3.19 
Constant .07 .37 .034 1.07 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. ** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
The main effect of PL did not significantly predict CV, = -.47, p= .82; and neither did the main effect of 
NOC, = -.437, p= .23, with participants being 36% less likely to vote correctly when the number of candidates 
in the choice set increases from 3 to 5. We note that using the directional method of CV (CVDR) that while the 
model containing all three terms is significant (p= .012), none of the predictors are significant (p> .196); 
bootstrapping (r= 10,.000) does not improve the significance levels (p> .18). 
CV (layered by PL): We were curious about the non-significance of the NOC term for CV in light of our 
previous results. We followed up using a layered chi-square test, looking at the differences in correct voting 
between the 3 and 5 candidate conditions in the presence or absence of Party Label separately. We found a 
significant decrease in the rates of correct voting when choice set increases from 3 to 5 candidates (51.7% vs. 
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26.7%) when PLA, 2(1, 130)= 3.90, p=.049, c= .26, but not when PLP, 2(1, 130)= .027, p=.86, c= .0237. 
CV rates are 51.7% when PLA-3Can; PLA-5Can, 26.7%; PLP-3Can, 40%; PLP-5Can, 41.9% (see Figure 2.13). 
Similar to Experiments 1-3, we see a rise in CV rates in the larger choice set (5-candidates) when PL is present, 
compared to when it is absent. 
Chance Level Analysis: The significant effect of Number of candidates when PLA would, of course, be 
expected even if participants were choosing candidates at random, due to the fewer options available in the 3-
Candidate condition. We therefore compared rates of CV to chance levels in these conditions, first collapsing 
across party label conditions. 44.9% of participants voted correctly in the 3-candidate condition (no greater 
than the 33% expected by chance, p=. 59), whilst the 34.4% of participants voting correctly in the 5-candidate 
condition did not differ significantly from chance levels (20%; p= .41). Additionally, considering only those 
for whom party label was absent, CV rates in both 3-candidate and 5-candidate conditions did not differ 
significantly from chance levels (p= .90; p= .19).  Thus, any influence of increasing the number of candidates 
on levels of CV cannot be explained solely on the basis of a difference in chance levels.  
 
Figure 2.13: % CV by condition 
 
 
                                                     
37 We did the same for CVDR, finding the opposite that rates of correct voting significantly increase from 3 to 5 candidates (15% 
vs,45%) when PLP, 2(1, 130)= 7.85, p=.005, c= .33, but no significant change in correct voting between conditions when PLA, 2(1, 
130)= 1.70, p=.19, c= .17. We discuss this in Appendix A.1.4. 
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Overall participants found the candidates in the experiment believable (= 64.38, SD= 18.32), had 
confidence in their vote choice (= 58.45, SD= 18.01), had confidence they would not change their vote (= 
57.65, SD= 20.76), and felt making their vote choice was of medium difficulty (= 46.44, SD= 24.54). 
We carried out a multivariate ANOVA on all four measures, using Party Label (PL), number of candidates 
(NOC), and their interaction term (PL*NOC) as predictor variables. Levene’s Test was not significant for any 
of the variables (all p> .41). We found no factor had a significant effect when averaged across all the dependent 
variables. However follow-up univariate analysis showed that Party Label had a significant effect on perceived 
vote choice difficulty, F(1, 126)= 5.79, p= .01, ηp²= .044. When party label was absent (= 51.86, SD= 23.56), 
participants found their vote choice more difficult than when party label was present (= 41.93, SD= 24.58). 
 
Figure 2.14: Post Ballot Measures by Condition. Bars are +/- SD. 
 
We regressed all of our post-ballot measures of vote confidence, believability, and difficulty, on CV in 
Block 1, adding our main predictors (PL, NOC) and their interaction term in Blocks 2 and 3. The regression 
model containing our post-ballot variables was not significant, 2(4) = .78, p= .94, R2= 0.8%, and predicted 
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58.5% of the overall cases correctly. None of the post-ballot measures were significantly predictive of correct 
voting (all p> .50). Adding the main predictors in Block 2 did not improve the model, and adding the interaction 
term in Block 3 did not further improve the model (p= .09).  
 
We regressed ‘distance BNB’ (centered on its mean) as a predictor variable on CV, finding it was positively 
associated with the likelihood of voting correctly but non-significantly, = .45, p= .18, indicating participants 
were 1.57 times more likely to vote correctly as distance between the two most proximal alternatives increases 
(in line with per Experiments 2 & 3). We included ‘distance BNB’ (centered on its mean) as a predictor variable 
with PL and NOC in Block 2, their 2-way interaction terms in Block 3, and their 3-way interaction term in 
Block 4.  
 Only the regression model containing Block 3 approached significance, 2(6) = 9.28, p= .07, R2= 11.4%, 
correctly classifying 63.8% of the cases; significantly improving over Block 2 (p= .044). The interaction of 
‘Distance’ and PL was significantly associated with the likelihood of voting correctly, = 1.55, p= .046, such 
that when party label is present and distance between alternatives increases participants are 4.7 times more 
likely to vote correctly.  
Adding the 3-way interactions between our condition variables and the distance between alternatives in 
Block 3 did not significantly improve our model (p= .91). The overall model was non-significant, 2(7) = 9.31, 
p= .121, R2= 11.4%, which we report in Table 2.15. 
Table 2.11: Logistic Regression results of ‘distance’ between ‘best’ and ‘next best’ options on CV rates. (N= 130) 
Predictor  SE  e 
Distance -1.03 .87 1.40 .35 
Party Label (PLP) -.55 .51 1.17 .57 
NOC (2CAN) -1.194** .574 4.322 .30 
PL*NOC 1.12 .773 2.101 3.07 
Dist*PL 1.46 1.14 1.65 4.31 
Dist*NOC .93 1.16 .64 2.55 
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Dist*PL*NOC .17 1.56 .01 1.18 
Constant .17 .39 .19 1.19 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. ** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
It seems worthwhile to point out the large exponentiated betas (the Odds Ratios) in our model (Block 4). 
While none of the terms reach significance after controlling the 3-way interaction term, participants are still 
4.3 times more likely to vote correctly when PL is present and distance between alternatives increases. 
Additionally, participants seem 3 times more likely to vote correctly in choice sets where the number of 
candidates increases when PL is present. Also, participants seem 2.5 times more likely to vote correctly in the 
5-candidate choice set when Distance between the two proximal alternatives increases. As these do not reach 
significance, we discuss them no further.   
Distance & Difficulty: Increasing distance was not significantly correlated with any of the measures of 
choice confidence or believability of the candidates collected after participants choose a candidate at the ‘Ballot 
Box’ stage. While it was negatively correlated with vote choice difficulty, this was not significant, r= -.06, p= 
.50. 
 
We found no main effects of party label (PL), nor of number of candidates (NOC). However, when 
examining differences between the 3 and 5 candidate choice sets, there is a significant difference when party 
label is absent such that CV rates decrease from 51.7% to 26.7% as the choice set size increases to 5 candidates. 
Distance followed the predicted trend, being positively associated with correct voting, but was not significant. 
The interaction between party label and increasing distance was significant, with increasing distance when 
party label is present increasing likelihood to correctly vote by an odds ratio of 4.7. 
There was an effect of party label on perceived difficulty of vote choice, such that collapsing across choice 
set conditions, participants found choosing a candidate easier when party label was present, compared to when 
it was absent. None of the post ballot measures were predictive of correct voting, nor did controlling for 
differences in confidence, perceived difficulty etc., improve the regression models or the predictive power of 
our main effects (i.e. PL and NOC). 
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 Discussion 
Generally, the rates of correct voting are lower in this experiment than in Experiments 1-3, with an averaged 
CV rate of 40.07% across conditions. We found no overall support for our initial hypotheses: 
H1: That rates of ‘correct voting’ will decrease when candidates (alternatives) increase from 3 to 5. 
44.9% of participants voted correctly in the 3-candidate and 34.4% of participants voted correctly in the 5-
candidate condition, the differences being non-significant. The trend in CV rates is in the predicted direction, 
and the rates of correct voting in the 3-candidate condition seem fairly consistent with those observed 
Experiments 1-3 (51%; 42%; 39%; respectively), suggesting our results are broadly in line with those obtained 
previously. That there is not a large drop-off following the addition of 2 additional candidates would suggest 
that there is a plateauing of the effect of increasing choice set size above 3 candidates, and the rates of correct 
voting here do not differ significantly from what is expected by chance.  
Lau et al. (2013) in their analysis of correct voting across 33 democracies find that the number of 
alternatives (‘political parties’) is negatively corrected with correct voting (= -.12), with “only two 
alternatives on the ballot the model predicts almost 79 percent correct voting, but when there are nine 
alternatives … the probability of a correct vote drops precipitously to under 57 percent … by far the largest 
effect present in our data” (p. 16). We observe similar or lower rates using a more ecologically valid approach, 
with a smaller set size. Lau et al. (2013) go further to comment that “voters are nonetheless doing considerably 
better than chance” (p .16). This is a beguiling statement, and a histogram of CV rates against chance rates are 
sadly not provided by the authors, for if here is a plateauing of the effect of increasing the choice set size, then 
at a certain point statistically people must be seen to vote correctly, as the chance rate drops to the floor (P= 
1/N).  
H2: That ‘correct voting’ will increase when Party Label (party identity) information is available. 
We observe no support for H2, with no main effect of party label observable in the data. Party label does 
have a significant effect on perceived difficulty, with participants finding the vote decision more difficult 
across the 3 and 5-candidate conditions when party label was absent than when it was present. This suggests 
that party label is not ignored, or not exerting some effect on participants, and is simplifying the decision for 
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participants somewhat as would be expected of a beneficial heuristic, but this is not affecting or aiding 
participants in making a correct vote. 
While there were concerns that the believability of materials may be the cause of a lack of an effect of party 
label overall in Experiment 3, believability has no relationship with correct voting in this experiment. One 
possible consideration might be the ‘ideological distinctiveness’ of the party candidates, that is, the clarity of 
party choices arising from how distinct or ‘polarised’ they are from each other38 on a ‘Left-Right’ scale. 
Ideological distinctiveness is measured by Dalton’s (2008) party polarization index39 (PPI); the greater the 
index the greater the variance of party ideologies, and the easier it should be to distinguish between alternatives 
on ideological grounds. Lau et al. (2013) find that “the ideological distinctiveness of alternatives … helps 
mitigate against the pernicious effect of too many alternatives in the choice set, increasing the probability of 
a correct vote by almost 8 percent when the parties are, on average, most distinct” (p. 16). As our experiments 
use real-world materials to construct our stimuli, we do not control for the ideological distinctiveness, or the 
perceived ideological distinctiveness, of the candidates in our experiments. It may well be that on this occasion 
certain parties are less ideologically distinct based on their manifestos, or as perceived by voters40. 
Conveniently, we do have an alternative way of testing the same principle, our ‘distance’ or ‘similarity’ 
measure of the two alternatives that are closest (‘best’) to a participant (based on their weighted policy 
preferences). An alternative way of viewing the measure is the ‘distinctiveness’ between the 2 alternatives 
closest to a voter in an n-dimensional policy space. We observe the trend for participants to be more likely to 
vote correctly as the instance between the two most-proximal alternatives increases (i.e. they become more 
distinct, or dissimilar), but unlike Experiments 2 & 3, the effect is not significant in this experiment. We find 
a significant interaction with Distance and party label, such that participants are 4.7 times more likely to vote 
correctly when alternatives are distinct from each other, and party label is present. Similarly, participants are 
more likely (2.8 times) to vote correctly the more distinct the candidates are as choice set size increases.  
                                                     
38 ‘Party polarisation’ is a concept fraught with terminological difficulties. See Dalton (2008) for a discussion. 
39 Essentially the standard deviation of the distribution of parties along the ‘Left-Right’ ideological dimension. See Dalton (2008, 
p.906) for the equation.  
40 Not included in this PhD thesis, we actually ran a study in March 2015 testing how the addition of each party in the UK to a group 
made of 1-5 of the others affected the perception of each on Left-Right, and Libertarian-Authoritation axes. We found no significant 
effects, but not it does change how the ‘scale range’ is used when adding in certain candidates. 
110 
 
In fact, our measure, might be more accurate (for our goals) than the method of calculating ideological 
distinctiveness than of Lau et al. (2013) whose “survey researchers provided expert judgements about where 
the political parties stand on the left-right scale” (p. 3) and combined them with “respondents’ own ideological 
self-placement [on an 11-point scale] to construct ideological closeness scores” (p. 10). There is no shortage 
of debate over the use of a simple ‘left-right’ scale to collapse n-dimensions of policy preferences (e.g. Castles 
& Mair, 1997). In our experiments, we are able to directly capture participants’ policy preferences, and their 
relative weights to construct and place alternatives in n-dimensional space. Unlike Dalton (2008) and Lau et 
al. (2013), our measure considers only the variation (distinctiveness) between the two parties that should matter 
most- those closest to a voter’s preferences. In the absence of intentionally creating a measure a priori, it is a 
worthwhile proxy for voters’ perceptions of ideological distinctiveness.  
H3: That H1 and H2 will have multiplicative effects, such that the effect of including Party Label will be 
greater in the 5-candidate condition, due to the enhanced task complexity. 
We find a lack evidence for H3, with the integration term being non-significant. However, closer analyses 
suggest a less clear-cut conclusion. Correct voting rates are 51.7% when PLA-3Can; PLA-5Can, 26.7%; PLP-
3Can, 40%; PLP-5Can, 41.9%; with the difference between the 3- and 5-candidate conditions significant when 
party label is absent. This result is in line with Experiments 1-3, which found that CV rates decreased when 
party label was absent and choice set size increased. However, unlike the trends Experiments 2-3, we do not 
see a beneficial effect of party label in the 3-candidates condition (albeit, the difference did not reach 
significance in previous Exps.); this difference may simply be a result of the imbalance in cell sizes between 
the party label conditions (33% less in the party label present conditions). We do see a positive increase in CV 
rates in the larger 5-candidate condition when party label is present, which is line with our predictions and 
previous results in Experiments 2-3. 
One aspect of our study that is surprising is the lack of any participant choosing the UKIP option, despite 
its availability. Of those who actually chose a candidate in our study, 10% felt the party they were closest to 
was UKIP (6.3% said the British Nationalist Party), and ‘UKIP-ers’ made up 6.5% of the 5-candidate party-
label present condition (with half voting correctly). Expecting UKIPers to vote in a partisan fashion presumes 
that these participants should engage in a simple matching strategy in this condition, which they clearly do not. 
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An obvious explanation is that their affective appraisal of whom they feel closest to is not whom they are 
closest to in our experiment; or, given the real-world materials used, even in reality.  This demonstrates why 
conceptions of ‘correct voting’ should never be about simply whether voter’s match their partisanship to that 
of a candidate available- they may not align (well) in reality. Despite the low prevalence of UKIPs in the 
sample, it is worth noting that it is broadly reflective of the 12% of the British electorate who supported UKIP 
at the time of testing.  
 General Discussion 
We have investigated correct voting in a multi-party electoral context outside of the USA, using four in-lab 
experiments and participants’ own self-reported policy preferences. We have examined correct voting using 
both proximal and directional approaches, weighted and unweighted, finding no real difference in using either.  
Worryingly, we find when the increase in the available candidates in the choice set is minimal (2 
alternatives to 3 alternatives), voters seem unable to correctly identify the candidate that overall best matches 
their own reported preferences. When we increase the choice set size to 5 alternatives, correct voting rates can 
go as low as 26%, but seems to plateau; indicating that either: a) there is some limit to the effect of choice set 
size on decision-complexity, or b) participants are utilizing some strategies to deal with increasing choice set 
size (e.g. by reducing the set to a smaller subset). 
In that light, we find mixed evidence for the idea that partisan labels act as a heuristic; with party label 
seemingly acting to aid participants in correctly voting as the choice set size increases, contrary to our initial 
hypotheses that it would act to bias participants to choose incorrectly. We find the effect mildly elusive, likely 
hampered by issues of low statistical power and unbalanced cell sizes. However, there is a consistent 
observation in all experiments that participants vote correctly at the lowest rates when the choice set size 
increases and there is an absence of partisan labels, and better when party label is present as choice set size 
increases. This finding is a positive contribution to both the political and psychological literature, identifying 
some initial evidence for an oft-mooted political heuristic that may aid decision-making in real world tasks, 
and contributes to the debate as to whether relying on partisan cues result in biased decision-making (and if 
that results in positive outcomes). 
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A possibility may be that party label acting as providing a memory aid to participants and reducing cognitive 
load, as having a proxy summary of positions reduces the need to hold all the learned attributes in working 
memory for recall, comparison, and evaluation. Additionally, party label may be acting to narrow the 
consideration of alternatives down to a smaller set of alternatives (i.e. by excluding those least preferred), 
effectively rendering the decision between larger sets of alternatives comparable to a smaller choice set. We 
examine these possibilities in Chapter 3. 
Our results also point towards the role of ideological (or inter-alternative) distinctiveness in playing a role 
in voters’ ability to correctly vote, such that greater distinctiveness (or decreasing similarity) of alternatives 
leads to greater rates of correct voting. This is in line with Scheibehenne et al. (2010), whom posited that 
greater alternative similarity in choice sets would lead to adverse outcomes by increasing task complexity- a 
similar concept mooted by Downs (1957) via the spatial voting model, positing that if two or more parties are 
equidistant (similar), this produces voter indifference and increases the likelihood of nonvoting (a negative 
outcome). While we are unable to tell if perceived similarity led to indifference in our study, it is a possible 
avenue for further investigation. 
There are some limitations to our own research, namely tension between the concepts of ‘sincere’ voting 
and ‘correct’ voting (Austen-Smith, 1989; Lau et al., 2013). ‘Sincere’ voting presumes that voters vote for the 
candidate whose ‘electoral platform’ is the most preferred, and is agnostic to other considerations such as 
barriers to voting for such a candidate, or indeed if the most preferred candidate is capable of winning 
(perceived or real). ‘Insincere’ voting is voting for a candidate who is disliked, such as tactically voting against 
a candidate to keep the ‘least preferred’ from being elected (and other strategic concerns). Like Lau et al. 
(2013), we do not incorporate these concerns into our CV framework, though aspects such as ‘electability’ can 
be as legitimate as any other attribute for consideration and weighting in a decision-theoretic model, and their 
exclusion may lead to over-estimation of incorrect voting. We do not believe it was a concern in our studies 
here, as participants were informed that all candidates were equally tied in ‘the polls’ (thus signaling equal 
electability), therefore participants had no reason to vote insincerely. Further, Lau et al. (2013) provide a 
posteriori analyses to support their claim that strategic voting was not a concern in their analysis of correct 
voting in 33 democracies. That said, an objective measure of whether voters vote ‘correctly’ should take into 
considerations that they may not be able to, which we do in our studies by assigning a correct vote to the 
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proximal alternative that is available, even if they are not ‘the most preferred’ in a wider sense of all 
possibilities. Identifying the best methods of measuring strategic voting concerns, and incorporating them into 
a correct voting framework, is a fruitful line of further research. 
Given the prevailing trend in non-USA countries towards increasing the number of parties on offer 
(Pederson, 1979), and the UK’s comparatively high party tribalism (YouGov, 2013b), our findings are 
concerning for a fundamental of modern democracy; political pluralism may negatively impact the health of 
democracy. While the UK political parties’ use of party branding is ubiquitous, and party labels exist on the 
ballot paper next to candidate names in every election, our results would suggest that even among voters that 
are given the opportunity (and arguably motivation) to access information for political candidates and make a 
decision, voters may only choose correctly as low as 41.2% of the time; and as low as ~24% of time if party 
label is missing.  
We have investigated choice set size and a suspected political heuristic, and their effects on correct voting 
as an outcome measure. In order to better understand how these may exert their effects on voters’ decision-
making during the formation of their vote choice at the cognitive level, we explore our data at in greater detail 
and more sensitive measures via an information processing approach in Chapter 3.  
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: Information processing in vote choices 
 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we explored how the size of the choice set of candidates, and the presence of ‘party label’ 
impacts on voters’ ability to vote correctly; that is, choose the candidate in the available choice set that best 
matches their political preferences. Specifically, we hypothesised that increasing numbers of alternatives 
would increase task complexity (Sela, Berger, & Liu 2009) leading to decreased rates of correct voting; that 
party label would act as a partisan heuristic (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001), leading to decreased rates of voting; and 
that these effects would be multiplicative, so that the lowest rates of correct voting would be where party label 
was absent and choice set size increases. 
We find across our four experiments that when the increase in the available candidates in the choice set is 
minimal (2 alternatives to 3 alternatives), the rate of correct voting decreases. When we increase the choice set 
size to 5 alternatives, correct voting rates can go as low as 26%, but seems to plateau; indicating that either: a) 
there is some limit to the effect of choice set size on decision-complexity; or b) participants are utilizing some 
strategies to deal with increasing choice set size and reducing cognitive load (e.g. by reducing the set to a 
smaller subset). 
We find mixed evidence for the idea that partisan labels act as a heuristic; with party label seemingly acting 
to aid participants in voting correctly as the choice set size increases, contrary to our initial hypotheses. While 
not reaching statistical significance in three of our four experiments, we consistently observe that participants 
vote correctly at the lowest rates when the choice set size increases and there is an absence of partisan labels, 
and better when party label is present as choice set size increases. We conjectured that party label may act as 
a memory aid to participants and reduce cognitive load, as having a proxy summary of positions reduces the 
need to hold all information in working memory. Additionally, party label may be acting to narrow the 
consideration of alternatives down to a smaller set of alternatives (i.e. by excluding certain alternatives), 
effectively rendering the decision between larger sets of alternatives comparable to a smaller choice set. While 
it may have no overall effect on our outcome measure of correct voting, we do observe some support that is 
exerting some effect, as participants in Experiments 3 and 4 that find the perceived difficulty of making a vote 
choice greater when party label was absent than present. 
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Fundamentally, we do not know why choice set size has this effect on participants’ (in)ability to vote 
correctly. While we can conjecture based upon Chapter 2 that participants are finding the decision-task far 
more complex due to the additional information load, and alternatives to compare between, this is no guarantee 
that participants are accessing more information in the expanded choice sets, or simply succumbing to fatigue 
during the experiments (Danzigera, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011). Similarly, it is unclear what, if any, 
heuristic effect party label has at the cognitive level; either to reduce the levels of information processing 
required, or by directing participants to a smaller subset of alternatives.  
As the results from Chapter 2 were unclear, this chapter also provides more sensitive measures of the direct 
effects of choice set size, and party label. We can explore the cognitive effects of both choice set size and party 
label by looking at how our ‘voters’ (i.e. participants) process the information they encounter during the 
experimental ‘flow stage’. For example, how much information they access, the duration of how long it is 
accessed, and if they engage in preferential search amongst alternatives. With this in mind, we examine 
participants’ processing-level data from our previous four experiments in Chapter 2. We adapt some of the 
approaches used by Lau and Redlawsk (2006) to examine the information processing of voters during the 
experimental flow stage; namely, looking at the amount of search participants engage in during the flow stage, 
and the average duration that participants spend on items; and we develop our own measures of preferential 
processing between alternatives.  
 Heuristics & Processing  
We provide a basic introduction to cognitive processing and heuristics in Chapter 1 (Section 1.5.1). Simon 
(1990), argues heuristics are “methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of 
computation” (p. 11), used to reduce the effort associated with decision processes. In judgment and decision 
making, the weighted additive rule (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) is “the traditional gold standard for 
rational preferences” (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999, p. 26) for arriving at optimal 
decisions and accurate judgments, where decision makers consider all of the available alternatives and cues 
for each alternative, determine a weight for each cue in some manner (e.g. relative importance), assign weights 
to each cue, and calculate each alternative’s value by multiplying each cue by its weight and summing the 
products. By contrast, heuristics can make judgments faster and less effortful through frugality, by examining 
116 
 
fewer cues, reducing the effort of retrieving cue values, simplifying the weighting of cues, integrating less 
information, and examining fewer alternatives (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
Of particular relevance is the role of heuristics in reducing cognitive effort, for example, in processing fewer 
cues (i.e. informational items).  
Decision makers may focus on the cues they deem most important, or what cues most validly predict 
judgments about alternatives. The lexicographic heuristic (Fishburn, 1967; 1974) operates by selecting the 
alternative with the best value on the most important cue; and if alternatives tie decision makers search again 
according to the second most important cue, and so on until a single alternative is chosen. The priority heuristic 
(Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006), and the Take-the-Best heuristic (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) are 
variants of the lexicographic heuristic. While decision makers may search multiple cues because the first cue 
does not discriminate between alternatives, they are still reducing effort as only one cue is considered at a time, 
reducing the amount of information to be kept in working memory. Under the elimination by aspects heuristic 
(EBA) (Tversky, 1972), decision makers select and establish a cut-off value for the most important cue, 
eliminating any alternatives that do not satisfy the criterion value on this cue and continue to choose cues in 
this manner until only one alternative remains. Again, while decision makers may still have to consider many 
cues before finally narrowing the set to one alternative, by consulting fewer cues during each comparison of 
alternatives, the decision task becomes significantly easier. Similarity, a heuristic might reduce the number of 
cues used, but use more than one cue (i.e. the CONF heuristic, Karelaia, 2006). 
Decision makers may reduce effort in retrieving/storing cues by computing them quickly or substituting 
other attributes in their place (‘attribute substitution theory’, Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), by using 
heuristics like the representativeness heuristic to judge using easy-to-access information about whether a target 
resembles a prototypical instance of the class (e.g. if a candidate with a Labour party label is a typical example 
of a Labour politician). Similarly, affect associated with an alternative can act as a prominent cue or affective 
heuristic (Monin & Oppenheimer, 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) 
In order to reduce decision effort, decision makers can reduce effort by integrating less information across 
multiple attributes or even by not integrating information at all., using non-compensatory heuristics (i.e., 
heuristics that do not make trade-offs between cues). The satisficing heuristic (Simon, 1955, 1956, 1990) uses 
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numerous cues, setting cut-off levels for each cue, and selecting the first alternative in their search that 
surpasses their cut-off for each cue. Information from all of these cues are not integrated to gain an alternative's 
total utility, therefore the chosen alternative is simply ‘good enough’. Payne et al., (1993) warn that decision 
makers utilizing such heuristics often do not form an overall impression of an alternative, and thus their overall 
utility, leading to poor decisions – a possible source of incorrect voting. The domran heuristic (Hogarth & 
Karelaia, 2005b) eliminates alternatives that are dominated on a cue by at least one other alternative, removing 
the need to integrate information across cues or to form an overall impression of an alternative before it is 
eliminated.  
Finally, decision makers can reduce effort in decision-making by utilizing heuristics that examine fewer 
alternatives. EBA and other lexicographic heuristics progressively rule out alternatives that fall below cue 
threshold levels during evaluation. Heuristics might also reduce effort by immediate elimination of some 
alternatives from the choice set (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). An example analogous to the political domain 
is the do-no-harm heuristic for policy reform (Baron, 1993, 1994), where decision makers rule out any policy 
change that would infringe upon the rights of a group, and then continues using cues, such as ‘fairness’, to 
decide on policy changes. 
Four ‘models’ of voters were proposed by Lau and Redlawsk (2006). Their voter models consist of Model 
1 (classic ‘rational decision-makers who seek out all information), Model 2 (confirming prior beliefs through 
partisan voting), ‘Model 3’ (‘fast & frugal’ by seeking out few but highly valid informational cues), and with 
‘Model 4’ types (utilize heuristics and other shortcuts, i.e. stereotypes, schemes, etc.). Model 3 voters are those 
most likely to utilize variants of the lexicographic heuristic, while Model 4 voters could use a wide range of 
heuristic strategies. By further exploring party label and choice set size in depth, we can examine the type of 
heuristic processing voters engage in, and relate our findings back to Lau and Redlawsk’s (2006) voter models. 
In all of our experiments in Chapter 2, we observe the trend that participants report their decision as more 
difficult when choice set size increases, particularly when party label is absent, while in Experiments 2-4 
participants’ perceived decision difficulty actually decreases (i.e. the choice seems easier) in larger choice sets 
when party label is present than when absent. This suggests that increasing choice set size does increase 
perceived effort of the decision in our experiments, while party label may act to reduce effort (e.g. through 
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heuristic processing). Lau and Redlawsk (2006, p.246) also note this trend to utilize ‘political heuristics’ when 
choice set size increases but do not find the use of their party heuristic significantly differs, which is based on 
the rate of access for that item. 
In the next section, we discuss how we can assess the use of heuristics and effort reduction under each of 
these principles. Primarily, we consider the role of information processing approaches, and a ‘Dynamic Process 
Tracing Environment’ (DPTE) methodology outlined in Chapter 2. 
 Assessing heuristics & information processing via process tracing 
Generally, there are three types of ways to study heuristics in judgment and decision making (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008); computer simulations to investigate the effort and expected accuracy of heuristics; what 
information is searched for and used over time to arrive at a decision; and how people's behavioural outcomes 
match patterns that are indicative of certain strategies. The latter we investigated in Chapter 2.  
Shah & Oppenheimer (2008) state while “computer simulations are useful, they cannot prove whether people 
actually use a given heuristic” (p. 218) whereas process tracing and outcome analysis are strong empirical 
tests of effort-reduction. Process tracing observes how people search for information prior to making a 
judgment or decision, allowing determination of which types of decision processes are being used (Payne et 
al., 1993; Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2010). It is especially useful for studying whether decision makers are 
examining fewer cues or alternatives (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008), for instance, by examining the relative 
number of cues accessed for alternatives, or the average duration spent on them. Lau and Redlawsk (2006, 
p.233) inferred ‘heuristic’ use by participants in their experiments (e.g. party label, candidate images) by 
comparing the mean (or relative) amount of times the information items (or all items in a related category) for 
each proposed ‘political heuristic’ were accessed by participants; comparing them between studies mimicking 
USA primary and general election campaigns. This approach is problematic. Access of information items itself 
can be part of a heuristic strategy (i.e. seeking out highly valid cues, like party label), but doesn’t show if, or 
how, such information may subsequently result in heuristic processing (e.g. by eliminating alternatives).  
The Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE) software used in our methodology allows for a degree 
of exploratory analysis into participants’ information processing during our experiments. The DPTE is 
designed to capture participants’ access of informational stimuli as they appear on screen during a simulated 
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election campaign (the ‘flow stage’); recording when an item is opened, for how long it remains open on a 
participant’s screen, and which alternative the informational item belongs to (and more; see Lau & Redlawsk, 
2006). As such, we decided to investigate how participants’ amount of information search and the average 
duration on items searched (as proxy measures of information processing), differed with choice set size and 
party label’s presence, in line with research on heuristic processing and effort reduction. 
Amount of Information Access (IA): Lau and Redlawsk (2006, p.109) explore the various ways one might 
assess a voter’s depth of information search in a study, namely looking at the total amount of access (i.e. total 
number of informational items searched) for each candidate. The amount of information accessed overall will 
be influenced by the number of candidates in the choice set (i.e., there is more to access in expanded choice 
sets), therefore we need an additional measure that takes into account the differing number of items accessed. 
Average Duration (AD): considering the general use of reaction times and duration data assess processing 
patterns, including in static information boards (Jacoby, Kohn, & Speller, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 
1974; Payne, 1980), it is somewhat surprising that Lau and Redlawsk (2001; 2006) do not include analysis on 
how party affiliation, number of candidates, or campaign effects, impact on the duration participants access 
items for. The duration spent on information searched is a useful way of assessing information processing, as 
one could expect that larger choice sets would result in less time spent on items or alternatives as participants 
attempt to search, and compare, information within/between more alternatives. We average duration across the 
number of items accessed to control for differences between participants who access differing amounts of 
information. Similarly, if party label’s presence does result in more heuristic processing, reducing the need for 
more information search and comparison, participants may spend a shorter average duration on items. 
Equality of Search (ES): The standard indicator of search equality is the variance in the amount of 
information gathered across alternatives; if the variance is low, then search is relatively equal; if it is high, then 
search across alternatives is unequal. However, this does not tell us in which direction (i.e. for which 
alternative) search is unequal (i.e. preferential for an alternative). Therefore, we construct our own measures 
of information search equality amongst alternatives in the choice set, using the amount of information accessed 
and average duration, and the chosen candidate as the reference point. We do this in two ways, as discussed 
below. 
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‘Suppressing’ Alternatives: First, we compare whether the equality of search between the chosen alternative 
(candidate) and the alternatives in the smaller choice set (e.g. 2 candidates) is the same as that in the expanded 
choice set (e.g. 3 candidates). This is in order to assess if unequal search (i.e. preferential search) patterns for 
the chosen alternative differ by choice set size. If the amount and average duration of search between the 
alternatives in both conditions (chosen +1 alternative, vs. chosen +2 alternatives) are not meaningfully different 
(i.e. equal), then it may be that participants are ‘suppressing’ the presence of additional alternatives by 
considering a smaller subset of alternatives in the larger choice sets. For example, an alternative pair comprised 
of the chosen alternative and whichever other alternative is next-most-accessed by the participant. Equality of 
search between choice sets would correspond to heuristic strategies that utilize pairwise comparisons (Russo 
& Dosher, 1983), which reduce the number of alternatives that must be kept in working memory at once and 
demand on cognitive resources. We can also see if party label has any effect across choice sets. However an 
effect using this measure may correspond to participants suppressing additional alternatives, or focusing on a 
preferred pair, therefore we construct an additional metric to test for these differences. 
‘Focussing [on]’ Alternatives: We test this idea more directly by ‘removing’ the additional ‘least-
considered’ candidates from our calculating our suppressing measures in larger choice sets (e.g. comparing 2 
the two most accessed alternatives in both the 2-/3-candidate conditions). This allows us to see if participants 
are ‘focussing’ on their chosen candidate relative to another candidate. In the smaller 2-candidate conditions, 
there is no choice but to focus on the chosen candidate and the remaining alternative (either Labour or 
Conservative), but in expanded choice sets the focussed pair of the chosen candidate and ‘next-most-
considered’41 could be any of a number of alternatives (Labour, Conservative, Liberal, Green, or UKIP). 
Therefore, we remove the alternative(s) that are the least considered when calculating our measures for the 
larger 3-/5- candidate conditions and re-calculate the score as if there were only that many alternatives in the 
choice set. This allows us to test if equality of information search between the chosen and next-preferred 
candidate differs based on choice set size, and if party label has any effect. 
                                                     
41 We use the word ‘considered’ as to not become confused with ‘preference’. We have no way of knowing if an alternative is 
accessed heavily indicates participants’ preference (though it seems likely), and we only assume preference for the chosen candidate 
as participants’ vote choice has made that explicit a posteriori. 
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The method of calculating of our ‘suppressing’ and ‘focussing’ preference measures are detailed in 
‘Procedure’ (Section 3.3.5, this chapter). 
Timebin: Considering that heuristics like EBA and other lexicographic heuristics initially include all 
alternatives and reduce effort by gradually paring down the number of alternatives in the set that fall below a 
minimum threshold for a particular cue, it is logical to analyse our IA, AD, and ES measures over the duration 
of the experimental flow stage. We follow Lau and Redlawsk (2006) in dividing up the flow stage into three 
equal time-bins. Looking at the pattern of our ES measures over time will allow us to examine how a preference 
for the chosen candidate relative to the alternatives emerge over time, per condition.  
Information Processing, Heuristics, & Correct Voting: Ultimately, we wish to investigate how participants’ 
information processing may relate to whether or not they vote correctly. In line with rational assumptions, it 
seems uncontroversial to state that the more information participants access should lead to more informed 
decisions, and thus be more likely to vote correctly. The alternative view is that ‘information overload’ arising 
from excess information results in lower quality decisions (Bargh & Thein, 1985, Kerstholt, 1992). In such a 
case, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) argue that using less information (e.g. by utilizing heuristics) can 
actually increase performance and accuracy in decision-tasks under certain conditions. For example, Take-the-
Best can predict more accurately than linear multiple regression models (Czerlinski et al.1999), provided cues 
are searched through in the order of their validity, and there is high cue redundancy and high variability in cue 
weights (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Famously, Ortmann, Gigerenzer, Borges, and Goldstein (2008) 
reported in a study on financial portfolio success, that general members of the public utilizing the recognition 
heuristic outperformed (on average) managed funds, the Dow/Dax markets, and stock experts.  
 In political information processing, Lau and Redlawsk (2006) put forward a theoretical voter model of 
decision-making (‘Model 4’, p.8) that is ‘rational bounded’ and ‘intuitive’ in decision-making; utilizing heavily 
on heuristic strategies (i.e. satisficing) and ‘political heuristics’. They find evidence that cognitive limits are 
indeed a problem for voters and that non-compensatory strategies corresponding to those for Model 4 voters 
are positively related to correct voting in certain scenarios, often outperforming ‘rational’ models 
corresponding to effortful decision-making strategies (e.g. weighted additive; ‘Model 1’ voters). Both of these 
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bodies of research suggest that in certain cases, voters following heuristic strategies may lead to positive 
outcomes, improving correct voting rates. 
Similarly, if participants are spending longer on items, rather than quickly skimming information, this should 
lead to better evaluations of the cues and alternatives overall, and thus better decisions on their utility (i.e. 
more correct voting). Alternatively, average duration on items may not matter, as individual differences in 
reading and processing speed may lead to participants spending only as long as is needed.  
One would expect that greater preference for the chosen candidate on our constructed measures should be 
related to rates of correct voting, in that, when participants show greater preference for a chosen candidate and 
they are the (in)correct choice, this should be related to (in)correct voting rates. Yet, greater amount of search 
for one specific candidate, and the longer spent on one candidate reduces evaluation of other candidates (as 
there is limited time); and may be negatively related to correct voting (if the participant is dwelling on the 
incorrect choice). 
 Research Questions 
As this chapter is exploratory in nature, analysing data already collected, we make no strong a priori 
predictions as to what the expected patterns of information processing may be. As party label is probably the 
most informative cue about candidates in elections (containing stereotypic information, and acting as a proxy 
for policy stances), its absence should make vote choice more difficult, and result in more effortful processing. 
Therefore, our first research question (RQ) is: 
RQ1. What effect does party label have on information search, and average duration, when it is absent 
versus when it is present? 
In Chapter 2 we observe that the number of candidates in the choice set exerts the most consistent effect 
throughout our 4 experiments on correct voting rates, with increasing choice set size negatively associated 
with the ability to vote correctly. Increasing the choice set from 2 (Labour Party, Conservative Party) to 3 
candidates (adding in Liberal Democrats) may seem like a minor increase, but it increases the number of items 
present in the flow stage from an average of 40 (when there are 2 candidates) to 60 (3 candidates); increasing 
the number of intra-/inter-alternative comparisons possible for participants to carry out. In Experiment 4, we 
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also increased the choice set size from 3 candidates to 5 (again increasing information items), including the 
two more relatively ‘extreme’ parties (albeit still ‘mainstream’) in the UK: the UK Independence Party, and 
the Green Party. These parties’ policies are less well known to the general UK electorate (relative to the Labour 
Party, Conservative Party, and the Liberal Democrats), and less covered by the wider media as a result of their 
small electoral share in the UK. While we give 33% more time in the flow stage with the addition of each 
candidate (alternative) to participants to access this information (as to be comparable with small choice set 
conditions), this does not necessarily mean participants will find the tasks any less demanding or complex, and 
may attempt to access as much information as possible in the shortest time to reduce the ‘cost’ of missing 
information as items continue in the background of the flow stage (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.1). Therefore, 
we expect task complexity arising from increasing choice set size to increase effortful processing and heuristic 
use (Timmermans, 1993; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  
 However, given the increased informational content and proportional duration, we would expect significant 
differences between our choice sets in the raw amount of information accessed- an uninformative result as it 
just confirms that more information is accessed when available and there is more time. Average duration, 
however, will provide us will more information on participants’ information processing. We expect increasing 
task complexity to result in more effortful processing, and therefore longer duration on average in accessing 
and integrating information to arrive at a judgment.  In addition, we should expect any heuristic effect party 
label may exert should be greater as task complexity increases, in order to reduce decision effort. Therefore, 
our RQ is: 
RQ2.   What effect does choice set size have on information search and average duration, and does this 
differ when party label is absent/present? 
In relation to equality of search, or ‘preferential search’, due to the more effortful processing required to 
choose a candidate when party label is absent (access more information, more cue retrieval, examining across 
more alternatives.), our RQs are: 
RQ3. What effect do choice set size and party label have on the equality of search and duration? 
In relation to correct voting, greater search and average duration could lead to better or worse correct voting 
rates, depending on voters’ decision strategies. We opt for the rationalist assumption that participants who 
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learn more about the alternatives, and spend longer considering them, gain a better overall impression of 
alternative utility, and thus vote more correctly. Therefore, our final RQ is: 
RQ4. How do our information processing, and equality, measures relate to correct voting rates? 
 Methods 
 Meta-Analysis  
We originally analysed Experiments 1-4 from Chapter 2 separately. An overall picture of the pattern of 
results was difficult to obtain, owing to changing patterns of significance across experiments. Possible 
explanations include differences in statistical power owing from differing sample sizes, temporal factors, etc. 
As the chapter is exploratory in nature, we opted to conduct a meta-analysis across our experiments to estimate 
the overall effect of our manipulations on our variables.  
Meta- analysis allows the combining of numerical results from a few or many studies, the accurate estimate 
of descriptive statistics (Hedges 1987, Rosenthal 1978) and “the explanation of inconsistencies as well as the 
discovery of moderators and mediators in bodies of research findings” (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001, p.61). 
Meta-analysis reduces the reliance on significance testing of any single finding as a measure of its value. In 
that, repeated results in the same direction across multiple studies can provide more powerful evidence than a 
single significant result, even if none of them are significant. Rosenthal and DiMatteo (2001) give an example 
as follows: “two results at p= .06 are much stronger evidence (p= 0.014) against the null hypothesis than is 
one 0.05 result; and ten results at p= 0.10 are stronger evidence (p= 0.000025) against the null than are five 
at p= 0.05 (p= 0.00012)” (p. 63). Meta-analysis can allow small and non-significant effects to contribute to 
understanding the overall picture of a research area. By conducting a meta-analysis on our studies we hope to 
provide more accurate and credible conclusions as to the patterns of results that emerge from our data. 
Random Effects Meta-Analysis: We use the random-effects model approach to meta-analysis. There are 
two ways to conceptualize meta-analysis: fixed- and random-effects models (Hedges, 1992; Hedges & Vevea, 
1998; Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). We opt to follow the random effects model of meta-analysis used by Hunter 
and Schmidt (2004), based on observations by Field and Gillet (2010) that real-world data in the social sciences 
are likely to have variable population parameters (Field, 2003; Hunter & Schmidt, 2000, 2004; National 
125 
 
Research Council, 1992; Osburn & Callender, 1992)42, and average effect sizes will vary randomly across 
studies depending on the sample population. Field and Gillet (2010) argue that “the consequences of applying 
random-effects models to fixed-effects data are much less severe than the other way around” (p. 674). 
Specifically, the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) random-effects method produces less biased estimates of the 
population values than Hedges & Piggot’s (2001) random-effects method (Field, 2005), which is what we 
follow here. 
Fixed-effect models assume that studies in the meta-analysis are sampled from a population in which the 
average effect size is fixed or can be predicted from a few predictors (Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). Thus, sample 
effect sizes should be homogeneous because they come from the same population with a fixed average effect. 
Alternatively, one may assume that the average effect size in the population varies randomly from study to 
study, or that studies in a meta-analysis come from populations that have different average effect sizes, so 
population effect sizes can be thought of as being sampled from a ‘super-population’ (Hedges, 1992). 
Therefore, effect sizes should be heterogeneous as they come from populations with varying average effect 
sizes. Essentially fixed effects models have one error term, whereas random effects models have two error 
terms; which has implications for computing mean effect sizes (Field & Gillet, 2010). When heterogeneity 
exists in fixed models, it results in over-weighting large studies, narrow confidence intervals, and smaller p-
values (compared to random effects models). Conversely, when homogeneity exists, fixed effects models have 
correct pooled estimates, correct confidence intervals, and correct p-values (compared to random effects, 
where confidence intervals are too wide, and p-values are larger). Random effects modeling allows us to assess, 
and adjust for, hetro-/homogeneity. 
Additionally, random-effects models allow inferences that generalize beyond the studies included in the 
meta-analysis (i.e. unconditional inferences). We outline our method below. 
 
 
                                                     
42 Field (2005) calculated the standard deviations of effect sizes for all meta-analytic studies (using r) published in Psychological 
Bulletin in 1997–2002 and found that they ranged from 0 to 0.3, and were most frequently in the region of 0.10–0.16; Barrick and 
Mount (1991) similarly found that the standard deviation of effect sizes (rs) in published data sets was around 0.16. These studies 
suggest that a random-effects approach should be the norm in social science data, and we take this as further reason to use a random-
effects approach to our meta-analysis here. 
126 
 
 Participants 
All details of the participants included in our analyses in Experiments 1-3 can be found in Chapter 2 under 
the appropriate sections.  
We include all participants from each of our studies: N= 120 in Experiment One, N= 93 in Experiment Two, 
N= 124 in Experiment Three, and N=153 from Experiment Four. 
 Design 
Experiments 1-3 followed the same 2x2 between-subjects design, Party Label (Present, Absent) and Number 
of Candidates (2, 3), as outlined in Chapter 2. Experiment 4 utilized a 2x2 between-subjects design, Party 
Label (Present, Absent) and Number of Candidates (3, 5). Our dependent variables are the total number of 
items accessed (IA), the average duration of item access (AD); our metrics of preferential search; 
IA(S)upressing, IA(F)ocussing, AD(S), and AD(F); and the rate of correct voting (CV). 
Additionally, we follow Lau and Redlawsk (2006) in dividing the flow stage into 3 equal segments, taken as 
the time from when the first item appears on screen to when the last item disappears off the screen. This gives 
us T1 (Start), T2 (Middle), and T3 (End). We include Time-bin (T1, T2, T3) as a within-subjects factor in our 
analyses. 
We conduct the random-effects meta-analysis for Experiments 1-3, and analyse Experiment 4 separately as 
it differs from Experiments 1-3. 
 Materials 
All details of the materials used in Experiments 1-3 are in Chapter 2, and/or contained in Appendix B, under 
the appropriate sections. 
 Procedure 
DPTE Flow Stage: To help the reader, we repeat here how the flow stage works in our experiments. All 
items appear in random order over the course of the flow stage, entering from the top of the screen, and exiting 
at the bottom. A total of 6 items are available on screen for access at any one time, and items are on screen for 
a total of 15 seconds in duration before becoming inaccessible. All items are repeated once, for a total of 2 
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possible accesses over the flow stage. Participants cannot terminate the campaign to ‘vote early’, so all 
information possible is presented over the maximum time. 
 
To calculate the amount of search for each candidate, we use the summed total number of items accessed 
(IA) for each candidate over the course of the flow stage. To calculate the average duration (AD) of item 
access, we calculate the duration each item accessed was ‘open’ on screen for, sum the total for each candidate, 
and divide the total duration for each candidate by the total number of items accessed for that candidate. 
Constructing our Equality Measures: When considering how best to calculate equality of search between 
alternatives in the choice set, we examined the decision-making and consumer psychology literature for best 
practice examples and found none that suited our purpose (to date). We are particularly interested in how to 
measure preference for one option over the alternatives in a choice set. One could calculate the variance in the 
amount of (unique) information/duration across alternatives (Payne et al.,1993), with smaller variance 
indicating equality across the choice set. However, this does not inform us towards what alternatives higher 
variance (i.e. unequal search) may be skewed. Alternatively, Lau and Redlawsk (2004, 2006) calculate equality 
of search (‘comparability’, 2006, p. 111) as the percentage of all unique attributes accessed for any one 
alternative compared to the total considered for all alternatives. For example, if a participant accessed 
‘Education’ and ‘Healthcare’ for Candidate A and B, comparability would be 100%; but if the participants 
only accessed one of the two (e.g. Education) for Candidate B, comparability would be 50%. As such, Lau and 
Redlawsk’s (2004, 2006) measure relies on knowing the attributes accessed, which is not our aim and again 
does not clearly indicate any preferential strategies towards any one candidate. 
Therefore, we examined a range of possible methods of calculating preference for one option over other 
alternatives, noting each have their own unique characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses. Our primary aim is 
to calculate a measure that assesses whether search is equal amongst alternatives, or unequal for/against the 
candidate chosen at the ‘Ballot Box’. 
One could calculate the percentage (%) of IA or AD for each alternative relative to total IA or AD across 
alternatives. However, this is not without problems. Imagine a scenario where there are 10 items accessed in 
the flow stage, and 5 items are accessed for the chosen candidate. When there are 2 candidates the scores will 
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be 50%:50%, indicating equal search (non-preferential search) between the options; however, when there are 
more than 2 candidates, the ‘50%’ score for the chosen candidate (%CC) is harder to interpret alone as being 
indicative of equal search. For example, the spread of scores could be 50%:49%:1% (CC: ALT1: ALT2)- 
essentially equal between 2 alternatives- or 50%: 25%: 25% (clear preference for chosen candidate), while 
truly ‘equal’ search in a 3-candidate condition would result in a score of 33%:33%:33%. Therefore, we need 
a single metric that is singularly diagnostic for the degree of preference shown for the chosen candidate that 
is comparable across choice-sets. 
Differing Metric Calculations: We attempted to create such a metric in a variety of ways. First we attempted 
either (i) dividing the %CC by the mean percentage of the remaining alternatives in the choice set (e.g. 
%CC/[25% + 25%]/2), or (ii) subtracting the mean percentage of the remaining alternatives from the %CC 
(e.g. %CC – [25% + 25%]/2). The former (i) aims to provide a proportional metric of the CC share relative to 
the other alternatives; however, this results in unintelligible results. For example, where participants sample 
only from one alternative (e.g. 100%:0:0), this will result in division by zero, despite a clear skew for the 
chosen candidate. Similarly, if the spread is 50%:50%:0%, the resulting product is either ‘1’ or ‘2’ depending 
on whether there are 2 or 3 alternatives and renders comparison between choice sets difficult. Another example, 
if the spread is 41.6%:58.4%:0%, the resulting product is either .71 or 1.42, despite the %CC being lower in 
both conditions.  
Version (ii) produces a metric of residual share for the CC relative to the alternatives. This solves the problem 
of division by zero, and provides a directionality in that +/- values indicate %CC is greater/less than the relative 
share than the remaining alternatives. However, it still suffers from the same issue as (i) where the presence of 
a 3rd alternative scoring 0 will artificially inflate the result for the CC. We attempted to solve this by computing 
the difference between the observed %CC share and the expected %CC, but finding it was too immune to 
absolute numbers. For example, if total items accessed for Candidates A:B:C are 5:3:2, this results in 
50%:30%:40%, and a score of ‘.16.’ If items for A only increase to 30 the score will be ‘.52’, and if 100, ‘.62’- 
despite the latter being a threefold increase. 
Our Chosen Metric: Ultimately, we find that calculating the difference between the observed values for the 
chosen candidate (OV), relative to what the expected values (EV) would have been if there were equal search 
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amongst alternatives in the choice set, is the best method. We calculate the expected values (EV) by dividing 
the total values for IA or AD by the number of alternatives in the choice set (2, 3, or 5). There are a few ways 
to construct a score based on OV and EV. 
One could divide OV/EV (e.g. (CC: 5)/[(Total:10)/(Alternatives: 3)]= 1.5); this results in a proportional 
measure that ranges from 0 to positive integers, and is only informative as to whether sampling for the CC is 
greater or less than what would be expected by chance, not whether is unequal in favour of other alternatives. 
To illustrate, if values were 0:0:10 or 0:10 (CC:ATL1:ALT2) the resulting score is ‘0’. Therefore, OV/EV 
does not provide useful information as to the skew of sampling in favour, or away, from the CC. 
 Alternatively, subtracting the OV from EV (OV-EV) results in a valenced measure that has centrality around 
0, such that values approaching 0 indicate more equal search amongst alternatives, and those further away 
from 0 in positive/negative directions indicate more preferential search for the chosen candidate or other 
alternatives. It also preserves the units of the original measure (e.g. ‘items’ or ‘seconds’).  
Using the previous 0:0:10 and three alternatives, the score will be -3.3 items for the CC (unequal sampling 
preference away from CC). If 0:10:10, -6.6 (stronger away from CC); if 10:10:0, +3.3 (in favour of CC overall); 
if 10:0:0, +6.6 (strongly in favour of CC overall). If only two alternatives: 0:10, -5 (away from CC in favour 
of remaining alternative); 10:0, +5 (in favour of CC against alternative).  
As per previous calculations, EV will be affected by the size of the choice set, even if no items are accessed 
for any one candidate. If ten items are accessed in a 2-candidate condition, then EV =5, however even if the 
access pattern in the 3-candidate condition is the exact same between the 2 candidates (no access for third 
candidate), the EV= 3.33. We address this in the next section. 
While it could be suggested this should be normalised by the total amount (i.e. [OV-EV]/N), doing so 
constrains the measure to lie between -/+ 1, losing the intuitive nature of the simpler measure version that 
preserves the original units it is derived from, and the relative degree of preference by being unconstrained to 
range outside of -/+ 1. 
Comparing between Choice Sets: When comparing these scores between the 2-, 3-, 5-candidate conditions, 
we are investigating whether the patterns of search/duration in the larger choice sets are similar to those in the 
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smaller choice sets. If they are, this indicates that participants may be ‘suppressing’ the additional alternatives 
or participants may be processing information as if it were a smaller choice set of alternatives, that is 
‘focussing’ on a smaller alternative subset. Using our main information processing variables IA & AD, we 
used the above calculation method to create two metrics to test for suppression; IA(S)upressing and 
AD(S)upressing.  
We can test if participants are focussing on a smaller subset, by removing the lesser-considered options in 
the 3 and 5-candidate conditions, and lowering the EV denominator (e.g. from 3 to 2). This results in a measure 
that compares the chosen candidate with the next-preferred alternative in the 2-, 3-, and 5-candidate choice 
sets (making them more comparable), and allows us to examine if there are any differences between conditions 
(if any) when participants are just ‘focussing’ on just the chosen and the next-most-considered alternative.  
Using our processing variables and the above calculations, we construct the two related metrics: 
IA(F)ocussing, and AD(F)ocussing. 
In Experiment 4, where we compare 3 vs 5 alternatives, we follow a similar method. We calculate a 
suppressing measures (3v5), and two focussing measures (3v3, 2v2), by progressively removing the least-
considered alternatives at each step from the previous choice set. 
 
Calculating Effect Sizes: An effect size is usually a standardized measure of the magnitude of an observed 
effect, such as the r family (Pearson’s r, phi, r2, 2 etc.) and the d family (Cohen’s d, Hedge’s g, and Glass’s 
. We follow Rosenthal and DiMatteo’s (2001) recommendation to convert all effect sizes to r, as unlike d 
and the Odds Ratio, r is constrained to lie between 0 (no effect) and ±1 (a perfect effect).  
Meta-Analysis, Hunter–Schmidt Method: The population effect (‘population correlation coefficient’) ?̅? is 
estimated using a simple mean in which each effect size estimate, r, is weighted43 by the sample size (n) on 
which it is based: 
                                                     
43 There is an argument to be made for weighting each of the studies by the quality of the methodology (i.e. the degree of confidence 
in the reliability of the experimental procedure and/or results) of each study, or some other factor, as a moderator of the effect size. 
Rosenthal (1995) recommends a weighting studies by their overall methodological quality (e.g. on a 5-point scale from ‘poor’ to 
‘excellent’). We report all results here unweighted, and note the discussion about the subjectivity issues arising from this approach in 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004). 
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?̅? =
∑ 𝑛𝑘𝑖=1 𝑖 𝑟𝑖
∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
 For each study, i in k number of studies included for meta-analysis.  
We estimate the generalizability of the population effect value, or whether other variables moderate the 
population effect, using ‘credibility intervals’ (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Credibility intervals provide 
information about if one can generalize validity, or if the population of effect sizes should be broken down 
into subpopulations (Whitener, 1990). The credibility intervals are based on taking the population effect 
estimate ?̅?, and adding to or subtracting from it the square root of the estimated population variance ?̂?𝑝
2 (for 
full calculations, see Appendix B.1), multiplied by /2 in which  is the desired probability (e.g., for a 95% 
interval, /2= 1.96):  
95% credibility interval𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 =  ?̅? + 1.96√?̂?𝑝
2 
95% credibility interval𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 =  ?̅? − 1.96√?̂?𝑝
2 
If the 95% credibility interval (95% CrI) includes zero (heterogeneous populations), then the mean corrected 
effect size is probably the mean of several subpopulations identified by the operation of moderators; if the 
interval does not include zero (homogeneous populations), then the mean corrected effect size is likely the 
estimate of a single population parameter, and we can assume the absence of moderators (Whitener, 1990).  
Dealing with (in)credible studies: While, whimsically, we consider all our studies to be ‘incredible’, we 
follow a series of stepwise recommendations (where practicable) outlined by Whitener (1990) in the event of 
the 95% CrI including zero and indicating the presence of moderators. Namely that:  
1) if moderators can be identified, this can be used to subgroup the data into subpopulations (and re-
analysed to see if they can be sub-grouped further) 
2) having identified one or more sub-populations as homogenous, a 95% confidence interval (95% CI), 
using the standard error (SE) for the mean effect size, can be generated around ?̅?: 
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𝑆𝐸 = √ 
 1 − ?̅?2 2
 𝑁 − 𝐾 
 
3) for heterogeneous subpopulations, one can generate a 95% CI using the SE formula provided by 
Hunter & Schmidt (1990): 
𝑆𝐸 =    
 1 − ?̅?2 2
 𝑁 − 𝐾 +  
?̂?𝑝
2
𝐾  
 
where N is the population size and K is the number of studies included in the sample. The resulting 95% CI 
formula is the standard ?̅? +/- 1.96(SE). 
 Results 
We divide our results section into two main parts: a meta-analysis of the processing data results from 
Experiments 1-3, and analysis of the results from Experiment 4. We summarise the results jointly at the end. 
In the analysis of each experiment we remove any participant that did not open at least 1 information item 
during the flow stage44. While it is a legitimate action to take to not access any information, there is little 
benefit to be gained from keeping these participants in the sample. We removed N=6 from Experiment 1, N=5 
from Experiment 2, N= 17 from Experiment 3, and N= 13 from Experiment 4. 
 Experiments 1-3: Meta-Analysis 
We carried out a series of repeated measures multi-variate ANOVAs on our dependent variables Items 
Accessed (IA) and Average Duration (AD) using their ‘Total’ amounts, and the derived ‘Suppressing’ (S) and 
‘Focussing’ (F) measures of both. For cogency and due to space constraints, we include all our analytic work 
and results in Appendix B.2 for reference, and only report the main findings here. All the tables containing the 
95% Credibility Intervals, sampling variances, etc. can be found in Appendix B.2. 
Many of the Credibility Intervals contained zero, indicating the presence of heterogeneous subpopulations, 
no one experiment stood out consistently as different from all the others, nor is it clear what any such moderator 
                                                     
44 Lau & Redlawsk (2006) also note some participants do not access at least one item for any candidate, though they account for 
approx. .01% of their total sample 
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may be given the similar set up of the experiments. We note that in the majority of our results we report the 
heterogeneous adjusted 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs) for the population effect size. Where the Hetro 
95% CIs include zero (p> .05), the homogenous versions often do not include zero (i.e. significant at p< .05). 
The reverse case never occurs. Therefore, it is possible our results are overly conservative in favour of the null 
hypothesis. 
The overall trends for each of our Total Items accessed variables, weighted and averaged across Experiments 
1-3 are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.1: Items Accessed by condition. N= 308 
 
      Figure 3.2: Preferences for Chosen using IA. N=308 
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The overall trends for each of our Averaged Duration variables weighted and averaged across Experiments 
1-3 are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 3.3: Average Duration (seconds) by TB 
 
Figure 3.3: Preference for chosen using AD. N=308. 
 
IA: The effect of NOC on IA was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .26 (95% CI: .15, .36).  This is a 
somewhat unsurprising result, given that there are more items to access and increased time in which to do so 
in the 3-candidate condition. 
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AD: The effect of NOC on AD was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .03 (95% CI: -.07, .18).  Participants 
spent an average duration of = 5.08s (SD= 2.44) on items in the 2-Can condition, and = 5.25s (SD= 3.54) 
in the 3-Can condition, which suggests the increasing the choice set from 2 to 3 alternatives does not affect 
the average duration participants spend on items. 
Effect of NOC on Equality: The effect of NOC on IA(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .28 (95% 
CI: .18, .38). Participants search was more equal in 2-Can condition (= .91, SD= 2.22), compared to the 3-
Can condition (= 2.34, SD= 2.65. The effect of NOC on IA(F)was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .15 (95% 
CI: .03, .25). Participants accessed more items for their chosen candidate relative to the next most considered 
alternative in 2-Can condition (= .91, SD= 2.22), compared to the 3-Can condition (= .83, SD= 2.05). 
The effect of NOC on AD(S) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .20 (95% CI: .09, .30). Participants 
spent more equal duration in 2-Can condition (= 2.61, SD= 1.69), compared to in the 3-Can condition (= 
2.96, SD= 2.61). The effect of NOC on AD(F) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .31 (95% CI: .21, .41). 
Participants spend more equal duration on the chosen and next-considered pair in 2-Can condition (= 2.61, 
SD= 1.69), compared to in the 3-Can condition (= 3.64, SD= 3.77).  
 
IA: The effect of PL on IA was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .03 (95% CI: -.09, .13).  Participants 
accessed = 29.84 items (SD= 14.34) when PLA, and =29.28 items (SD=16.36) when PLP. 
AD: The effect of PL on AD was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .07 (95% CI: -.03, .18). Participants 
spent an average duration of = 5.05 (SD= 2.61) on items when PLA, and = 5.26s (SD=3.34) when PLP.  
Effect of PL on Equality: The effect of PL on IA(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .20 (95% CI: .09, 
.29). Participants accessed more items for their chosen candidate relative to the alternatives in the choice set 
when PLA (= 2.03, SD= 2.17), compared to when PLP (= 1.21, SD= 2.30). The effect of PL on IA(F) was 
significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .17 (95% CI: .06, .28). Participants accessed more items for their chosen 
candidate compared to the most considered alternative when PLA (= 1.21, SD= 2.18), compared to when PLP 
(= .58, SD= 2.06). 
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The effect of PL on AD(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .11 (95% CI: .004, .21). Participants spent 
less time on average on their chosen candidate compared to the alternatives in the choice set when PLA (= 
2.76, SD= 1.98), compared to when PLP (= 2.80, SD= 2.36). The effect of PL on AD(F) was significant at 
the = .05 level, ?̅?= .17 (95% CI: .06, .28). Participants spent less time on average on their chosen candidate 
compared to the most considered alternative when PLA (= 3.00, SD= 2.94), compared to when PLP (= 3.19, 
SD= 2.91). 
 
IA: The effect of PL & NOC on IA was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .03 (95% CI: -.07, .15). 
AD: The effect of PL & NOC on AD was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .05 (95% CI: -.06, .16). 
Effect of PL & NOC on Equality: The effect of PL & NOC on IA(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= 
.14 (95% CI: .03, .25). Participants access the most items for their chosen candidates when PLA and there are 
3 candidates (= 3.00, SD= 2.01), and least when PLP and there are 2-candidates (= .72, SD= 2.28; see Figure 
3.4). The effect of PL & NOC on IA(F)was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .14 (95% CI: .03, .25). 
Participants access the most items for their chosen candidates when PLA and there are 3 candidates (= 1.30, 
SD= 2.25), compared to when PLP and there are 3-candidates (= .41, SD= 1.77; see Figure 3.5).  
 
The effect of PL & NOC on AD(S) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .06 (95% CI: -.08, .14. The 
effect of PL & NOC on AD(F) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .31 (95% CI: .21, .41). Participants spend 
the longest on their chosen candidate relative to the next-considered alternative when PLP and there are 3-
Figure 3.4: IA(S) by PL and NOC. N=308.   Figure 3.5: IA(F) by PL and NOC. N=308 
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candidates (= 3.81, SD= 3.65), and the least time when PLA and there are 2-candidates (= 2.38, SD= 2.37). 
Results are shown in Figure 3.7.  
 
 
IA: The effect of TB on IA was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .29 (95% CI: .19, .39). There were 
significant linear trends for IA, F(1, 305)= 39.84, p< .001, r= .33; and quadratic trends, F(1, 305)= 18.34, p< 
.001, r= .24. Participants access fewer items as the flow stage progresses: =10.44 items (SD= 6.12) in T1, 
=10.29 items (SD= 5.54) in T3, and =8.80 items (SD= 5.10) in T3. 
AD: The effect of TB on AD was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .12 (95% CI: .04, .26). There were 
significant linear trends for IA, F(1, 305)= 4.21, p= .04, r= .12; and quadratic trends, F(1, 305)= 5.01, p= .026, 
r= .13. Participants’ average duration spent on each item increases from T1 (= 5.21, SD= 3.48) to T2 (= 
5.43, SD= 4.06), and decreases overall at T3 (= 4.85, SD= 3.27).  
Effect of TB on Equality: The effect of TB on IA(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .13 (95% CI: 
.02, .25). Participants access increasingly more items for their chosen candidate as the flow stage progresses 
(see Figure 2) from T1 to T2, with a slight decrease in T3. The credibility intervals for the effect of TB on 
IA(F)indicated the population variances were not homogenous (-.09, .34), and the effect of TB on IA(F)was 
significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .12 (95% CI: .01, .23). The same trend for participants to increasingly access 
more items for their chosen candidate as the flow stage progresses from T1 to T2, with a slight decrease at T3, 
is observed. 
Figure 3.6: AD(S) by PL and NOC   Figure 3.7: AD(F) by PL and NOC 
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The effect of TB on AD(S) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .07 (95% CI: -.04, .18. The effect of 
TB on AD(F) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .06 (95% CI: -.04, .19). 
 
IA: The effect of TB & PL on IA was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .13 (95% CI: .02, .24). There was a 
significant linear trend for IA, F(1, 305)= 3.91, p= .049, r= .11.When PLA, participants access = 10.26 items 
in T1 (SD= 5.82), = 10.42 in T2 (SD= 5.07), and = 9.15 items (SD= 4.88)  in T3. When PLP participants 
access = 10.60 items in T1 (SD= 6.38), = 10.17 in T2 (SD= 5.94), and = 8.80 items in T3 (see Figure 1).  
AD: The effect of TB & PL on AD was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .06 (95% CI: -.05, .17).  
Effect of PL & TB on Equality: The effect of TB & PL on IA(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .14 
(95% CI: .03, .24). There was a significant linear trend of IA(S), F(1, 305)= 21.57, p= .004, r= .16.When PLA, 
participants access more items for their chosen candidate relative to the others in the choice as the flow stage 
progresses from T1 (= .30, SD= 1.51) to T2 (= .85, SD= 1.75), and remains at the same level at T3 (= .87, 
SD= 1.90). When PLP, participants’ preference for their chosen candidate is relatively the same at T1 (= .45, 
SD= 1.20) and T2 (= .48, SD= 1.48), but decreases at T3 (= .27, SD= 1.39) (see Figure 2).  
The effect of TB & PL on IA(F)was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .13 (95% CI: .01, .23). There was a 
significant linear trend for IA(F), F(1, 305)= 6.44, p= .01, r= .14. When PLA, participants access almost equally 
between their chosen candidate and the next most considered alternative in T1 (= .06, SD= 1.52), accessing 
more items for their chosen candidate in T2 (= .56, SD= 1.54), and continuing to access for the chosen 
candidate in T3 (= .58, SD= 1.73). When PLP, participants access more items for their chosen candidate than 
the next most considered alternative at T1 (= .23, SD= 1.14) and T2 (= .24, SD= 1.39), but have more equal 
access between the chosen and the next most considered candidate at T3 (= .10 SD= 1.55).  
The effect of TB & PL on AD(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .15 (95% CI: .04, .26). There was a 
significant linear trend of AD(S), F(1, 305)= 9.73, p= .002, r= .17. When PLA, participants spend progressively 
less time on their chosen candidate relative to others in the choice set. When PLP, participants spend 
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progressively more time on items access for their chosen candidate relative to others in the choice set. See 
Figure 4 for visualisation of trends.  
The effect of TB & PL on AD(F) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .13 (95% CI: .02, .24). There was a 
significant linear trend for AD(F), F(1, 305)= 7.28, p= .007, r= .15.  When PLA, participants spend 
progressively less time on their chosen candidate relative to the next most considered alternative. When PLP, 
participants spend progressively more time on items access for their chosen candidate relative to the next most 
considered alternative. See Figure 4 for trends. 
 
TIA: The effect of TB & NOC on TIA was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .06 (95% CI: -.05, .17).  
AD: The effect of TB & NOC on AD was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .09 (95% CI: -.01, .21). 
Effect of NOC & TB on Equality: The effect of TB & NOC on IA(S) was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= 
.12 (95% CI: .005, .22). When there are 2-candidates, participants access = .22 items (SD= 1.11) for their 
chosen candidate at T1, = .45, (SD= 1.31) at T2, and = .25 (SD= 1.48) at T3. When there are 3-candiates, 
participants show increasing rate of item access for their chosen candidate as the flow stage progresses, 
accessing = .56 items (SD= 1.56) at T1, = .85 (SD= 1.89) at T2, and = .90 (SD= 3.48) at T3.  
The effect of TB & NOC on IA(F)was significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .12 (95% CI: .01, .24). Similar 
trends are observed; when there are 3-candidates, participants access more items for their chosen candidate 
relative to the next-considered alternative as the flow stages progresses: = .07 items (SD= 1.53) at T1, = .35 
(SD= 1.62) at T2, and = .41 (SD= 1.63) at T3. 
The effect of TB & NOC on AD(S) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .07 (95% CI: -.04, .18). The 
effect of TB & NOC on AD(F) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .09 (95% CI: -.02, .22).  
 
TIA: The effect of TB & PL & NOC on TIA was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .07 (95% CI: -.04, 
.18). 
140 
 
AD: The effect of TB & PL & NOC on AD was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .11 (95% CI: -.001, 
.21). 
Effect of PL & NOC & TB on Equality: The effect of TB & PL & NOC on IA(S) was not significant at the 
= .05 level, ?̅?= .07 (95% CI: -.04, .18). The effect of TB & PL & NOC on IA(F)was not significant at the = 
.05 level, ?̅?= .07 (95% CI: -.04, .18). 
The effect of TB & PL & NOC on AD(S) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .08 (95% CI: -.02, .19). 
The effect of TB & PL & NOC on AD(F) was not significant at the = .05 level, ?̅?= .10 (95% CI: -.006, .22).  
 
We carried out logistic regressions on CV with our processing variables included, in order to check if the 
effects of NOC or PL are mediated by any variable. 
IA & AD: Using binary logistic regression we regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) on our processing 
variables (total IA, AD) entered in Block 1, adding their interaction term in Block 2, our condition variables 
(PL, NOC) in Block 3, and the condition interaction term in Block 4. The regression models for Block 1 was 
non-significant (p= .92), and neither total IA or AD were significantly predictive of increasing levels of CV 
(p> .72).  The addition of their interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .81). The regression 
model containing Block 3 was significant, 2(5)= 35.70, p< .001, R2= 14.6%, and predicted 67.9% of the 
overall cases correctly.  
After controlling for the Total Items Accessed (IA), and the Average Duration (AD) spent on each item, the 
main effect of PL predicted CV at marginal significance, = .45, p= .052, with participants 1.5 times more 
likely to vote correctly when party label is present. The main effect of NOC significantly predicted CV, = -
1.61, p< .001, with participants being 80% less likely to vote correctly when the number of candidates in the 
choice set increases from 2 to 3. Adding the condition interaction term (PL*NOC) did not significantly improve 
the model (p= .47), and the interaction term PL*NOC was not significant, = .35 p= .47. We report the full 
model in Table 3.1, 2(6)= 36.20, p< .001, R2= 14.8%45. 
                                                     
45 We perform bootstrapped logistic regressions for each of our reported regression models (r= 10,000), finding the pattern of results 
do not meaningfully differ from those reported here. 
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Table 3.1: Logistic Regression results of main effects, controlling for IA and AD, on CV rates. (N=308). 
Predictor  SE  e 
IA .007 .014 .236 1.007 
AD -.027 .069 .155 .973 
IA*AD .001 .003 .150 1.001 
Party Label (PLA) .275 .346 .629 1.316 
NOC (2CAN) -1.605ǂ .365 19.31 .201 
PL*NOC .349 .490 .506 1.417 
Constant .526 .451 1.365 1.693 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. *** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
Suppressing Measures: Using binary logistic regression we regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) on 
IA(S) & AD(S) in Block 1, adding their interaction term in Block 2, and PL/NOC in Block 3, and PL*NOC in 
Block 4. Blocks 1 & 2 were non-significant (p= .25; p =.19). The regression model containing Block 3 was 
significant, 2(5)= 35.60, p< .001, R2= 14.6%, and predicted 66.9% of the overall cases correctly. After 
controlling for the equality of search shown towards the chosen candidates, PL was marginally non-significant 
(=. 442, p= .074), and NOC was significantly predictive of correct voting (= -1.34, p< .001), 
Table 3.2: Logistic Regression model including main effects, IA(S), and AD(s), for CV rates. (N=308). 
Predictor  SE  e 
IA(S) .108 .091 1.390 1.114 
AD(S) .094 .074 1.647 1.099 
IA(S)*AD(S) -.035 .028 1.544 .966 
Party Label (PLA) .284 .348 .666 1.328 
NOC (2CAN) -1.512 ǂ .371 16.644 .221 
PL*NOC .320 .493 .422 1.377 
Constant .453 .313 2.097 1.573 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. *** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
Adding the condition interaction term (PL*NOC) did not significantly improve the model (p= .51). We 
report the full model in Table 2, 2(6)= 36.01, p< .001, R2= 14.8%. 
Focussing Measures: Using binary logistic regression we regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) on IA(F) 
& AD(F) in Block 1, adding their interaction term in Block 2, and PL/NOC in Block 3, and PL*NOC in Block 
4. The regression model containing Block 3 was significant, 2(5)= 35.52, p< .001, R2= 15.0%, and predicted 
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66.6% of the overall cases correctly. Adding the condition interaction term (PL*NOC) did not significantly 
improve the model (p= .53). We report the full model in Table 3, 2(6)= 36.91, p< .001, R2= 15.1%. 
Table 3.3: Logistic Regression results of main effects, controlling for IA(F) and AD(F), on CV rates. (N=308). 
Predictor  SE  e 
IA(F) .100 .109 .846 1.106 
AD(F) .083 .052 2.524 1.087 
IA(F)*AD(F) -.024 .028 .745 .976 
Party Label (PLA) .287 .348 .678 1.332 
NOC (2CAN) -1.549 ǂ .363 18.236 .213 
PL*NOC .310 .494 .393 1.363 
Constant .459 .290 2.515 1.583 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. *** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
When comparing the equality of search for the chosen candidate with the 3rd (least considered) alternative 
removed, IA(F)was not significantly predictive of CV, = .10, p= .35. AD(F) was not significantly predictive 
of CV, = .083, p= .11. The main effect of NOC significantly predicted CV, = -1.38, p< .001, with participants 
being 75% less likely to vote correctly when the number of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. 
 
There were some significant patterns observed across Time-bins. Participants’ item access decreased linearly 
over time, while average duration initially increased during the flow stage, but decreased by the end. 
Participants show increasing item access for the chosen candidate over the flow stage, both overall and in 
comparison to the next-considered alternative. 
Party Label (PL) did not significantly affect IA or AD. At the level of time-bin, participants rate of item 
access increased initially when PLA, but decreases linearly when PLP. PL did have an effect on IA(S), IA(F), 
AD(S) and AD(F). Participants had more unequal search in favour of the chosen candidate when PLA versus 
when PLP, even when considering just the chosen and next-considered alternative. Participants spent less 
average duration on their chosen candidate when PLA versus PLP, and this holds for when looking at the chosen 
and next-considered alternative. At the level of time-bin: when PLA, access between alternatives begins equal 
and increases over time; when PLP, access is greatest for the chosen candidate and becomes more equal 
between alternatives over time. 
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Number of candidates (NOC) had a significant effect on IA and AD. NOC did have an effect on IA(S) and 
IA(F), such that greater information was accessed for the chosen candidate relative to the alternatives as choice 
set size increased (unequal search in favour of candidate). NOC had a significant effect on AD(F) but not 
AD(S), such that average duration was more equal between alternatives in the 2-candidate condition, but 
greater for the chosen candidate in the 3-candidate condition relative to the next-considered alternative. At the 
time-bin level: in the 2-candidate condition, access for the chosen candidate increases initially, then decreases; 
in the 3-candidate condition, access for the chosen candidate increases linearly over time. 
The interaction of NOC and PL had a significant effect IA(S), IA(F) and AD(F). Participants search for their 
chosen candidate was greatest when PLA and 3 candidates, and least when PLP and 2 candidates. When 
compared to the next-considered candidate, participants show more equality of search when PLP in the 3-
candidate condition than when PLA (see Figure 3.6).  
Correct Voting: None of our total, ‘suppressing’, or ‘focussing’, measures of processing were predictive of 
correct voting rates. Party Label was significant after controlling for IA, AD, and their interaction, positively 
predicting correct voting; but did not reach significance after controlling for our ‘suppressing’ or ‘focussing’ 
measures. We note party label’s positive beta coefficients across all analyses. Only choice set size (number of 
candidates) was significantly predictive of CV rates after controlling for our measures, with CV decreasing as 
the choice set size increases from 2 to 3 candidates. We note the positive beta coefficients and Odd Ratios (e) 
for the interaction of party label and choice set size after controlling for our measures, though the term does 
not reach significance. 
 Discussion: Experiments 1-3 
We made no predictions as to the pattern of information search or average duration over the flow stage. 
Participants appear to access less information as the flow stage progresses, while the average duration spent 
on information increases initially, only to decrease by the end. This could be due to participants engaging in 
more deliberative processing, constructing preferences for candidates. As the flow stage progresses, items are 
most likely to be repeated, and participants are more likely to have reached a conclusion- decreasing the need 
for effortful search and deliberation amongst alternatives. Alternatively, this could be as a result of task fatigue; 
or boredom, as information is repeated and participants have already accessed items according to some cue 
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validity. However, these explanations seem unlikely, given participants access more information (i.e. engage 
in more unequal search) for their chosen candidate as the flow stage progresses relative to alternatives in the 
choice set. Thus it seems participants are engaging in confirmatory processing (Bruner et al., 1956; Fischer, 
Fischer, Weisweiller, & Frey, 2010), checking previously accessed information, or accessing new information 
about the chosen candidate, to confirm their evaluations. Confirmatory processing strategies have been argued 
to be a heuristic strategy, in particular the CONF heuristic (Karelaia, 2006), which differs from TTB in that it 
allows for multiple pieces of confirming evidence to be accumulated before reaching a decision. This heuristic 
pattern relates to Lau & Redlawsk’s (2006) Model 4 voter type, more so than Model 3 (‘fast and frugal’) or 
Model 2 (‘partisan-matching’), as they are conceptualized as needing only one piece of confirming evidence 
in order to make a decision. 
To recap, our initial research question was: 
RQ1. What effect does party label have on information search, and average duration, when it is absent 
versus when it is present? 
We observed no significant differences for the overall amount of search, or the average duration spent on 
information, as a result of party label’s presence or absence. Party label does not seem to cause less information 
search when it is present, or cause less time to be spent on the items accessed, even if they have party 
stereotypic information attached to them.  
We do note some significant differences in the patterns of information search when looking across time-
bins; when PLA, information search increases initially from T1, and decrease towards T3; when PLP, search 
decreases linearly over time from T1 (-T3). This suggest that party label does exert an effect on information 
search, such that when party label is available it reduces information search over time by participants. This 
might be as a result of more focussed search between alternatives; or that it provides a memory aid for 
participants, reducing the need to re-access information. When party label is absent, participants may need to 
learn and develop a sense of candidate’s positions in the general ideological space, requiring initially greater 
search rates until such a point is reached. A possible way of testing for this may be to potentially ask 
participants to recall candidate’s stances on policies, recording errors, and analysing the differences; with the 
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expectation that those exposed to party label will be able to rely more on stereotypic information to recall (or 
infer) policy stances. 
RQ2.   What effect does choice set size have on information search and average duration, and does this 
differ when party label is absent/present? 
We find no significant effect of choice set size on the amount of information search, or average duration 
spend on items accessed, with no interaction effects observed on the depth of information processing or the 
average duration spent on items accessed. There were no differences over the flow stage. While the average 
duration participants spend on information accessed does increase from 2-candidates to 3-candiates, it is not 
significant; suggesting if there is any effect of choice set size on task complexity and/or effortful processing, 
it is not reflected in the average duration participants spend on the information they access. We provide 
additional thoughts on this at the end of the chapter in our General Discussion. 
RQ3. What effect do choice set size and party label have on the equality of search and duration? 
We find that participants search more equally between alternatives, and the average duration spent on items 
for alternatives is more equal, when there are two candidates compared to when there are three candidates. 
Equality of search differs comparing our ‘suppressing’ and ‘focussing’ measures. When comparing the chosen 
candidate to all other alternatives (2v3), equality of search decreases in favour of the chosen candidate in the 
3-candidate set; whereas if we compare just the chosen and next-considered, search between the two becomes 
more equal in the 3-candidate set. This is in line with people eliminating the least preferred candidate 
(suppressing), rather than focusing on the most preferred candidate. In addition, this greater equality of search 
as the choice set size increases, reflect heuristic strategies that utilize pairwise comparisons (Russo & Dosher, 
1983). 
We found participants spend longer on their chosen candidate when party label is present.  There are 
differences at the descriptive level between our suppressing and focussing measures. The mean increase for 
the chosen candidate in party label’s presence is 0.4s when compared to the entire alternative set (suppressing), 
while it increases to .19s when compared only to the next-most-considered alternative (focussing). We find 
these patterns also emerge over the flow stage, such that when party label is absent duration spent between 
alternatives becomes more equal; while it gradually increases in favour of the chosen candidate when present.  
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We do find greater search for the chosen candidate relative to all the other alternatives in the choice set and 
the next-considered alternative when party label is absent. Furthermore, over the flow stage we see preferential 
search for chosen candidate begins at a level closer to 0 (more equal search between alternatives) and increases 
linearly over time when party label is absent (on both measures), while preferential access decreases (becomes 
more equal) later in the flow stage when party label is present (on both measures). This suggests that when 
party label is present, participants are utilising less information in order to arrive at a judgment about their 
chosen candidate, compared to when it is absent. This is in line with the hypothesis that party label may be 
acting to reduce informational search requirements, and information/cue storage, retrieval, and integration.  
Taken together it seems that when party label is absent participants access more information for their chosen 
candidate (more unequal), but spends less average duration on the chosen candidate (becoming more equal). 
This suggests, in the absence of partisan cues or heuristics, participants are continually seeking out more 
information to aid in their judgment, but that the time spent evaluating and integrating the information accessed 
becomes less- possibly due to decreasing cue validity decreasing the need for effortful processing and 
integration. Participants may be engaging in a simple confirmatory processing strategy (as per the CONF 
heuristic), with time spent on each subsequent evaluation and judgment of each cue decreasing in line with cue 
validity. 
What of those participants accessing less information, but spending more time on their chosen candidate 
when party label is present? Taking Shah & Oppenheimer (2008)’s view that heuristics can make judgments 
faster and less effortful through frugality via; examining fewer cues, integrating less information, and 
examining fewer alternatives; we see no conflict with this and the fact participants spend longer on the target 
of their judgment. In fact, if participants are focussing their informational search, the most intuitive way to 
express a reduction in effort is to simply ‘take your time’. That we see these patterns emerge from the onset 
lends credence to such an idea- why frantically search between alternatives once you’ve narrowed them down? 
Alternatively, it could be a mathematical artifact from how average duration is calculated, as all else being 
equal, average duration decreases as the number of items increases (AD= Duration/N accessed items). 
Participants’ information search for their chosen candidate was greatest (most unequal between alternatives) 
when PLA and 3 candidates, and search was least (most equal between alternatives) when PLP and 2 candidates. 
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It is hard to ignore how these conditions also reflect the general trends in the experiments for correct voting 
rates, where each condition usually reflects the worst and best rates of correct voting respectively; suggesting 
a relationship between equality of search and CV. The difference in our suppressing and focussing measures 
is also worth highlighting. Using our focussing measure, participants show more equality of search, and spend 
the longest average duration on their chosen candidate, in the 3-candidate condition when PLP (vs. PLA); the 
condition where we often see a trend for CV rates to improve in the larger choice set. 
Taken together, this would suggest that participants in the larger choice set when party label is absent (worst 
CV rates) are engaging in more exclusive information access for an inappropriate candidate, possibly resulting 
in an incorrect choice. This stands to reason: if the focus of search is predominantly within one candidate, then 
should that candidate be the incorrect one, participants cannot encounter information that may be indicative of 
a better alternative. That we see more equal search in both the 2 and 3 candidate conditions when party label 
is present, where CV rates improve on when it is absent in the same conditions, seems overly coincidental. 
This supports the argument that party level is acting as an aid in participants’ decision making- particularly by 
initially narrowing options down to the most appropriate alternatives to consider.  
It may be that the lack of diagnostic partisan labels, and the increased complexity of the choice set size, may 
be causing participants to choose inappropriate alternatives to focus on at the outset. Looking at the level of 
time-bin (see Figure 3.2) we see over the flow stage that for equality of search remains relatively flat and close 
to ‘0’ (equal search) when party label is present (on both measures); whereas when it is absent, participants 
access more information for their chosen candidate, particularly in the 3-candidate condition (on both 
measures). Similarly, for duration of access we see a tendency for more equal duration to be spent on the 
remaining alternatives over time (both measures) in those conditions where CV rates are lowest (i.e. party label 
absent, 3-candidates), whereas we see average duration become more in favour of the chosen candidate in 
those conditions were CV is highest or improves (i.e. when party label is present). In short, participants may 
well be considering the two best pair of alternatives as the flow stage progresses, but CV rates would indicate 
they ultimately build a preference for the incorrect candidate more often than not when party label is absent 
and choice sets are larger. 
Specifically, in relation to correct voting, our RQ was: 
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RQ4. How do our information processing, and equality, measures relate to correct voting rates? 
We found that the trends for information search were positively associated with increasing rates of correct 
voting, but non-significantly so. Average duration of item access was negatively associated with correct voting. 
While the rationalist assumption is that greater duration spend on information will lead to better quality 
decisions, this result makes sense as the longer you spend on items on average, the less time you have overall 
to access and processes additional information (limiting intake of potentially diagnostic information) in our 
limited time frame. To take an example to ad absurdum if you access 1 item for the entirety of the study 
duration, it doesn’t seem likely you’ll gain much (more) useful information about the alternatives, and you are 
more likely to make poor decisions.  
Participants were more likely to vote correctly as they search and dwell preferentially for their chosen 
candidate relative to their choice set, or their next-considered alternative; but non-significantly so. Party label 
is positively associated with correct voting at marginal significance (p= .052). After controlling for the amount 
of information accessed; average duration, and the main effect of choice set size; participants are 1.22 times 
more likely to vote correctly when it is present. Party label remains positively predicted of correct voting when 
controlling for our two measures of search and duration equality, but non-significantly (at = .05), suggesting 
a positive role for party label in aiding correct voting even when search and average duration are equal amongst 
alternatives. However, such a result may mean that while party label’s presence may lead to greater equality 
of search (and to a lesser degree, average duration) and is relatively flat over time, party label may not confer 
a benefit beyond the narrowing of alternatives and comparing equally between them on correct voting.  
Consistently choice set size is negatively and significantly predictive of correct voting rates. After controlling 
for depth of search, average item search duration, and the main effects of party label (and their interaction 
term), increasing the choice set size from 2 to 3 candidates results in an 80% decrease in likelihood to correctly 
vote; and exerts a negative effect even after controlling for equality of search and duration amongst 
alternatives. This means the effect of additional candidates to the choice set on correct voting holds despite 
equal search or duration spent between alternatives, or the two most considered alternatives. As we do not 
observe significant differences (overall) in our measures of perceived difficulty (etc.) of vote choice between 
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choice sets in Chapter 2, taken together this suggest task complexity and/or effortful processing is not the main 
cause of incorrect voting.  
 We note the interaction term (NOC*PL) is positively associated with rates of correct voting after controlling 
for our differing information processing variables, although non-significantly; and that addition of the 
interaction term does not significantly improve our model(s). This points to unique effects of each of our main 
variables, independent of the level of the other. That is, after equality of search/average duration are controlled 
for, the effect of party label is not conditional on the size of the choice set (and vice-versa). 
We deal further with these points in the General Discussion (this chapter) but proceed with the results of 
Experiment 4, where we increased the alternatives in the choice set from three to five. 
 Experiment 4  
117 participants were included in the analysis, 35 were excluded for either choosing to ‘Abstain’, not 
knowing who to pick, or not accessing at least 1 item during the flow stage. We also excluded N=1 participant 
who accessed 1 item for a duration of 405s, under the assumption they did not take the experiment seriously. 
We carried out a series of repeated measures MANOVAs including our IA and AD variables, and our 
‘Suppressing’ and ‘Focussing’ measures. We have two ‘suppressing’ measures here, ‘3v5 alternatives’, and 
‘3v3 alternatives’, in order to see if people are suppressing the two least-preferred alternatives relative to the 
smaller subset of the three alternatives. Our focusing measure, 2v2, is the same conceptually as previously 
(testing if participants are focusing on the most preferred pair of alternatives). 
We report the results by effect, as to be in line with previous sections. Where Mauchley’s W is significant, 
we report Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values. The trends for each of our Items Accessed (IA) variables can 
be seen in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, and for average duration (AD) in Figures 3.11 and 3.12. 
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    Figure 3.8: Items Accessed over TB (by PL & NOC)    Figure 3.9: Preference Measures (IA) over TB 
 
Figure 3.10: Average Duration over TB (by PL & NOC)  Figure 3.11: Preference Measures (AD) over TB 
  
 
IA: There was a non-significant effect of Party Label (PL) on total Items Accessed (IA), F(1, 113)= 1.35, 
p= .247, r= .11.  
AD: There was a non-significant effect of Party Label (PL) on Average Duration of Access (AD), F(1, 113)= 
3.03, p= .085, r= .16. 
Effect of PL on Equality: There was a non-significant effect of PL comparing search between the chosen 
candidate and the rest of the choice set, between the 3-Can and 5-Can conditions on Items Accessed, IA(3v5), 
F(1, 113)= .857, p= .356, r= .06; similarly, no significant effect on IA(3v3), F(1, 113)= .12, p= .72, r= .04; or 
on IA(2v2), F(1, 113)= .14, p= .70, r= .04.  
151 
 
There was a significant effect of PL on AD(3v5), F(1, 113)= 8.73, p= .004, r= .26. Participants spend a 
longer average duration on their chosen candidate when PLA (= 4.01, SD= 1.96) compared to when PLP (= 
2.76, SD= 2.69). There was a significant effect of PL on AD(3v3), F(1, 113)= 7.53, p= .007, r= .25; participants 
spend a longer average duration on their chosen candidate when PLA (= 4.59, SD= 2.94) compared to when 
PLP (= 2.98, SD= 2.89) The effect of PL on AD(2v2) trended towards significance, F(1, 113)= 3.16, p= .07, 
r= .16, PLA (= 3.46, SD= 2.56) compared to when PLP (= 2.55, SD= 2.87). 
 
IA: There was a significant effect of Number of Candidates (NOC) on total Items Accessed (IA), F(1, 113)= 
6.25, p= .01, r= .23. This is expected as there are more items in the expanded choice set condition and longer 
duration in which to access them. As such, we discuss this no further. 
AD: There was no significant effect NOC on Average Duration of Access (AD), F(1, 113)= 3.06, p= .083, 
r= .16. 
Effect of NOC on Equality: There was a significant effect of NOC on IA(3v5), F(1, 113)= 6.73, p= .003, 
r= .27. Participants access more items for their chosen candidate, relative to the others in the choice set, in the 
5-Can condition (= 2.87, SD= 3.32) compared to the 3-Can condition (= 1.27, SD= 2.34). There was a 
significant effect of NOC on IA(3v3), F(1, 113)= 4.81, p= .03, r= .21; participants access more items for their 
chosen candidate, relative to the two considered alternative pair, in the 5-Can condition (= 2.48, SD= 3.61) 
compared to the 3-Can condition (= 1.27, SD= 2.34) There was a significant effect of NOC on IA(2v2), F(1, 
113)= 4.81, p= .03, r= .20; participants engage in more equal search next-considered alternative, in the 3-Can 
condition (= -.24, SD= 2.60); and participants engage in greater search in favour of the next-considered 
alternative in the 5-Can condition (= -1.91, SD= 4.92).  
The effect of NOC on AD(3v5) was non-significant, F(1, 113)= .34, p= .55, r= .05. There was a marginally 
significant effect of NOC on AD(3v3), F(1, 113)= 3.69, p= .056, r= .18; participants longer on average on 
items for their chosen candidate, relative to the others in the choice set, in the 5-Can condition (= 4.28, SD= 
3.32) compared to the 3-Can condition (= 3.13, SD= 2.59). There was a non- significant effect of NOC on 
AD(2v2), F(1, 113)= 3.69, p= .056, r= .18. 
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IA: There was a non-significant effect of the interaction between PL & NOC on IA, F(1, 113)= .037, p= 
.847, r= .02.  
AD: There was a non-significant effect of PL & NOC on AD(3v5), F(1, 113)= .26, p= .605, r= .05. 
Effect of PL & NOC on Equality: There were no significant effects arising from the interaction of PL & 
NOC observed, for any of our measures. 
 
IA: Mauchley’s W was significant, W= .82, p< .001. There was a significant effect of Time-bin (TB) on 
Total Items Accessed (TIA), F(1.69, 191.43)= 16.68, p< .001, r= .36. There was a significant linear trend 
observed for IA across time-bins, F(1, 113)= 25.29, p< .001, r= .42. Participants access fewer items during the 
flow stage as it progresses (see Figure 3.8).  
AD: Mauchley’s W was not significant, W= .99, p= .61. There was a significant effect of TB on AD, F(2, 
226)= 3.12, p= .046, r= .19. There was a significant quadratic trend of AD across time-bins, F(1, 113)= 7.51, 
p= .005, r= .26. The trend follows a U-shape, with participants spending less time in T2 on items compared to 
T1, whereas the duration spent increases at T3 (see Figure 3.10). 
Effect of Time-bin on Equality: There was no significant effect of Time-bin on IA(3v5), F(2, 226)= 1.62, 
p= .19, r= .11; nor on IA(3v3), F(2, 226)= 1.66, p= .19, r= .12. There was a significant effect of TB on IA(2v2), 
F(2, 226)= 5.95, p= .003, r= .22. There was a significant linear trend in the data observed for IA(2v2), F(1, 
113)= 10.75, p= .001, r= .29. Participants initially access more items for the next-considered alternative at T1 
(= -.76, SD= 1.98), but access linearly increases to become more equal between the chosen candidate and the 
next-considered alternative across the flow stage (at T3: = -.08, SD= 1.30). See Figure 3.9. 
There was no significant effect of TB on AD(3v5), F(2, 226)= .43, p= .64, r= .02; nor on AD(3v3), F(2, 
226)= .38, p= .68, r= .05; nor on AD(2v2), F(2, 226)= 1.62, p= .19, r= .11. See Figure 3.11. 
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IA: There was a non-significant effect of the interaction of TB & PL on TIA, F(1.69, 191.43)= .05, p= .95, 
r= .01.  
AD: There was a non-significant effect of the interaction of TB & PL on AD, F(2, 226)= 1.31, p= .272, r= 
.10. 
Effect of TB & PL on Equality: There was no significant effect of TB & PL on IA(3v5), F(2, 226)= 1.05, 
p= .19, r= .08; nor on IA(3v3), F(2, 226)= 1.25, p= .28, r= .10; nor on IA(2v2), F(2, 226)= 1.62, p= .19, r= 
.11. 
Nor was there a significant effect of TB & PL on AD(3v5), F(2, 226)= 2.03, p= .13, r= .13; the effect on 
AD(3v3) trended toward significance, F(2, 226)= 2.63, p= .07, r= .15; while the effect on AD(2v2) was 
significant, F(2, 226)= 4.44, p= .01, r= .19. There was a significant quadratic trend observed in the data, F(1, 
113)= 7.77, p= .006, r= .25. When PLA, duration spent on items for the chosen candidate relative to the next-
considered alternative follows a U- shape (initially unequal in favour of chosen candidate, becomes more equal, 
and increases for chosen candidate at the end), while search when PLP is inverted, following a ∩-shape, over 
the flow stage (equal initially, becomes less equal in favour of the chosen candidate, then returning towards 
equal duration).  
 
IA: There was a significant effect of TB & NOC on IA, F(1.69, 191.43)= 5.59, p= .01, r= .20. There was a 
significant linear trend of IA, F(1, 113)= 7.22, p= .008, r= .06. Participants access more items in each time-
bin in the 5-Can condition compared to the same time-bin in the 3-Can condition, with negative linear trends 
observed in both conditions. Simple effects tests show that this difference is only significant at T1 with 
participants accessing more items in the 5-candidate condition (3-Can: = 5.45, SD=4.11; 5-Can: = 9.22, 
SD=7.4; p= .003, Sidak adjusted), with non-significant differences at T2 and T3 (both p> .08, Sidak adjusted). 
AD: There was a non-significant effect of TB & NOC on AD, F(2, 226)= 1.56, p= .21, r= .12. 
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Effect of TB & NOC on Equality: There was no significant interaction of TB & NOC on IA(3v5), F(2, 
226)= .53, p= .58, r= .02; nor on IA(3v3), F(2, 226)= 1.54, p= .40, r= .09; nor on IA(2v2), F(2, 226)= 1.84, p= 
.16, r= .12.  
There was no significant interaction of TB & NOC on AD(3v5), F(2, 226)= 1.86, p= .16, r= .07; nor on 
AD(3v3), F(2, 226)= 2.13, p= .12, r= .13; nor on AD(2v2), F(2, 226)= 1.56, p= .21, r= .12. 
 
IA: There was a non-significant effect of TB & PL & NOC on TIA, F(1.69, 191.43)= .33, p= .68, r= .09.  
AD: There was a non-significant effect of TB & PL & NOC on AD, F(2, 226)= 2.03, p= .133, r= .12. 
Effect of TB & NOC & PL on Equality: There was a marginally significant effect of on IA(3v5), F(2, 
226)= 2.77, p= .06, r= .15. There was a significant linear trend observed, F(1, 113)= 4.81, p= .03, r= .20. 
Follow-up simple effects tests show that when PLA, there is no significant difference in search equality between 
the 3-Can and 5-Can conditions at T1, whereas there are at T2 and T3 (both p< .012, Sidak adjusted). When 
PLP the opposite is true, with a significant difference at T1 between 3-/5-Can and no significant difference at 
T2 or T3. When PLA, search for the chosen candidate in the 3-Can follows a U shape, while it increases linearly 
in the PLA 5-Can condition. When PLP search increases linearly for the chosen candidate in the 3-Can 
condition, while in the 5-Can condition it follows a ∩-shape; increasing at T2 only to decrease at T3.  
There was no significant effect on IA(3v3), F(2, 226)= 2.09, p= .10, r= .14; nor on IA(2v2), F(2, 226)= 1.62, 
p= .19, r= .11. 
There was a significant effect on AD(3v5), F(2, 226)= 3.56, p= .01, r= .19. There was a significant linear 
trend observed, F(1, 113)= 4.10, p= .045, r= .20. Follow-up simple effects tests show there are no significant 
differences in the average duration participants spend on items for their chosen candidate, relative to the rest 
of the choice set, between the 3-Can and 5-Can conditions, except at T1 when PLP; participants access items 
for their chosen candidate longer in the 5-Can condition. We note that the reverse is true at T3 (participants 
access items for longer at T3 in the 3-Can condition when PLP), but this does not reach significance (p= .08, 
Sidak adjusted) 
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There was no significant effect on AD(3v3), F(2, 226)= 2.04, p= .13, r= .13; nor was there a significant 
effect on AD(2v2), F(2, 226)= 1.79, p= .17, r= .12.  
 
IA & AD: Using binary logistic regression we regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) on our processing 
variables (total IA, AD) entered in Block 1, adding their interaction term in Block 2, our condition variables 
(PL, NOC) in Block 3, and the condition interaction term in Block 4. The regression model(s) containing 
Blocks 1-4 were not significant. We report the full model in Table 3.4, 2(6)= 4.06, p= .66, R2= 4.7%.46 
Table 3.4: Logistic Regression results of main effects, IA, and AD, on CV rates. (N=117). 
Predictor  SE  e 
IA .010 .034 .078 1.010 
AD .083 .090 .845 1.086 
IA*AD -.003 .007 .141 .997 
NOC (3CAN) -.762 .625 1.490 .467 
Party Label (PLA) -.309 .553 .311 .734 
PL*NOC 1.034 .811 1.623 2.811 
Constant -.713 .652 1.196 .490 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. *** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
None of our raw processing measures, or condition variables, were significantly predictive of levels of CV. 
Suppressing Measures (1 & 2): Using binary logistic regression we regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) 
on IA(S1) & AD(S1) in Block 1, adding their interaction term in Block 2, and PL/NOC in Block 3, and PL*NOC 
in Block 4. The regression model(s) for IA(S1) & AD(S1) were not significant (3-Can vs 5-Can), and we do 
not report it here. The regression model containing Block 1 for IA(S2) & AD(S2) was marginally significant 
(3-Can vs 3-Can), 2(2)= 5.41, p= .063, R2= 6.2%, and adding further variables do not significantly improve 
the model. IA(S2) is positively predictive of CV, = .15, p= .035, with participants 1.16 times more likely to 
vote correctly when accessing items for their chosen candidate relative to the other two next-considered 
alternatives in the choice set. 
                                                     
46 We perform bootstrapped logistic regressions for each of our reported regression models (r= 10,000), finding the pattern of results 
do not meaningfully differ from those reported here. 
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We report the full model in Table 3.5, 2(6)= 10.29, p= .11, R2= 11.6%. 
Table 3.5: Logistic Regression results of main effects, IA(S2), and AD(S2), on CV rates. (N=117). 
Predictor  SE  e 
IA(S2) .102 .100 1.035 1.107 
AD(S2) -.101 .100 1.016 .904 
IA(S2)*AD(S2) .027 .025 1.103 1.027 
NOC (3CAN) -1.336** .679 3.875 .263 
Party Label (PLA) -.523 .568 .846 .593 
PL*NOC 1.395 .851 2.687 4.033 
Constant -.113 .548 .043 .893 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. *** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
In our full model, NOC is negatively predictive of CV rates, = -1.33, p= .035, with participants 74% less 
likely to vote correctly when there are 5-candidates in the choice set, compared to when there are 3-candidates. 
We note that when controlling for all other variables, participants are 4 times more likely to vote correctly 
when party label is present and there are 5 candidates, though this does not reach significance (= 1.39, p= 
.10; p= .072 using r=10,000 bootstrapped sample) 
Focussing Measures: Using binary logistic regression we regressed CV (0 = Incorrect, 1= Correct) on IA(F) 
& AD(F) in Block 1, adding their interaction term in Block 2, and PL/NOC in Block 3, and PL*NOC in Block 
4. The regression model containing Block 1 was marginally significant, 2(2)= 5.64, p= .059, R2= 6.5%, and 
predicted 66.7% of the overall cases correctly. IA(F1) is positively predictive of CV, = .12, p= .029, with 
participants 1.13 times more likely to vote correctly when accessing items for their chosen candidate relative 
to the next-considered alternative in the choice set. 
Adding Blocks 2-4 did not significantly improve the model (p> .05). We report the full model in Table 3.6, 
2(6)= 8.44, p= .21, R2= 9.6%. 
Table 3.6: Logistic Regression results of main effects, IA(F) and AD(F), on CV rates. (N=117). 
Predictor  SE  e 
IA(F) .064 .088 .533 1.066 
AD(F) .001 .074 .000 1.001 
IA(F)*AD(F) .024 .028 .755 1.024 
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NOC (3CAN) -.643 .628 1.048 .526 
Party Label (PLA) -.436 .555 .618 .646 
PL*NOC 1.029 .821 1.571 2.798 
Constant -.198 .490 .162 .821 
 * p< .1. ** p< .05. *** p< .01. ǂ p< .001. (Reference categories in parentheses). 
None of our variables were significantly predictive of CV rates. We note as previous that the interaction of 
PL & NOC is still the most positively predictive of CV rates, = 1.02, with participants 2.79 times more likely 
to vote correctly when PLP and choice set is 5-candidates, though this is non-significant (p= .21).  
 
Time-bin: As per Experiments 1-3, participants’ information access decreases linearly over the flow stage, 
while average duration spent on items decreases initially and increases again towards the end of the flow stage. 
Equality of search between the two most-considered alternatives is initially skewed away from the chosen 
candidate, becoming approximately equal by the end of the flow stage (similar to Exps. 1-3).  
Party Label (PL): There was no effect of PL on information access, or average duration spend on 
information. There were significant effects on our equality measures, such that when PL was absent 
participants spent more time on their chosen candidate relative to the other alternatives (opposite to Exps. 1-
3). When absent, duration between alternatives becomes more equal over time, and more in favour of the 
chosen candidate by the end (U-shape). When present, duration becomes less equal between alternatives over 
time, returning to equal duration by the end (a ∩-shape). These patterns over time are broadly in line with the 
aggregated trends, and individual results, in Experiments 1-3. 
Number of Candidates (NOC): There was no effect of NOC on average duration of information access. There 
were significant effects on our equality of search measures, such that equality of search skewed more in favour 
of the chosen candidate when choice set size increased (as per Exps. 1-3). There were no significant patterns 
of results for any measure over time-bins (broadly in line with Exps. 1-3. 
Interaction of PL and NOC: There were no overall effects of the interaction on any of our measures. We find 
some significant differences at the level of time-bin between our groups on our 3v5 suppressing measure only. 
When party label is absent, equality of search differs only at the middle and end of the flow stage between 
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choice sets. Search becomes more equal at T2 in the 3-Can condition (more for chosen candidate in 5-Can) 
and more in favour of the chosen alternative at T3 (search his more equal in 5-Can,). In general, when PL is 
absent equality of search follows a U-shape in the 3-Can condition, while search equality becomes linearly 
more equal over time in the 5-Can condition. When party label is present, search increases linearly for the 
chosen candidate in the 3-Can condition, while in the 5-Can condition it follows a ∩-shape; with the only 
significant difference at T1 where search in the 5-Can condition is more in favour of the alternative(s). 
Comparisons of equality measures: It is worth noting the effect removing alternatives has on our equality 
measures in Figures 3.10 and Figure 3.12. When looking at equality of information search (IA-) among 
alternatives, there are not large descriptive differences for 3v5 ‘suppressing’ (= 2.04, SD= 3.07) and 3v3 
‘suppressing’ (= 1.85, SD= 2.95; p= .03), and are highly correlated (r= .95; p< .001). By contrast, the 2v2 
‘focussing’ measure mean lowers noticeably into the negative (= -1.04, SD= 3.96), and is less strongly 
correlated (r= .48, r= .60; p< .001). We can see in Figure 3.10 that in all conditions, the 2v2 measure is 
generally <0 at the beginning at the flow stage, and comes closer to 0 over time. This suggests that when 
looking at the chosen and the next considered alternative pair, search is far more in favour of the non-chosen 
alternative but equalises over time- and that this is masked by the inclusion of the other alternatives in the 3/5- 
candidate choice sets, that artificially inflate the skew of search on the 3v3/5 metrics in favour of the chosen 
candidate. For reference, we do not see this in Experiments 1-3; removing alternatives does move the mean of 
our 2v2 focussing measure closer to ‘0’, but always remains in the chosen candidate’s favour across all 
conditions (>0).  
 Discussion: Experiment 4 
We had the same research questions (RQs) for Experiment 4 as for Experiments 1-3, namely: 
RQ1. What effect does party label have on information search, and average duration, when it is absent 
versus when it is present? 
Party label did not affect the depth of search participants engaged in overall or the average duration they 
spent on items. Nor did we see any meaningful differences for either of these, between party label 
absent/present. This is the same as our findings in Experiments 1-3. We did not find any differences for party 
label on our information processing variables across the flow-stage (whereas we did in Experiments 1-3). 
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Comparing the graphs in Figures 3.1 and 3.9 we note that in general the tendency in all conditions is a linear 
decrease in informational access over time, and do not seem to differ visually by party label condition. We 
find this the most plausible conclusion. As we do not include a 2-candidate condition in our experiment, we 
are unable to test if the differences are unique to Experiments 1-3’s design. 
RQ2.   What effect does choice set size have on information search and average duration, and does this 
differ when party label is absent/present? 
We find no significant effect of choice set size on the amount of information search, or average duration 
spend on items accessed, with no interaction effects observed on the depth of information processing or the 
average duration spent on items accessed. There were no meaningful differences over the flow stage. This is 
the same as our findings in Experiments 1-3. 
RQ3. What effect does choice set size and party label have on the equality of search and duration? 
Party label seemingly has no effect on equality of information search across any of our preference measures 
(unlike Exps. 1-3). We do note that there is a trend for increasing search linearly over the flow stage for the 
chosen candidate relative to other alternatives across all measures (as in Experiments 1-3) with a possible 
exception of when party label is present and the choice set includes 5 candidates (see Figure 3.10).  
Party label had significant effects on all our measures of average duration equality, such that participants 
spend a longer average duration on their chosen candidate when party label is absent compared to when party 
label is present. This is the reverse of Experiments 1-3 where we observed participants spend less time (more 
equal duration) when party label was absent than present. Our finding here is more in line with the thinking 
that party label’s presence should reduce the need for effortful processing by encouraging heuristic processing 
(as per Model 4; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006) by reducing the effort of retrieving cue values, simplifying the 
weighting of cues, or integrating less information. All of which would decrease time spent on information 
evaluation and integration into a judgment model about the alternatives. This may arise from differences in 
complexity between the experimental tasks: while we collapse across 2-/3-candidate sets in Experiments 1-3, 
we collapse 3-/5-candidate sets here. While we do not see differences at the aggregate level of participants’ 
perceived choice difficulty or confidence between Experiments 1-3 and 4, as noted in Chapter 4, perceived 
difficulty does not necessarily reflect difference in cognitive effort expended. Particularly, we ask participants 
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how the choice was, not necessarily the task, and as such participants may be positively evaluating their choice 
(Brehm, 1916; Lieberman, Oschner, Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001) and misattributing how they feel about their 
choice for how they viewed the decision task. 
We find an effect of choice set size on our equality measures (as in Exps. 1-3). Participants engage in more 
equal informational search in the smaller 3-candidate choice set, compared to the 5-candidate choice set on 
our ‘3v5’ and ‘3v3’ measures (as per Exps. 1-3). However, when we remove the two-least considered 
alternatives (our ‘2v2’ measure), we see unequal sampling in favour of the next-preferred candidate (= -.21) 
in the 3-candidate set which increases in the 5-candidate set (= -1.91). While there were no significant 
interactions with time-bin, looking at Figure 3.10, we see that generally over the flow stage participants’ 
sampling becomes more equal between their chosen candidate and next-alternative, approaching equality by 
the end of the flow stage. This does not differ by party label and seems consistent with participants engaging 
in confirmatory decision-strategy as they learn about alternatives, form preferences, and sample more from 
those they like in order to confirm those emerging preferences. Also, this increasing equality of search between 
the two alternative pairs correspond to heuristic strategies that utilize pairwise comparisons (Russo & Dosher, 
1983), and evolve over the flow stage. 
A key question is why is there a clear tendency for participants to sample from their next-considered 
candidate so heavy from the outset? Party label could initially bias participants to certain initial options, but 
we do not observe that here. A possible answer may be that participants simply base their preferences around 
the first alternatives they sample and/or like, and use those as comparators as they sample the informational 
environment and build preferences for the inevitably chosen candidate. While this could be a form of primacy 
effect or ‘anchoring bias’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975), various research shows that the order of information 
items participants see for one alternative has a substantial effect on their choices (Carlson et al., 2006; DeKay 
et al., 2011; DeKay et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2013; Russo & Chaxel, 2010). DeKay (2015) work on ‘pre-
decisional information distortion’ details how decision makers’ initial preference shifts the evaluation of 
subsequent information in a manner that benefits the early leader. 
RQ4. How do our information processing, and equality, measures relate to correct voting rates? 
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Only our regression models of CV that included our equality measures for ‘3v3’ and ‘2v2’ were significant, 
with no other variable improving the models. The trends we observe are in line with those observed in 
Experiments 1-3, namely that greater search (and duration) in favour of the chosen candidate is positively 
associated with correct voting, but only is significant when comparing the chosen and ‘next-two’ (3v3) 
alternatives. Excepting this, none of the equality measures reach significance in our regression models, and 
have small effect sizes (as measured by the Odds Ratio or e Trends for choice set size (NOC) and the 
interaction with party label and choice set size are in line with Experiments 1-3, with choice set size negatively 
predictive of correct voting. In our 3v3 model, choice set size was significant when search and duration equality 
was equal between the chosen candidate and the ‘next-two’ alternatives (3v3), resulting in a 73.7% decrease 
in the likelihood of voting correctly. Our 3v3 measure assumes that participants are suppressing, ignoring, or 
removing, the two-least-preferred options in the 5-candidate choice set; this result suggests that participants 
those least-preferred options are ones that would have led them to vote correctly. In the 5-candidate condition, 
we introduce the Green Party and UKIP. While we cannot distinguish between the choices participants could 
have made if in both conditions (as it was a between-subjects design), this result can only arise if a) participants 
who should have voted Green/UKIP did not when opportunity arose, or b) switched to Green/UKIP 
inappropriately from either Labour/Conservative/Green. Additionally, we should take the above in light of the 
large Odds Ratio observed for the party label and choice set seize interaction term (OR=4.04), which was 
consistently positively predictive of correct voting, but non-significantly (p= .10). This suggests that all other 
variables held equal, participants were 4.04 times more likely to vote correctly when party label was present 
and choice set size was increased to 5 candidates. We are wary of over-interpreting our non-significant results 
in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis and suggest that these results should be taken in the broader 
observation that so far party label seems to possibly have a) some effects and b) some positive effect on correct 
voting as choice set expands. 
 General Discussion 
As this chapter was inherently exploratory, we aimed to see if patterns in the data might shed light on the 
results we observed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we posited party label would act as a heuristic and increase 
decision-error via voting incorrectly for candidates. We did not consistently observe a significant effect on 
participants’ correct voting and found party label had a positive relationship with correct voting. We suspected 
162 
 
party label may still be exerting an effect upon participants’ information processing, but whether it acted as a 
heuristic was unclear. We also wished to see if we could observe any patterns in the data between choice set 
sizes, as to explain the consistently negative effect increasing choice set size has on correct voting in all four 
of our experiments. 
Overall, we can say that party label does seem to exert some effect on information processing, not at the 
aggregate level, but in the equality of information search, and duration on items, participants engage in for 
their chosen candidate relative to other alternatives in the choice set. Namely, when party label is absent 
participants preferentially sample information on the chosen candidate at increasing rates over time when 
choice sets are greater than 2 candidates. When label is present, participants tend to compare information for 
the chosen and another highly considered alternative equally at an earlier rate, staying consist between them 
across the flow stage; that is, there is immediate elimination of some alternatives from the choice set (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008), a heuristic strategy.  
There are conflicting results of the effect of party label on the equality of average duration spent on 
information accessed. For example, in Experiments 1-3 participants spend more time on information for their 
chosen candidate vs. alternatives when party label is present (unequal); while in Experiment 4 participants 
spend less time relatively on information for their candidate (more equal). However, these differing results are 
not incompatible with each other.  
That party label could focus participants to search and dwell preferentially on their chosen candidate when 
the choice sets are relatively small (2-3 alternatives; Exps. 1-3) is understandable, as smaller choice sets make 
it easier to eliminate alternatives earlier and focus on preferred candidates. Why look at alternatives you don’t 
like? In larger choice sets (i.e. 5; Exp. 4), party label would be more useful in narrowing alternatives into 
subsets that include the chosen candidate and encouraging more equal duration between them. We see this in 
Experiment 4, where average duration is more equal between alternatives on all our measures when party label 
is present (vs. absent), with little change at the descriptive level as we remove lesser-considered alternatives 
(e.g. 5-3-2). We also see that average duration gradually becomes more equal over time when party label is 
present in the 5-candidate condition, suggesting this narrowing may occur over time. We can see this clearly 
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in the differences between the 3-candidate and 5-candidate choice sets when party label is present in Figures 
3.4 and 3.12.  
We highlight an issue looking at the descriptive statistics for average duration in the 3-candidate condition 
(our only common condition) across experiments. In Experiments 1-3 that average duration on items increases 
when party label is present, but in Experiment 4 duration decreases when it is present. All things being equal, 
we should observe the same pattern of results in this conditions across all our experiments. We do not observe 
such differing patterns for information search. There are a number of possible explanations. In Experiment 4 
we use differing candidate materials that were more current and reflective of the real-world party policies in 
2014/2015 (Experiments 1-3 were based on 2010, and run 2013-2014), decreasing perhaps the average 
duration needed to appraise them; particularly when party label is present, as participants are simply 
confirming current knowledge against information presented experimentally. A possible solution would be to 
run an experiment with the most current policies using a condition comparing multiple choice set sizes in 
tandem (i.e. choice set: 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.); however, we highlight the points made in Chapter 2 (section 2.5), and 
at the end of this chapter, that such an experiment has methodological and practical restraints, but is still worth 
pursuing. It is also worth noting that Lau and Redlawsk (2006) also follow a similar strategy, comparing 2-
candidate sets with 4-candidate sets, so our approach is not without precedent. 
A final note on party label’s inability to affect information search and average duration overall. There is a 
methodological explanation for why we might not be able to observe this here; we do not account for the time 
during non-access of information. We are only able to measure the duration participants spend with items open, 
however, this presumes that this accurately captures the time frame in which participants spend processing the 
information and evaluating it. Clearly, this would not be the case but is the best approximation we have of 
measuring time spent processing information, but point out its limitation. There is also a more inherent issue 
resulting from the nature of information boards; because participants can easily lookup cues in a process tracing 
environment, they need not always retrieve cues from memory (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008), reducing reliance 
on heuristics that aid in memory consolidation/retrieval. As one of the roles we hypothesized party label would 
play is as a decision-aid, reducing reliance on memory, it seems using process tracing methodology might 
actually decrease reliance on party label- rendering testing for any effect difficult. The interaction of memory 
and partisan heuristics does not seem examined by Lau and Redlawsk (2006) in their original work, who found 
164 
 
simply that there was a weak (r= .25) correlation between party affiliation access (their measure of heuristic 
use), and the memory for “relevant” (p. 239) information (presumably if participants remembered candidate-
party affiliations). This seems a fruitful avenue for potential research, though it may require a differing 
methodological approach. 
We do see a consistent effect of choice set size. Increasing the choice set size has absolutely no effect on the 
average duration participants spend on each item, spending approximately the same time on items whether 
were are 2, 3 or 5 candidates to search between and consider. However, as choice set sizes increases from 2 to 
3 to 5 candidates, there is greater preferential search for the chosen candidate (unequal) when we use our 
‘suppressing’ measures. When we compare search equality for the chosen candidate and the next-preferred 
candidate only (our ‘focusing’ measure), we see that search is less equal between the pair in smaller sets than 
in the larger sets. In other words, in larger choice sets participants engage in more equal search between the 
two most preferred candidates, than in smaller choice sets. This is in line with confirmatory heuristic strategies 
that utilize pairwise comparisons (Russo & Dosher, 1983), such as elimination-by-aspects and other 
lexicographic heuristic, in particular choice by most attractive aspect heuristic, which retains the alternative 
with the highest overall cue value (Svenson, 1979), which we expect to be engaged more as choice set size 
increases and task complexity increases.  
In relation to correct voting, we observed that none of our information search, duration, or equality measures 
were predictive of correct voting. The exception being that when participants are searching between a 
candidate and the two-next-considered alternatives (Exp. 4, ‘3v3’ measure), or between their chosen and ‘next-
preferred’, preferential search for the candidate positively predicts correct voting. It seems that as participants 
remove the ‘worst’ alternatives out of the set of 5, and are more likely to identify a ‘correct’ alternative out of 
the remaining two/three and confirm this through preferential sampling; leading to correct voting. 
Only choice set size was significantly predictive of correct voting, even after controlling for all our 
information measures and equality measures, and any interaction with party label, such that choice set size 
seems to have a unique effect on participant’s ability to vote correctly beyond explanations of influencing 
information search, equality of search, etc. However, choice set size was not significantly predictive of correct 
voting in Experiment 4, except for the ‘3v3’ measure comparison, such that increasing the choice set size to 5 
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alternatives and focusing only on the chosen and other ‘top 2’ made it more likely to vote incorrectly, even 
when sampling and duration were equal between them. This points to a potential incorrect consideration of 
alternatives, in other words, participants choose the ‘wrong’ three alternatives to consider between in the larger 
5-candidate set. This may explain why in Experiments 1-3 we see choice set size as negatively predictive of 
correct voting on both measures (looking at all three alternatives, or just the ‘top 2’); participants choose the 
wrong alternatives to focus on in the expanded choice set. If this is an accurate assumption, we would expect 
choice set size to be negatively signed in our ‘focussing measure’ in Experiment 4, which it is, albeit non-
significantly. Despite this, we feel this is strong evidence for why increasing choice set size seems to have 
such consistent negative impact on correct voting rates. 
What does help participants identify the ‘best’ alternatives in a choice set to narrow their options down? 
Perhaps, party label. Interestingly, across all experiments is the positive interaction term of PL and NOC that 
consistently appears in all of our regression models, and nearly always has the greatest effect (looking at Odds 
Ratio) on correct voting, but is non-significant in each case after controlling for our information search/equality 
measures. We draw attention to the notes in our results sections that every logistic regression is compared with 
a 10,000 sample bootstrapped model. In Experiment 4, the interaction term in the models looking at our 
equality measures neared significance at = .05 on each occasion. Post-hoc power analyses for the logistic 
regression models revealed power to be ~.75, meaning the study was underpowered in order to avoid Type II 
errors (accepting the null hypotheses incorrectly). It is possible, at least when we consider larger choice sets 
of candidates, that party label’s effects might be more beneficial in aiding a correct vote, but we do not have 
the power to detect it. 
It seems therefore that choice set size might encourage heuristic processing into the narrowing of alternatives 
to smaller subsets, with participants incorrectly choosing the alternatives to compare between. However, party 
label’s effect may be to attenuate such misselection, by guiding participants to consider alternatives that may 
result in a greater likelihood of correct voting. 
An obvious criticism is the fact we do not conduct a study that has scaled choice sets (i.e. a condition with 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 etc., alternatives), as to test for these effects in one controlled study. In many regards we were 
constrained by recruitment difficulties and time, due to the lab-based nature of the experiments; a study with 
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4 choice set conditions and party label manipulation would require approximately 1,721 participants47, based 
on the relatively small-medium effect sizes observed. An online-based study is possible using the DPTE 
software, however, this loses the control of the lab setting, and may lead to even greater noise in the data at 
the processing level.  
An omission in our analyses may be that party label might affect the type of information accessed between 
conditions (i.e. attributes), such that participants might access different attributes for alternatives when party 
label is absent compared to when it is present. If party label contains stereotypic information, then it is 
cognitively inefficient to search information items that would be highly consistent with this stereotypic 
information, since that information is already implicitly given. For instance, they may substitute such 
information for cues as per ‘attribute substitution theory’ (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), or they may infer 
information about candidates and/or their policies reducing the motivation to access non-valid (less important) 
cues. Lau and Redlawsk (2006) found that participants who accessed partisan information were more likely to 
be accurate in their inferences about candidate’s policy stances that they did not access; whether this access 
would differ based on the global presence of partisan cues (party label), is an open question, and if it is related 
to correct voting.   
To return to Lau and Redlawsk (2006) finally; in their analyses of political heuristic use, they found that 
party affiliation was utilized by ‘Model 4’ voters more so than their hypothesized ‘Model 2’ voters (decision 
based on matching candidates with voter’s own partisan identify) in general election campaigns. Model 4 
voters were assumed to use heuristics (i.e. satisficing), restricting information search in order to reduce 
decision-effort, with unequal comparability across alternatives. We find support for the idea that party label 
encourages heuristic strategies among voters as per Model 4 voters, however, this seems to exert its effect by 
restricting information search via reducing the number of alternatives considered, to engage in more equal 
search between those being considered during formation of their vote choice. This is the first work of its kind, 
which we are aware of, in exploring the effect of ‘political heuristics’ on voter decision-making at the cognitive 
level. 
                                                     
47 Estimated using G*Power 3.1.7, at .95 power and .10 effect size.  
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The effect of increasing choice set size on the ability to vote correctly after controlling for information search 
is still somewhat harder to explain, and while task complexity (Kerstholt, 1992) is a strong explanation, and 
results through our outcome measures support this, there are other explanations as to why the introduction of 
alternatives into choice sets may result in decisions that are not in line with voters’ preferences. We explore 
one of these in Chapter 4. 
Before concluding with correct voting using Lau and Redlawk’s (2006) DPTE approach, it is useful to 
summarise our findings across Chapters 2 and 3. We have investigated correct voting in a multi-party electoral 
context outside of the USA, using both proximal and directional approaches, weighted and unweighted, finding 
no real difference in using either, which is a useful contribution to the ongoing debate between the use of these 
models.  
We find when choice set size increases voters seem unable to correctly identify the candidate that overall 
best matches their own reported preferences, going as low as 26%. We investigate this finding at the 
information processing level, finding as choice sets get larger, participants engage in more equal search 
between the two most preferred candidates, than in smaller choice sets. Participants information processing 
seem to correspond to confirmatory heuristic strategies that utilize pairwise comparisons, choosing subsets of 
alternatives which may lead to incorrect selection of the ‘best’ alternatives for consideration- explaining the 
decrease in correct voting rates.  
We find mixed evidence partisan labels acting as a heuristic in Chapter 2, with evidence for  party label 
aiding participants in correctly voting as the choice-set size increases, contrary to our initial hypotheses that it 
would act to bias participants to choose incorrectly. From our analyses in Chapter 3, party label seems exerts 
an effect such that it helps narrow choice sets down into smaller subsets of alternatives, and with more equal 
duration on information between those alternatives. This may result in a greater likelihood of including 
alternatives that are the ‘best’ choice for the voter, increasing the probability of a ‘correct vote’. 
That we are aware of, this research is the first to explore the underlying cognitive mechanisms for choice 
set size’s well documented negative effect on correct voting (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Lau et al., 2013). 
Additionally, we are also the first to directly test partisan information as a global cue via party labels, and their 
effect on voters’ information processing, and the subsequent relationship with correct voting. 
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: Context Effects in Political Domains 
 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we observed strong evidence that increasing the number of alternatives (candidates) in a choice 
set leads to adverse outcomes, namely decreasing rates of correct voting. A likely explanation is the increasing 
complexity of the decision-task (Scheibehenne et al., 2010), with the effect of increasing alternatives seeming 
strongest when increasing the choice set size from 2 to 3 alternatives, rather than from 3 to 5 alternatives. In 
Chapter 3 we explored this idea more deeply, looking at how increasing choice set size impacts voters’ 
information processing, and use of decision strategies in order to reduce task effort arising from increased 
complexity. We found, even after controlling for the amount of information, duration spend on the information, 
and how people sampled between preferred options, increasing choice set size still had effects on the ability to 
vote correctly. Reflecting on how we set up the decision-task, namely between a choice set of two diverging 
options (Labour, Conservative) or an expanded choice set that includes a third option (Liberal Democrats), it 
is hard to ignore parallels with another research area in psychology that uses a similar paradigm: contextual 
preference reversals, or ‘context effects’.  
Context effects arise from changes in preference for options that vary on differing attribute dimensions (e.g. 
the price and quality of beer), following the addition of a new irrelevant option. That is, the preference for Beer 
A (over Beer B) should not change simply by adding additional options to the choice set (Beer C). These 
‘context effects’ violate rational theories of choice (e.g. rational choice theory; Anderson, 1983), which 
assumes the entry of additional alternatives in a choice set will only reduce the choice share of the existing 
alternatives (Luce, 1977). Yet, the phenomenon of contextual preference reversal has been well documented 
in decision-making research (Huber, Payne & Puto, 1982; Tsetos, Usher & Chater, 2010). We have given a 
thorough background to these effects (Chapter 1.5.2), and limit our discussion here. 
A number of context effects have been observed to date, such as the ‘attraction effect’ (Huber, Payne, & 
Puto, 1982) and the ‘compromise effect’ (Simonson, 1989); both of which violate the principle of regularity. 
For the attraction effect, the irrelevant option (D) is a decoy (an inferior or ‘dominated’ option), similar to but 
of less value than A, which creates a bias in favour of A. For the compromise situation, option C is of 
approximately equal value to A and B, but it is placed in the middle within the two-dimensional attribute space, 
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making it a compromise. A third is the ‘similarity effect’ (Tversky, 1972), which violates the independence 
from irrelevant alternatives principle. Here the new option S is very similar to B (and of equal value), shifts 
the relative choice between A and B in favour of the dissimilar option A. The ‘phantom effect’ (Choplin & 
Hummel, 2005; Dhar & Glazer, 1996; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000, 2007; Pratkanis & Farquhar, 1992), occurs 
following the introduction of an unavailable but dominant option P, which biases the decision toward the 
similar dominated option (A).  
Various theoretical accounts to explain the mechanisms behind context effects have been mooted, based on 
either: attentional switching between different choice aspects; relational evaluation of properties and loss 
aversion; and value shifts or contrast effects; although “no single mechanism accounts for all three decoy 
effects” (Tsetsos et al., 2010, p. 1276). Other mechanisms, such as dimensional weight change, stretching or 
shrinking of the choice space, ranking, grouping, etc., have been proposed (Guo & Holyoak, 2002; Pettibone 
& Wedel, 2007; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). A number of models have been proposed to account for 
some, but not all of, context effects based on the differing mechanisms previously mentioned, for example, 
decision-field theory (DTF; Roe et al., 2001) and leaky competing accumulators (LCA; Usher & McClelland, 
2004). We do not propose to distinguish which best account for these effects here but note them for reference. 
In our previous studies (Chapter 2), we provided participants with over 17 attribute dimensions on which to 
evaluate candidates, and we did not control how participants perceived each of the alternatives in relation to 
each other, or provide numerical values on some common scale (e.g. Candidate A is ‘5’ on Healthcare, 
Candidate B is ‘4’, etc.). Regardless, it is plausible that the addition of a third alternative resulted in violations 
of preference for one of the alternatives in the smaller choice set, leading to incorrect voting. Therefore, we 
investigate in this chapter if context effects can occur in political domains, limiting the number of dimensional 
attributes to two, and controlling the position of alternatives in the dimensional space in line with previous 
research in order to elicit each differing context effect. 
 Context Effects in Politics 
Much like in consumer choice modeling, political models also assume regularity and independence from 
irrelevant alternatives (Shapiro, 1969). Context effects (to the best of our knowledge via an extensive literature 
search) have not been investigated meaningfully in the political decision-making domain, with the exception 
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of Pan, O’ Curry, and Pitts (1995) who studied the attraction effect in political scenarios. Pan et al., (1995) 
noted that in the US Presidential Election 1992, the Bush campaign hoped that the entry of a third candidate 
(Perot) would pull more votes from Clinton while others speculated that the opposite effect would occur, with 
no political experts predicting that Perot's re-entry would increase the votes for either Clinton or Bush48. Yet, 
at the time, literature on the attraction effect abounded (Lehmann & Pan, 1994; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1992; Simonson & Tversky, 1992).  
Pan et al. (1995) conducted two studies to examine the attraction effect in two elections: the 1994 Illinois 
Primary election (Burris, Netsch, & Phelan), using fake poll approval ratings on ‘tax’ and ‘crime’; and the 
1992 U.S. Presidential election (Bush, Clinton, & Perrot), using participants’ own perceptual values on a 7-
point desirability scale for ‘defence’ and ‘healthcare’. The authors find the attraction effect in their first study, 
and that voters have naturally occurring asymmetric dominance patterns (in line with the attraction effect) that 
predict their vote choice. We address this study in further detail in Experiment 8 (Section 4.5, this chapter). 
Since Pan et al. (1995), three large-scale reviews of the extant literature on the attraction effect (Huber et al., 
2014) exploring the factors and situations determining when the attraction effect may (not) hold, some 
involving over 49 additional studies/replications and hundreds of choice scenarios (Frederick et al., 2014; Yang 
& Lynn, 2014), have been published; none involved context effects in political scenarios. This is surprising 
given the nature of politics and the multi-dimensional nature of the spatial model of voting; and we note we 
are not the only ones to ruminate over the possibility of their existence in how voters make decisions for 
candidates (in popular media: Vedantam, 2007).  
Political parties often compete on a few key attributes (or ‘policies’) such as healthcare and education 
spending, and taxation levels etc., and there is well-documented evidence that parties ‘position’ themselves 
along the spectrum of issues as to be seen as a ‘compromise’ option (Warwick, 2009), or (dis)similar to other 
parties in the political space as to maximise vote share (Buckler & Dolowitz, 2012). Presuming that preferences 
for policies range along a spectrum of positions (or values) for each issue, and that voters perceive party 
positions along at least one of these issues spectrums, it stands to reason that voters who may trade-off between 
party options may be susceptible to context effects elicited by party positioning. For example, a voter preferring 
                                                     
48 Kramer, H. (1992, October 12). Why Bush welcomes Perot. Time, p. 48. 
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increased healthcare spending while decreasing immigration may try to decide between Labour (increased 
healthcare spending, no change in immigration) and Conservatives (decreased healthcare spending, decreased 
immigration). The addition of a third party, for example the Green Party, who promise even greater healthcare 
spending and greater immigration (an ‘extreme’ option), may cause the Labour Party to appear as a 
‘compromise’, increasing the Labour Party’s vote share. 
Investigating these effects is especially of interest to majoritarian democracies where there are 2 or 3 main 
political parties to choose from, such as the UK and the USA; or in democracies where newer parties are 
emerging that seek to compete on a very limited policy platform with established parties. Context effects may 
provide an insight into what (if any) effect the Liberal Democrats, UKIP, or the Green Party may have on the 
decisions of voters determining between Labour and Conservatives in the UK. This is a timely question, as the 
Liberal Democrats (often see as a compromise between the two parties) are in electoral decline, whereas UKIP 
are seen as a similar party to the Conservatives (but more ‘right-wing’ on issues such as immigration, and more 
‘left’ on healthcare49,50) were the main alternative to Labour (national polling: 34%) and the Conservatives 
(34%) in the UK General Election 2015 (UKIP 12% vs. Lib Dem, 10%)51,52. These are not idle questions. 
Figure 4.1 (replicated from YouGov, Footnote 3) shows the placement of the four main parties in December 
2014 by the UK population on a Left-Right ideological scale, clearly showing spatial positions with potential 
for contextual preference reversals. Additionally, the self-placement of UK voting population on a simple Left-
Right ideological spectrum (Figure 4.2) shows main parties own voters perceive themselves, with similar 
patterns.    
                                                     
49 71% of UKIP voters agreed with five leftwing ideological statements, far above the Conservatives (43%) or even the Liberal 
Democrats (65%). They are only a little behind Labour (81%). British Election Study Internet Panel, 2014-15 
50 “UKIP voters now put themselves to the left of Tories”, YouGov, December 2014. 
51 Pre-May 7th ‘Great Britain Final Call’ GE 2015 Poll, YouGov, May 6th. 
52 Actual vote for UKIP was higher than forecast: UKIP (13%), Lib Dems (8%). 
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Figure 4.1: Placement of UK parties on Left-Right scale by GB population (darker bar). 
 
Figure 4.2: Average Lab/Con/Lib Dem/UKIP voter self-rating on Left-Right scale 
In this chapter we seek to investigate if such ‘context effects’ can be replicated in the political domain. 
Experiment 5 examines all four of the (so-far) discovered context effects using realistic political scenarios and 
political materials; Experiment 6 explores all context effects in hypothetical political scenarios; Experiment 7 
uses attribute ‘desirability’ to enable a more first-person approach to eliciting context effects; and Experiment 
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8 tests whether or not asymmetric preference structures, mirroring those of context effects, exist in the UK 
population, and whether they predict real-life voters’ political vote preferences. 
 Experiment 5: Third-Person Context Effects in Political Scenarios 
In this experiment we investigate if context effects occur when using realistic political attribute dimensions 
(e.g. education/healthcare spending) that members of the public would be familiar with. We adopted a similar 
method to Huber et al. (1982), which required participants to choose one option out of the presented choice set 
(options A, B, D/C/S) at an initial time-point, and then again out of a choice set containing just the target (e.g. 
option A) and the competitor (e.g. option B) two weeks later. In our experiment however, there is no 2-week 
delay, and participants choose again in the same experiment. We limit carry-over effects arising from 
participants realising the task is the same as previous by asking participants to predict the best choice between 
the options presented for two different hypothetical voters (different per context effect, for a total of eight 
scenarios). We ask participants to choose an option in the third-person, predicting what a hypothetical voter 
would choose, to limit participants’ using their personal preferences for the realistic attributes. Participants are 
told what voters’ preferences for the attributes are, that they were equally important to the voter, and to choose 
only on this information. 
A note on the similarity effect is useful here. The similarity effect predicts a relative increase in the choice 
share for the non-targeted option (e.g. A), resulting from the targeting the other option (B) by a decoy (S), and 
can manifest in two ways. Suppose choice share for A & B is 50%:50%: A can increase choice share by gaining 
directly from B’s loss (e.g. 70%:30%) when targeted by SB, or A can increase share relatively by having B’s 
share split between B and SB (e.g. 50%:25%:25%). A choice for the decoy in the similarity condition is not an 
irrelevant choice, as it is better on one attribute dimension than B, and less on the other (unlike the decoy in 
the attraction effect). 
We follow work by Noguchi & Stewart (2014), among others, in alternating which of the ‘core’ options in 
the choice set would be the target for the decoy (i.e. for half of participants A would be targeted by DA, the 
other half B would be the target of DB). Additionally, we follow Malkoc, Hedgcock, and Hoeffler (2013) in 
analysing our results in two ways: firstly, by comparing the choice proportions of the core set (A, B) to each 
expanded set (A, B, DA/DB) (as per Huber et al., 1982); and then by directly comparing the choice proportions 
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of the choice sets where the decoys target different options (e.g. A, B, DA vs. A, B, DB).  This is a stronger test 
the hypothesis, as it takes the difference between the two conditions with decoy, making it harder to find a 
non-significant difference (Malkoc et al., 2013). 
Our hypotheses are that we would observe each of the four ‘context effects’ following the addition of the 
appropriate ‘decoy’ option, namely: 
H1: An increase in preference share for the targeted option in the ‘attraction effect’ condition. 
H2: A decrease in preference share for the targeted option in the ‘similarity effect’ condition 
H3: An increase in preference share for the targeted option in the’ compromise effect’ condition. 
H4: An increase in preference share for the targeted option in the ‘phantom effect’, despite the unavailability 
of a decoy option. 
Methods 
 Participants 
300 participants took part in an online study using Qualtrics, and recruited via the Prolific Academic53 subject 
pool, in return for £0.80. All reported being born in the UK, resident in the UK at the time of the study, and 
with English as their primary language. Participants were aged 18-60 (= 30.14, SD= 9.34), 63.3% of whom 
were female. 86.7% of participants identified as ‘White-British’. 28% of participants identified as working in 
the private sector, 27.7% were students, 17.3% in the public sector, 13.3% were self-employed, and 9.7% were 
unemployed; with the remained stating ‘None of the Above’.  
 Design 
We utilized a mixed 2x3 (Decoy x Choice Set) between-within subjects design. The between subjects Decoy 
condition determined whether the decoy targeted either option A or option B respectively (i.e. DA or DB) in the 
expanded choice set. The within-subjects condition consisted of the ‘core’ set of options (A, B), or the 
expanded set (A, B, D1A/D2B), with the expanded set presented first (AB options are the same for all 
                                                     
53 Prolific Academic. URL: https://prolific.ac/  
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conditions). Participants were then randomly presented with all 4 context effect scenarios (attraction, 
compromise, similarity, phantom) for each choice set, which are analysed separately. 
 Materials 
Stimuli: For each ‘context effect’, we created 2 attributes on which participants would attempt to distinguish 
between 2 or 3 options, on behalf of the hypothetical ‘voters’. We used differing policies for the differing 
context effects to allow for effective within-subjects manipulation. All attributes and associated figures were 
chosen as to be as realistic as possible, based on current information in current affairs, and the top issues from 
political polling trackers54. Our materials and stimuli are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 4.1: Option stimuli for each attribute, per task (Experiment 1). 
‘Voter' Context Effect Attribute(s) A B DA DB 
Grace/Emily Attraction Healthcare Spend (£bns) 3 7 2.5 6.5  
Education Spend (£bns) 7 3 6.5 2.5 
Olivia/Sophie Similarity Social Welfare Spend 
(£bns) 
2 4 1.5 4.5 
 
Defence Spend (£bns) 4 2 4.5 1.5 
Lily/Ella Compromise Greenhouse Gases 
Reduction (%) 
50 30 70 10 
 
Top-Rate Income Tax 
(%) 
30 50 10 70 
Lucy/Laura Phantom Immigration Levels 
Reduction (%) 
20 50 20 50 
 
Crime Level Reduction 
(%) 
50 20 55 25 
For convenience, we have shown the spatial positions of each of these options, per context effect, in Figures 
4.3-4.7. 
Scenarios: Participants were presented with scenarios containing 8 hypothetical voters (2 differing sets of 4 
for each choice set), and a set of alternatives that varied on two attribute dimensions that the hypothetical voter 
had preferences on (‘issues’, e.g. healthcare, education). Participants were told the hypothetical voter(s) 
preferred higher levels of each attribute, except for the phantom effect scenarios where they were told that they 
lower levels of each (unlikely any ‘normal’ voter would want higher levels of crime). 
Participants were told that the voter cared about each issue equally, had no preference for any one party, and 
were asked to predict the party the voter would choose given the voter’s stated preferences only. For example: 
                                                     
54 “Issues 2 (Most important now + Most important your family) 2010 to 2015”. YouGov, 2015. 
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“[Grace/Emily] cares about spending on Healthcare (i.e. the NHS) and Education (i.e. schools, universities), 
and wants to support a party that will fund these areas as much as possible. Below are the stances of the three 
parties Grace is considering supporting… Which party do you think Grace will choose?” In the case of the 
phantom effect where the dominating alternative is unavailable, participants were told: “[Lucy/Laura] would 
also vote for Party [O], but they are not in her electoral area. Party O want to…” and given the choice out of 
the two available options presented.  
 
Figure 4.3-7: Option stimuli plotted for each context effect.  
 Procedure 
Participants were self-selected through the online Prolific Academic subject pool, and screened by Prolific 
Academic as to ensure they meet the requirement criteria (i.e. born, and currently resident, in the UK). 
Participants are given a brief introduction & explanation of the study, and asked to indicate consent. 
Participants are asked to enter their age in years (e.g. ‘25’), and also their Prolific Academic ID for tracking 
purposes. 
The experimental tasks were presented using the online Qualtrics survey software.  
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Participants are provided with an explanation of the task; to predict for a number of hypothetical ‘voters’ 
(e.g. ‘Grace’ or ‘Emily’) which was the best political party (choice option) for Grace/Emily to have chosen, 
based on 2 issues (attributes) presented to the participants that matter equally to the hypothetical voter. They 
are reminded to choose an option based on what the ‘voter’ would prefer, and not their own preferences.  
Participants were randomly allocated to either the DA or DB conditions and then assigned to the expanded 
choice set, where they all four context effects ‘scenarios’ are randomly displayed. Participants are then asked 
to choose one of the 3 options available in each scenario. Upon completion, they then are assigned to the core 
set (AB), and all four context effects scenarios are randomly presented again, but for different voters, and 
participants asked to choose one of the 2 options available. We used this fixed order design in case carry-over 
effects from a fully randomised within-subjects manipulation affected our results; for instance, seeing the core 
set of AB may limit the effect of the introduced decoy in ABDA (e.g. by simply defaulting to the initial choice); 
though we note choice repetition is not always proposed to limit context effects (Trueblood et al., 2013). As 
Malkoc et al. (2013) argue the strongest test of decoy effects comes from comparing the two expanded choice 
sets (ABDA vs ABDB), this design ensures participants will be as naïve as possible to our manipulation in the 
conditions that will provide the strongest test of any possible effects. 
Upon completion, they are asked for demographic information (year of birth, gender, ethnicity, primary 
language, occupation), debriefed as to the nature of the task, and then forwarded to Prolific Academic for 
automatic payment.  
Prior to analysis, a simple attention check was conducted by matching the reported year of birth to reported 
age in years. Those with consistent ages were deemed as passing the attention check. 
 Results 
None of our participants failed an attention check, nor failed to meet the requirements of the study, leaving 
a total sample size of 300.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this experiment, we analyse each context effect in two ways. First, we 
analyse the choice proportions between the two expanded choice sets where the decoy targets differing options 
(i.e. DA vs DB) without removing any participants.  
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Secondly, we remove those participants who choose the decoy in the expanded set, and directly comparing 
the pattern of choices made between the core options (AB) between the expanded and core choice sets for each 
context effect (Huber, 1982)55. We would expect, for example, when the decoy (DA) targets A in the attraction 
effect, choice share for A will increase; whereas if the decoy (DB) targets B, choice share for B will increase.  
 
For the attraction effect, we would expect to see an increase in the proportions of those choosing the target 
following the addition of the relevant decoy (DA/DB), and we would expect to still observe these differences 
when the decoy is removed. The choice proportions for the attraction effect are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Choice Proportions for the Attraction Effect, per condition. Total counts in parentheses. 
Option 
          Condition 
AB ABDA ABDB 
A 19.8% (54) 25.3% (38) 17.3% (26) 
B 80.2% (219) 66.7% (100) 72.7% (109) 
Decoy - 8.0% (12) 10% (15) 
Total 273 150 150 
DA vs DB: A chi-square analysis between the DA and DB conditions shows no significant difference in choice 
proportions between the two groups, 2(2, 300)= 2.97, p= .226, V= .10. The pattern of results is in the expected 
direction for the attraction effect; option A’s choice share increases when targeted by DA (17.3% -> 25.3%), 
as does option B when targeted by DB (66.7%-> 72.7%). The results remain non-significant when the decoy 
option is removed from the chi-square analysis (p= .107). 
We note the overall preference for option B, and comment on this in the Discussion. 
Core vs DA/DB: We compared the choice proportions between the Core and the DA/DB conditions separately, 
with those choosing the decoy removed (N=27). This tests the direct gain the target receives at the expense of 
the competitor following the addition of the decoy. 
26.1% of participants chose A in the core set, increasing to 27.5% in the expanded set with DA. This increase 
is in line with the attraction effect. However, a McNemar’s test for changes in choice proportions between the 
                                                     
55 We note that in Huber et al. (1982) they compared in two tests; firstly, those participants who did not choose the decoy; and 
secondly, they merged the competitor and decoy groups and compared switching to/from the target. We feel Malkoc et al. (2013) make 
a strong case for comparing DA vs DB, and Huber himself uses the exclusion method in later studies. 
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Core and DA was non-significant, p= .856, with a net gain of 2 for the target (A) following the addition of the 
decoy at the expense of the competitor (B).  
86.7% chose B in the core set, with a decrease to 80.7% when the DB decoy was present; opposite to what 
was expected. A McNemar’s test for Core vs DB was also non-significant, p= .152, with a net loss of 8 for the 
target (B) following the addition of the decoy.  
 
For the similarity effect, we would expect to see a relative increase in the proportions of the non-targeted 
option, following the addition of the relevant decoy (SA/SB). The choice proportions for the similarity effect 
are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Choice Proportions for the Similarity Effect, per condition 
Option 
          Condition 
AB ABSA ABSB 
A 17.8% (48) 14.7% (22) 12% (18) 
B 82.2% (222) 80% (120) 73.3% (110) 
Decoy - 5.3% (8) 14.7% (22) 
Total 270 150 150 
SA vs SB: A chi-square analysis between the SA and SB conditions shows a significant difference in choice 
proportions between the two groups, 2(2, 300)= 7.37, p= .025, V= .16. The pattern of results is somewhat in 
the expected direction for the similarity effect; option A’s choice share is higher when targeted by SA (14.7% 
vs 12%), whereas option B’s choice share decreases when targeted by SB (80.0%-> 73.3%). The decoy’s choice 
share increases when targeting option B in the SB condition (5.3% -> 14.7%). The results become non-
significant when the decoy option is removed from the chi-square analysis, 2(1, 270)= .109, p= .741, V= .02, 
suggesting the effect is driven mostly by increased share for the similar decoy(s)- rather than direct gains by 
the competitor(s). 
Core vs SA/SB: We compared the choice proportions between the Core and the SA/SB conditions separately, 
with those choosing the decoy removed (N= 30). This tests the direct loss the target has to the competitor 
following the addition of the decoy. 
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Relative share for the competitor (B) increased from the core set when A was targeted by SA (83.1% -> 
84.5%) - in line with the similarity effect. A McNemar’s test for changes in choice proportions between the 
Core and SA was non-significant, p= .832, with a net loss of 2 for the target (A) following the addition of the 
similarity decoy SA.  
Relative share for the competitor (A) decreased from the core set when B was targeted by SB (18.8% -> 
14.1%),  opposite to predictions for the similarity effect. A McNemar’s test for Core vs SB was also non-
significant, p= .312, with a net gain of 6 for the target (B) following the addition of the similarity decoy SB.  
 
For the compromise effect, we would expect to see an increase in the proportions of those choosing the 
target following the addition of the relevant decoy (CA/CB). The choice proportions for the compromise effect 
are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Choice Proportions for the Compromise Effect, per condition 
Option 
          Condition 
AB ABCA ABCB 
A 51.3% (135) 42% (63) 42% (63) 
B 48.7% (128) 38% (57) 53.3% (80) 
Decoy - 20% (30) 4.7% (7) 
Total 263 150 150 
C1A vs C2B: A chi-square analysis between the CA and CB conditions shows a significant difference in choice 
proportions between the two groups, 2(2, 300)= 18.16, p< .001, V= .246. The pattern of results is somewhat 
in the expected direction for the compromise effect; option A’s choice share is unchanged when targeted by 
CA (42% -> 42%); whereas option B’s choice share increases when targeted by CB (38.0% -> 53.3%). The 
decoy’s choice share decreases from CA to CB (20% -> 4.7%).  
The relative choice proportions are in line with those expected by a compromise effect; A (52.5% -> 44.1%) 
comparing CA to CB, with a corresponding increase in the choice share for B (47.5% -> 55.9%). However, the 
results are non-significant when the decoy option is removed from the chi-square analysis, 2(1, 263)= .109, 
p= .172, V= .084.  
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Core vs CA/CB: We compared the choice proportions between the Core and the CA/CB, with those choosing 
the decoy removed (N=37). We would expect the target’s share to increase at the expense of the competitor 
when the decoy is present. 
Share for the target (A) increased from the core set when targeted by CA (48.3% -> 52.5%) – in line with the 
compromise effect. A McNemar’s test for changes in choice proportions between the Core and CA was non-
significant, p= .473, with a net gain of 5 for the target (A) following the addition of CA.  
Share for the target (B) increased from the core set when targeted by CB (46.2% -> 55.9%) – in line with 
the compromise effect. A McNemar’s test for Core vs CB was marginally non-significant, p= .059 with a net 
gain of 14 for the target (B) following the addition of CB.  
 
As per the phantom effect, there is no actual decoy option included in the choice set for participants to 
choose, therefore we analyse the differences between the target/competitor between and within groups. We 
expect an increase in the share for the target following the depiction of an unavailable decoy (P). The choice 
proportions for the phantom effect are shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Choice Proportions for the Phantom Effect, per condition 
Option 
          Condition 
AB ABPA ABPB 
A 55% (165) 74% (111) 27.3% (41) 
B 45% (135) 26% (39) 72.7% (109) 
Decoy - - - 
Total 300 150 150 
PA vs PB: The pattern of results is in the expected direction for the phantom effect; option A’s choice share 
increases when targeted by PA (27.3% -> 74%); whereas option B’s choice share increases when targeted by 
PB (26.0% -> 72.7%). A chi-square analysis between the PA and PB conditions shows a significant difference 
in choice proportions between the two groups, 2(2, 300)= 65.35, p< .001, V= .467.  
Core vs PA/PB: Share for the target (A) increased from the core set when PA was introduced (60.7% -> 74.0%) 
– in line with the phantom effect. A McNemar’s test for changes in choice proportions between the Core and 
PA was significant, p= .005, with a net gain of 20 for the target (A).  
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Share for the target (B) increased from the core set when PB was introduced (50.7% -> 72.7%)  – in line with 
the phantom effect. A McNemar’s test for Core vs PB was also significant, p< .001 with a net gain of 33 for 
the target (B).  
 
We found no significant results for the attraction effect either between (DA vs DB) or within-subjects (Core 
vs DA/DB). Looking between-subjects (our stronger test for an effect), the pattern of results was in line with 
those expected for an attraction effect (target share increases). Looking within-subjects, when A was targeted 
results were in line with an attraction effect, but non-significant; whereas when B was targeted the results were 
in the opposite direction to what would be expected. 
We did find significant results for the similarity effect comparing between the decoy (SA vs SB) groups, 
however effects largely disappear when comparing the AB options after the decoy was removed. Thus suggests 
that the similarity effect here results from participants choosing the decoy(s) (a legitimate choice, as outlined 
in Section 4.2), rather than the non-targeted option. Looking within-subjects, when A was targeted relative 
share for the competitor (B) increased, in line with a similarity effect; while the opposite was observed when 
B was targeted (share for A decreased). 
For the compromise effect, we find a significant effect comparing between-groups (CA vs CB), but not when 
we remove the decoy; though the pattern of results for the remaining AB options are consistent with those 
expected for a compromise effect. This is likely due to participants choosing the CA option at the expense of B 
(A was unchanged). Looking within-subjects, we find the results for either targeted option (A or B) in line 
with those expected in a compromise effect, but only the share for B in Core vs CB neared significance (p= 
.059). 
Significant results for the phantom effects in the predicted directions were observed with between groups 
(PA vs PB), and within-subjects (Core vs. PA/PB). Despite the dominating decoy’s unavailability, participants 
chose the dominated available decoy at higher rates when informed of the unavailable alternative. 
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 Discussion 
We discuss each of our hypotheses in relation to each context effect separately below. We found no support 
for our first hypothesis (H1) pertaining to the attraction effect; 
H1: An increase in preference share for the targeted option in the ‘attraction effect’ condition. 
While our results, both between and within-subjects, were non-significant, we observe pattern of results 
between DA and DB groups are in the predicted direction as expected for an attraction effect, with the target 
increasing share when the inferior decoy is present (A: 25.3% -> 17.3%, B: 66.7%-> 72.7%). Removing the 
decoys and comparing directly the share for A and B between these groups does improve significance (p=. 
109) with the results in the expected direction. The lack of a significant finding is somewhat surprising, as of 
all the context effects, the attraction effect is considered the most documented and discussed in the consumer 
psychology literature; with numerous studies showing these effects (Doyle et al. 1999; Trueblood et al. 2013) 
regardless of the ‘domain’ examined (cf. Frederick, Lee, & Baskin, 2014). While it would be remiss of us to 
ignore the trend for increasing participant sizes generally in these studies (e.g. see Frederick et al., 2014), we 
do not think lack of power is an explanation. The mean effect size reported in Heath and Chatterjee’s (1995) 
meta-analysis for the attraction effect is a 11.4% share shift (Binomial test p< .001), which corresponds to an 
a priori sample size of 390, while setting a= .05 (power = .95) as per Yang and Lynn (2014) results in a sample 
size of 208 required. As we have 300 participants in our sample, this does not seem a major factor- though we 
note our share changes are slightly less than the 11.4% mean effect size, so it cannot be ruled out. 
A more probable explanation lies in participants’ prior preferences for our real-world attributes. A large 
number of participants choose the ‘B’ option in both conditions (209 out of 300), the commonality being that 
option B is highest on the ‘healthcare spending’ attribute (£7billion vs. £3 billion), while it is lowest on 
‘education spending’ (£3 billion vs. £7billion). Considering our participant sample is made up of 27% students, 
this could be considered surprising as the traditional view of students’ political choices around education (in 
particular the UK) would be to increase education spending (on its own merits, or as a view to limiting tuition 
fee contributions). Our research took place against a backdrop of large decreases in funding to the higher 
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education budgets by the then Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in 201056, with a trebling of higher-
level tuition fees for students57, and decreases in maintenance grants/supports. 
It is likely this had become less of a dominant concern by the time of the experiment’s data collection phase 
(mid-2015), when current headlines in the British media were reporting that the National Health Service (NHS) 
was ‘in need of £8 billion in funding’, and was a significant election issue in the run up to the 2015 General 
Election in 201558. Our sample’s mean age is 30 years old, and 73% are not students with 17% self-reporting 
as public-sector workers, typically the demographics more likely to care about healthcare and current affairs 
generally, it does not seem a stretch of the imagination to assume that real-world influences are the cause of 
the overwhelming preference for option B.  
We do ask participants to choose what a hypothetical voter who cares equally about the issues would pick, 
but whether participants are choosing based on their own preferences, or predicting what another would do 
(substituting their own preferences in lieu of more information about the imaginary voter), or choosing the 
subjectively ‘best option’ for an unknown other (e.g. believing such a voter would prefer/ benefit from greater 
NHS funding) is unclear. Yet, they all can lead to the same skewed preference. This is supported by Huber et 
al. (2014) who state if “a decision maker has clear prior preferences between the target and the competitor, 
the effect of adding an undesired decoy will be muted.” (p. 522). Indeed, there is a long tradition of ‘leakage’ 
of real-world concerns into experiments, for example: ‘belief bias’ (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; 
Newstead, Pollard, Evens, & Allen, 1993); and in studies on the role of memory accessibility in exaggerating 
risks, even when risk information is explicitly available (Kusev, van Schaik, Ayton, Dent, & Chater, 2009). 
On a positive note, while irksome for research purposes, it is somewhat relieving that given the high 
importance real-world voters in the UK place on healthcare (42-50% of voters consistently say it is “the most 
important issue facing the country at this time”, YouGov, 2015) that the addition of an irrelevant decoy does 
not significantly affect their preference for option B.  
                                                     
56 “Universities alarmed by 40% cut to teaching budgets” The Guardian. 20th October 2010.  
57 “Tuition fees vote: Plans approved despite rebellion”, BBC. 9th December 2010.  
58 “NHS needs £8 bn funding boost and 'major reforms' says health chief”. The Telegraph. 23rd Oct 2014.  
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H2: A decrease in preference share for the targeted option in the ‘similarity effect’ condition, with an 
increase in the competitor and/or the decoy  
We found support for H2 when comparing between groups, with the target losing relative choice share to 
the competitor and decoy. However, when you remove the decoy from analysis these effects disappear, 
suggesting they are mostly driven by the choice share gain by the decoy and less-so by the direct loss from the 
target to its competitor. This in itself is not an issue for the similarity effect per se, as choosing the decoy 
(which is marginally better on one attribute, but worse on the other) is a legitimate choice. Comparing with 
the core AB set, we see the trends in the predicted directions when A is targeted by the decoy (loss of relative 
share); but the opposite when B is targeted by the decoy relative to the core AB set (gain of relative share). 
Again, despite telling participants that they should choose based on the hypothetical voters presented, it 
could be that they were basing the decision on their own preferences. Unlike the attraction effect, the decoy in 
the similarity effect is not ‘irrelevant’. 73.3%-80% of participants consistently preferred the B option which 
was highest on ‘social welfare’ spending, with 14.7% choosing the SB decoy (SA: 6.3%) when it was highest 
on the social welfare attribute. Our participant sample (majority female, young, university educated, 
student/public sector) can be consisted typical of the voter profile that would be pro-welfare spending based 
on political research worldwide (Armingeon, 2004, Esping-Andersen, 1999). Participants may be expressing 
their viewpoint on social welfare, ignoring the task demands. 
Alternatively, participants might be using stereotypic information to infer additional information about the 
hypothetical voters, who were both given female names. There is research to suggest that women are more 
likely to support traditionally left-wing/socially liberal political parties (Bonoli, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 
1999), greater likelihood for females to support social welfare policies over males (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 
2003), and a psychological stereotype that they will as both candidates (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993; Swers, 
2002, p. 5-6) and therefore as voters. 
H3: An increase in preference share for the targeted option in the’ compromise effect’ condition. 
We find support for the compromise effect. Comparing the expanded choice sets, relative choice share for 
the target increases when the decoy is in the choice set, and the pattern of results change depending on which 
is targeted. Looking within-subjects, we see the expected pattern of results, share for A increases when it is 
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the target, and the same when B is the target. However, these differences are non-significant, suggesting the 
effect is driven by the change in preference for the decoy (20% ->7%; CA -> CB), and that the within-subjects 
analysis is a weak test of the effect. 
Again, preference asymmetry may be a cause. Decoy CA is highest on ‘reducing greenhouse gas emissions’ 
(GGEs) (70%) and lowest on the ‘top-rate of income tax’ (10%); while decoy CB is highest on ‘top-rate of 
income tax rate’ (70%), and lowest on reducing GGEs (10%). As our hypothetical voter is said to prefer higher 
levels of both tax and reductions in GGEs and both were equally preferred, neither option should have an 
overall advantage. Yet, if participants are ignoring task demands, then the low-tax, eco-friendly option (CA) 
could be seen as more appealing as people likely attempt to maximize personal benefit (economic, and 
sustainable environment) for the voter, compared to the relatively high-tax, less eco-friendly option (CB). That 
we don’t see an overwhelming preference for CA would suggest that, in general, participants are following the 
task demands and not ignoring them. 
In the context of the British electoral landscape, the higher rate of income tax rate is 40% (as of May 2016), 
with the highest rate for those earning over £150,000 reduced from 50% to 45% during the 2010-2015 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat government. Participants may be generally unwilling to support a higher rate 
of income tax, as they are aware of the historical downward trend. It may only be that the introduction of an 
option (CB) that is ‘extreme’ on the dimension of income tax (70%) may cause them to see option B as a 
compromise on this dimension. Of all the attraction, similarity, and compromise effects, this scenario was the 
only one at near-significance (= .05) when directly comparing the core sets within-subjects, suggesting it was 
an effective manipulation for eliciting a compromise effect.  
H4: An increase in preference share for the targeted option in the ‘phantom effect’, despite the unavailability 
of a decoy option. 
We find strong support for the phantom effect, with all our analyses (between, and within) showing that the 
mention of an unavailable alternative had the effect of increasing preference for the targeted (dominated) 
option. Phantom effects represent a unique problem for models of political choice; ‘sincere voting’ assumes 
that voters will choose the alternative that is most preferred, while ‘correct voting’ assumes voters will choose 
the alternative most preferred (or confer highest utility) given some constraints (i.e. availability). However, 
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both presume that voters’ actual preferences (i.e. between candidate A or B) are not affected by unavailable 
alternatives, while our results show that they can be. How then to reconcile this with correct voting: is the 
‘correct voice’ that made with(out) knowledge of ‘better’ alternatives outside of the decision-task at hand? It 
is easy to dismiss these phantom scenarios as unlikely to occur in reality, in that only 2 political 
parties/candidates exist or contest an election while better alternatives are known but unavailable. The USA is 
a possible example, where Obama might be considered a better alternative to the US Presidential Democratic-
Republican contest between Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump, but cannot run for a third term as President.   
Overall, ‘context effects’ have strong parallels with the idea that participants ultimately narrow their options 
down to two main alternatives (Chapter 3) comparing them on differing attributes (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014) 
while remaining aware of other options that exist in the choice set. For example, the Labour and Green parties 
are often considered the main dyadic choices for those on the ‘left’, with Conservatives and UKIP on the 
‘right’. In either case, one may be aware of the Liberal Democrats and their stances on an issue, causing 
changes in preference for the other two alternatives along that issue dimension. For example, in the scenario 
that used ‘immigration’ and ‘crime’ one could easily imagine a voter oscillating between the Conservatives 
(considered ‘tough on crime’) and UKIP (‘tough on immigration’), who becomes aware of the British 
Nationalist Party’s (BNP) or Britain First’s position59 on anti-immigration, increasing relative share for 
Conservatives by splitting the UKIP share.  
In summary, we observe support for the similarity, compromise, and phantom effects; with non-significant 
results for the attraction effect that mostly trend in the correct direction. That we are aware of, we are the only 
researcher besides Pan et al. (1995) to examine the attraction effect in political domains; and the first to explore 
the similarity, compromise, and phantom effects. We have raised possible influences on our results arising 
from the use of real-world political attributes and voters’ own preferences for these, rather than weighting them 
equally, and we address these in Experiment 6. 
 
                                                     
59 Owing to their views, party size, and geo-political distribution of their supporters, the BNP and BF field candidates for election in 
relatively few constituencies; whereas voter salience of them is relatively prominent due to media coverage (see national coverage 
during May 2016). In the London 2016 Mayoral Election, BF received 105,225 combined 1st & 2nd preferences (8th place out of 12), 
more than the BNP (49, 493).  
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 Experiment 6: Context Effects in Fictional Political Scenarios 
One of the main issues arising out of Experiment 5 was the possible effect of real-life political knowledge 
on participants’ choices, even when asked to make them for hypothetical voters who cared about issues equally. 
For example, in the attraction effect scenario, the majority of participants (209 of 300) chose the option that 
maximized healthcare spending, despite being told that the hypothetical voter valued each attribute equally. 
This is likely due to the context in which the study took place, with headlines in the British media at the time 
reporting that the National Health Service (NHS) was ‘in need of £8 billion in funding’.  
Therefore, we decided to run an experiment fully abstracting the task scenarios to fictional decisions between 
fictional parties on fictional attributes. This was to remove as much as possible the possibility of participants 
having strong prior biases towards or against parties they think might represent ‘real world’ parties, and to 
minimise participants use of their own preferences for real-world policy attributes (e.g. taxes, healthcare, etc.). 
To do this we created an overall scenario whereby the participant took the role of an ‘inter-galactic observer’ 
of different ‘planets in the galaxy’, who were having democratic elections between 2 or 3 parties. Participants 
were tasked with predicting what party the native inhabitants (or ‘citizens’) might elect.  
We replicated the format of Experiment 5, where we created 4 conditions relating each of the 4 ‘context 
effects’; attraction, similarity, compromise, and phantom; and participants took part in each one. Unlike 
Experiment 5, we used a fully between-subjects design to assign participants to one of 3 differing choice sets, 
containing either 2 or 3 available options (‘parties’), with the decoy counterbalanced to target each option (A 
or B). 
As per Experiment 5, we hypothesised that we would observe the expected pattern of results for each ‘context 
effect’, namely: 
H1: In the ‘attraction effect’, an increase in the choice share for the target following the addition of a 
dominated decoy. 
H2: In the ‘similarity effect’, a decrease in the choice share for the target following the addition of an 
asymmetrically dominating decoy. 
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H3: In the ‘compromise effect’, an increase in the choice share for the target following the addition of an 
extreme but equal-value decoy. 
H4: In the ‘phantom effect’, an increase in the choice share for the target following the addition of a 
dominating, but unavailable, decoy. 
Methods 
 Participants 
296 participants took party in the experiment online via Amazon Turk in return for $0.25. Participants’ age 
ranged from 18-73 years (=36.15 years SD=12.35); 53% were male, 47% were female, with 98.3% of 
participants reporting English as their primary or native language. 34.8% of participants were employed in the 
private sector, 20.9% in the public sector, 16.9% were self-employed, 12.8% unemployed and 10.5% were 
students; the remainder reported ‘Didn’t Know’ or ‘None of the above’. 66.6% participants identified as 
‘White- European/American’, 4.4% as ‘White-Other’, 7.8% as ‘Black- African/American’, 6.4% as 
‘Hispanic’, and the remainder as Asian or ‘Mixed Heritage’. 
 Design 
We used a 4x3 between-subjects design (Context Effect) x (Choice Set). ‘Context Effect’ had 4 conditions: 
attraction, similarity, compromise, and phantom; corresponding to each type of ‘context effect’ under 
examination. Each participant completed all four of the Context Effect conditions. ‘Choice Set’ had 3 groups: 
Group 1(AB), Group 2 (ABDA), and Group 3 (ABDB); where DA always targets option A, and DB targets B.  
 Materials 
Scenarios: In order to remove possible confounds as suspected from Experiment 5, such as the weighting 
of familiar or preferred attributes which prevents participants from treating attributes as equal, we created 4 
hypothetical alien planets; each with their own political parties and ‘alien’ policies (attributes). For example, 
on ‘Planet Zog’ the Zogonians’ main issues were ‘zogabong’ production and ‘space exploration’. 
We created 4 separate scenarios for each planet, where a hypothetical alien voter is trying to decide between 
the various parties on the relevant attribute dimensions. Participants are told voters equally prefer each of the 
attributes, and have no prior preference for any of the parties. Participants are told the direction of preference 
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each hypothetical alien voter has for each attribute. In the attraction, similarity and compromise conditions, 
the scenario makes clear that higher levels of each attribute is preferred. In the phantom effect, lower costs of 
‘strawberry jelly’ in a fictional currency (‘Quixel credits’) are preferred, while higher ‘workforce places’ are 
preferred. Participants are reminded to judge only on the information in the scenario and then asked to predict 
which party the alien voter would choose (as per Experiment 5). 
Stimuli: We generated 12 fictional parties (‘Zub’, ‘Axo’, etc.) that inhabit 4 fictional planets in the galaxy 
and 8 fictional planetary issues that the parties differ on (Table 4.6). ‘Zongabong’ production is measured in 
units of ‘millions’, and ‘atmospheric pollutants’ is measured in units of ‘parts per million’. We invented two 
fictional currencies to be the units for two of the attributes: ‘Kong Dollars’ (K), and ‘Quixel credits’. 
Table 4.6: Planetary Scenarios; attribute values per options per condition. 
Planet 'Zog' (Attraction) 
Attributes 
Zub  
(A) 
Axo  
(B) 
Xram 
(DA) 
Xram 
(DB) 
Zogabong Production (units) 60 30 50 20 
Space Exploration (% increase) 30 60 20 50 
Planet 'Slub' (Similarity) 
 
Voron 
(A) 
Grebulon 
(B) 
Tantos 
(SA) 
Tantos 
(SB) 
Free Water (litres) 600 250 650 300 
Atmospheric Pollutants (ppm) 250 600 200 550 
Planet 'Kong' (Compromise) 
 
Zargo 
(A) 
Betelge 
(B) 
Mittel 
(CA) 
Mittel 
(CB) 
Furble Production (% increase) 40 60 20 80 
Galactic Foreign Aid (K dollars) 60 40 80 20 
Planet 'Quix' (Phantom) 
 
Zumba 
(A) 
Arcturia 
(B) 
Krak 
(PA) 
Krak 
(PB) 
Strawberry Jelly Cost (‘Quixels’) 50 80 50 80 
Workforce places (0,000s) 500 800 550 850 
The stimuli sets for each condition are presented graphically in Figures 4.8-11. 
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Figure 4.8-11: Option positions per context effect scenario. 
 Procedure 
Participants signed up for the study via Amazon MTurk, and conducted the experiment via the online survey 
software ‘Qualtrics’. Participants were given information on the nature of the experiment, and the type of data 
that would be collected, and asked to provide consent via a web-form.  
Upon consenting participants were given detailed task instructions, and told that they would be predicting 
what party citizens of various planets would be voting for, based on their preferences for 2 equally important 
and equally preferred attributes held by the ‘planetary citizens’.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 4 Context Effect conditions, and further randomly 
assigned to one of the 3 Choice Sets. They were presented with a fictional scenario about the planet and its 
inhabitants, what two attributes differentiated the parties from each other, and what the planetary inhabitants 
preferred for those attributes (higher or lower amounts). Participants were then asked to choose which option 
they thought the citizens of that planet would vote for. Upon indicating a choice, participants were re-assigned 
randomly into another context effect and choice set, until all four had been presented.  
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For example, for those assigned to the attraction effect condition, participants are told ‘Zogabongs’ are an 
important resource to have in order to fuel homes, and that Zogonians are eager to fund space exploration to 
seek out resources in space. Participants are told Zogonians care about each issue exactly the same amount, 
and to predict what the Zogonians would choose, based only on what is presented. Participants are then asked 
“Who would a Zogonian choose”: the ‘Zub’ (A), ‘Axo’ (B), or ‘Xram’ (DA/DB) party? Upon choosing, 
participants are randomly assigned to different context effect scenario. 
Following the completion of the main part of the study, participants were asked to provide demographic 
information, and enter in their Amazon mTurk code for verification and payment, and were then debriefed as 
to the purpose of the study.  
We constructed a simple attention check for participants, by asking them to provide their age in years at the 
beginning of the study and choosing their date of birth at the end in the demographics questionnaire. Consistent 
answers were deemed as having passed the attention check.  
 Results 
8 participants failed the attention check and were excluded from further analysis. For analysis, we compare 
the choice-proportions for each decoy choice set (eg. DA vs DB) to each other, which is considered a more 
robust test for changes resulting from the addition of a decoy (Malkoc et al, 2013). We also compare the 
difference in relative choice proportions for those choosing A/ B from the Core Set to the counterbalanced 
Decoy choice-sets (e.g. AB DA, ABDB).  
 
Planet Zog: The change in relative choice-share proportions between DA and DB was significant, 2(2, 194)= 
6.135, p= .047 V=.178. We examined the difference in choice-share for A and B between the DA and DB 
conditions without those choosing the decoy, which was significant, 2(1, 164)= 4.158, p= .041, V=.159. We 
observed a decrease in choice share for A (target to competitor; 67.5% -> 51.9%) between the DA and DB, with 
a corresponding increase for B (competitor to target; 32.5% -> 48.1%). 
There was no significant change in choice-share for the Decoy between DA and DB (11.7% vs 19%), p= .50. 
We report the figures below in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Attraction Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and percentages. 
Planet 'Zog' (Attraction) 
Option 
Condition 
AB(Core) ABDA ABDB 
A 54.9% (56) 59.6% (56) 42% (42) 
B 45.1% (46) 28.7% (27) 39% (39) 
Decoy - 11.7% (11) 19% (19) 
Total 102 94 100 
A chi-square test of independence was carried out on the difference in relative choice-share proportions for 
the target (A) in the Core vs DA condition (54.9% vs 67.5%), which was non-significant, 2(1, 185)= 3.026, 
p= .08, V=.128; and the target (B) for Core vs DB condition (45.1% vs 48%), which was non-significant, 2(1, 
183)= .169, p= .681, V=0.03.  
 
Planet Slub: The changes in proportions between SA and SB were significant, 2(2, 195)= 33.42, p< .001, 
V=.414; with the Decoy preferred more in ABSA than ABSA (21.65 vs. 59.2%; p< .05). Directly comparing 
choices in the SA and SB conditions without the decoy, we find a significant difference in the overall choice-
share proportions, 2(2, 116)= 5.46, p= .02, V=.217. When A is targeted by SA, it loses relative share compared 
to when SB is the target (44.7% -> 67.5%); while B loses relative share when it is targeted by SB (55.3% -> 
32.5%; competitor to target). These results are in line with those predicted for the similarity effect. Figures are 
in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Similarity Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and percentages. 
Planet 'Slub' (Similarity) 
Option 
Condition 
AB(Core) ABSA ABSB 
A 50 (49.5%) 34 (35.1%) 27 (27.6%) 
B 51 (50.5%) 42 (43.3%) 13 (13.3%) 
Decoy - 21 (21.6%) 58 (59.2%) 
Total 101 97 98 
When analysing the difference in relative choice-share from Core to SA we observed a non-significant 
decrease in the choice share for the target as predicted (49.5% to 44.7%), 2(1, 177)= .395, p= .529, V=.047; 
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and a decrease in target share from Core to SB (50.5% -> 32.5%) that approached significance, 2(1, 141)= 
3.743, p= .053 (p= .039, one-sided), V=.163. 
 
Planet Kong: Differences between CA and CB conditions were significant, 2(2, 198)= 9.45, p= .009, 
V=.218. Choice share for A when targeted by CA is 25% compared to competitor B (60%); whereas choice 
share for B when targeted by CB is 38.8% compared to competitor A (33.7%). These results are not in line with 
those expected by a compromise effect (i.e., an increase in the share for the targeted option) 
Analysing the difference in relative choice share for AB between CA and CB without decoys, we find a 
significant change overall; with A increasing share from 29.4% to 46.5% (target -> competitor) and B 
decreasing from 70.6% to 53.5% (competitor -> target); 2(2, 156)= 4.825, p= .028, V=.176. Again, the 
opposite trend for a compromise effect. 
The difference in choice-share proportions for the target in the Core vs CA conditions (30.6% vs 29.4%) was 
non-significant, 2(1, 183)= .031, p= .86, V=.013; and Core vs CB conditions (69.4% vs 53.5%) was 
significant, 2(1, 169)= 4.433, p= .035, V=.162. Figures are in Table 5. 
Table 4.9: Compromise Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and percentages. 
Planet 'Kong' (Compromise) 
Option 
                   
Condition 
AB(Core) ABCA ABCB 
A 30 (30.6%) 25 (25%) 33 (33.7%) 
B 68 (69.4%) 60 (60%) 38 (38.8%) 
Decoy - 15 (15%) 27 (27.6%) 
Total 98 100 98 
We note the consistent preference for option B across conditions, and comment on it in the discussion. 
 
Planet Quix: We observed no significant change in choice proportion overall, or for any option, across any 
comparison following the introduction of a dominating but unavailable decoy (P): PA vs PB, p=.716; AB vs PA, 
p=.985; AB vs PB, p=.703;. None of the results differ significantly from chance; p=.361. The results are shown 
below in Table 4.10. 
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Table 4.10: Phantom Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and percentages. 
Planet ‘Quix’ (Phantom) 
Option 
                   
Condition 
AB(Core) ABPA ABPB 
A 42 (43.3%) 43 (43.4%) 46 (46%) 
B 55 (56.7%) 56 (56%) 54 (54%) 
Decoy - - - 
Total 97 99 100 
 
 
We observe significant results in line with an attraction effect when comparing choice share between the DA 
and DB conditions, which remained significant when the decoys were removed. Choice share for AB 
comparing the Core set to either DA and DB showed no significant change in choice share for the target (though 
trends were in line with an attraction effect comparing Core to DA). 
We observe significant results in line with a similarity effect when comparing choice share between the SA 
and SB conditions, which remained significant when the decoys were removed. Choice share for AB comparing 
the Core set to either SA and SB showed no significant change in relative choice share for the target, though 
comparisons between Core and SB bordered significance (p= .053; p= .039, one-sided test), with trends in the 
predicted direction for a similarity effect.  
We observe significant results when comparing choice share for the compromise effect between the CA and 
CB conditions, with trends in the opposite direction expected for a compromise effect. We observe no 
significant results comparing the Core set to either CA and CB. 
We observe no significant results in line with a phantom effect when comparing choice share between the 
PA and PB conditions, or comparing the Core set to either PA and PB; with the results not being significantly 
different than those expected by chance.  
 Discussion 
Our first hypotheses were that we would observe: 
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H1: In the ‘attraction effect’, an increase in the choice share for the target following the addition of a 
dominated decoy. 
H2: In the ‘similarity effect’, a decrease in the choice share for the target following the addition of an 
asymmetrically dominating decoy. 
In 2 out of 4 of the ‘context effect’ conditions (‘attraction’ & ‘similarity’), we observe a pattern of results 
that reached statistical significance that corresponded with the hypothesised pattern of results for those effects. 
Namely, in the ‘attraction effect’ condition we observe a significant gain in choice share for the target of the 
dominated decoy (DA/DB); and in the similarity effect we observe a loss of choice share for the target of the 
similar asymmetrically dominating decoy (SA/SB).  
This may be as a result of using more abstracted scenarios and attribute dimensions, limiting the effect of 
participants’ prior preferences in muting decoys. In support of a more even trade-off of attributes, we see the 
share for the core AB sets in the attraction and similarity are closer to 50:50% (compared to Experiment 5), 
which gives the most power to detect changes and increases likelihood that the decoy’s presence will alter 
choices (Huber et al., 2014). The large choice share for the SB decoy is worth noting, being best on the 
environmental attribute of ‘cleaning up the atmosphere’, a concept not wholly abstracted from the greenhouse 
gas attribute of Experiment 5 where participants also showed strong preferences. However, as the choice share 
in core AB set seem approximately 50:50 between the two, this does not seem a concern, and the SB decoy’s 
share might just be a result of how we placed it on the indifference line relative to B. In our experiment, the 
option SB lies ‘outside’ the option B, rather than ‘inside’ it as per A and SA (a quirk in coding the stimuli). 
There is no exact position to place a decoy to elicit a similarity effect, the requirements being that it is not 
dominated by its target and is of approximate or equal value (i.e. it is located along the line of indifference’; 
Berkowitsch et al. 2014). Indeed, most stimuli set place both similarity decoy either on the ‘outside’ (Trueblood 
et al., 2013) or ‘inside’ (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014) of the core options. Here we have one on the ‘outside’, SB, 
and one on the inside, SA. We find no theoretical reason why this should make any difference to our results, 
but report it here anyway for consideration. 
H3: In the ‘compromise effect’, an increase in the choice share for the target following the addition of an 
extreme but equal-value decoy.  
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While we observe a significant result for the ‘compromise effect’, the pattern of results the opposite of what 
was predicted. The results suggest there is a general strong preference for B (69.4%, Core AB set), which is 
better than A on the attribute ‘% Furble Production’, which is not reversed following the introduction of decoy 
CA. CA is worse than A on ‘Furbles’, but better on ‘Galactic Foreign Aid’, and should cause an increase in 
relative choice-share for A as the compromise option between CA and B, and a decrease for B as the ‘extreme 
option’ (Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Tversky, 1992). That this doesn’t occur suggests participants are 
overweighting the ‘Furble Production’ attribute, and this B will be the more preferable and rational choice. 
Choice-share shifted significantly following the introduction of decoy CB, with a significant decrease in the 
share for B (while retaining majority preference) and increasing share for A and CB (relative to core and 
ABCA), akin to a similarity effect. Given that the pattern of results is no better than if participants were 
choosing at chance levels (~33%), we could interpret the results as ambivalence between equally preferable 
options (i.e. at these values, all options in ABCB trade off equally).  
Given the significant increase in choice-share for CB, we posit that CB acts as a ‘similarity’ decoy for B, with 
CB gaining choice-share at B’s expense rather than A (which does not change significantly). If our participant 
sample have a general preference for ‘Furbles over ‘Galactic Foreign Aid’ attribute, differences between CB 
and B will seem less on this dimension, and preference for CB>B>A; which is what we observe. While we 
cannot test this directly, we feel it’s a sensible interpretation. Indeed, in the real-world many voters prioritise 
foreign aid far below the economy60, though this depends how the question of foreign aid support is asked 
(Eurobarometer, 2014), and if voters are asked to rank it in priority to other issues. Also, as ‘foreign aid’ has 
an intrinsic cost to it beyond the numerical value attached to it, this might have caused option A and decoy CA 
to be evaluated over-negatively (despite framing increasing amounts of the attribute in the scenario as a 
positive) relative to B and decoy CB.  
H4: In the ‘phantom effect’, an increase in the choice share for the target following the addition of a 
dominating, but unavailable decoy. 
                                                     
60 In the USA, the last time foreign policy appeared as the most important issue either a) facing the polling respondent, b) facing the 
country, or c) determining a voter’s choice in an election, was July 2015 where voters responded ‘Foreign Policy’ 9-10% vs ‘the 
Economy’ 37-44%. See: The Polling Report for a history of US polls. In the UK, YouGov’s ‘Most Important Issues’ tracker has not 
found foreign aid concerns to be the top 12 voter concerns since at least June 2010- while the economy is consistently number one. 
See: YouGov Issues (2) 2016. 
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We observed no support whatsoever for the ‘phantom effect’, with no significant (or numeric) differences 
in choice share when a third but unavailable dominating decoy targeted a pre-existing option. The ‘phantom 
effect’ was not observed in any way, and there were nearly homogenous choices across all conditions.  We 
interpret this in a number of positive ways; firstly, the stimuli have been shown to have been set up correctly, 
with no strong preference for either of the options across any choice set. Secondly, the idea of the phantom 
effect is to present an option that is better than any of the existing options available, in order to increase 
preference for its nearest alternative. Our pattern of results is what should be obtained if our participants are 
acting as rational decision-makers, in that they ignore an option they cannot choose, and base their decision 
only on what is available and will provide maximum utility. However, that we do not observe a phantom effect 
in fictional scenarios, and do in realistic scenarios (Experiment 5) should give us worry- ideally we would not 
observe phantom effects in either. 
It is worth pointing out that in the conditions where we do observe the predicted effects, we did so by 
comparing the counterbalanced decoy conditions; whereas in nearly all cases comparing core AB sets to the 
AB options in the expanded sets yielded no significant results. This departs from the traditional method of 
observing context effects, which compares the choices between a pair of original options and the choices made 
following the introduction of a third option. Comparing choice shares between expanded sets should be a 
stronger test of context effects, as there is more power comparing the bias in choice share in one direction with 
the bias in the other direction, arising from the addition of counterbalanced decoys. This may be one potential 
explanation as to why decoy effects are difficult to observe when comparing only to the original core reference 
set. 
One issue with the study is that we did not capture participants’ weighting of each of the attributes. The 
attributes were fictional, and we informed participants that the ‘planetary citizens’ valued all the attributes 
equally, and to predict which ‘planetary party’ the citizens would choose only based on this. This may not have 
prevented participants from bringing prior belief’s and biases to help them choose an option; due to the limits 
of the author’s creativity, the nature of some of the attributes are analogous to real-life attributes (as previously 
mentioned).  
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In conclusion, we observe the attraction and similarity effects in fictionalised political domains. We observe 
no support for the compromise effect, or the phantom effect. Due to the persistent issue of participants’ prior 
preferences for attributes (even when abstracted to fictionalised versions), we attempt to resolve this in further 
experiments. 
 Experiment 7: Exploring Context Effects with ‘Desirability’ 
Experiments 5 and 6 explored all context effects in ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ political scenarios, with mixed 
results. We observed the attraction effect and similarity effect in fictional, but not realistic, political scenarios; 
and the compromise effect and phantom effect in real, but not fictional, political scenarios. The mixed nature 
of our findings is out of step with other work, particularly on the attraction effect, which is considered a 
“prominent and robust decision bias” that occurs in fictional and real scenarios (Malkoc, Hedgecock, & 
Hoeffler, 2013, p.318), and even occurs in other species (e.g. hummingbirds; Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2002). 
Across Experiments 5 and 6, we identify participants’ prior preferences as a probable factor in our results. 
Additionally, while we observe evidence for each effect, these are using third-party scenarios, and whether 
they occur when decision-makers are choosing for themselves is yet to be determined. 
Further, a potential issue with our previous experiments may be that the scales we used are somewhat 
unconstrained and interpretable (e.g. ‘£X millions spending on healthcare’).  Also, we use differing units for 
our attributes (e.g. %’s, GBP Sterling £, parts-per-million, fictional currency units, etc.). Other issues include 
the directional preference of voters, whereby asking a participant to make a decision based on a fictional voter’s 
preference may conflict with a participants own; for example, lower/raising taxation despite having a differing 
direction preference on taxation changes. All these may lead to confusion in participants’ appraisal of our 
stimuli and decision-conflict, leading to negative appraisal of the choice set, and negative processing. 
Prior research has shown that processing negative (i.e., less desirable) information versus positive (i.e., 
desirable) information leads to systematic differences in motivation, perception, learning, and evaluation 
(Ahluwalia, 2002; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Higgins, 1997; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Negative stimuli receive more attention during an evaluation stage, and memories for negative stimuli 
are better remembered than for positive stimuli (Pratto & John, 1991). Anticipated regret around outcomes 
arising out of choosing between unattractive options outcomes evokes negative emotions, which influence 
200 
 
information processing (Zeelenberg, 1999). People experiencing negative (vs. positive) moods engage in 
greater information search prior to making a decision (Bless et al., 1996), more local information processing, 
and pay more attention to details (Gasper & Clore, 2002). As a result, people in negative moods appear to be 
more accurate, showing fewer false memory biases and attribution errors than those in positive moods (Forgas, 
1998; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). This suggests that people in negative moods process information more 
carefully, increasing accuracy and may serve to attenuate context effects.  
Malkoc et al. (2013)’s work on context effects and choice set ‘desirability’ (i.e., how much the choice set 
was perceived as ‘good’ or ‘bad’) is pertinent in this regard. Malkoc et al. (2013) found across five experiments 
that the attraction effect only occurs in desirable domains. Usefully, Malkoc et al. (2013) operationalised 
‘desirability’ by providing ‘desirability ratings’ for choice options on 2 attributes on a scale ranging from ‘-
10’ to ‘+10’ where ‘0’ is average desirability. This eliminates issues of unit comparisons across attributes, and 
provides an intuitive and common directional preference for participants to understand.  
We explore context effects in political domains, using ‘desirability’ as a scale for each attribute, assigning 
participants to differing scenarios based on their own preferences for each attribute (see, Malkoc et al. 2013), 
and asking them to make the choices for themselves. Contrary to Malkoc et al. (2013), whom focussed only 
on the attraction effect, we use ‘desirability’ to test across all four context effects. Formally, we hypothesise 
that, when the choice set is desirable, we will see: 
H1: an increase in choice share for the ‘target’ following the introduction of a dominated ‘decoy’ (attraction 
effect),  
H2: a decrease in the choice share for the ‘target’, following the introduction of an asymmetrically dominated 
‘decoy’ (similarity effect),  
H3: an increase in the choice share for the ‘target’ following the introduction of a decoy that causes they 
target to be equidistant between the decoy and competitor (compromise effect),  
H4: an increase in choice share for the ‘target’ after informing participants of an unavailable, dominating, 
option (phantom effect). 
 
201 
 
Methods 
 Participants 
789 participants were recruited using the Prolific Academic database, and took part in the study for £0.50. 
All participants reported English as their primary language, and ranged between 18-71 years of age (=29.9, 
SD=9.9). 58.7% of participants were female. 88.8% of participants reported their ethnicity as ‘White: 
European/American’, with 3.3% reporting ‘White: Other’; the largest remaining group as ‘Mixed Heritage’ 
(1.8%). 29.5% of participants were students, 26.6% worked in the private sector, 18.7% in public sector, 11.1% 
were ‘self-employed’, 10.2% were unemployed, 0.8% were retired, and 3.2% responded ‘None of the Above’ 
or ‘Don’t Know’. 
 Design 
A 4x3 between-within mixed design; (Context Effect: Attraction, Compromise, Similarity, and Phantom) x 
(Choice Set: AB, ABA’, ABB’). 
After indicating a preference for an option in each context effect scenario (e.g. between A/B/A’), participants 
were asked to repeat their choice with the decoy removed (i.e. between A/B). 
 Materials 
Attributes: We used pilot data from some of our prior experiments on the UK public (not included in this 
thesis), along with polling of public opinion openly available online (YouGov, April 2015), which showed that 
the two most important issues (that are also approximately equally important) to the UK public were (at the 
time of the experiment) ‘healthcare’ and ‘education’.  
Scenarios: There are some differences in how we constructed the scenarios compared to Experiments 5 and 
6. Firstly, the voter is asked to make their choice on their own behalf, not for a hypothetical voter. Secondly, 
they are told the parties presented care about the issues of healthcare and education equally, as to minimise 
any inferring about party-level preferences for attributes (as provided ratings are sourced from external 
opinion). 
Stimuli: We use a modified version of the stimuli found in Malkoc et al. (2013), whom used ‘desirability’ 
ratings as proxies for specific attribute values. ‘Desirability’ of an option on each attribute ranged from ‘0’ 
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(Very undesirable) to ‘10’ (Very Desirable), and were ostensibly taken from the average ratings of that party’s 
policy from other participants with ‘similar political views’ (see Procedure, this section). 
We fix three different choice options (Party A, Party B, Party D) on a 10-point desirability scale (‘0’ being 
‘Very Undesirable’ – ‘10’ being ‘Very Desirable’) for both attributes designed to elicit each of the four context 
effects. For example, for the ‘attraction effect’, we place the decoy C as to be inferior to the target (ABA’, 
where the decoy targets A; or ABB’ where the decoy targets B) on one or both attributes. We have provided 
the stimuli for each context effect in Table 4.10, and plotted in Figures 4.12. 
Table 4.10: Attribute stimuli values for each option, per context effect scenario. 
Context Effect Attribute A B ABA' ABB' 
Attraction 
Healthcare 6 4 5 3 
Education 4 6 3 5 
Similarity 
Healthcare 6 4 7 3 
Education 4 6 3 7 
Compromise 
Healthcare 6 4 8 2 
Education 4 6 2 8 
Phantom 
Healthcare 6 4 7 4 
Education 4 6 4 7 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Relative positions of option stimuli per context effect. 
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 Procedure 
Participants were all sourced using the online participant pool ‘Prolific Academic’ (PA), with the criteria 
that they were born, and were currently resident at the time of the experiment, in the UK. Participants were 
given a brief explanation about the study’s aims, informed they would be asked some political questions (e.g., 
on their opinions), and that they would be given a scenario to choose an option (fictional candidate/party) in.  
Participants then indicated consent, and entered their Prolific Academic ID, and their age in numbers (as part 
of an attention check). Participants were asked to indicate their interest level in politics on a 3-point scale (‘Not 
at all Interested’, ‘Somewhat’, or ‘Very Interested’); and answered 5 questions on whether, generally, they 
preferred ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ amounts (i.e. ‘spending’) in relation to 5 key policy areas: Healthcare, Defence, 
Education, Immigration, Income Tax. For example, for ‘healthcare/NHS’ participants are asked ‘Of the 
following two statements, please indicate which is closest to your own opinion: “I would prefer higher levels 
of spending on healthcare/the NHS”, or “I would prefer lower levels of spending on healthcare/the NHS”. Not 
all the questions were relevant to the study, and were included as to make the main experimental items of 
interest less obvious to the participant. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were randomly assigned each of 4 context effect conditions, 
and further randomly assigned to one of two decoy conditions (ABA’/ABB’). Participants were informed that 
“People sharing your political outlook have rated the following parties below on how ‘desirable’ they are, 
based on their policies on healthcare and education.”, and were given an explanation of the desirability 
ratings.61  
Participants were informed that the parties presented all supported higher/lower spending on Healthcare, or 
higher/lower levels of spending on Education, (depending on the participant’s choices previously in the 
questionnaire). This was to ensure participants would perceive the desirability of each party as consistent with 
their own preferences for a given policy direction. Participants were asked “If you had to choose one of the 
following below options, which one would it be?”, and chose one of the 3 options. 
                                                     
61 This stays true to the spirit of Malkoc et al. (2013), whom informed participants that the ratings provided were averages from 
members of the public; and also to Pan, O’ Curry & Pitts (1995) whom used ‘favourability ratings’ by the public for candidates (choice 
options) on issues as the attribute stimuli. 
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Participants are then subsequently re-shown the scenario, and asked to choose one of the 2 ‘core’ options, if 
the previous 3rd option had not been available. 
Finally, participants were asked to provide demographic details (year of birth gender, ethnicity, English 
language proficiency). Participants were then debriefed as to the purpose of the study, explained as to the 
nature and purpose of the mild deception in the scenario presentation, and reminded that the parties presented 
were fictional. Participants were then told to close the study, and were auto-forwarded to PA to register 
completion, and processed for payment. 
 Results 
8 participants were identified for exclusion on the basis of either failing the attention check62,, or taking the 
survey from an IP located outside of the United Kingdom.  
 
DA vs. DB: A chi square analysis showed a significant difference in the choice proportions of those choosing 
the target in the ABDA vs. ABDB conditions in the predicted direction, 2(2, 197)= 10.56, p= .005, V= .232. 
66.7% chose A when it was the target in the DA condition (B: 24.2%), 55.1% in the DB condition (B: 42.9%). 
These results remained significant after the decoy options were removed, 2(1, 186)= 5.92, p= .015, V= .178. 
The pattern of results are shown in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11: Attraction Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and % share. 
Option 
Condition 
AB(Core) ABDA ABDB 
A 69.3% (129) 67.3% (66) 55.1% (54) 
B 30.7% (57) 24.5% (24) 42.9% (42) 
Decoy - 8.2% (8) 2.0% (2) 
Total 186 98 98 
Core vs. DA/DB: A non-parametric chi square (McNemar’s), comparing the choice proportions of the Core 
set (AB) to the Expanded set (ABA’/ABB’), revealed no significant changes in choice proportions for A or B 
between the Core and Expanded sets (p= .18; p= .29). 
                                                     
62 Participants who did not correctly match their age in years, with their year of birth, were failed on our attention check.  
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SA vs. SB: The pattern of results are shown in Table 4.12. When A is the target, 55.1% chose A (B: 31.6%; 
SA: 13.3%); when B is the target, 30.6% choose B (A: 65.3%; SB: 4.1%). This conforms to the predicted pattern 
of results for a similarity effect. A chi square analysis showed a marginally significant difference in the choice 
proportions between the SA vs. SB conditions in the predicted direction when we include those choosing the 
decoy, 2(2, 196)= 5.63, p= .06, V= .169; but not when we exclude them, 2(2, 179)= .412, p= .521, V= .048. 
As the similarity effect predicts loss of share for the target to the competitor, and does not discount the decoy 
as legitimate option, we address this analysis here.  
Table 4.12: Similarity Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and % share. 
Option 
Condition 
AB(Core) ABSA ABSB 
A 66.4% (119) 55.1% (54) 65.3% (64) 
B 33.6% (60) 31.6% (31) 30.6% (30) 
Decoy - 13.3% (13) 4.1% (4) 
Total 179 98 98 
Core vs. SA/SB: A McNemar’s test comparing the choice proportions of the Core set (AB) to the Expanded 
set (ABA’/ABB’), revealed no significant changes in choice proportions for A or B between the Core and 
Expanded sets (both p> .72). 
 
CA vs. CB: The pattern of results are shown in Table 4.13. When A is the target, 64.2% chose A (B:26.3%; 
CA: 9.5%); when B is the target, 27.1% choose B (A: 64.6%; CB: 8.3%). A chi square analysis showed a non-
significant difference in the choice proportions between the CA vs. CB conditions, 2(2, 191)= .08, p= .96, V= 
.021.  
Table 4.13: Compromise Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and % share. 
Option 
Condition 
AB(Core) ABCA ABCB 
A 70.6% (123) 64.2% (61) 64.6% (62) 
B 29.4% (51) 26.3% (25) 27.1% (26) 
Decoy - 9.5% (9) 8.3% (8) 
Total 174 95 96 
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Core vs. CA/CB: A McNemar’s test comparing the choice proportions of the Core set (AB) to the Expanded 
set (CA/CB), revealed no significant changes in choice proportions for A or B between the Core and Expanded 
sets (all p> .75). 
 
PA vs. PB: The pattern of results are shown in Table 4.14. When A is the target, 63% chose A (B: 37%); when 
B is the target, 43.9% choose B (A: 56.1%). A chi square analysis showed a no significant difference in the 
choice proportions between the PA vs. PB conditions, 2(1, 198)= .972, p= .324, V= .07.  
Table 4.14: Phantom Effect; Options per choice-set condition, total counts and % share. 
Option 
Condition 
AB(Core) ABPA ABPB 
A 68.6% (135) 63% (63) 56.1% (55) 
B 21.4% (63) 37% (37) 43.9% (43) 
Decoy - - - 
Total 198 100 98 
Core vs. PA/PB: A McNemar’s test comparing the choice proportions of the Core set (AB) to the Expanded 
set (PA/PB), revealed no significant changes in choice proportions for A or B between the Core and Expanded 
sets (all p> .51). 
 
We observe the attraction effect, and the similarity effect, in our experimental results looking between-
subjects, but not when comparing choice share for the core AB options to the extended sets. We find no 
evidence of the compromise or the phantom effects, either between or within-subjects.  
These results mirror our findings in Experiment 2.  
 Discussion 
We hypothesised that when the choice set is desirable, we would see: 
H1: an increase in choice share for the ‘target’ following the introduction of a dominated ‘decoy’ (attraction 
effect). 
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We observe the attraction effect in our results in this experiment, with 55.1% choosing the target when 
targeted by DA and 66.7% when targeted by DB. This would seem to suggest that the attraction effect can occur 
in political domains;when the choice set is ‘desirable’ (i.e., the options match the directional preferences of 
the political decision-maker), and the relative importance of the policy attributes to participants is 
approximately equal. This result is in line with Malkoc et al. (2013) who found fairly consistent evidence 
across four differing choice scenarios (e.g., frequent-flier programs and humidifiers) that the attraction effect 
only occurs in desirable domains (relative to undesirable domains).  
H2: a decrease in the choice share for the ‘target’, following the introduction of an asymmetrically dominated 
‘decoy’ (similarity effect). 
We observed some support for H2, with marginally significant differences in the choice proportions of those 
choosing the targeted option depending on the position of the decoy; however, these differences are non-
significant if we exclude those choosing the decoy. These results are in line with our positive results for the 
similarity effect in Experiments 5 and 6 (this chapter).  
Whether or not the decoy option in the similarity effect is a ‘legitimate’ choice to include/exclude from the 
method of an analysis does not seem something considered in the literature, and there is little consistency in 
how context effects are analysed; hence why we compare the choice patterns between the expanded choice 
sets with the differing decoy-targets (as per Malkoc et al., 2013; Nagouchi & Stewart, 2014), and the choice 
patterns of the main AB options with a ‘core set’ with the decoy removed (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982). It 
may be that for certain context effects including/excluding the decoy makes more sense, and testing the shift 
in choice proportions for the core options is a stronger test of the effect; for instance, in the case of the attraction 
effect which predicts that no one should choose the inferior decoy; or the phantom effect where no decoy 
exists. At least in our three experiments here (Exps. 5-7), only looking at the shift in the choice share for the 
core options relative to the expanded set(s) where the decoy is included, will nearly always lead to non-
significant results for the similarity effect.  
There is also the perceived importance of the attributes to consider; 95.9% of participants preferred higher 
spending on the NHS/Healthcare, and 91.8% of participants wanted higher levels of spending on education, 
with 87.4% wanting both higher healthcare spending and higher education spending. However, we do not trade 
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off the degree to which they prefer each as to make them equally weighted. Changes in the choice shares for 
AB and the decoy(s) are not perfectly mirrored in our results, with greater than 50% choosing A (and ~ 30% 
choosing B) in both conditions. More participants chose the DA decoy when both A and DA were better on the 
‘healthcare’ attribute. It seems likely that despite our best efforts the majority of participants had a greater 
importance weighting for healthcare relative to education, attenuating the competing effect of our DB decoy 
on B.   
H3: an increase in the choice share for the ‘target’ following the introduction of a decoy that causes they 
target to be equidistant between the decoy and competitor (compromise effect). 
We observe no support for H3, with 63.6% choosing A when it is the target, and 64.3% choosing A when it 
is not. This is in contrast to our positive result in Experiment 5 where we used more realistic scenarios, and in 
line with our negative result in Experiment 6 using fictional scenarios. However, in light of the point around 
preferences above for H2, we suspect that participants’ preferences are the explanation for the lack of an 
observable effect. The compromise effect relies on including ‘extreme’ options as to make the targeted option 
equidistant (or less so, depending on the degree to which you want to make the targeted option a ‘compromise’) 
between the ‘extreme’ decoy’ and the competitor on the two attributes considered. Yet the preferences of our 
participants are strongly in favour of both healthcare and education spending to increase. Introducing either 
decoy that is closer to ‘0-Not at all desirable’ on either of these attributes (a ‘2’ out of 10 on our scale) may 
result in participants effectively removing it from consideration. Given the greater tendency of our participants 
to place greater importance on healthcare over education, it seems understandable this option would be 
consistently chosen by our participants regardless of the decoy introduced to the AB set. 
H4: an increase in choice share for the ‘target’ after informing participants of an unavailable, dominating, 
option (phantom effect). 
We observe no support for H4, with no effect of an unavailable dominating option on the choice share for A 
or B in this experiment, in contrast with Experiment 5 and in line with Experiment 6. Again, returning to our 
discussion around the preferences of our sample, this is somewhat unsurprising. People should ignore the 
presence of an irrelevant alternative, and focus on the options that are present; considering that we focus (even 
in our task descriptions) on presenting the options in the choice set as ‘desirable’, it is possible we are 
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unintentionally encouraging participants to making simplified decisions- that is, they are not considering the 
unavailable alternative and deciding only on what is present and available. This is similar to the position 
Malkoc et al. (2013) put forward in how ‘desirable’ choice sets options elicit non-vigilant mind-sets in 
decision-makers, and less critical processing as a result of affective arousal. A possible criticism of Malkoc et 
al. (2013)’s work that may apply to our own, is that our instructions might be encouraging a more cognitive 
(think vs. feel) mind-set (Zajonc, 2000) in participants, thus increasing critical processing and attenuating the 
phantom effect. 
So far in three separate experiments, we have studied all four context effects in online studies, using 
hypothetical materials and scenarios, real-world materials and scenarios, differing attribute measures, and even 
considering voters’ directional preferences on issues. However, all these experiments attempt to elicit context 
effects in political domains by manipulating artificially created stimuli to create asymmetric preference 
structures, in an attempt to infer their existence in real-world political decision-making. A question therefore 
springs to mind: do asymmetric preference structures exist naturally in voters’ preferences? And if so, can 
these can lead to situations where voters’ violate their own preferences in voting for a political candidate/party? 
In 2015 we had a unique opportunity to engage with voters during the UK’s 2015 General Election, and test 
these questions. 
 Experiment 8: Attraction Effect in UK General Election 2015 
One of the main assumptions of political models, such as the ‘spatial model’, is that political candidates 
(and/or parties) can position themselves (intentionally or otherwise) in such a way as to capture the maximum 
amount of vote share. This positioning is also subject to the perceived positing of political options by voters 
in relation to others on various policy attributes. In the previous three studies, we have looked at how 
positioning political options in a choice set affects the vote share for each of the options, positioning them in 
line with research on ‘context effects’ to see if voters’ choices may violate rational assumptions and lead to 
preference reversals.  
Our results are for each context effect are fairly consistent across Experiments 5-7. The ‘attraction effect’ 
shows the most consistent evidence, in line with the idea it is the most robust context effect in the psychological 
literature (Doyle et al. 1999; Trueblood et al. 2013). While efforts were taken to minimise moderators of the 
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attraction effect (e.g. relevance of materials, equal attribute weighting, presentation format, etc.; Frederick et 
al., 2014), it may be that it is impossible to control all these factors and retain the real-world aspects (and 
relevance) of studying these effects in relation to political decision-making. However, previous authors have 
stated “the attraction effect is a real-world phenomenon, not just an experimental artefact”, (Mishra, Umesh, 
& Stem, 1993, p. 331). Thus, an obvious question to ask is: does the attraction effect naturally exist in real-
world political decision-making, and how does one measure this phenomenon? 
Previous studies by Pan, O’ Curry and Pitts (1995) have shown that the attraction effect can be observed in 
political decision-making between 2 and 3 candidates, and when considering 2 or 3 attributes, in real world 
political decision making (i.e. the 1994 Illinois Primary election, and the 1992 U.S. Presidential election). In 
one study they provided college students in an Illinois university with fictional ratings from ‘0- Very 
Unfavourable’ to ‘100- Very favourable’ for with 3 real-world candidates on ‘education’, ‘crime control’, ‘and 
tax policy’ (including their relative importance on a 0-100 point scale), allowing subjects to entire their own 
ratings if they disagreed with those presented. Their results showed a significant effect for the asymmetrically 
dominating alternatives (an attraction effect), and no effect of the number of attributes. 
In second study, Pan et al. (1995) show that asymmetric preference structures (perceived one candidate to 
be better than another candidate but not both other candidates on two attribute dimensions) existed in voters’ 
perceptions of the main Presidential candidates (Bush, Clinton, & Perott) in the 1992 elections, and were 
significantly related to their resulting vote choice. The authors recruited 485 students from three business 
schools to rate the desirability of each of the three presidential candidates on ‘national defense’ and ‘health 
care’ on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘1- undesirable’ to ‘7- very desirable’, along with the relative importance 
of each of the issues (0-100). Participants were categorised into one of seven groups (two possible asymmetric 
dominance structures per candidate, and no asymmetric dominance structure). Pan et al. (1995) found 67.4% 
of people had asymmetric dominance for the three presidential candidates, increasing choice share for the 
dominating candidate, and took this as evidence for an ‘attraction effect’ in real-world political decisions.  
We replicate this real-world study looking at the UK General Election in 2015, considering the 3 main 
political parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, & Conservative Party)63, and how the public perceive their 
                                                     
63 We do also consider the Green Party and UKIP in a secondary part of the study, but we do not report the results here. 
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‘desirability’ on two major issues: the Economy, and the NHS. We continue to use desirability scales for our 
attributes, as it is a straightforward way of eliciting policy preferences without any prior specialist knowledge, 
or need for specific units. Therefore, we adapt Pan, O’ Curry and Pitts (1995)’s methodology to be more 
consistent with our approach, and investigate if the attraction effect is present in real-world political decisions 
by uncovering voters’ actual perceptions. 
We are conscious of the socio-geographical nature of politics in the UK, with the locality of the experimental 
setting (London) representing a certain section of the population (Hall, 2006; ONS, 2013). Therefore, we 
conduct our study on two samples of the UK population: a field study carried out in differing public locations 
in London, and a replication of the field study online open to the larger UK population regardless of geographic 
location within the UK. We wished to carry out a field study in order to gain a more heterogeneous sample of 
the UK in relation to political outlook (e.g. more Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and UKIP supporters), as 
our previous online samples have been relatively left-leaning and liberal in outlook (see Experiments 5 & 6, 
this chapter).  While these samples are not specifically designed to be representative samples of the UK 
population, they provide a useful comparison of results between the online and field samples. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind outside of the US. 
Formally, we hypothesise that: 
H1: Where we observe symmetric dominance structures among the general public, we will observe greater 
preference for the dominating option (the target) as per the attraction effect.  
Methods 
 Participants 
Two samples of participants were collected from a public field study, and an online version of the study. 
Only participants eligible to vote in the upcoming UK General Election were allowed to take party in the study 
(i.e. over 18 years old; registered as resident in the UK; and either a UK, Commonwealth, Irish citizen). 
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In the first (Field Sample), 288 participants were opportunistically recruited from members of the general 
public in a marginal constituency in Central London64, 5-10 days away from the General Election on May 8th 
2015. Participants were 50% male and 49.3% female, with an age range of 18-72 (= 34.42 SD= 12.43). 20.1% 
reported their occupation as ‘Student’, 14.9% as ‘Unemployed’, 35.8% as ‘Private Sector’, 18.8% as ‘Public 
Sector’, 2.1% as ‘Self-Employed’, 8.3% as ‘Public Representative’. 
In the second (Online Sample), 306 participants were recruited online via the subject pool ‘Prolific 
Academic’ 3 days before the 2015 General Election (Cohort Two), and completed the same questionnaire as 
the participants recruited in cohort one. Participants were compensated £0.30 upon completion. Participants 
were 41% male and 58.3% female, with an age range of 19-68 (= 30.36, SD= 10.31). 46.6% reported their 
occupation as ‘Student’, 4.9% as ‘Unemployed’, 19.5% as ‘Private Sector’, 12.1% as ‘Public Sector’, 15.0% 
as ‘Self Employed’, 1% as ‘Retired’ and 1% as ‘Other’. 
 Design 
Participants were briefed that the study was about how people perceive the main political parties in the 
United Kingdom. Each participant was asked to rate the desirability of each of the main political parties 
(Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservative Party) on two attributes (‘the Economy’ & ‘the NHS’) using a 
7-point ‘desirability’ scale. Participants were asked then to indicate their vote choice for one of the three parties 
if they were to base their vote choice on these two issues. Finally, participants were asked to rate both 
attributes’ perceived importance on a constant sum 0-10 point scale. At the end of the experiment, subjects 
were debriefed and were reminded to consider all relevant issues when they voted.  
 Materials 
Attributes: We chose two issues that national polling data (‘Most Important Issues’; YouGov, 30th & 31st 
March) indicated were both the most important, and the most likely to be equally important, to the UK 
electorate around the time of data collection: the ‘economy’, and the ‘NHS’. This also is in line with previous 
importance ratings provided from our own participant samples in previous experiments. 
                                                     
64 Constituency of Hampstead & Kilburn; 42 votes separated the Labour and Conservative candidates in 2010’s General Election, 
and is considered to have a high population of Liberal Democrat supporters. Actual vote share for the seat in 2015: 42.3% for 
Conservatives, 44.4% for Labour, and 5.6% for the Liberal Democrats. 
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Questionnaire: For the Field Sample, we distributed the questionnaire in a 4-page paper format. Page 1 
contained information about the study, its general aims, the researcher details, and a consent form where 
participants indicated consent to take part. This page was designed to be a tear-away page as to preserve 
participant anonymity and was removed after consent was provided. 
Page 2 asked participants to rate each of the parties’ stances on two attributes (‘the economy’ and ‘the NHS’) 
on a 7-point desirability scale (1-7; anchored on ‘Undesirable’ and ‘Very Desirable’). For example, “Thinking 
about how they stand on the Economy, please rate the desirability of each of the parties (Please Circle)”. At 
the bottom of Page 2 participants were asked: “If you were to base your decision on just these two issues, of 
the three parties above, who would you be most likely to vote for” in a free-text box. 
Page 3 asked for their importance ratings of both attributes (0-10, anchored on ‘Not at all’ and ‘Extremely 
Important’), and were also asked to rate two additional parties (Green Party, UKIP) on the same attributes and 
indicate their vote choice out of all 5 parties. Page 4 asked participants for their age, gender, and occupation. 
Pages 2-4 had a blank box in the top right corner where the researcher entered a numerical participant ID. A 
copy of the study form is included in Appendix C.  
For the Online Sample, the same materials are replicated online using the ‘Qualtrics’ survey software.  
The order of attribute presentation, and the order of the political parties are all counterbalanced both in the 
field study, and online, to minimise order effects. 
 Procedure 
For the Field Sample, recruitment was carried out in two main public areas of Hampstead & Kilburn: Queen’s 
Park public park, and Kilburn High Road (including various cafés) during May 1st 2015- May 7th 2015. 
Members of the public were approached by the researcher, who identified themselves as a researcher from 
UCL, and invited them to take part in the study. Upon meeting the eligibility criteria, and providing consent, 
the experimenter removed the tear-way Page 1, and participants were left to complete the questionnaire in 
private, and asked to return to the researcher upon finishing. Participants were then debriefed as to the nature 
of the study orally and provided with a takeaway debrief form containing the researcher’s email if there were 
any further questions arising from the study. 
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For the Online Sample, participants were recruited via ‘Prolific Academic’ during the same time period, and 
restricted to UK-only residents over 18 years of age, and were eligible to vote in the 2015 General Election 
(GE). Participants were self-selecting and indicated consent after reading an explanation of the study and its 
requirements. Participants then completed the same study as per the field cohort, adapted for the online 
Qualtrics platform, with the additional of a question at the end of the study as to whether they were eligible to 
vote in the GE as an additional check. 
 Results 
12 participants were removed from the analysis for providing a blank or ‘None of the Above’ response for 
the Party Choice question. While we recorded ratings for the Green Party and UKIP, we only report the results 
for the 3 main political parties (Labour, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats) here, deeming them of greatest 
interest given their predominant status in the UK electoral system. There were no meaningful differences in 
the results of our analyses for each of our samples, so we merge both into one overall sample and report the 
results here. 
 
Labour was the most desirable on the NHS, compared to the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats. The 
Conservatives were most desirable on the Economy, compared to the Liberal Democrats and Labour. 
Desirability ratings descriptive statistics are in Table 4.15.  
Table 4.15: Overall mean Desirability Ratings per issue per Party, and Standard Deviations (N=226). 
Issue Party Mean Desirability (1-7) SD (+/-) 
NHS 
Labour 4.82 1.49 
Conservatives 3.1 1.68 
Liberal Democrats 4.80 1.52 
Economy 
Labour 3.83 1.52 
Conservatives 4.71 1.86 
Liberal Democrats 4.36 1.44 
Importance Ratings: Attribute importance ratings for the NHS are NHS=7.90 (SD=1.85), and are 
ECON=7.86 (SD=1.81) for the Economy. Only 12.4%  of participants rated NHS <5, and only 11.9% of 
participants rated the Economy <5, on a 10-point scale. A one-way ANOVA between participants’ attribute 
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importance ratings and perceptual structure showed no significant difference in perceived importance on the 
NHS, F(6, 225)< 1; or on the Economy, F(6, 225)<1 across the perceptual structures. 
 
In keeping with Pan et al. (1995), we removed all participants that had one option which dominated all others 
(Labour: N=211; Conservatives: N= 106; Liberal Democrats: N=45), leaving N=226 participants in the 
sample. These participants are not needed for our research questions, as we are only interested in those with 
non-dominated options (i.e. had an asymmetric preference structure, or had no asymmetric dominance 
structures). 
Including those who had no asymmetric-dominance structure, 35.8% (N=81) participants chose the Labour 
Party, 31.4% (N=71) chose the Conservative Party, and 32.7% (N=74) chose the Liberal Democrats. Of those 
with an asymmetric dominance structure, 37.9% (N=22) of people chose Labour, 37.9% (N=22) chose the 
Conservative party, and 24.1% (N=-14) chose the Liberal Democrats.  
We plot the mean positions of the parties for each of the dominance structure for visual aid in Figures 4.13-
20.  
N=226 N=168 
N=20 N=2 
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Figure 4.13-20 Party positions using attribute ratings. Standard Error bars (SE +/-) included. 
A one-way ANOVA of vote choice with Perceptual Structure as the independent variable (7 levels) was 
significant, F(6, 225)= 2.55, p= .021.  We also used a 3x7 (Vote Choice x Perceptual Structure) chi-square 
analysis, which showed a significant relationship between Party Choice, and the perceived asymmetrical 
dominance structure of the participant; 2(12, 226)= 25.58, p= .012. v= .238. This remains significant even 
when removing those with a non-asymmetric dominance structure, 2(10, 58)= 23.99, p= .008, v= .643. This 
result shows that participants are taking the task seriously, as participants who rate parties differently should 
choose them differently. The exact breakdown pattern of choices can be seen in Table 4.16. We now consider 
if any of these patterns provide evidence for a real-world attraction effect. 
Table 4.16: Vote Choice per Perceived Asymmetric Dominance Structure. % share of structure in parentheses. 
 LAB 
LIB 
LAB 
CON 
LIB 
CON 
LIB 
LAB 
CON 
LAB 
CON 
LIB 
NO  
AD 
LAB 
12 
(60%) 
1 
(50%) 
5 
(55.6%) 
1 
(6.7%) 
1 
(20%) 
2 
(28.6%) 
59 
(35.1%) 
CON 
7 
(35%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(11.1%) 
6 
(40%) 
3 
(60%) 
5 
(71.4%) 
49 
(29.2%) 
LIB 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(50%) 
3 
(33.3%) 
8 
(53.3%) 
1 
(20%) 
0 
(0%) 
60 
(35.7%) 
N=9 N=15 
N=5 N=7 
217 
 
Total (N) 20 2 9 15 5 7 168 
Note: Columns indicate party asymmetric dominance. For example, ‘LAB LIB’ denotes Labour asymmetrically dominates 
Liberal Democrats, and so forth. ‘NO AD’ indicates a lack of asymmetrical in perceptual structure. 
 
We note the low observed frequencies in our cells. A requirement for chi-square analysis in for contingency 
table greater than 2x2 is that "no more than 20% of the expected counts are less than 5 and all individual 
expected counts are 1 or greater" (Yates, Moore & McCabe, 1999, p. 734). However, it is generally considered 
acceptable if expected counts are less than 5, provided none are less than 1, and at least 80% of the expected 
counts are equal to or greater than 5 (Weaver, 2016; Yates, Moore & McCabe, 1999). Only the No 
Asymmetric-Dominance (NA-D) perceptual structure, Labour-Dominates-Liberal Democrats, and Liberal-
Dominates-Labour, perceptual structures meet these criteria; therefore, we only analyse these here. 
We analysed whether the pattern of choices for the individual perceptual structures differed from the No 
Asymmetric-Dominance (NA-D) perceptual structure. There was (marginally) no significant difference in 
choice proportions for each political party between the NA-D and when Liberal Democrats dominated Labour, 
2(2, 183)= 5.08, p= .079; However, we found significant differences when Labour dominated Liberal 
Democrats (LAB-D-LIB), 2(2, 188)= 8.33, p= .016, v=.21. 
Finally, we replicated the method of analysis by Pan et al. (1995) in using a series of binomial logistic 
regressions to analyse the attraction effect for each party choice. Three dependant variables were coded 0-1, if 
they had chosen that party (1) or not (0). The independent variables were: the desirability ratings for that party 
on the NHS and the Economy, and a dominating dummy variable; coded 1 if the party dominated one of the 
other options in the set, and 0 if not (Pan et al., 1995). The attraction effect predicts that the dominating dummy 
variable should have a positive coefficient.  
We also included stepwise in 2 extra blocks: 1) the attribute importance ratings, and 2) the interaction terms 
between the attribute(s) and perceived importance. As the inclusion of the interaction terms did not 
significantly improve our model for any of the 3 binomial regressions (i.e. increase Nagalkerke’s R2), we omit 
them from our final model. Our results are shown in Table 4.17. 
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Table 4.17: Binomial Logistical Regression Analyses of Choice. 
Predictors Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats 
Economy () .641*** .662*** .345** 
 (18.20) (15.93) (5.84) 
NHS () -.082 .370** .426** 
 (.42) (6.64) (7.92) 
Imp: Economy () -.178** .206 -.226** 
 (4.00) (2.97) (6.40) 
Imp: NHS () .254* -.266** -.023 
 (6.67) (6.86) (.067) 
Dominating () -21.59 21.17 21.85 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Model Wald 2 57.24*** 84.59*** 50.22*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .31 .44 .28 
Note: *p<. 05. ** p<. 01. *** p< .001. Wald chi-square statistics in parentheses. N=588. 
The dummy variable is non-significant for each of the parties and is negatively signed (and non-significant) 
in the case of the Labour Party. 
 
An interesting side question is whether or not perceived importance of attributes are predictive of vote choice 
for any particular political party (i.e. ‘issue ownership’; Green & Hobolt, 2008). We regressed attribute 
importance ratings on vote choice for each of the 3 main parties. Results indicate that higher ratings on the 
Economy are significantly associated with higher likelihood of choosing any of the parties, with a slight edge 
for the Conservatives; Labour (OR=1.9), Conservatives (OR= 1.94), and Liberal Democrats (OR= 1.41), which 
would be expected. Higher ratings on the NHS is only significantly related to a higher likelihood of choosing 
the Liberal Democrats (OR= 1.53), and the Conservative Party (OR= 1.45). Attribute importance ratings 
indicate that Labour is more likely to be chosen as the perceived importance of the NHS increases (OR= 1.29), 
with a decreased likelihood of the Conservatives (OR=.76). With higher ratings of importance for the Economy 
(OR= 1.2), there is a decreased likelihood of Labour (OR= .83) or the Liberal Democrats being chosen (OR= 
.79).  
We tested to see if the attribute importance ratings were correlated with the actual ratings given to the parties, 
finding results only in the case of the Conservative Party. The perceived importance of the NHS negatively 
correlated with desirability ratings for the Conservative Party on the NHS, r(226)= -.212, p= .001; and the 
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perceived importance of the Economy was positively correlated with desirability ratings on the Economy, 
r(226)= .31, p< .001. As these are medium-strength correlations (r≤ .30), and tests for collinearity for these 
variables were all within acceptable limits (Tolerance= 1, VIF=1), and as they improve the R2 of our model, 
we leave them in our subsequent binomial regression for the Conservative Party. 
The dominating dummy variable is non-significant (p> .99) for all choices, which suggests the attraction 
effect is not a significant predictor of vote choice in our model; this is likely due to the small amount of data 
points corresponding to dominating perceptual structures in the regression. 
 
H1: Where we observe asymmetric dominance structures among the general public, we will observe greater 
preference for the dominating option (the target) as per the attraction effect.  
We found an overall significant difference in choice share due to perceptual structure, using both an ANOVA 
and a chi-square analysis. Only the party-choice proportions for when the Labour dominated the Liberal 
Democrats, or the Conservatives dominated the Liberal Democrats, were significantly different from those 
who had no asymmetric dominance perceptual structure. Looking at the pattern of choices made across the 
perceptual structures, they seem consistent with our hypotheses that the dominating option is chosen more-
often than others. Also we note that across a 6 asymmetric dominance structures, few people (or none) seem 
to choose the decoy option, which is encouraging; people should not be choosing the dominated option that 
they rated inferior if the attraction effect is to hold, or even on a rational level if they are trying to maximise 
utility from their choices. However, all these results are limited by the low number of cases where participants 
display an asymmetric dominance pattern, and that a number of the cells compared in the chi-square analyses 
have a count less than 5. Thus it is hard to make strong declarative statements on the prevalence of perceived 
asymmetric dominance structures, and potential effects on real-world political decisions. 
Using binomial logistic regression and a dummy variable to code for the presence of an asymmetric 
dominance structure, we found no statistically significant relationship between the presence of an asymmetric 
dominance structure and the vote choice for that party, controlling for all other variables.  
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Overall, our results show that the majority of people do not seem to have an asymmetric dominance structure, 
at least on the two attribute issues we tested. This is in stark contrast to Pan et al. (1995) who found 67.4% of 
their participant sample had asymmetric dominating structures, whereas we find only them among 14.1% of 
our sample65. A possible explanation may be that Pan et al. (1995) test individual candidate perceptions, 
whereas we test party-level perceptions and not for any one candidate (i.e. a party leader). Another difference 
is that in our study all the parties are seen as viable candidates (~33% vote share each), whereas in the US third 
party candidates are seen as less viable; indeed, vote share for Clinton was 51% overall in Pan et al. (1995). 
At grand mean level, Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives seem to trade off on the NHS and Economy, 
with Labour being slightly better than the Liberal Democrats on the NHS, and worse on the Economy. This is 
more in line with a ‘similarity effect’ (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982), where one predicts a split in the choice 
share for Labour and Liberal Democrats to the benefit of the Conservative Party.  
There are some notable key differences between our study and Pan et al. (1995): 1) Pan et al. (1995) use 
‘Healthcare’ and ‘Defence’ as attributes for participants to rate the options on, whereas we use ‘Healthcare/the 
NHS’ and ‘the Economy’; 2) we use political parties rather than presidential candidates as our options; 3) and 
their sample was relatively homogenous in that they tested graduate students in 3 separate business schools, 
whereas ours had 2 cohorts designed to capture the general public.  
On 1): we used public opinion polls which have been consistent in their ranking of ‘the NHS’ and ‘the 
Economy’ as the two most important issues according to the public for months prior to the 2015 UK General 
Election, whereas Pan et al. (1995) based their attribute choices on judgments by 6 experts; we believe our 
choice of attributes is robust. Further, the mean importance ratings of the two attributes in our study are at the 
high end of the scale for ~80% of our sample.  
On 2): while the USA political system is considered to focus more on the personal aspects of a candidate, 
the UK is considered to be a more party-brand electoral system. It is possible that people rate candidates’ 
positions on attributes separately to the perceived position of the party they belong to, and indeed there is 
                                                     
65 Both of our samples had a clear lack of asymmetric dominance structures present, with each having 28 people (~10% of each 
cohort) who exhibit one of 6 possible asymmetric structures.  
 
221 
 
evidence that suggests candidates in all democracies utilize this as a vote maximising or survival tactic in 
elections (Quinlavan & Weeks, 2009).  
Partisan support often has emotional qualities (Burden & Klofstad, 2005), and it could be that evaluating 
parties (versus candidates) leads to differences on scales that ask how ‘desirable’ the party is on that attribute; 
‘desirability’ itself having an affective element. Asking people to consider candidates (i.e. people) may cause 
affective responses, by bringing to mind candidate images and/or personal traits like trustworthiness and 
competence (Olivola & Todorov, 2010). There is evidence to suggest that the personalisation of ‘leader 
images’ in the UK are a significant factor in voters’ decisions (Adams, 2001; Langer, 2009; Stewart & Clarke, 
1992), something we do not control for as we are assessing the parties on only two issue dimensions. The 
problems of prior biases in context effects studies are not new (Mishra, Umesh, & Stem, 1993), but are difficult 
to account for a priori. Perhaps it is no longer useful to only ask for an appraisal of the party brand, and we 
should control for differences between them. However, controlling factors as to artificially reduce all decisions 
down to 2 attributes may not be ecologically valid, and alternatively, we could consider leader images as 
another dimensional attribute for evaluation. This would require consideration of context effects in n-
dimensional space, literature on which is not currently available (to our knowledge).  
Alternatively, participants may be more likely to give high ratings of desirability to a party they support on 
some/all issues under consideration, rather than undergo a cognitively effortful and potentially discomforting 
reappraisal of their party perceptions upon request (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 
2010). Also, in our study participants indicated their vote choice and ratings on the same page, and therefore 
it is possible that they simply indicated their vote choice as the one they rated highest on both attributes as to 
appear consistent- but still may not be their actual intended vote choice vote once in the ballot box, as other 
factors may determine their vote choice (e.g. perceived competence, Green & Hobolt, 2008). However, we did 
explicitly request participants to base their vote choice on just these two issues and assume representativeness 
of participant’s actual vote choice if based only on these issues. 
The final difference (3) between Pan et al. (1995) and our study, is that we believe testing the general public 
is a more useful (if noisy) strategy to follow. Our results are more generalizable to the real world, and capture 
data using two differing methods: a field test in a marginal parliamentary seat considered a 3-way race; and 
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online in order to sample opinion across the UK, both geographically and politically. Pan et al. (1995) used 
business college populations in their study and retained 64.7% of their sample after excluding those who had 
one completely dominating option, whereas only 37% of our general population sample did not have a 
dominating option between the three main political parties. Pan et al. (1995)’s sample contained only 12% who 
had no asymmetric dominance structure, compared to 74% of our sample (i.e. most of our sample had a clearly 
dominating choice). A possible explanation for these differences might be education levels (our sample should 
have a more heterogeneous distribution of education), or political sophistication levels, which neither Pan et 
al. (1995) or we capture in our studies. Yet, as our sample is a more random sample of the population in the 
UK, we argue it is far more representative of the preference structures naturally present in the UK population, 
and that asymmetric preferences structures for political choices are far less prevalent than may be thought by 
Pan et al. (1995). 
Despite limitations, our study has real world implications. In the 2015 General Election, 23,060,519 people 
cast votes for the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, or the Conservative Party. Those with an asymmetric 
dominance structure make up 9.5% of our sample, which would correspond to 2,196,240 voters in the UK 
whom may have an asymmetric dominance structure that may elicit an ‘attraction effect’. This is not an 
insignificant number when we consider that the UK political system is a ‘First-Past-The-Post’ majoritarian 
democracy, where very small vote differences in constituencies have a larger impact on the overall 
representation in the UK parliament (in 2015 there were 194 marginal seats in Britain, needing up to a 5% 
swing to change hands)66. These figures also ignore the existence of the other two smaller mainstream parties 
in the UK, the Green Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which exist on the left and right of the 
spectrum respectively. It is quite possible that subsets of these 5 parties may be more relevant to explore, 
particularly for voters who perceive themselves on the ‘left’ or ‘right’ of the political spectrum and would be 
unlikely to ever consider a vote for a party on the opposite side of the ‘centre’ (e.g. Green, Labour, and Lib 
Dem; UKIP, Conservative, and Lib Dem).  
Reassuringly, our logistic regression results mirror the dominant post-election opinion amongst pollsters and 
political pundits, that Labour’s poor results in the 2015 General Election were due to their perceived weakness 
                                                     
66 “Election 2015: The political battleground” BBC News, 24-02-2014  
223 
 
on the issue of the Economy67 (although this may be conflated with overall ‘competence’68). Our regression 
analyses show that voters’ ratings of Labour on the Economy (but not the NHS, their ‘owned’ issue) was 
positively associated with increased likelihood of choosing Labour; voters were 1.9 times more likely to choose 
Labour with each unitary increase on our 7-point desirability scale, but .83 times less likely to choose Labour 
as voters’ perceived importance of the Economy increases (10-point scale). By contrast, desirability ratings on 
both the Economy and the NHS, and the perceived importance of the Economy, were associated with an 
increased likelihood of choosing the Conservative Party; and only for the Conservatives was the Economy’s 
importance positively correlated with higher ratings on the Economy. The poll results by YouGov published 
before May 7th that tracked voter opinion showed that more people thought the economy was a greater issue 
“… facing the country” and “…their family” (52%/44%, and 45%/41%); that more people were worried about 
the economy (54% vs. 42%); that the coalition was handling the economy well (50% vs. 41%); and that the 
Conservatives would handle the economy better than Labour (40 vs 22%)69. Therefore, we can take reasonable 
reassurance from the alignment of our studies results with real world polling results, that our study’s findings 
capture voters’ decision-making both pre- and post- the 2015 General Election in a realistic manner. 
One must spare a moment for the Liberal Democrats for whom the NHS was not considered a significant 
predictor, and were less likely to be chosen with higher ratings of the Economy’s importance. Given the high 
mean importance ratings of both issues in our study (and in national polls), we find the low vote for the Liberal 
Democrats in our study and nationally, somewhat unsurprising.  This suggests that the Liberal Democrats were 
not seen as dependable on the economy, with its increasing importance meaning voters were less likely to 
consider voting for them. That the NHS was not an issue that predicted voters’ choosing them is slightly 
surprising, given their pledge to spend £8 billion extra per year on the NHS; however, this was a pledge quickly 
adopted by all the political parties (e.g. Labour, Conservatives etc.) in some form or another, suggesting any 
initial tactical advantage arising from attempted ‘issue ownership’ was neutralised by competing parties. It 
also may be due to perceived likelihood of delivering on pledges and perceived ‘competence’ in achieving 
these goals in government. Although the Liberal Democrats were in coalition with the Conservative Party from 
                                                     
67 “UK post-election poll for the TUC” GQRR Polling, May 2016. 
68 “A defeat to reckon with: On Scotland, economic competence, and the complexities of Labour's losses”, John Curtice, IPPR, June 
2015.  
69 https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/  
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2010-2015, their effectiveness in achieving their policy goals is, literally, debatable 70. An example being their 
immediate inability to prevent a rise in UK tuition fees by their coalition partners to £9,000 within a short time 
of taking office. The widely-accepted sentiment in UK political discourse is that large majority parties are the 
most likely to deliver on policy pledges71,72. 
To summate: we have provided evidence of perceptual asymmetric dominance structures in a minority of 
the general public’s political perceptions of the main 3 UK parties in the run-up to the UK 2015 General 
Election. There is tentative support that these are related to voters’ political vote choice, but analysis is highly 
constrained by the low prevalence of voters with these structures in our sample. We recommend further studies 
done with much larger sample sizes, as done by other authors on the attraction effect among the general 
population using Google Surveys (Huber, Payne & Puto, 2014), or using data from the British Election 
Survey(s). We have also explored the impact of the two attributes and their perceived importance on the 
likelihood of voting for any of the 3 main parties, and find our results complimentary to the current discourse 
on the 2015 General Election outcome. 
 General Discussion 
We investigated the main ‘context effects’ prevalent in the literature in four differing experiments, using online 
studies both realistic and fictional in the 3rd and 1st person, and field tests of the general public; and using 
differing attributes and scales (%s, monetary units, ‘desirability’ ratings, etc.). In Experiments 5-7 we studied 
the attraction, similarity, compromise, and phantom effects in controlled online studies, while we focussed 
solely on the attraction effect in Experiment 8.  
We observe the attraction effect in Experiments 6 and 7 (but not Experiment 5), and not in our study 
(Experiment 8) during the 2015 UK General Election where we sampled widely from the general UK 
population- though this could be due to low statistical power. This evidence suggests that the attraction effect 
can indeed occur in political decision-making. Still, recent offerings from the consumer psychology literature 
have brought the robustness of the attraction effect into question (Frederick et al., 2014; Huber, et al., 2014; 
Yang et al., 2014). Frederick et al. (2014) conducted 38 studies, some replicating studies eliciting the attraction 
                                                     
70 “Liberal Democrat general election disaster was caused by 'perfect storm'”, The Independent, February 2016  
71 “How will a Conservative majority government affect Britain's foreign policy?” The Telegraph, May 2015  
72 “Hung Parliaments- What you need to Know”- Institute for Government (2015) 
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effect, finding attraction effects when choice options were described numerically, but not when those same 
options and attributes were visually depicted. They conclude that the attraction effect is not as robust or useful 
as is widely believed and that it seems limited to highly abstract and numeric stimulus presentations- which 
differ from those in real-world contexts. Specifically, the authors note that in 29 studies where at least one 
attribute could be directly experienced, they found no instances of a significant attraction effect. In fact, in 
some instances they find ‘repulsion’ effects, where the introduction of an asymmetrically dominated decoy 
reduced choice share for the target; for example, diluted grape ‘Kool-Aid’ increased preference for cherry 
‘Kool-Aid’, rather than for the full-strength grape-flavour option.  
While we do not observe any instances in our results corresponding to a ‘repulsion effect’, it is an interesting 
idea. Could ‘watered-down’ versions of political parties (e.g. a ‘Tory-lite’ option) lead to increase in preference 
for non-dominating alternatives? There is a real world example in the UK; in the decade between 2005-2015 
the UK Labour Party were described as just that: “Tory-lite”73,74. Were this perception held by members of the 
public, then an ‘attraction effect’ would predict this would increase support for the Conservative Party (the 
‘Tories’), while a ‘repulsion effect’ would predict greater support for competing parties. We do not speculate 
as to whether these effects may have occurred in reality, only to note that the Conservative, Liberal Democrat, 
and UKIP vote share has increased (largely) at Labour’s expense (Ford & Goodwin, 2014)75 from 2001-2010. 
This may represent both an attraction effect and a repulsion effect for differing types voters (e.g. ‘working 
class’ voters in more rural areas vs. ‘middle-class’ voters in urban cities). Indeed, Evans and Mellon (2015) 
posit that Labour’s move to a more socially-liberal stance (on the EU and immigration) increased support for 
the Conservatives (at Labour’s expense) among the disaffected working-class in 2010, who switched to UKIP 
in 2015 when UKIP became seen as a more viable entity. We don’t presume to simplify the complexity of 
electoral politics down to attraction/repulsion effects, but we argue there is more research to conduct before 
claiming they do (not) exist in real-world political decision-making. 
Yang & Lynn (2014) add to our understanding of when the attraction effect may be observed, noting that 
the use of meaningful qualitative-verbal descriptions to differentiate choice options significantly reduced the 
                                                     
73 “Jeremy Corbyn: Labour cannot go on being 'Tory-lite'”, Independent, August 2016.  
74 “It’s not ‘Tory lite’ to recognise that Labour’s problem is economic credibility” The Guardian, Jun 2015.  
75 Some may point to the fairly consistent vote share of Labour in 2010 and 2015 (29% & 30%) in disagreement, however this 
ignores the decimation of the Liberal Democrats to Labour’s benefit in 2015, whose vote share increased in 2005 as a results of Labour’s 
support for the Iraq War. 
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effect size of any attraction effects; whereas, numeric representations of choice attributes elicited effect sizes 
for the attraction effect at expected levels (see Yang & Lynn, 2014). Essentially this suggests that the more 
meaningful and relevant we attempt to make each scenario (a core objective of this body of research here), 
versus non-meaningful and abstract, may limit our attempts at eliciting an attraction effect. This is clearly 
encouraging vis-a-vie real-world political decision-making, and points to the challenge of framing the act of 
voting, and the issues voters consider, in such a way as to be as meaningful and relevant in order to attenuate 
possible rational choice violations.  
This may explain why we observe an attraction effect in Experiments 6 and 7, where the options are 
abstracted from everyday reality (using ‘desirability’, or fictional attributes); thus, participants may have 
engaged in less meaningful (or ‘effortful’) decision-making. In the original work by Malkoc et al. (2013), the 
authors did use standard ‘product description scenarios’ typical of those explored by Yang & Lynn (2014), 
along with desirability ratings, so our explanation is not necessarily in conflict with Malkoc et al.’s (2013) 
positive findings for the attraction effect.  
There is no comparable discussion in the literature as to the robustness, given the previous considerations 
mentioned around the attraction effect, for the similarity effect, compromise, or phantom, effects.  
We find fairly consistent evidence for the similarity effect in Experiments 5-7. In a way this effect is the 
most analogous to what is predicted by political models of competing parties, in that, parties should (and do) 
adjust their policy positions in order to compete with and maximise vote share (Adams & Merrill, 2003; Green 
& Hobolt, 2008). In other words, a party should alter their perceived position one or more policy attributes (in 
particular those considered most important to voters) relative to competitor parties, as to capture and/or split 
the share of a competitor’s vote (nominally, in the party’s favour). Any party engaging in rational vote 
maximisation will seek to be perceived as slightly better on at least one attribute, and seek to minimise 
perceptual differences on others, relative to competitors (Ansolabehere & Synder, 2000). Therefore, the 
similarity effect should be the most obvious expected effect to be observed in political decision-making 
scenarios, which our results would seem to support. 
Whether or not the ‘meaningfulness’ or ‘abstractedness’ of the presented scenarios may moderate the 
similarity effect is outside of this thesis to give evidence for. However, one does not see how it would, as the 
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similarity effect is fundamentally different from the attraction effect, in that the ‘decoy’ option is not an 
irrelevant option. Unless voters’ have perfectly equal weighting of attributes (which seems unlikely in reality), 
loss of share to the decoy with no change in preference for the other option(s) in the choice set will still elicit 
the similarity effect; that is, the relative loss of choice share for the target. Whether a scenario where the 
introduction of a (correctly positioned) decoy causes a perfect share shift from the target to the decoy (i.e., 
50%:50% AB to 50%:0%:50% ABD) can be considered a ‘similarity’ effect is unclear, but based on current 
theory it should be considered valid. 
We observe direct support for the compromise effect only once, in Experiment 5, where results trended in 
the predicted direction and reached significance on some (but not all) of our analyses. In many respects, this 
is our most surprising result as the compromise effect is supposedly the most ubiquitous, and easy to elicit, 
context effect (Kivetz, Netzer & Srinivasan, 2004). Common sentiment would hold that a compromise is 
considered more acceptable than an extreme option- but this ignores the perceived importance of the attributes, 
and indeed the context in which the options are appraised. In Experiment 7, there was no evidence for a 
compromise effect and a consistent preference for those parties that were higher in desirability for ‘healthcare’ 
over ‘education’ in all conditions. Participants reported a preference for increasing healthcare spending at 
higher rates than education spending, though only marginally so. Therefore, it is not unsurprising that voters 
would seek an option that provides relative balance between healthcare than education, with a tendency overall 
to prefer the option conferring a slightly greater benefit for healthcare, and not be affected by the introduction 
of ‘extreme’ options that forces a compromise between it and two options that are more preferable.  
In UK politics the Liberal Democrats are often considered the ‘compromise’ option between the Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party; representing socially liberal policies, and centre/centre-right economic 
policies. Yet the vote share for the Liberal Democrats has not risen above 22.1% (its zenith; currently 7.9% in 
2015) in the last few decades. It may very well be a ‘compromise’ option for some voters, but either a) not on 
the issues that matter, or b) enough issues to be relevant. This may be doing the Liberal Democrats a mild 
disservice, as there are other factors that voters may be utilizing in determining vote choice- the most obvious 
of which is partisanship, but also that their relative media share and party size are smaller than the 
Conservatives and Labour; representing more structural barriers than simply party positioning.  
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Intriguingly, compromise options might simply not be popular in politics generally. Guttman and Thompson 
(2010) discuss in length how political compromise is resisted (at least in the USA), due to tenaciously clinging 
to principles or ‘core values’, rather than seeing such things as ‘interests’ that are compromisable. Additionally, 
research in the USA by Pew Research Centre (2014, p.56) has shown the increasing polarisation of the USA 
affects where liberals/conservatives believe the ideal point of compromise should lie between negotiations 
between President Obama and Republicans in Congress. About 34% of liberals see the ideal point as halfway 
between Obama and the Republicans, while 62% see it as closer to Obama’s position than the GOP’s position. 
The opposite is true for conservatives: 57% say the point lies closer to the Republicans, and 34% closer to 
Obama. Therefore, voters may not be motivated to see available options as a compromise, regardless of their 
objective position on policy issues, due to voters’ core values and the distorting effect of ideological 
polarisation.   
Finally, we only observe the phantom effect in Experiment 5, failing to find any evidence of it in subsequent 
studies. The phantom effect is one that has been observed in various studies (Choplin & Hummel, 2005; Dhar 
& Glazer, 1996; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000, 2007; Pratkanis & Farquhar, 1992) and even among honeybees 
(Tan et al., 204); however, the conditions for its effects are not yet widely understood, and theoretical accounts 
are still debated (Pettibone & Wedell, 2007; Tsetsos et al., 2010). We are not surprised we do not observe 
phantom effects. Political decision-making in real world elections is nearly always about making a decision 
based on the actual options available, with a ‘better’ option (either physical or imaginary) unavailable. This is 
true for candidates, parties, policy decisions, etc. In Chapter 2 (2.6, General Discussion) we noted one of 
correct voting’s assumptions is that people should vote for the highest preferred alternative in a choice set, 
even if a better preferred alternative is known but unavailable. The phantom effect directly tests this 
assumption, and that we do not observe it lends empirical strength to correct voting’s assumptions. 
There is a question as to what degree we can claim a context effect’s (non-) existence based on observed 
frequency across (or within) studies (Yang & Lynn, 2014). Berkowitsch, Scheibehenne, and Rieskamp (2014), 
and Nagouchi and Stewart (2014), both determine evidence for the attraction, similarity, and compromise 
effects, by computing some relative proportion of each alternative chosen for each choice type. Berkowitsch 
et al. (2014) compute the ‘relative share choice share of the target’ (RST) from hundreds of trials per effect; 
whereas Nagouchi & Stewart (2014) computed the proportion of times each alternative was chosen for each 
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choice type per participant, over 10 trials per context effect. We clearly do not carry out multiple trials per 
experiment, and comparisons across each are not easily done. Yet it raises an important point; we should not 
expect any context effect to be elicited 100% of the time, and our ‘one-shot’ designs should be seen in that 
context. Indeed, in our final study of the general public, only 9.5% have an asymmetric dominance structure 
that may elicit an ‘attraction effect’, but this would correspond to 2,196,240 voters in the UK. This points to a 
clear need to examine context effects in larger populations than currently used in the literature (Frederick et 
al., 2014; Huber et al., 2014). 
In addition, both Berkowitsch et al. (2014) and Nagouchi & Stewart (2014) vary the relative position of the 
decoy to the stimuli presented; in the case of, Berkowitsch et al. (2014) get participants to set a value for one 
option as to trade-off equally the other option, and the experimenters vary the decoy 10% of the distance 
between AB along (or orthogonal to) the ‘indifference line’. In general, we do not use this 10% rule to construct 
our stimuli in each experiment, but the question as to what distance/values stimuli should be set around a target 
as to elicit these context effects in political domains is an open one- and understandably one that would highly 
interest party political strategists looking to maximise candidate/party vote share. 
Thus we suggest future research should examine context effects in political domains considering if context 
effects could occur systemically over repeated presentations of similar decisions, and what may be the optimal 
distance to set stimuli as to elicit each of context effects in political scenarios. 
On a final note, it is worth bearing in mind the wider context of our research. Preference reversals, and 
violations of rational choice, are a particular expression of ‘correct voting’ concept, which assumes choosing 
the candidate (option) that best matches a voter’s preferences out of an available choice set. However, context 
effects raise a problem for current concepts of correct voting: if a voter prefers Party A overall and subsequently 
switches to Party B (of equivalent utility, but differing on attribute values) due to the presence of Party C, it is 
difficult to state which choice is ‘correct’, only that one option must be incorrect: is the initial choice ‘correct’, 
or the subsequent choice?  
While in Chapter 2 we explored how the size of the choice set can lead to incorrect voting, here we have 
shown how the choices for those options based on voter preferences can be reversed following those choice 
set increases, depending on the relative location of the additional parties on certain issues. Whether preference 
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reversals arising from context effects are the reason for decreasing rates of correct voting arising from choice 
set size increases is, as yet, unclear, but our results suggest it is possible. This explanation is a novel 
contribution to correct voting research, and warrants further investigation. 
We should be concerned that we find in four differing studies, one being a large study of the voting UK 
public that, preference violations can occur when people make political decisions for candidates or parties (but 
not always). While there is low risk and cost to the self, or society, in a person changing their mind from the 
salad to the burger, after being informed todays special is fish (a classic food menu metaphor for preference 
reversals), preferences reversals and violations of rationality in voting can lead to negative outcomes for the 
self (not least affective concerns like ‘regret’ and stress), and also negative effects on wider society. The 
possibility of people being elected whom do not represent the actual preferences of the electorate, simply due 
to a quirk of human psychology, could concern all fans of the democratic system. 
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: Conclusion 
“Our ability to predict how voters will vote is far more solidly based, than our ability to explain why they 
vote as they do” 
- Kelly & Mirer (1974). The Simple Act of Voting.76 
 Summary of Main Findings 
We begin our journey asking some simple questions: do voters vote ‘correctly’ in elections? More to the 
point, do they vote in line with their preferences on issues that matter to them? And what, if any, factors might 
help or hinder their ability to vote correctly? 
Prior research led us to identify two fruitful areas for investigation. Firstly, that increasing numbers of parties 
(‘alternatives’) in democratic elections (Lau et al., 2013) led to drastic decreases in the rate of correct voting. 
Secondly, research on ‘political heuristics’ (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, 2006), in particular, party affiliation (i.e. 
party brands/labels); and may bias voters’ choices by causing them to ignore useful information about other 
candidates, and thus vote incorrectly.  
In Chapter 2, we investigated whether increasing choice set size and the presence of party labels would lead 
to greater rates of incorrect voting. We utilized real-world materials from the 5 main UK political parties from 
their 2010 and 2015 manifestos, presenting information to participants via dynamic information boards across 
four in-lab experiments. 
We found when the increase in the available candidates in the choice set is minimal (2 alternatives to 3 
alternatives), voters seem unable to correctly identify the candidate that overall best matches their own reported 
preferences; voting correctly as low as 39% of the time, and not differing from what would be expected by 
simply choosing at chance. When we increase the choice set size to 5 alternatives, correct voting rates decrease 
as low as 26%. This is likely as a result of the increased task complexity arising from attempting to integrate 
additional alternatives and their accompanying information into voter’s decision-making (Timmermans, 1993). 
                                                     
76 Kelley, S., & Mirer, T. W. (1974). The Simple Act of Voting. The American Political Science Review, 68(2), 572–591  
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We find mixed evidence for the idea that partisan labels act to negatively impact correct voting; with party 
label possibly improving correct voting as the choice set size increases, contrary to our hypotheses that it 
decrease correct voting. We find the effect mildly elusive, however, in all our results participants vote correctly 
at the lowest rates when the choice set size increases and there is an absence of partisan labels, which improves 
when party label is present.  
Our results also point towards the role of ideological (or inter-alternative) distinctiveness in playing a role 
in voters’ ability to correctly vote, such that greater distinctiveness (or decreasing similarity) of alternatives 
leads to greater rates of correct voting. This supports Scheibehenne et al. (2010), who posited that greater 
alternative similarity in choice sets would lead to adverse outcomes by increasing task complexity; and 
assumptions of the spatial model in politics, which posits that if two or more parties are equidistant (similar), 
this produces voter indifference and increases the likelihood of negative outcome (Downs, 1957).  
We also find that there are no key differences in our results whether we use the directional (Rabinowitz & 
MacDonald, 1989) or proximal spatial model (Downs, 1957), in determining if voters’ chose correctly; at least, 
based on the candidates in our studies. While Lau et al. (2013) note that the use of either rarely manifest in 
differing results, we show this empirically. We also lay out theoretical and methodological reasons why their 
correct voting method may lead to flawed results in the next section (Chapter 5.2.1). 
In Chapter 3, we explored these results further in order to gain a better understanding of the potential effects 
of party label and choice set size on voters’ cognitive processes, and relationship with correct voting rates. In 
particular, exploring the concept of party label as a heuristic, acting to reduce voter effort by limiting 
information search requirements and examine fewer alternatives. We examined the amount of information 
search, the average duration spent on time searched, and developed a number of novel metrics to explore 
equality of sampling between (sub-) sets of alternatives. 
Using our measures of equality of search and average duration between alternatives in choice sets, we find 
evidence that party label is encouraging participants into utilizing confirming heuristic strategies (Russo & 
Dosher, 1983), such that over time participants make pairwise comparisons between their chosen and another 
alternative. We see this process evolve over the course of participant’s information search in our experimental 
flow stages, and seems to correspond with the choice by most attractive aspect heuristic (Svenson, 1979). We 
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also find evidence that increasing choice set size encourages more unequal consideration in favour of the 
chosen candidate overall, but more equal consideration between the two most-preferred alternatives, 
presumably through eliciting heuristic strategies to reduce task complexity. We find that choice set size is 
negatively predictive of correct voting, even after accounting for levels of information search, and duration 
spent evaluating the information, and offer evidence that incorrect voting results from the incorrect selection 
of alternatives to consider between as choice set size increases. However, party label seems to exert a positive 
effect such that it improves the likelihood of participants correctly selecting sets pf alternatives that may result 
in a ‘correct vote’. 
In Chapter 4, we investigated correct voting in a differing matter, drawing upon extensive literature in 
consumer psychology around ‘context effects’; the phenomenon where the addition of alternatives into a 
choice set can cause violations of rational preference, and even the reversal of preference, depending on their 
relative position to other choice options on two or more attributes (i.e. issues). We hypothesised that we would 
observe the attraction, similarity, compromise, and phantom effects (Tsetsos et al., 2010) in political scenarios, 
using political issues as attributes, and asking participants to indicate a vote choice out of two or three 
alternatives placed along those attributes. We tested all four of these effects across three online studies, using 
both: within and between-subjects designs, fictional and hypothetical scenarios, and both real and abstracted 
attributes scales (e.g. ‘£’s or ‘desirability’ ratings). We found consistent evidence for the similarity and 
attraction effect, none for the compromise effect, and the phantom effect in only our ‘realistic’ scenario. 
Further, we followed work conducted by Pan et al. (1995) on the attraction effect in preferences for real 
world political candidates. Using a joint online and field study during the UK 2015 General Election, we 
investigated whether asymmetric preferences for the main political parties in the UK (i.e. a party is perceived 
as better than others on one attribute, but not both) existed naturally among voters’ preferences in the UK; and 
whether these asymmetries corresponded to what would be expected for an ‘attraction effect’. We found 63% 
of voters sampled in the UK had a dominating option (i.e. felt a party was best on both ‘healthcare’ and ‘the 
economy’), with a minority having asymmetric preference structures (12%); in comparison to Pan et al. (1995) 
who found 67% of their sample did not have a dominating option for a real-world candidate. While we found 
tentative support that these asymmetric structures do predict voters’ choice for political party, our results are 
constrained by the small sample size we were left with. 
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In beginning this body of work, we started with a seemingly simple question: what, if any, is the effect of 
increasing numbers of political options (parties/candidates) on the ability for voters’ to decide in line with their 
own political preferences? The assumption underlying the democratic process is a simple, and rational, one: 
that voters choose a party or candidate based on their preferences across a range of attributes. Adopting the 
correct voting framework from Lau and Redlawsk (2006) using an n-dimensional proximity model of correct 
voting, we show that voters’ inability to choose the alternative that best matches their own preferences on 
multiple attributes increases as the number of alternatives increases. Using an information processing 
approach, we examined the possible underlying mechanisms for this, finding voters appear to engage in greater 
confirmatory heuristic processing strategies that utilize pairwise comparisons (e.g. Elimination-By-Aspects) 
as the choice set size increases. We suggest that the decrease in correct voting rates may be a result of selecting 
inappropriate alternatives to compare between, decreasingly the likelihood of making a correct vote.  
However, in Chapter 4 we investigated an alternative explanation, whereby the addition of alternatives into 
a choice set may lead to violations of rational preference for a preferred option. For example, switching voters’ 
preference for Party A to an originally lesser preferred Party B, by introducing an irrelevant decoy Party C 
(e.g. the attraction effect), We found in certain cases that this indeed occurs, with the similarity effect being 
the most consistently observed across both realistic and fictional political scenarios. To the extent of our 
knowledge, we are the first to investigate context effects other than the attraction effect in political decision-
making, and the first to evidence for their presence, and possible factors that may attenuate their effects. 
Our finding of preference reversals represent a particular problem for current concepts of correct voting. 
Correct voting assumes that voters should choose the option that provides the highest utility based their 
preferences on certain attributes, or, ‘highest on preferred value dimensions (Chapter 1.5.2.). The proximal 
model of correct voting assumes that in an infinite n-dimensional attribute (policy) space with infinite 
alternatives, there is an option that perfectly aligns with a voter’s own position in this space, and voter’s attempt 
to choose an option that approximates this ideal point (i.e. highest preferred on their value dimensions). While 
correct voting does not assume that preferences are immutable, it implicitly assumes that when considering a 
subset of these alternatives, the adding or removing of irrelevant alternatives should not affect a voter’s 
preferences in this n-dimensional attribute space; as, similar to option-based accounts of choice (e.g. expected 
utility theory), alternative values are assigned independently of each other.  
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Preference reversals may explain the decrease in correct voting rates as alternatives are introduced, causing 
temporary shifts in the perceived relative values of the options available, leading to a choice for an ‘incorrect’ 
alternative. However, this terminology becomes problematic: if the relative value of Party B is perceived as 
greater following the addition of Party C resulting in a change of preference, then this surely is a ‘correct 
choice’? Is the original choice for party A the ‘correct’ choice, or the subsequent choice for Party B? Resolving 
these questions are outside the scope of this body of work, but given the evidence for contextual reversal of 
preferences for political options, resolving these seem pertinent for the correct voting paradigm.  
 Future Directions 
There are a number of possible future directions for each of the theoretical areas explored across all our 
studies. We explore them in turn below. 
 Correct Voting 
We do not explore a variety of factors in our analyses that could possibly provide additional insights into 
correct voting, chief among them is the concept of ‘political sophistication’ (Luskin, 1990); a person’s political 
awareness and political knowledge (Lupia, 2002). One of the main reasons for avoiding investigating the role 
of political sophistication has been the presence of a decades-long debate between political psychologists and 
political scientists over what exactly is political sophistication, what psychological constructs underpin it, and 
best how to measure it (Luskin, 1990). The debate is beyond summation here and the reader is directed to a 
review of the area by Lawrence (2003). Despite this, political sophistication as a concept has been widely 
utilized in political science (McGraw et al., 1990; Miller, 2011; Weisberg & Nawara, 2010; Zaller, 1996).  
Lau and Redlawsk (2006) investigated the relationship between political sophistication and correct voting, 
finding it positively predictive of correct voting; but found no evidence that differing decision-strategies of 
voters between political ‘sophisticates’ or ‘novices’ improved correct voting (p. 216). Additionally, Lau and 
Redlawsk (2006) found no significant difference in the use of their ‘party heuristic’ based on political 
sophistication, but did find after controlling for a multitude of other variables, that party heuristic use by 
sophisticates in general election campaigns increased the probability of correct voting and decreased for 
novices (p. 251), albeit weakly. Whether political sophistication levels relate to correct voting rates, and if the 
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effect of our party label heuristic differs by level of political sophistication, are both avenues for future 
research. 
A particular question for the correct voting paradigm as put forward by Lau and Redlawsk (1997) and 
utilized by Lau et al. (2013), regards the operationalization of directional measure used to calculate candidate 
utility, and subsequently correct voting. Under their operationalization of Rabinowitz & MacDonald’s (1989) 
directional model, if either a voter OR a candidate occupies the neutral point (i.e. the midpoint) on an issue 
dimension, then the resulting term will be ‘0’, and the entire utility score for that issue will result in ‘0’ for all 
candidates; or for any candidate that occupies the neutral point and the voter does not. This seems completely 
at odds with the concept of the directional model (Rabinowitz & MacDonald, 1989). The ‘neutral’ point is 
often interpreted as ‘keeping the status quo’, or the midpoint between two extremes (i.e. the ‘centre ground’). 
Given the dominant belief that parties (and voters) converge towards the ‘centre ground’ between political 
extremes, and ‘centrist parties’ certainly exist (e.g. the Liberal Democrats in the UK), assigning a utility score 
of ‘0’ in the scenarios mentioned seems incorrect.  
A solution would be to provide an exception in the directional model, that changes the product term to a 
subtraction term whenever either voter or candidate occupies the neutral point. This would seem to reflect the 
idea that movement in either direction from the neutral point is unfavourable to a candidate, though we 
acknowledge that voters may have a directional preference for policy issues. The resulting model would better 
reflect the utility arising from ‘(dis)agreement’ between a voter and a candidate on an issue, which is more in 
line with Rabinowitz & MacDonald (1989).   
Perhaps the most fundamental issue with the current concept of correct voting is its classification of a 
correct vote as a binary outcome, rather than as a continuous discrete measure. Simply, how correct is a correct 
vote? Correct voting’s underlying premise is the accuracy of voters in aligning their preference with their 
choice, but surely if the difference between choices is negligible and one chooses the slightly inferior option, 
this is more correct than if one chooses an option where the difference is greater? Putting it more concretely, 
is a voter 99% correct, or just ‘incorrect’ in their vote choice? The latter purely rationalist assumption seems 
overly harsh, in comparison with concepts of ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘everyday rationality’ (Anderson, 1990, 
1991), which consider what is the optimal choice given the goals of the cognitive system, the environmental 
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structure, and cognitive limitations. Under the current framework of correct voting, it does not matter ‘how 
close’ a voter got to their ‘correct’ or ‘optimal’ vote, or what their constraints or goals were; for instance, 
whether they were voting strategically for some reason.  
On the issue of discrete scales of correct voting, under the proximity model we know the option co-ordinates 
in n-dimensional space; returning a percentage ‘correctness’ is simply a matter of dividing a voter’s actual 
choice’s distance from the origin (0, 0) from that closest to the origin (the ‘best possible’ option). Strategic 
voting is a far more difficult issue to resolve, but one could start by investigating the roles of ‘electability’ (Lau 
et al., 2013) and perceived ‘competence’ of political options (Jellison & Harvey, 1973; Merril & Groffman, 
1999). Electability, or ‘viability’, is often signaled through polling results, but basing measures of perceived 
electability on polls is not without problems. People may vote for poll leaders to ‘be on the winning team’ 
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), or just to resolve cognitive dissonance by switching to the side they infer is going 
to win based on the poll (Kay et al. 2002). Polls may act as self-fulfilling prophecies, (Rothschild & Malhorta, 
2014) such that people are more supportive of parties/policies that are seen to have higher general public 
support. In relation to perceived competence, Clarke et al. (2004) put forward this as the reason why despite 
the average voter lying closer to Labour and the Liberal Democrats/Alliance than to the Conservatives on a 
whole range of policy issues since 1987, the Conservatives won in both 1987 and 1992; and again in 2010 
(Clarke et al., 2011) and 2015. 
We see no reason why all of these considerations cannot be addressed in future research. 
Finally, while we have investigated correct voting in an experimental setting, there are two fruitful avenues 
for research in the real-world. Lau et al. (2013) show that correct voting rates in the UK have dropped slightly 
from 79.3% (1997) to 78% (2005), but provide no data on correct voting rates in the more recently elections 
in 2010 and 2016. One could utilize data from the British Election Survey for each of these elections, using 
similar methodology to examine how correct voting has changed over time, and what potential factors may be 
involved. More important is the question: what to do with incorrect voting? A look at Table 1 in Lau et al. 
(2013, p.15) shows that in 2001 Poland had a correct voting rate of 44%. How then does one improve correct 
voting? Results in the same paper show that structural aspects of the democratic systems like information 
availability, and ideological distinctiveness (the clarity of choices) are both positively predictive of increased 
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correct voting; albeit weakly for the latter. However, at the cognitive level, perceived political efficacy was the 
strongest predictor of correct voting rates across thirty-three democracies (person’s belief they have the ability 
to influence their political outcomes, thus increasing motivation to vote correctly). Beliefs and motivations are 
the bread and butter of psychologists, and understanding how to better increase political efficacy amongst 
voters seems like a noble cause, and useful research. One avenue may lie in methods to increase voters’ 
perceived responsibility (accountability) for outcomes, shown to lead to increasing effort on vote tasks 
(Weldon & Gargano, 1985) and judgment accuracy (Mero and Motowidlo, 1995; for a review see Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999). 
 Context Effects 
Context effects represent a differing problem for correct voting assumptions. While correct voting assumes 
that voters should match their preferences with some target option available, context effects lead to violations 
of those preferences even if the target is ‘correctly’ identified.   
It is unclear to what extent context effects themselves exist in natural settings outside of tightly controlled 
experimental setups, with recent findings that find that the attraction effect (at least) is significant in choice 
sets where abstract and numerical attributes describe the options, but not when options are described by more 
realistic, qualitative-verbal descriptions and pictorial information (Frederick et al., 2014; Yang & Lynn, 2014). 
While political campaigning pledges often involve numbers (e.g. ‘£8billion for the NHS’), arguably most 
voters do not place all parties’ policy pledges in some convenient numeral array for comparison (the standard 
in context effects research). While these findings may hold true for the attraction effect, and indeed our inability 
to find the attraction effect in our two most ‘realistic’ experimental scenarios would support it, there is no 
similar investigation around the similarity, compromise, and phantom effects. In fact, for the similarity effect, 
we find it the most robust across the three experiments in which we investigated it, and is most analogous to 
the ‘vote splitting’ concept of competitive electoral politics (where similar candidates/parties position to ‘split 
the vote’, often benefitting a third competitor).  
This negative view of the attraction effect’s robustness is not shared by all (Lichters, Sarstedt, & Voght, 
2015; Simpson, 2014). In a critique of Frederick et al. (2014) and Yang and Lynn’s (2014), Simonson (2014) 
stating their negative findings is a result of participants being unable to identify the dominated option, and 
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ignoring ‘repulsion effects’, which may account for the absence of an attraction effect. Lichters et al. (2015) 
provide a stunningly comprehensive review of the extant literature to identify the “seven ingredients for an 
‘ideal’ context effect experiment” (p. 14). While we do not repeat them here, we note three of relevance: using 
real items or realistic attributes/attribute; corresponding the choice alternatives’ relevance between subjects 
sampled in experiments and individuals in real-world applications; avoiding artificial learning processes 
triggered by a high number of repeated choices. Our experiments follow this ‘ideal’ experimental standard, 
however we do not control for subjects’ perception of choice alternatives (another ingredient) - a theme that 
emerges consistently. Sinn et al. (2007) highlight this by investigating ‘familiarity’ with brands, finding that 
the compromise effect only occurs when brand familiarity for choice set options is high. Considering we do 
not use any real-world party ‘brands’ in our experiments on context effects, with the exception of Experiment 
8 where we test only for the attraction effect, this seems a worthwhile avenue of investigation for future 
research.  
We do address recommendations by Lichters et al. (2015) who suggest research address the differences 
between between-subjects designs and within-subjects designs. We use a within-subjects design in Experiment 
5, and between-subjects in the others, finding in almost no case do context-effects occur within-subjects. 
Arguably, we do not design our experiments to test this directly (as we use differing scenarios but the same 
options) as to minimize carry-over effects, therefore we should control all aspects in order to directly test if 
the same choices will occur in the same decision scenario.  
A key need of future research is how context effects differ as the number of products in a choice set increases, 
as political choices in democracies are not, barring the USA, often constrained to two or three choices. While 
we have not found the compromise effect in any of our experiments here, Kivet, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004) 
have demonstrated that compromise effects do occur in choice states that comprise of five alternatives that 
differ on 4 attribute dimensions. This high dimensionality, multi-alternative, approach is a highly promising 
area for future research, allowing us to begin testing context effects in scenarios more reflective of reality’s 
complexity. 
An interesting question is what happens if a candidate, or party, drops out of an election, rather than entering? 
Hedgcock, Rao, and Chen (2009) found a ‘phantom attraction’ effect whereby the choice share for a 
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dominating target stayed significantly greater after the inferior decoy was removed from the choice set, 
suggesting this may mimic the ‘dropping out’ of candidates in three-way elections (specifically Nader’s exit 
from the 2000 US Presidential election). It is interesting then that the Merriam-Webster definition of a ‘stalking 
horse’ is: “a candidate put forward to divide the opposition or to conceal someone's real candidacy”77. This 
suggests that ‘stalking horses’ in politics can also be used tactically to increase choice share for a preferred 
candidate, simply by getting a slightly less superior candidate to announce their entry to (and later exit from) 
an election. From a review of the extant literature, there does not seem to be any additional research into how 
removing contextual decoys may affect preferences for targeted options; and no research on whether these 
effects actually occur in political scenarios. While Hedgcock et al. (2009) related their findings to politics, they 
used the price/quality of beer as their two attributes, rather than, for example, healthcare and education. 
We have also not investigated other curious violations of preferences as a result of context. For example, 
‘single option aversion’ (Mochon, 2013), where decision-makers were less likely to make a choice (e.g. a 
purchase decision, a donation to Red Cross) more when faced with just a single option, but more likely to 
choose that option when competitors are present in the choice set. This is similar to Glazer, Khan, and Moore 
(1991) finding for the ‘lone-alternative-effect’, whereby an option is more preferable when offered in a choice 
set of two than alone, with the effect strengthening as option similarity in the choice set increases. This may 
be due to task difficulty eliciting the use of heuristics (Glazer et al., 1991), or simply that justifying a preferred 
choice is easier when it is not the only option (as multiple explanations can be generated). To briefly take an 
example from current UK politics, it would suggest that the (current) leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy 
Corbyn, would actually benefit far more from having a competitor (i.e. Owen Smith) in the Labour Leadership 
race than running unopposed. Indeed, poll results suggesting Corbyn has seen an increase in support following 
the entry/exit of Angela Eagle, and the continuing context with Owen Smith, lends conjecture of such context 
effects credence78,79. 
 
                                                     
77 Or: someone or something that is used to hide a true purpose; especially: a candidate for a political office or position who has no 
real chance of winning but is being used by a political party to weaken the support for an opposing party. Retrieved from Merrian-
Webster.com. 
78 “Jeremy Corbyn increases dominant lead over Angela Eagle and Owen Smith among Labour Party members, poll finds”, The 
Independent, July 2016. 
79 “Jeremy Corbyn has more than double the support of Owen Smith, poll shows”, The Guardian, July 2016. 
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 Heuristics 
We found that increasing choice set size does result in information processing patterns that conform to those 
expected by decision-makers utilizing heuristic strategies. However, we are still unclear as to what types of 
heuristic strategies are used, and what models best explain how decision-makers decide between options as 
choice set size increased. We only investigated one possible heuristic here, namely the effect of partisan 
identity by way of global party brand-labels. There are others identified by Lau and Redlawsk (2001, 2006), 
such as ‘endorsements’, ‘candidate ideology’, ‘candidate appearance’, and ‘polls’, however their findings for 
each were mixed, and no follow up research on their use, the conditions in which they may be most utilized, 
or the mechanisms underlying them, seems to have occurred. Particularly, it is unclear how candidate ideology 
interacts with party label, and how much of a concern outside of the USA (where discussions of 
liberal/conservative ideology are ubiquitous) candidate ideology is. Or indeed, if there are other (political) 
heuristics that might be utilized in more complex electoral systems like those in the EU (e.g. recognition 
heuristic, Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). It seems clear that there is scope for further work in the area.  
There are questions about the appropriateness of testing party label as a heuristic through information boards, 
which we raised at the end of Chapter 3, namely that the ability to re-access information reduces the reliance 
on possible heuristics that may be utilized to decrease working memory load (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
Therefore, it may be better to test party label’s effects in low information environments, as the reliance on it 
should be greater. One could do this simply by preventing re-access of information after access in the flow 
stage. As a counterpoint, such a scenario is hardly reflective of reality- hence why we originally chose to allow 
repeat access. Is the real world a low information environment? Perhaps to some, and perhaps not to others, 
dependent on the media saturation in their personal context, and the motivation they have to appraise the 
information or seek it out. The advent of the internet, and the pervasiveness of access through modern 
technology has essentially removed many of the structural barriers to information access that may have existed 
and has made information almost permanently re-accessible. If one needs to look up a party position, Google 
will provide in seconds. Researching these questions of heuristic use in political scenarios that may reflect low, 
moderate, and high information environments would answer many of these questions, and shed light on when 
and how voters’ may engage in heuristic processing.  
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One aspect under considered is ‘stopping rules’, the idea that heuristics have rules whereby they stop seeking 
information once the considered alternatives reach a certain criterion. In our experiments using the dynamic 
processing tracing method, we do not allow participants to terminate the flow stage early in order to vote 
(contrary to Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). In addition, we lengthen the time participants spend in the flow stage 
commensurate with how much information we included with each additional candidate. However, election 
campaigns (by and large) don’t lengthen in the real world the more candidates/parties enter the race, nor do 
they suddenly terminate when a voter feels ready to vote. Future research should limit the amount of time 
participants have as to be constant across conditions, while increasing the amount of information/alternatives, 
to examine how processing changes as a result. Also, allowing participants to terminate their information 
search when they are ready may allow us to identify points where they have reached a threshold under some 
heuristic strategy, and whether allowing participants to terminate early could result in greater or lesser rates of 
correct voting. 
Finally, there is great value in further pursuing the 4 ‘models’ of voters developed by Lau & Redlawsk 
(2006). While we have not sought to classify our voters under these models, we have investigated whether 
voters by-and-large confirm to ‘Model 4’ types that would expect to utilize heuristics and other shortcuts (i.e. 
stereotypes, schemes, etc.), as Lau and Redlawsk (2006) find the majority of voters in their samples conform 
to this voter type across differing electoral scenarios. However, they do find large numbers of voters also 
conform to Model 1 (classic ‘rational decision-makers who seek out all information), Model 2 (confirming 
prior beliefs through partisan voting), and yet more (6-15%) are ‘unclassified’ under any of these models. 
Their other model, ‘Model 3’ (‘fast & frugal’ by seeking out few but highly valid informational cues), had the 
lowest prevalence among their sample. In the latter case, it is likely the low prevalence is due to the fact such 
(heuristic) strategies are common with those exhibited by Model 4 voters. 
Whether or not these models accurately capture voter decision-making is unclear, and whether some can be 
either merged, or sub-divided, or new ones created, based on observations about how voters’ process 
information remains an open research question. Further, we have no insight as to how these models may apply 
to voters in democracies outside of the USA, or how they might be influenced by the context voters exist in; 
or the prevalence of such voters across democracies. Such questions require deeper thought, and considerations 
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of how to test such comparative analyses across democracies, it seems a pursuit that lies at the heart of 
understanding voter decision-making, and human decision-making more generally. 
 Conclusion 
“We are the model citizens; We are the absentees; We are the politicians; I am exactly like you, you're 
just like me.” 
- The Living End (The Ending Is Just the Beginning Repeating) 
It is a tired phase: the end is just the beginning. Indeed, for Ph.D. work and most theses, the above album 
name by a certain Australian rock band is a better reflection of the reality. As such, let us repeat the beginning: 
What is it to ‘vote’? 
To vote is to express through almost unfathomable processes, influenced by innumerable factors, the 
preferences that have been constructed in one’s mind for abstract concepts like ‘social justice’, and to mark on 
a (literally) paper thin sheet, who would be best placed to run the complex machinery of democratic 
government. It is, at every level, one of the complex pieces of human psychology imaginable; possibly 
secondary to understanding why anyone would want to vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 USA Presidential 
Elections. Yet, there is beauty in its simplicity. 
Psychology has informed us for over 50 years that as humans, we make poor decisions, even when we 
simply increase the number of options available to us; be they pots of jam, or here, political candidates and 
parties. Be it in the bar after a country leaves the EU, or in an academic journal, the question asked is: do voters 
vote correctly? This thesis attempts to grapple with such a seemingly benign question.  
Our findings should provide a degree of worry as an answer: as voters seem to do no better than if they 
were choosing by chance when there are three or more parties. Thankfully, voters do not seem to change their 
vote choice if we tell them of some ‘ideal’ party out of reach, or take a compromise choice following the 
introduction of extremist options. Yet we do find voters can be influenced through canny positioning by other 
parties in order to ‘compete’ and split vote share, and possibly voters’ choices can be influenced by considering 
additional inferior political options. All of these makes one think: yes, voters do vote incorrectly.  
244 
 
Yet democracy assumes we are all ‘model citizens’; rational, informed, and whatever our vote, they reflect 
the needs, moods, sentiment, and preferences of the voter. Should they not, therefore, reflect the limitations, 
the frailties, the inaccuracies?  
It begs the question: why is the gold standard for elections ‘free and fair’, but not 'accurate’? Why is it that 
we measure the health of a democracy by how many electors turn out to vote on a given day, and not how well 
supported they are in making an accurate vote’? It seems policy-makers should be asking these questions. 
What steps can we take to measure and improve the systems and structures that voters in society exist in, to 
aid them in voting, and provide a voter the greatest personal utility (and/or the highest utility for society) based 
on their true preferences? Should a government elected with high turnout, but with low voter ‘correctness’, be 
preferable to one where few vote but with high accuracy? What of democracies where voting is compulsory 
(i.e. Australia), but the accuracy of those votes are ignored?  
The last major revision of the fundamentals of democracy in the UK (ignoring the suffrage movement) was 
the introduction of the secret ballot via the Ballot Act of 187280. Perhaps it is time for a fundamental re-think 
of how we view our democratic health: we do not sit idly by when a patient is in questionable health, or a 
friend is making a poor decision; so why do so for our democracy? 
 
 
  
                                                     
80 Co-incidentally linked with the decline in the 20th century of voter turnout (Davenport et al., 2010; Green & Gerber, 2010) 
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Appendix A 
A.1. Directional Measures of Correct Voting 
We have outlined our rationale for calculating a directional model measure of correct voting in Chapter 
2.1.3. In our directional measure, we include only the issue stands and, where relevant, the decision weights 
explicitly reported by participants. Where participants report ‘Don’t Know’ on an issue stand, or assign a policy 
issue an importance rating of ‘0’, that dimension is discounted from calculating the utility of that candidate to 
the participant. In contrast to Lau and Redlawsk (2006), we do not make a distinction as to what participants 
actually accessed in our studies, as we are interested in who participants should have voted for if they and full 
information. We sum up over all policy issues to create an additive utility score for each candidate; unlike Lau 
and Redlawsk (2001; 2006; Lau, Anderson, & Redlawsk, 2008), we do not average utility scores by dividing 
by the number of items accessed, nor do we exclude issues stands where voters did not access informational 
items relating to that issue for any candidate (e.g. if ‘Healthcare’ was not accessed for any candidate).  
Under normative standards, we assume they should access all items (at least as many as possible), as they 
are given adequate time and opportunity to do so. Lau and Redlawsk’s (2001; 2006) claim that their measure 
of correct voting is a normative ‘objective’ measure seems overly flexible, when they only calculate based on 
what was actually accessed, versus all possible information a voter could have accessed. For simple illustration: 
if a voter accessed a single attribute only, then under Lau and Redlawsk (2006) only that attribute matters in 
calculating if a vote will be ‘correct’, which seems counter to the theoretical underpinnings of correct voting. 
Therefore, both our Proximal and Directional measures are likely more ‘strict’ in determining a voter’s ‘correct 
vote’, but closer to the conception of correct voting laid out in Lau and Redlawsk’s (1997) original work. 
Finally, it is important to vote that Lau et al. (2008) include many issue stands where 7-point scales do not 
exist in the ANES (e.g. for ‘Abortion’), and policy questions that are asked in different formats (see Footnote 
18, Lau et al., 2008). Lau et al. (2008) state they recode these items as to have a 7-point range, yet it is unclear 
how exactly they do so. As recoding scales can add subjectivity to the coding (e.g. creating assumptions about 
policy space where none might exist), we do not recode the issue scales we use in our studies to range between 
1-7, and simply calculate a directional score for that issue by calculating an exact midpoint on that scale (eg., 
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‘3.5’ for a 6-point scale; 1+6/2 = 3.5); or using an obvious neutral point that may not be the mathematical 
midpoint (though this situation does not arise). 
A.2. Proximal vs. Directional Models (Results, Chapter 2) 
We followed a similar procedure as per Lau & Redlawsk (2008) who conducted simple correlations between 
the results of the directional and proximal measures. We expand this by firstly looking at: a) what is the degree 
of correlation between the classification of participants’ ‘best choice’ between the directional and proximal 
measures; b) what is the degree of correlation between CV as per the proximal method (CVPX) and CV as per 
the directional method (CVDR); c) what changes in classification arise from using either method; and finally d) 
do the main experiments’ pattern of results differ depending on which method we use. Where appropriate we 
also examine the degree of correlation, and if any differences arise, from using the weighted vs. unweighted 
versions of both the proximal and directional methods. 
As per all our analyses, we exclude all participants whose ‘Vote Choice’ was either ‘Abstain’ or ‘Don’t 
Know’. Our hypotheses are: 
H1a: That there will significant agreement between the proximal and directional model accounts of which 
candidate in the choice set is a participant’s ‘best option’. 
H1b: That there will be significant agreement between the weighted and unweighted versions of the proximal 
and directional accounts of participants’ ‘best options’ 
H2: That there will be significant agreement between the proximal Correct Voting (CVPX) measure and the 
directional Correct Voting (CVDR) measure. 
2.1. Experiment 1 
Directional vs. Proximal: A chi- square analysis for the degree of agreement between the Proximal (PX) 
and Directional (DR) classifications was significant, 2(4, 120)= 25.15, p< .001, c= .3381, indicating the two 
are strongly correlated. The pattern of results is in Table 1 below.  
Table 12: Experiment 1; 'Best candidate' classification by both Proximal  & Directional measures. N= 120. 
                                                     
81 Which is a large effect size as per Cohen (1992). 
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Proximal  (PX) 
Directional (DR) 
 CON LAB LIB 
CON 8 5 2 
LAB 2 18 4 
LIB 6 52 23 
Between 53-75% of cases remain the same when comparing the classifications of PX to DR, with the notable 
exception of those whose ‘best candidate’ was the Liberal Democrat option. 64.2% of these cases under the 
PX measure are reclassified as ‘Labour’ when using the DR measure.  
CVPX vs. CVDR: A chi- square analysis between the CVPX and CVDR measures was significant, 2(1, 120)= 
5.98, p= .014, c= .22, indicating the two are strongly correlated. The pattern of results is in Table 2 below. 
Table 13: Experiment 1m, Correct Vote classification by Proximal and Directional measures. N= 120. 
Proximal (PX) 
Directional (DR) 
 Incorrect Correct 
Incorrect 23 35 
Correct 12 50 
Of the 58 participants classed as voting ‘incorrectly’ by CVPX, 23 (39.7%) remain incorrect in the CVDR 
variable, while 35 (60.3%) are re-classed as voting ‘correctly’. Of the 63 participants classed as voting 
‘correctly’ by CVPX, 50 (80.6%) remain correct as per CVDR, while 12 (19.4%) are re-classed as voting 
‘incorrectly’. There is an overall net shift of 23 into the ‘correct vote’ category using the DR measure. 
Effect on Main Analyses: We performed a binary logistic regression, using CVDR as the dependent variable. 
The regression model containing PL & No. of Candidates was significant, p= .002, R2= 13.8%, and predicted 
70.8% of the overall cases correctly. PL did not significantly predict CVDR, = -.19, p= .65; whereas NOC 
significantly predicted CVDR, = -1.46, p= .001, with participants being 23.2% less likely to vote correctly 
when the number of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. The addition of the PL & NOC 
interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .19), and was non-significant, p= .19. 
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Chance Level Analysis: Using CVDR, when there are 2-candidates, correct voting rates differ significantly 
from what would be expected by chance (50%), p< .001. Levels of CVDR do not differ significantly from those 
expected by chance (33%) when there are 3 candidates in the choice set, p= .67.  
Summary: While qualitatively the CV variables do differ from each other, depending on the method used 
to calculate them (Directional or Proximal), the measures of association between the two are significant. 
Further, the pattern of results arising from the logistic regressions, using either CV measures, are the same. 
While there is a minor change in the significance in the chance analysis results when looking at whether CV 
rates differ from chance when there are 2-candidates, both results are in the same (and predicted) direction. 
Therefore we consider them to be functionally equivalent. 
2.2. Experiment 2: 
Directional vs. Proximal: A chi- square analysis between the Proximal (PX) and Directional (DR) measures 
was significant, 2(4, 93)= 44.24, p< .001, c= .4982, indicating the two are strongly correlated. The pattern of 
results is in Table 3. 
 Table 3: Experiment 2, 'Best candidate' classification by both Proximal  & Directional measures. N= 93. 
Proximal  (PX) 
Directional (DR) 
 CON LAB LIB 
CON 8 2 1 
LAB 7 52 5 
LIB 2 7 9 
Between 50-81% of cases remain the same when comparing the classifications of PX to DR, with the notable 
exception of those classed as closest to the ‘Liberal Democrat’ candidate. 38.9% of these cases under the PX 
measure are reclassified as ‘Labour’ when using the DR measure.  
CVPX vs. CVDR: A chi- square analysis between the CVPX and CVDR measures was significant, 2(1, 120)= 
45.85, p< .001, c= .70, indicating the two are strongly correlated. The pattern of results is in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Experiment 2; Correct Vote classification by Proximal and Directional measures. N= 120. 
                                                     
82 Which is a large effect size as per Cohen (1992). 
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Correct Vote (PX) 
Correct Vote (DR) 
 Incorrect Correct 
Incorrect 34 4 
Correct 10 45 
Of the 58 participants classed as voting ‘incorrectly’ by CVPX, 34 (89.5%) remain incorrect in the CVDR 
variable, while 4 (10.5%) are re-classed as voting ‘correctly’. Of the 45 participants classed as voting 
‘correctly’ by CVPX, 10 (81.8%) remain correct as per CVDR, while 10 (18.2%) are re-classed as voting 
‘incorrectly’. There is an overall net shift of 6 participants into the ‘correct vote’ category when using the DR 
measure. 
Effect on Main Analyses: We performed a binary logistic regression, using CVDR as the dependent variable. 
The regression model containing PL & No. of Candidates was not significant, p= .084, R2= 6.9%, and predicted 
60.2% of the overall cases correctly. PL did not significantly predict CVDR, = .40, p= .34; whereas NOC 
significantly predicted CVDR, = -.903, p= .037, with participants being 40.5% less likely to vote correctly 
when the number of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. The addition of the PL & NOC 
interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .60), and was non-significant, p= .60. 
Chance Level Analysis: Using CVDR, when there are 2-candidates, correct voting rates do not differ 
significantly from what would be expected by chance (50%), p= .197. Levels of CVDR do not differ 
significantly from those expected by chance (33%) when there are 3 candidates in the choice set, p= .52.  
Summary: The CV variables do differ from each other, depending on the method used to calculate them 
(Directional or Proximal), but these differences are minor and the measures of association between the two are 
significant and strongly correlated. The logistic regression results using either CV measures are the same, with 
the note that the logistic regression model using CVDR as the dependent variable is non-significant. There is a 
minor change in the significance in the chance analysis results when looking at whether CV rates differ from 
chance when there are 2-candidates, both results are in the same (and predicted) direction, but only when 
considering CVPX do participants choose the ‘best’ candidate above chance levels when there are 2 candidates. 
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2.3. Experiment 3 
Comparison of Weighted vs. Unweighted measures: We compared the weighted proximal (PXW) and 
unweighted proximal (PXU) measures using a chi-square test, finding significant agreement between PXW and 
PXU, 2(4, 125)= 101.28, p< .001, c= .64. Table 5 shows the pattern of results. 
Table 5: Classification using Proximal (weighted) compared to Proximal (Unweighted). N= 125. 
Proximal 
Weighted (PXW) 
Proximal Unweighted (PXU) 
 CON LAB LIB 
CON 3 2 0 
LAB 3 72 4 
LIB 4 4 33 
We also compared the weighted directional (DRW) and unweighted directional (DRU) measures using a chi-
square test, finding significant agreement between DRW and DRU, 2(4, 125)= 66.96, p< .001, c= .52. Table 
6 shows the pattern of results.  
Table 6: Classification using Proximal (weighted) compared to Proximal (Unweighted). N= 125. 
Directional 
Weighted (DRW) 
Directional Unweighted (DRU) 
 CON LAB LIB 
CON 16 6 4 
LAB 5 74 12 
LIB 2 0 6 
Overall we can say that there are relatively few shifts in classifications between the weighted and unweighted 
versions of either the proximal or the directional measures. From this point on we consider only the weighted 
versions in our analyses. 
Directional vs. Proximal: A chi- square analysis between the Proximal (PXW) and Directional (DRW) 
measures was significant, 2(4, 125)= 32.85, p< .001, c= .36, indicating the two are strongly correlated. The 
pattern of results is in Table 7 below.  
Table 7: Experiment 3; 'Best candidate' classification by both Proximal & Directional measures. N= 125. 
Proximal (PXW) 
Directional (DRW) 
 CON LAB LIB 
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CON 5 0 0 
LAB 12 66 1 
LIB 9 25 7 
Most cases remain the same when comparing the classifications of PXW to DRW, with the notable exception 
of those classed as closest to the ‘Liberal Democrat’ candidate; 60% of those classed as closest to the Liberal 
Democrat candidate are reclassified as ‘Labour’ when using DRW.  
CVPX vs. CVDR: A chi- square analysis between the CVPX and CVDR measures was significant, 2(1, 125)= 
37.73, p< .001, c= .55, indicating the two are strongly correlated. The pattern of results is in Table 8. 
Table 8: Experiment 3, Correct Vote classification by Proximal and Directional measures. N= 125. 
Correct Vote (PX) 
Correct Vote (DR) 
 Incorrect Correct 
Incorrect 36 15 
Correct 12 62 
Of the 51 participants classed as voting ‘incorrectly’ by CVPX, 36 (70.5%) remain incorrect in the CVDR 
variable, while 15 (29.5%) are re-classed as voting ‘correctly’. Of the 74 participants classed as voting 
‘correctly’ by CVPX, 62 (83.8%) remain correct as per CVDR, while 10 (16.2%) are re-classed as voting 
‘incorrectly’. There is an overall net shift of 3 participants into the ‘correct vote’ category when using the DR 
measure. 
Effect on Main Analyses: We performed a stepwise binary logistic regression on CVPX, with the group 
variables Party Label (PL) and Number of Candidates (NOC) entered in Block 1, and their interaction term in 
Block 2. The regression model containing PL & No. of Candidates was significant, p< .001, R2= 22.6%, and 
predicted 71.2% of the overall cases correctly. PL did not significantly predict CVPX, = .08, p= .82; whereas 
NOC significantly predicted CVPX, = -1.83, p< .001, with participants being 15.9% less likely to vote 
correctly when the number of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. The addition of the PL & NOC 
interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .98), and was non-significant, p= .98. 
We repeated the previous binary logistic regression, using CVDR as the dependent variable. The regression 
model containing PL & No. of Candidates was significant, p= .001, R2= 15.2%, and predicted 67.2% of the 
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overall cases correctly. PL did not significantly predict CVDR, = .12, p= .76; whereas NOC significantly 
predicted CVDR, = -1.47, p< .001, with participants being 23.0% less likely to vote correctly when the number 
of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. The addition of the PL & NOC interaction term did not 
significantly improve the model (p= .20), and was non-significant, p= .20. 
Chance Level Analysis: Using CVDR, when there are 2-candidates, correct voting rates do differ 
significantly from what would be expected by chance (50%), p= .001. Levels of CVDR do not differ 
significantly from those expected by chance (33%) when there are 3 candidates in the choice set, p= .56.  
Summary: The weighted and unweighted versions of both the proximal and directional variables are 
strongly and significantly correlated with each other. Further, the classifications of participants’ ‘best option’ 
using either the directional (weighted/unweighted) or proximal (weighted/unweighted) methods of calculation 
are strongly and significantly correlated with each other. Similarly, the resulting CV variables, using either 
directional or proximal methods, are also strongly and significantly correlated with each other. We use the 
weighted versions of each in a series of stepwise binary logistic regressions.  
The logistic regression results using either CV measures are the same, with the note that the logistic 
regression model using weighted CVPX as the dependant variable explains a larger degree of the variance (R2= 
22.6%) compared to the model using weighted CVDR (R2= 15.2%). There are no meaningful differences in the 
chance analysis results when looking at whether CV rates differ from chance when there are 2 or 3 candidates 
in the choice set; participants seem to be choosing correctly at rates above chance when there are 2 candidates 
(50%), but at rates no better than chance (33%) when the number of candidates in the choice set increases to 
3. 
2.4. Experiment 4 
Comparison of Weighted vs. Unweighted measures: We compared the weighted proximal (PXW) and 
unweighted proximal (PXU) measures using a chi-square test83, finding significant agreement between PXW 
and PXU, 2(1, 130)= 15.32, p< .001, c= .38. Table 9 shows the pattern of results. 
                                                     
83 We note 72% of the expected cell counts are less than 5, which is a basic assumption of the Pearson chi-square (Yates, Moore & 
McCabe, 1999, p. 734). We use an N-1 chi-square on recommendations by Campbell (2007), which is equivalent to the Linear-by-
Linear chi-square in SPSS (Weaver, 2013). 
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Table 9: Experiment 4; Comparison of Proximal (weighted) vs. Proximal (unweighted). N= 130. 
Proximal 
(PXW) 
Proximal (PXU) 
 CON LAB LIB GREEN UKIP 
CON 2 1 2 0 0 
LAB 0 44 13 5 1 
LIB 1 15 25 5 0 
GREEN 0 4 3 8 0 
UKIP 0 1 0 0 1 
Next, we compared the weighted directional (DRW) and unweighted directional (DRU) measures using a chi-
square test, finding significant agreement between DRW and DRU, 2(1, 130)= 89.98, p< .001, c= .83. Table 
10 shows the pattern of results. 
Table 10: Experiment 4; Comparison of Directional (weighted) vs. Directional (unweighted). N= 130. 
Directional 
(DRW) 
Directional (DRU) 
 CON LAB LIB GREEN UKIP 
CON 12 1 1 0 1 
LAB 1 29 0 0 0 
LIB 1 2 19 4 0 
GREEN 0 5 2 48 0 
UKIP 0 0 0 0 4 
Overall there seems to be strong and significant degree of agreement between the weighted and unweighted 
versions of both the proximal and the directional measures in classifying which candidate is the ‘best option’ 
for participants. 
Directional vs. Proximal: A chi- square analysis between the Proximal (PXU) and Directional (DRU) 
measures was significant, 2(1, 130)= 14.92, p< .001, c= .51, indicating strong agreement between them. The 
pattern of results is in Table 11. 
Table 11: Experiment 4; Comparison of Proximal (unweighted) vs. Directional (unweighted). N= 130. 
Proximal 
(PXU) 
Directional (DRU) 
 CON LAB LIB GREEN UKIP 
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CON 2 0 0 0 1 
LAB 2 35 3 25 0 
LIB 10 2 19 9 3 
GREEN 0 0 0 18 0 
UKIP 0 0 0 0 1 
A chi- square analysis between the Proximal (PXW) and Directional (DRW) measures was significant, 2(1, 
130)= 6.58, p= .010, c= .24, indicating medium to strong agreement between them. The pattern of results is 
in Table 12. 
Table 12: Experiment 4; Comparison of Proximal (weighted) vs. Directional (weighted). N= 130. 
Proximal 
(PXW) 
Directional (DRW) 
 CON LAB LIB GREEN UKIP 
CON 3 1 1 0 0 
LAB 6 21 9 25 2 
LIB 6 5 13 20 2 
GREEN 0 2 3 10 0 
UKIP 0 1 0 0 0 
There are notable differences in the classifications in the weighted versions of the proximal and directional 
measures. In particular, using PXW only 11.5% of participants are classed as having the Green candidate as 
their ‘best option, whereas using DRW this figure increases to 42.3% of participants. This increase comes 
primarily from a reclassification of 39.7% of those classed as Labour and 43.5% of those classed as ‘Liberal 
Democrat’. The totals are reproduced in Table 13. 
Table 13: Total number of cases classified as 'best candidate', for both Proximal and Directional measures (weighted). N=130. 
 CON LAB LIB GREEN UKIP 
PXW 5 63 46 15 1 
DRW 15 30 26 55 4 
CVPX vs. CVDR: A chi- square analysis between the unweighted CVPX and CVDR measures was significant, 
2(1, 130)= 31.77, p< .001, c= .49, indicating the two are strongly correlated. The pattern of results is in Table 
14. 
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Table 14: Experiment 4, Correct Vote classification by Proximal and Directional measures. N= 130. 
Correct Vote (PX) 
Correct Vote (DR) 
 Incorrect Correct 
Incorrect 72 9 
Correct 21 28 
More participants are classed as voting ‘incorrectly’ using the DRU measure than using PXU (N= 93 vs. N= 
81), with a net shift of 12 fewer participants voting ‘correctly’ (N= 37 vs. N=  49) when using DRU. 
A chi- square analysis between the weighted CVPX and CVDR measures was not significant at the p= .05 
level, 2(1, 130)= 2.95, p=.086, c= .15, indicating the two are somewhat correlated at the p= .10 level. The 
pattern of results is in Table 15. 
Table 15: Experiment 4; Correct Vote classification by Proximal and Directional measures. N= 130. 
Correct Vote (PXW) 
Correct Vote (DRW) 
 Incorrect Correct 
Incorrect 59 19 
Correct 32 20 
Similarly to the trend for the unweighted CV measures, more participants are classed as having voted 
incorrectly using the weighted directional method (N= 91), compared to the weighted proximal method 
(N=78), a net increase of N=13 participants. 
CVPX vs. CVDR (unweighted): We performed a stepwise binary logistic regression on unweighted CVPX, 
with the group variables Party Label (PL) and Number of Candidates (NOC) entered in Block 1, and their 
interaction term in Block 2. The regression model containing PL & No. of Candidates was significant, p< .001, 
R2= 22.6%, and predicted 71.2% of the overall cases correctly. PL did not significantly predict CVPX, = .08, 
p= .82; whereas NOC significantly predicted CVPX, = -1.83, p< .001, with participants being 15.9% less likely 
to vote correctly when the number of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. The addition of the PL 
& NOC interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .98), and was non-significant, p= .98. 
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We repeated the previous binary logistic regression, using CVDR as the dependent variable. The regression 
model containing PL & No. of Candidates was significant, p= .001, R2= 15.2%, and predicted 67.2% of the 
overall cases correctly. PL did not significantly predict CVDR, = .12, p= .76; whereas NOC significantly 
predicted CVDR, = -1.47, p< .001, with participants being 23.0% less likely to vote correctly when the number 
of candidates in the choice set increases from 2 to 3. The addition of the PL & NOC interaction term did not 
significantly improve the model (p= .20), and was non-significant, p= .20. 
CVPX vs. CVDR (weighted): We repeated binary logistic regression, using CVDR as the dependent variable. 
The regression model containing PL & No. of Candidates was significant, p= .012, R2= 9.4%, and predicted 
70% of the overall cases correctly. PL did not significantly predict CVDR, = -.11, p= .76; whereas NOC 
significantly predicted CVDR, = 1.15, p= .004, with participants being 3.17 times more likely to vote correctly 
when the number of candidates in the choice set increases from 3 to 5. The addition of the PL & NOC 
interaction term did not significantly improve the model (p= .32), and was non-significant, p= .32. 
CVPX (layered by PL): We were curious about the non-significance of the NOC term for CVPX in light our 
previous results. We followed up using a layered chi-square test, looking at the differences in correct voting 
between the 3 and 5  candidate conditions in the presence or absence of Party Label separately. We found a 
significant decrease in the rates of correct voting when choice set increased from 3 to 5 candidates when PLA, 
2(1, 130)= 3.90, p=.049, c= .26, but not when PLP, 2(1, 130)= .027, p=.86, c= .02. We did the same for 
CVDR, finding the opposite that rates of correct voting significantly increase when PLP, 2(1, 130)= 7.85, 
p=.005, c= .33, but no significant change in correct voting between conditions when PLA, 2(1, 130)= 1.70, 
p=.19, c= .17. 
Chance Level Analysis: Using CVPX, when there are 3 candidates, correct voting rates do not differ 
significantly from what would be expected by chance (33%), p= .59. Levels of CVPX do not differ significantly 
from those expected by chance (20%) when there are 5 candidates in the choice set, p= .17.  
Using CVDR, when there are 3 candidates, correct voting rates do differ significantly from what would be 
expected by chance (33%), p< .001, with more people incorrectly voting a rate higher than at chance. Levels 
of CVDR do not differ significantly from those expected by chance (20%) when there are 5 candidates in the 
choice set, p= .52.  
283 
 
Summary: All comparisons of the weighted and unweighted directional and proximal measures are 
significantly and strongly in agreement with each other. The unweighted directional and proximal measures 
used to assess participants’ correct voting show significant and good agreement; however, to  the weighted 
versions provide different patterns of classifications, and the resulting CV measures arising from both only 
show medium levels of agreement at the p =.10 level.  
This also marks the only instance where our binary logistic model does not significantly explain the variance 
in proximal accounts of correct voting, and where the number of candidates in the model does not significantly 
predict decreased levels of correct voting as the number of candidates in the choice set increases; however the 
trend for decreasing levels of correct voting as choice set size increases is still observed. 
By contrast, the binary logistic regression model for directional accounts of correct voting was significant, 
with numbers of candidates being a significant predictor of increasing likelihood of correct voting as the choice 
set increases from 3 to 5 candidates. 
Rates of correct voting do not differ from what would be expected if participants were simply voting by 
chance, except in the case of the directional account of correct voting when there was 3 candidates in the choice 
set; participants voted incorrectly at rates higher than expected by chance. 
Conclusion:  
Our hypotheses were:  
H1a: That there will significant agreement between the proximal and directional model accounts of which 
candidate in the choice set is a participant’s ‘best option’. 
H1b: That there will be significant agreement between the weighted and unweighted versions of the proximal 
and directional accounts of participants’ ‘best options’ 
H2: That there will be significant agreement between the proximal Correct Voting (CVPX) measure and the 
directional Correct Voting (CVDR) measure. 
Across Experiments 1-3 there seems strong evidence for the belief that there are no statistically significant, 
or meaningful, differences in using either the proximal or directional accounts of calculating a participant’s 
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‘correct vote’ for candidates in the choice set. All measures were strongly in agreement with each other. In 
Experiment 4 we note similar results, with unweighted versions of the proximal and directional accounts of 
correct voting strongly in agreement. However the weighted versions only significantly agree at the p= .10 
level, with far more participants being classified as the Green candidate being the ‘best option’ using the 
directional account of correct voting. 
In general, we note that the use of decision-weights to calculate the correct voting measures does seem to 
improve the proportion of the variance (Nagelkerke’s R2) accounted for by our regression model. 
H3: That there will be no meaningful difference in the pattern of results obtained using either CVPX CVDR. 
Using either the proximal or directional account of calculating correct voting led to no meaningful 
differences in the analyses used to test our original hypotheses (except in the case of Experiment 4, see below). 
There is a consistent trend across all three experiments for i) correct voting rates to decrease as the choice set 
increases from 2 to 3 candidates, and ii) participants to vote correctly at rates greater than chance where there 
are 2 candidates, and to vote at rates no different from those expected by chance when there are 3 candidates.  
In Experiment 4, the number of candidates was not a significant predictor of decreasing likelihood of correct 
voting, as per Experiments 1-3; in fact under the directional account of correct voting, increasing the number 
of candidates in the choice set from 3 to 5 was significantly associated with increasing rates of correct voting. 
Only using the directional account was there a significantly higher rate of incorrect voting than what would be 
expected by chance when there were 3 candidates in the choice set. However, in follow-up analyses of these 
results we observe that under the proximal account when party label is absent, increasing the choice set size 
decreases rates of correct voting, while correct voting rates remain relatively unchanged when party label is 
present. Under the directional account the opposite is observed; when party label is absent there are no 
significant differences in correct voting rates regardless of the choice set size, however when party label is 
present, rates of correct voting increase as the choice set increases to 5 candidates.  
While both of these measures result in different patterns of significant results, it suggests a possibility that 
the presence of party identifying information in expanding choice sets is being utilised in some way to increase 
correct voting by participants.  
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In general, there are a few possible explanations possible for the differing results of Experiment 4 to 
Experiment 1-3. The major differences between Experiments 1-3 and Experiment 4 are as follows: i) 
Experiment 4 uses updated materials from the 2015 General Election manifestos, compared to the 2010 GE 
election manifestos used in Experiments 1-3; ii) Experiment 4 was carried out in early 2015, whereas 
Experiments 1-3 were carried out in 2013 and early 2014; and finally, iii) Experiment 4 included two additional 
parties representing the ‘extreme’ ends of the UK political spectrum (Green Party, and the UK Independence 
Party). 
Firstly, under the proximity model accounts of correct voting we observe the continuing trend for participants 
to vote less correctly when we increase the choice set of candidates (44.9% when 3 candidates -> 34.4% when 
5 candidates), albeit this trend is no longer significant. This may be as a result of the new materials being more 
relevant to participants, or being better indicators of candidates’ positions at that time (given their aim was to 
be real world relevant), which may allow for better matching by participants to their ‘ideal’ candidate at the 
experimental ‘ballot box’.  
Secondly, increasing the number of candidates to include the 2 other main parties in the UK may allow for 
better identification of candidate’s positions by virtue of comparison in that participants may be able to identify 
the differences between all the candidates by virtue of having more points of reference on an issue scale. 
Further, increasing the choice set size in political choices is generally considered a good thing, as it increases 
the possibility of a political option arising that is more in line with a voter’s preferences. Therefore simply 
increasing the differing options available may result in participants being able to better identify their ‘best’ 
option in the expanded choice set, rather than trying to decide between the smaller choice set of three (arguably) 
similar options (Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, and Conservative Party). 
We suggest the results arising out of the directional account of correct voting in Experiment 4 arise from 
issues with its calculation, as detailed in Appendix A.1. The directional model assigns candidates who are on 
the ‘same side’ of the neutral point of an issue stand (sic: ‘issue scale’) far greater utility if that candidate is 
even further toward the extreme end of that issue stand. Looking at our sample of participants, many can be 
considered (or self-identify in our experiments) as ‘left of centre’, that is, on average, ‘left of the neutral point’ 
on most issues. Thus the Green candidate in our study will be assigned higher utility for those participants 
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than, say, the Labour candidate, for all issues where they are on the same side of the neutral point, simply by 
virtue of being placed further away on each issue; even if the participant occupies the same stance as the 
Labour candidate on that given issue. Indeed this seems to play out in the actual patterns of classification of 
participants’ ‘best option’ in Experiment 4, with many participants originally ‘Labour’ or ‘Liberal Democrat’ 
(the traditional ‘centrist’ option) under the proximal model account, being reclassified as having the Green 
candidates as their ‘best option’ under the directional model account. Therefore we refer back to arguments 
made in Chapter 2, with supporting references, that the proximal model and method of calculation is the more 
reliable of the two with regards to calculating correct voting. 
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A.3. Questionaires: Experiments 1-3 
1) National Deficit 
A lot of talk about the economy concerns the national deficit (i.e. the gap between what the government spends 
and what it gets in income). Some people feel we should spend more to stimulate the economy, with growth 
lowering the deficit. Others feel we should cut public spending 'hard & fast' to bring down the deficit. Others 
favour a mix of the two. 
Where would you place yourself on the below scale? 
 Only additional spending, no cuts [1.0] 
 Mostly additional spending, some cuts [2.0] 
 Balance of cuts and spending [3.0] 
 Mostly cuts, some additional spending [4.0] 
 Only cuts, no additional spending [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
2) Healthcare/NHS Spending 
National healthcare spending in recent years has been heavily debated due to rising costs. 
Some believe the NHS budget should not be reduced at all, as it will affect front-line staff & services (i.e. 
nurses & ambulances). Others believe savings can be made without affecting frontline staff & services (i.e. by 
reducing waste & middle-management). Some believe that some cuts to frontline staff are necessary (i.e. too 
much staff in some areas), while others believe the government should just privatize healthcare. 
If you had to, where would you place yourself on the below scale? 
 No cuts at all [1.0] 
 Savings & no front-line cuts [2.0] 
 Savings & some frontline cuts [3.0] 
 Balance of frontline cuts & Savings [4.0] 
 Mostly frontline cuts & Savings [5.0] 
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 Entirely frontline cuts & Savings [6.0] 
 Privatise healthcare [7.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this. [8.0] 
3) Elderly Care 
Society has often considered how to best care for the elderly, especially considering the growing elderly 
population and the costs involved. 
Some people think it is important for the government to care for the elderly regardless of the cost, i.e. through 
taxation. Others think it is up to each person themselves to pay for their own care costs, i.e. through savings or 
selling assets. 
Where would you put yourself on the below scale? 
 Government should always care for elderly, regardless of circumstance [1.0] 
 ... [2.0] 
 ... [3.0] 
 ... [4.0] 
 ... [5.0] 
 ... [6.0] 
 Government should let people provide for themselves [7.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
4) Imigration Restrictions 
Restrictions on the level of people migrating to the UK were introduced in previous years, with a points-based 
system being created and some universities' ability to issue student visa's reduced. 
Some feel immigration levels need to be further restricted; some feel the immigration restrictions as exist are 
adequate; while some people feel immigration restrictions need to be relaxed. 
Where would you place yourself on the below scale? 
 Restrictions need to be increased a lot [5.0] 
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 Restrictions need to be increased a little [4.0] 
 Limits are fine as they are [3.0] 
 Restrictions need to be decreased a little [2.0] 
 Restrictions need to be decreased a lot [1.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
5) EU Membership 
How strongly do you oppose, or support, the UK's continuing membership of the EU? 
 Strongly Oppose, and the UK should leave the EU [6.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [5.0] 
 Oppose [4.0] 
 Support [3.0] 
 Strongly Support [2.0] 
 Strongly Support, and the UK should join the Euro currency [1.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
6) Schools/Academies 
Historically the UK has state schools, private schools and fee-paying schools, all of which are subject to the 
control of local council authorities (i.e. on student selection criteria). The current Government has established 
'Academies', which are state-funded schools, but run by charities, parent & teacher groups & co-operatives; 
and are independent from local authorities' control. 
Would you say you support, or oppose, the continuing roll-out of academies? 
 Strongly Support [6.0] 
 Support [5.0] 
 Support, if under some local authority control [4.0] 
 Oppose, if under some local authority control [3.0] 
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 Oppose [2.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [1.0] 
 Don't know, have not thought about the question [8.0] 
7) Council Tax Rates 
The money the government gives to local council authorities has decreased in recent years, making council 
budgets smaller and causing councils to reduce services. One way of restoring, or increasing, council budgets 
is to increase local Council Tax rates. Do you think councils should: 
 Increase council rates if needed [1.0] 
 Cap council tax rates at a certain level [2.0] 
 Freeze council tax rates for a while [3.0] 
 Cut council tax rates [4.0] 
 Abolish council tax [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
8) Wealth Taxes 
Do you support, or oppose, levying certain taxes on 'wealth' to aid the economy? For instance: a mansion tax, 
a levy on bank profits, or a 'Robin Hood' tax on large financial transactions. 
 Strongly Support [1.0] 
 Support [2.0] 
 Depends on the tax [3.0] 
 Oppose [4.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
9) Police Spending 
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The government recently introduced Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) with the power over local police 
budgets, much like the London Mayor. It is argued increased spending on police budgets means more police 
on the streets, while decreases mean less. 
Do you feel the police spending should: 
 Greatly increase [1.0] 
 Increase a bit [2.0] 
 Stay the same [3.0] 
 Decrease a bit [4.0] 
 Greatly Decrease [5.0] 
 Allow PCCs to decide per area [6.0] 
 Dont know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
10) Prison Overcrowding 
Prisons in the UK are overcrowded. Currently, those convicted of small offenses are released early in order to 
relieve over-crowding, but worries exist over releasing criminals early. Some people believe those convicted 
of small crimes should never go to prison to start with, and believe community service should replace shorter 
sentences, Others say the government should build more prisons to solve over-crowding, Some are completely 
against the early release of criminals 
Which do you feel best solves the overcrowding problem? 
 Continue Early Release only [1.0] 
 Introduce more Community Service [2.0] 
 Build new prisons [3.0] 
 Build new prisons and abolish early release programs [4.0] 
 No new prisons, let over-crowding continue [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
11) Tuition Fees (University)  
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University Tuition Fees have increased to 9,000 pounds per year under the current government. Do you feel 
that Tuition Fees should be lowered, stay the same, or increased? Please indicate on the scale below how you 
feel about this. 
 Fees should be abolished [1.0] 
 Fees should be lowered [2.0] 
 Fees should remain as they are [3.0] 
 Fees should be increased [4.0] 
 Fees should be uncapped [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
12) Nursery Places /Childcare 
With many of todays parents expected to work, affordable childcare has become an important issue. Some 
people believe the government should help parents with children under 5years old as much as possible, while 
others believe the government should not step in to help. 
Generally, how important do you feel it is for the government to provide public nursery places for children? 
 Very Important [1.0] 
 ... [2.0] 
 ... [3.0] 
 ... [4.0] 
 ... [5.0] 
 ... [6.0] 
 Not at all important [7.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
13) Greenhouse Gases 
How important is it to you for the government to quickly reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the coming 
years? 
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 Not at all important [0.0] 
 A little important [1.0] 
 Somewhat important [2.0] 
 Fairly important [3.0] 
 Very important [4.0] 
 Extremely important [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
14) Child Tax Credits 
The government awards parents tax credits for each child they have. How strongly do you support, or oppose, 
the idea that families should receive Child Tax Credits? 
 All families should definitely receive child tax credits, regardless of their income [1.0] 
 Most families should receive tax credits, but the richest should not [2.0] 
 About half of families should receive child tax credits [3.0] 
 Some families should receive tax credits, depending on their income [4.0] 
 No family should receive Child Tax Credits, regardless of their income [5.0] 
 Don't Know, have not really thought about it [8.0] 
15) Nuclear Power 
Energy is a constant concern for the UK. Some believe building more nuclear power stations is the solution, 
while others disagree. How strongly do you support or oppose the creation of new nuclear stations in the UK? 
 Strongly Support [1.0] 
 Support [2.0] 
 Oppose [3.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [4.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
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16) High Speed Rail 2 
The government plans to build and extend High Speed Rail services across Britain, commonly known as HS2. 
On the scale below, how much would you agree or disagree with their plans? 
 Strongly Agree [1.0] 
 Somewhat Agree [2.0] 
 Neither Agree, nor Disagree [3.0] 
 Somewhat Disagree [4.0] 
 Strongly Disagree [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
17) 3rd Heathrow Runway 
Transport is vital to London and the UK. There has been a lot of debate over the merits of building 3rd runways 
at airports like Heathrow, Gatwick, etc. Some people have suggested building a new airport in the Thames 
Estuary to solve the problem. If you had to state your own opinion, would you support or oppose proposals to 
expand airport travel capacity? 
 Agree with 3rd runway AND a new airport in the Thames Estuary [7.0] 
 Agree with 3rd runway at Heathrow only [6.0] 
 Disagree with third runway, but support a new airport in the Thames Estuary [5.0] 
 Disagree with third runway, and oppose a new airport in the Thames Estuary [4.0] 
 Oppose extra runways at any London airport [3.0] 
 Oppose extra runways at any UK airport [2.0] 
 Oppose extra runways at any UK airport AND any new Airports [1.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
18) Trident/ Nuclear Defence  
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Trident is the UK's sea-based ballistic missile system that comprises the UK's nuclear deterrent. It is due for 
renewal over the next 30 years at an estimated cost of 97billion British pounds. If you had to say, where would 
you stand on Trident? 
 Should replace Trident to maintain nuclear deterrent [4.0] 
 Should decrease the size of the Trident system [3.0] 
 Should scrap Trident [2.0] 
 Remove the UK's nuclear arsenal entirely [1.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
19) Pension Age 
The government provides a state pension to those who do retire, at the age of 65 for men and 60 for women. 
Due to the increasing proportion of people living longer, the cost of providing a state pension is increasing. 
The current government has proposed to link the age you can receive a state pension to life expectancy. The 
age will start rising to 66 for both men and women in 2020, and 67 in 2026. 
Some people feel the age is rising too quickly for women, as men only wait 1 year while women need to wait 
for 5 extra years. Others think it is fine, and the ages should be raised quickly. 
What age do you think people should be able to receive a state pension at? 
 Pension Age should be kept at current levels [1.0] 
 Pension Age should rise slower for women, then equal out [2.0] 
 Pension Age should be equalled sooner for men and women, as proposed [3.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [8.0] 
 
20) European Single Currency (Euro)  
Do you feel that you support, or oppose, the UK joining the European single currency (i.e. the Euro)? 
 Stongly Support [1.0] 
 Support [2.0] 
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 Support, but shouldn't join right now [2.0] 
 No feeling either way, but hold a Referendum on joining the Euro [4.0] 
 Oppose, shouldn't join right now [5.0] 
 Oppose [6.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [7.0] 
 Don't Know, have not thought about it [8.0] 
A.4. Questionaire: Experiment 4 
1) National Deficit 
Discussions on the economy often are about the national deficit (i.e. the gap between what the government 
spends and what it gets in income). Some people feel we should raise taxes to reduce the deficit, and we should 
increase public spending to encourage economic growth to reduce the deficit. Others feel we should cut public 
spending 'hard & fast' to bring down the deficit, and give tax cuts to encourage growth. Some people favour a 
mix of taxes or cuts. 
Overall, where would you place your opinion on the below scale? 
 Lots of tax increases, and lots of public spending [1.0] 
 Mostly increase tax, and some increase in public spending [2.0] 
 Some increases in tax, no increase in public spending [3.0] 
 Balance of tax increases, and efficiency savings [4.0] 
 Some cuts in public spending, no tax increases [5.0] 
 Mostly public spending cuts, and some tax cuts [6.0] 
 Lots of public spending cuts, and lots of tax cuts [7.0] 
 Don't Kow, have not thought much about it [0.0] 
2) Healthcare Spending 
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The UK public healthcare budget is increasing yearly, due to rising costs and a growing population. Some 
people believe we dont spend enough on the National Healthcare Service (NHS)- that it is underfunded and 
the budget should not be reduced as it will affect front-line staff & services (i.e. nurses & ambulances). 
Others believe savings can be made without affecting frontline staff & services (i.e. by reducing waste & 
middle-management). Some believe that some cuts to frontline staff are necessary (i.e. too much staff in some 
areas), while others believe the government should just privatize healthcare. 
What do you think the government should do on the NHS? 
 Greatly increase spending [1.0] 
 Increase Spending [2.0] 
 Save money via 'efficiency savings' [3.0] 
 Decrease spending [4.0] 
 Greatly decrease speding [5.0] 
 Privatise healthcare [6.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this. [0.0] 
3) Elderly Care 
Society has often considered how to best care for the elderly, especially considering the growing elderly 
population and the costs involved. Some people think it is important for the government to care for the elderly 
regardless of the cost, i.e. through taxation. Others think it is up to each person themselves to pay for their own 
care costs, i.e. through savings or selling assets (i.e. their house). 
How much to you think Government should increase, or decrease, public funding for elderly care? 
 Goverment should provide all elderly with free care [1.0] 
 Increase funding a lot [2.0] 
 Increase funding a little [3.0] 
 No change in funding (things are fine right now) [4.0] 
 Decrease funding a little [5.0] 
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 Decrease funding a lot [6.0] 
 Government should let people provide for themselves [7.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
4) Immigration 
Immigration is a hot topic at the moment in the UK. Mostly debates are concerned with the number and ease 
of immigrants entering the UK, and what restrictions there should be on immigrants in getting welfare benefits 
(i.e. unemployment benefits, healthcare etc.). Some people think we should increase restrictions (less 
immigration), and allow less access to benefits for immigrants. Some think we should ease restrictions (more 
immigration), and allow more access to benefits for immigrants. 
Generally, would you say you want: 
 A lot more restrictions on immigration & benefits [5.0] 
 Some increase in restrictions on immigration & benefits [4.0] 
 No change (things are fine as they are) [3.0] 
 Some decrease in restrictions on immigration & benefits [2.0] 
 A lot fewer restrictions on immigration & benefits [1.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
 
5) Membership of the European Union 
How strongly do you oppose, or support, the UK's continuing membership of the EU? 
 Strongly Oppose, the UK should leave the EU [7.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [6.0] 
 Oppose [5.0] 
 Neither Support nor Oppse [4.0] 
 Support [3.0] 
 Strongly Support [2.0] 
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 Strongly Support, and the UK should join the Euro currency [1.0] 
 Dont know, havent thought much about this [0.0] 
6) Academies 
Historically the UK had 'state schools' (accepted all students), and 'grammar schools' (could select students), 
which were overseen by local councils (i.e. to ensure quality teaching) and followed a national curriculum. 
The current Government controversially established 'Academies' and free-schools, which are state-funded 
schools, but are run by charities, businesses, universities, parent-teacher groups, & co-operatives. Academies 
are also independent from local authorities' control, and can set their own curriculum. 
Would you say you support, or oppose, the continuing roll-out of academies and free-schools? 
 Strongly Support [7.0] 
 Support [6.0] 
 Support, if under Local Authority control [5.0] 
 Neither Support nor Oppose (fine either way) [4.0] 
 Oppose, even if under local authority control [3.0] 
 Oppose [2.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [1.0] 
 Don't Know, have not thought about it [0.0] 
7) Income Taxes 
Income tax is one of the main ways Governments can raise money in order to spend on public services. 
Generally debates are around whether Government should increase, or decrease, income tax (i.e. on wages, 
profits, dividents, shares, etc.), and if we should increase or decrease taxes on the wealthy and the poor. 
Currently the highest rate of income tax is 40% for those earning over 41,900Pounds. Currently in the UK 
those earning 10,500Pounds or less do not have to pay any income tax, their 'personal allowance'. Increases in 
personal allowance are the same as 'tax cuts' for low earners. 
Generally speaking, would you say you are in favour of: 
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 Higher taxes on people earning over 100,000Pounds [1.0] 
 Higher taxes on people earning over 150,000Pounds [2.0] 
 No changes to income taxes [3.0] 
 Increasing the personal allowance to 12,500Pounds [4.0] 
 Increasing the personal allowance to 13,500Pounds [5.0] 
 Starting the 40% income tax level at 50,000Pounds [6.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
8) Mansion Tax 
Various parties have proposed some form of property tax on high-value properties, nicknamed a 'mansion tax'; 
stating it would bring in valuable revenue from the wealthy. Some have suggested it could be a direct tax, 
some have suggested higher council tax bands for high-value properties; while others are completely against 
any form of property taxes. 
Would you support, or oppose, the idea of additional taxes on high-value properties? 
 Strongly Support [1.0] 
 Support [2.0] 
 Neither support or oppose (no strong feelings either way) [3.0] 
 Oppose [4.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
9) Police Spending 
The government recently introduced Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) with the power over local police 
budgets, much like the London Mayor, at a cost of 50million pounds. It is argued increased spending on police 
budgets means more police on the streets, while decreases mean less. 
Do you feel the police spending should: 
 Increase police budgets [1.0] 
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 Scrap the PCCs to save money in police budgets [2.0] 
 Scrap the PCCs and put Local Police Boards in charge of budgets [3.0] 
 Keep budgets the same [4.0] 
 Allow PCCs to decide per area [5.0] 
 Decrease police budgets [6.0] 
 Abolish public police & replace with private police [7.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
10) Prison Overcrowding 
Prisons in the UK are overcrowded. Currently, those convicted of small offenses are released early in order to 
relieve over-crowding, but worries exist over releasing criminals early. Some people believe those convicted 
of small crimes should never go to prison to start with, and believe community service should replace shorter 
sentences; some are completely against the early release of criminals under any circumstances. Others say the 
government should build more prisons to solve over-crowding, others are happy for the situation to remain 
unchanged. 
Which do you feel best solves the overcrowding problem? 
 Decriminalising certain minor offences (i.e. cannabis possession) [1.0] 
 Continue Early Release for small offenses [2.0] 
 Community service instead of prison for minor crimes (i.e. drugs possession) [3.0] 
 Build new prisons & keep early release [4.0] 
 Build new prisons and abolish early release programs [5.0] 
 No new prisons, let over-crowding continue [6.0] 
 Privatise the prison system [7.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
11) Tuition Fees 
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University Tuition Fees have increased to 9,000 pounds per year under the current government. Do you feel 
that Tuition Fees should be lowered, stay the same, or increased? Please indicate on the scale below how you 
feel about this. 
 Fees should be abolished [1.0] 
 Fees should be lowered [2.0] 
 Fees should remain as they are [3.0] 
 Fees should be increased [4.0] 
 Fees should be uncapped [5.0] 
 Dont know, havent thought much about this [0.0] 
12) Childcare 
With many of todays parents expected to work, affordable childcare has become an important issue. Currently 
working parents receive 15 hours free child care for children aged 3 & 4 years old. Some people think we 
should extend the amount of free hours, some people think we should extend the 15 free hours to children aged 
2 and younger. Others think we should reduce the amount of free childcare the Government provides. 
Do you think that we should extend, or decrease, the amount of free childcare provided to working parents? 
 Increase free childcare a lot [1.0] 
 Increase free childcare a little [2.0] 
 Keep childcare the same (things are fine as they are) [3.0] 
 Reduce free childcare a little [4.0] 
 Reduce free childcare a lot [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
13) Greenhouse Gases 
How urgent is it to you for the government to quickly reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the coming years? 
 Not at all urgent [1.0] 
 A little urgent [2.0] 
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 Somewhat urgent [3.0] 
 Fairly urgent [4.0] 
 Very urgent [5.0] 
 Extremely urgent [6.0] 
 The most urgent issue [7.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
14) Nuclear Power 
Energy is a constant concern for the UK. Some believe building more nuclear power stations is the solution, 
while others disagree. How strongly do you support the creation of new nuclear stations in the UK? 
 Strongly Support [5.0] 
 Support [4.0] 
 Neither support nor oppose [3.0] 
 Oppose [2.0] 
 Strongly Oppose [1.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
15) Trident/Nuclear Defence 
Trident is the UK's sea-based ballistic missile system that comprises the UK's nuclear deterrent. It is due for 
renewal over the next 30 years at an estimated cost of 97billion British pounds. 
If you had to say, where would you stand on Trident? 
 Replace Trident to maintain nuclear deterrent [4.0] 
 Decrease the size of the Trident program [3.0] 
 Scrap Trident, but have a nuclear deterrent alliance [2.0] 
 Have no nuclear deterrent in any form [1.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
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16) State Penion Age 
The state pension currently stands at 113 Pounds per week for elderly people, and is guarenteed to rise 
150Pounds every year (or 3Pounds a week) at a minimum of 2.5%. Some parties feel that is not enough, others 
think it is fine. 
Do you think pensions should: 
 Increase a lot [1.0] 
 Increase a small bit [2.0] 
 Remain the same (things are fine as they are) [3.0] 
 Decrease a small bit [4.0] 
 Decrease a lot [5.0] 
 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
17) Jobs & Employment 
There is a lot of discussion on how to best tackle the jobs crisis in the UK. Some people think government 
should create and provide more jobs, some people think we should let the market decide employment. Others 
think we should increase the minimum wage to help those already employed and to encourage people off 
welfare benefits. Some people think we should try to create more apprentice schemes & let the market decide 
who to hire, and others think we need to relax employment laws to encourage the market. 
If you had to choose, what option below best fits what you think Government should do about the jobs crisis: 
 Ensure jobs for everyone [1.0] 
 Create a lot more jobs [2.0] 
 Ensure jobs for those unemployed for 2 year or more [3.0] 
 Raise the minimum wage [4.0] 
 Create more apprenticeships [5.0] 
 Relax employment laws for businesses [6.0] 
 Let the free-market decide who gets a job [7.0] 
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 Don't know, haven't thought much about this [0.0] 
 
  
306 
 
Appendix B 
B.1. Calculating the estimated population variance ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 for credibility intervals.  
We correct the population effect for ‘artefacts’, as credibility intervals are based on the variance of effect 
sizes in the population (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). The variance across sample effect sizes consists of the 
variance of effect sizes in the population and the sampling error, thus the variance in population effect sizes is 
estimated by correcting the variance in sample effect sizes by the sampling error (Hunter & Schmidt (2004). 
The variance of sample effect sizes (?̂?𝑟
2) is the frequency-weighted average squared error: 
?̂?𝑟
2 =
∑ 𝑛𝑘𝑖=1 𝑖  𝑟𝑖 − ?̅? 
2
∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
Where the population effect ?̅? is subtracted from the sample effect size r for each study i for k studies, and 
divided by the total number of participants n across k studies.  
It is also necessary to estimate the sampling error variance (?̂?𝑒
2) using the population correlation estimate ?̅?, 
and the average sample size, ?̅?  (n divided by k studies; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 88) 
?̂?𝑒
2 =
 1 − ?̅?2 2
?̅? − 1
 
To estimate the residual variance in population correlations (?̂?𝑝
2), we subtract the sampling error variance 
from the variance in sample correlations (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 88):  
?̂?𝑝
2 = ?̂?𝑟
2 − ?̂?𝑒
2 
If the corrected population variance equals zero, then it indicates only one population may be involved.  
B.2. Meta-Analysis   
Effect Sizes averaged across variables (RM MANOVA) 
We carried out a repeated measures MANOVA on Total Items Accessed and Averaged Duration, and report 
the overall effect sizes averaged across the two dependent variables for Experiments 1-3. Table 1 contains the 
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effect sizes, sample effect size variance, sampling error variance, variance in population correlations, and the 
95% Credibility Intervals, for all the main effects and within-subjects factors and their interactions.  
Table 1: Effect sizes for full factorial repeated measures ANOVA across TIA and AD. (K=3, N=308) 
factor ?̅? ?̂?𝒓
𝟐 ?̂?𝒄
𝟐 ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 95% Cr.I 
Party Label .155 <.001 .012 .012 -.060, .373 
Number Cand. .320 .002 .010 .007 .148, .492 
PL*NOC .106 <.001 .013 .012 -.010, .321 
Timebin .321 .008 .010 .002 .226, .416 
Timebin*PL .303 .010 .011 <.001 .253, .352 
Timebin*NOC .119 .001 .012 .011 -.095, .333 
Timebin*PL*NOC .156 <.001 .012 .012 -.061, .373 
Note: 95% credibility intervals in parentheses (2.5%, 97.5%). CIs not containing zero in bold. 
Table 2 contains the effect sizes and the adjusted 95% Confidence Intervals, based on the presence of 
homogeneous or heterogeneous subpopulations, for all the main effects and within-subjects factors and their 
interactions. 
Table 2: 95% confidence intervals for the averaged effect size in the full-=factorial RM MANOVA (N=308). 
 PL NOC PL*NOC TB TB*PL 
TB*
NOC 
TB*PL*NOC 
?̅? .155 .320 .106 
.32
1 
.303 .119 .156 
Upper .271 .421 .223 
.42
2 
.405 .236 .271 
Lower .001 .219 -.048 
.22
1 
.201 -.034 .001 
 
Effect Sizes for Total Items and Averaged Duration 
Table 3 contains the values for each of the terms mention previously, but for the univariate analyses of TIA 
across Experiments 1-3. 
Table 3: Effect sizes for the main effects and interactions on TIA. (K=3, N=308) 
factor ?̅? ?̂?𝒓
𝟐 ?̂?𝒄
𝟐 ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 95% Cr.I 
Party Label .026 <.001 .013 .012 -.190, .244 
Number Cand. .298 .005 .011 .005 .157, .438 
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PL*NOC .038 .001 .013 .012 -.176, .253 
Timebin .159 .002 .012 .010 -.040, .360 
Timebin*PL .211 .023 .012 .011 <.001, .442 
Timebin*NOC .058 <.001 .013 .012 -.164, .280 
Timebin*PL*NOC .049 <.001 .013 .013 -.174, .273 
Note: 95% credibility intervals in parentheses (2.5%, 97.5%). CIs not containing zero in bold. 
Table 4 contains the effect sizes and the adjusted 95% Confidence Intervals, for all the main effects and 
within-subjects factors and their interactions, for TIA. 
Table 4: 95% confidence intervals for the main effects and interactions on TIA (N=308). 
 PL NOC PL*NOC TB TB*PL 
TB*
NOC 
TB*PL*NO
C 
?̅? .026 .298 .038 .159 .211 .058 .049 
Upper .136 .400 .150 .266 .319 .170 .161 
Lower -.088 .195 -.073 .050 .104 
-
.053 
-.062 
Table 5 contains the values for each of the terms mention previously, but for the univariate analyses of AD 
across Experiments 1-3.  
Table 5: Effect sizes for the main effects and interactions on AD. (K=3, N=308) 
factor ?̅? ?̂?𝒓
𝟐 ?̂?𝒄
𝟐 ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 95% Cr.I 
Party Label .151 <.001 .012 .011 -.066, .369 
Number Cand. .070 <.001 .013 .012 -.015, .291 
PL*NOC .090 .002 .013 .010 -.010, .332 
Timebin .111 <.001 .012 .012 -.105, .354 
Timebin*PL .102 .001 .013 .012 -.119, .320 
Timebin*NOC .099 .001 .013 .012 -.007, .276 
Timebin*PL*NOC .109 <.001 .013 .012 -.098, .316 
Note: 95% credibility intervals in parentheses (2.5%, 97.5%). CIs not containing zero in bold. 
Table 6 contains the effect sizes and the adjusted 95% Confidence Intervals, for all the main effects and 
within-subjects factors and their interactions, for AD. 
Table 6: 95% confidence intervals for sizes for the main effects and interactions on AD. (N=308). 
 PL 
NO
C 
PL*NO
C 
TB 
TB*
PL 
TB*NO
C 
TB*PL*NO
C 
?̅? .151 .070 .090 .111 .102 .099 .109 
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Upper .260 .182 .291 .224 .213 .210 .219 
Lower .041 -.041 -.021 .002 -.008 -.011 -.001 
 
Effect Sizes for ‘supressing’ measures of TI and AD 
Table 7 contains the values for each of the terms mention previously, but for the univariate analyses of our 
calculated measure of TIA ‘supressing’, TIA(S), across Experiments 1-3. 
Table 7: Effect sizes for the main effects and interactions on TIA(S). (K=3, N=308) 
factor ?̅? ?̂?𝒓
𝟐 ?̂?𝒄
𝟐 ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 95% Cr.I 
Party Label .203 .009 .012 .003 .096, .311 
Number Cand. .310 .010 .010 <.001 .268, .353 
PL*NOC .171 <.001 .012 .011 -.043, .386 
Timebin .134 .002 .012 .010 -.065, .333 
Timebin*PL .159 .008 .012 .003 .037, .281 
Timebin*NOC .117 .002 .012 .010 -.087, .322 
Timebin*PL*NOC .095 .001 .013 .011 .114, .305 
Note: 95% credibility intervals in parentheses (2.5%, 97.5%). CIs not containing zero in bold. 
Table 8 contains the effect sizes and the adjusted 95% Confidence Intervals, for all the main effects and 
within-subjects factors and their interactions, for TIA(S). 
Table 8: 95% confidence intervals for the main effects and interactions on TIA(S). (N=308). 
 PL 
NO
C 
PL*NO
C 
TB 
TB*P
L 
TB*NOC 
TB*PL 
*NOC 
?̅? .203 .31 .171 .134 .159 .117 .095 
Upper .311 .412 .286 .244 .268 .228 .206 
Lower .095 .209 .062 .024 .050 .007 -.015 
Table 9 contains the values for each of the terms mention previously, but for the univariate analyses of our 
calculated measure of AD ‘supressing’, AD(S), across Experiments 1-3. 
Table 9: Effect sizes for the main effects and interactions on AD(S). (K=3, N=308) 
factor ?̅? ?̂?𝒓
𝟐 ?̂?𝒄
𝟐 ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 95% Cr.I 
Party Label .048 .003 .012 .011 -.173, .269 
Number Cand. .270 .010 .012 .011 .091, .449 
PL*NOC .055 .002 .013 .011 -.150, .261 
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Timebin .088 .001 .012 .011 -.107, .285 
Timebin*PL .111 <.001 .012 .011 -.093, .315 
Timebin*NOC .121 <.001 .013 .013 -.098, .344 
Timebin*PL*NOC .123 <.001 .013 .013 -.097, .344 
Note: 95% credibility intervals in parentheses (2.5%, 97.5%). CIs not containing zero in bold. 
Table 10 contains the effect sizes and the adjusted 95% Confidence Intervals, for all the main effects and 
within-subjects factors and their interactions, for AD(S). 
Table 10: 95% confidence intervals for the main effects and interactions on AD(S). (N=308). 
 PL NOC 
PL* 
NOC 
TB TB*PL TB*NOC 
TB*PL
*NOC 
?̅? .048 .270 .055 .088 .111 .121 .123 
Upper .160 .374 .167 .201 .221 .231 .234 
Lower 
-
.063 
.166 -.056 -.022 <.001 .010 .013 
 
Effect Sizes for ‘focussing’ measures of TI and AD 
Table 11 contains the values for each of the terms mention previously, but for the univariate analyses of our 
calculated measure of TIA ‘focussing’, TIA(F), across Experiments 1-3. 
Table 11: Effect sizes for the main effects and interactions on TIA(F). (K=3, N=308) 
factor ?̅? ?̂?𝒓
𝟐 ?̂?𝒄
𝟐 ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 95% Cr.I 
Party Label .175 .013 .012 .001 .112, .238 
Number Cand. .160 .004 .012 .008 -.018, .337 
PL*NOC .145 .001 .012 .011 -.063, .353  
Timebin .096 .002 .012 .009 -.098, .292 
Timebin*PL .130 .003 .012 .009 -.059, .319 
Timebin*NOC .094 .004 .013 .008 -.084, .274 
Timebin*PL*NOC .089 .002 .013 .010 -.110, .290 
Note: 95% credibility intervals in parentheses (2.5%, 97.5%). CIs not containing zero in bold. 
Table 12 contains the effect sizes and the adjusted 95% Confidence Intervals, for all the main effects and 
within-subjects factors and their interactions, for TIA(F). 
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Table 12: 95% confidence intervals for the main effects and interactions on TIA(F). (N=308). 
 PL 
NO
C 
PL*NO
C 
TB 
TB*
PL 
TB*NO
C 
TB*PL*NO
C 
?̅? .175 .160 .145 .096 .130 .094 .089 
Upper .284 .268 .254 .207 .240 .205 .201 
Lower .066 .050 .035 -.014 .020 -.016 -.021 
Table 13 contains the values for each of the terms mention previously, but for the univariate analyses of our 
calculated measure of TIA ‘focussing’, TIA(F), across Experiments 1-3. 
Table 13: Effect sizes for the main effects and interactions on AD(F). (K=3, N=308) 
factor ?̅? ?̂?𝒓
𝟐 ?̂?𝒄
𝟐 ?̂?𝒑
𝟐 95% Cr.I 
Party Label .135 .002 .013 .009 -.073, .344 
Number Cand. .290 .039 .012 .027 .095, .485 
PL*NOC .080 .001 .013 .011 -.127, .298 
Timebin .085 .001 .013 .011 -.115, .280 
Timebin*PL .096 .002 .013 .011 -.11, .303 
Timebin*NOC .118 <.001 .012 .012 -.101, .338 
Timebin*PL*NOC .131 .001 .013 .011 -.082, .346 
Note: 95% credibility intervals in parentheses (2.5%, 97.5%). CIs not containing zero in bold. 
Table 14 contains the effect sizes and the adjusted 95% Confidence Intervals, for all the main effects and 
within-subjects factors and their interactions, for AD(F). 
Table 14: 95% confidence intervals for the main effects and interactions on AD(F). (N=308). 
 PL NOC 
PL* 
NOC 
TB TB*PL TB*NOC 
TB*PL*
NOC 
?̅? .135 .290 .085 .085 .096 .118 .131 
Upper .245 .393 .191 .197 .207 .229 .242 
Lower .024 .028 -.031 -.025 -.010 .007 .021 
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Appendix C 
C.1 Experiment 8: Questionnaire 
Q1: Thinking about how they stand on the NHS, please rate the desirability of each of the parties (Please 
Circle). 
Labour Party 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conservative Party 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Liberal Democrats 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
            
Q2: Thinking about how they stand on the Economy, please rate the desirability of each of the parties 
(Please Circle). 
Labour Party 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conservative Party 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
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1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Liberal Democrats 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Q3: If you were to base your decision on just these two issues, of the three parties above, would you be 
most likely to vote for? (Please Circle). 
 
 Conservative Party  
 
Q4: How important is the issue of (The NHS) to you in this election, on a scale of 0-10.  
- 0 being ‘Not at all Important’, 10 being ‘Extremely Important’. 
 
Q5: How important is the issue of (The Economy) to you in this election, on a scale of 0-10.  
  
 
 
 
 
Q6: Please rate how desirable each party below is on the NHS (Please Circle). 
Green Party 
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Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Q7: Please rate how desirable each party below is on the Economy (Please Circle). 
Green Party 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
Undesirable       Very Desirable 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Q8: If you were to base your decision on just these two issues, which party of the five UK parties would 
you be most likely to vote for?  
 
 
Q10: What is your age (in years)?  
 
Q11: What is your gender (Please Circle)? 
Male   Female    Other 
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Q12: Please circle what best describes your occupation from the following:  
 Student 
 Self Employed 
 Private Sector 
 Public Sector 
 Unemployed 
 Other 
 
 
